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MORE JAPONICO.

A CRITIQUE OF THE EFFECT OF AN IDEA—COMMUNITYISM
—ON THE LIFE AND HISTORY OF A PEOPLE.

BY
JAMES S. DE BENNEVILLE.

"God is the most ancient of all things for He has no
"birth: the world is the most beautiful of all things,
"for it is the work of God."

THALES OF MILETUS.

PRINTED AT THE "JAPAN GAZETTE" PRESS, YOKOHAMA, JAPAN,
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1908

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DEDICATED
TO THOSE WHO HAVE GONE BEFORE

1908 BY JAMES S. DE BENNEVILLE.

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Introduction

The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of a 12-week training program on the physical and psychological health of sedentary adults. The study was conducted in a controlled environment, and participants were randomly assigned to either a training group or a control group. The training group participated in a structured exercise program, while the control group remained sedentary. The study was designed to assess the impact of regular physical activity on various health parameters, including cardiovascular fitness, body composition, and mental well-being. The results of the study are presented in the following sections, highlighting the significant improvements observed in the training group compared to the control group. The study was conducted over a period of 12 weeks, with data collected at baseline and at the end of the intervention. The participants were monitored throughout the study to ensure safety and adherence to the protocol. The findings of this study suggest that a 12-week training program can lead to substantial improvements in physical and psychological health for sedentary adults. The study was conducted in a controlled environment, and participants were randomly assigned to either a training group or a control group. The training group participated in a structured exercise program, while the control group remained sedentary. The study was designed to assess the impact of regular physical activity on various health parameters, including cardiovascular fitness, body composition, and mental well-being. The results of the study are presented in the following sections, highlighting the significant improvements observed in the training group compared to the control group.

ERRATA.

- Preface—page V line 12 from top, read “like” for “life.”
Page 24—line 2 from bottom, read “Opere” for “Prose.”
Page 27—line 4 from top, read “were” for “was.”
Page 33—line 12 from bottom, read “*De Rerum Natura*.”
Page 49—line 22 from top, read “he” for “it.”
Page 71—line 24 from bottom, read “was” for “were.”
Page 88—line 23 from top, read “have” for “has.”
Page 107—line 2 from top, read “mediaeval” for “mediaeval.”
Page 147—line 20 from bottom, read “maintain” for “main.”
Page 152—line 11 from bottom, read “were discordant elements.”
Page 162—line 18 from top, read “through” for “thorough.”
Page 170—line 9 from top, read “such schools and teaching as.”
Pages 208 and 209—read “Pippin” for “Pepin.”
Page 257—line 14 from top, read “tribesmen” for “tribes.”
Page 288—line 22 from top, read “their” for “this.”
Page 291—line 27 from top, read “relations” for “relation.”
Page 297—line 27 from top, read “their” for “its.”
Page 317—line 16 from top, read “Proudhon” for “Prudhon.”
Page 326—line 8 from top, read “Engels” for “Engel.”
Page 346—line 9 from bottom, read “combated.”
Page 381—line 22 from bottom, read “did not lie within the
range of Socialism but within the powers” etc.
Page 393—line 13 from top, read “its” for “his.”
Page 419—line 11 from bottom, read “iridescent.”
Page 423—line 2 from bottom, read “1875” for “1865.”
Page 450—line 6 from bottom, read “for” instead of “against.”
Page 454—line 17 from bottom, read “whom” for “which.”
Page 461—lines 15 and 18 from top, read “it” for “they.”
Page 519—top line, read “woman” for “women.”
Page 533—line 2 from top, read “stratum” for “strata.”
Page 542—last line, read “canceling.”
Page 553—line 6 from top, read “as does” for “like.”
Page 570—lines 12 and 13, read “leveling.”
Page 583—line 13 from top, read “are” for “is.”
Page 588—line 27 from top, read “chemist” for “element.”
Page 590—line 20 from top, read “makes” for “make.”

PREFACE.

It is no easy matter to put into set form the ideas aroused by the many intricacies and shifting complexities of a national life extending over centuries. The value to contemporary thought of such a life history as that of the Japanese people must be the excuse for what the writer feels keenly to be the very insufficient presentment of this complex subject submitted to the consideration of the western reader. Scope and method also with two widely separated fields can present no satisfactory issue. Separate treatment, rather than a jumble of partial references, at least gives sharper definition. One object, and the main one, of the present volume can be said to be a reading of east into west, or vice versa; for although the central idea and the major part of the book deals with Japanese development, there is enough of western illustration to make up a considerable part of the exposition. And the two do not unnaturally interlace with each other. After all, to one observing this eastern people close at hand, there soon appears not a difference in the apparatus of thought, not even a difference in the fundamentals of thought, but a difference in stage of development. With such an instrument as the brain this can only be brought about in one way. The westerner does think in slightly different channels from the Japanese, but this is a matter of development from an original closely alike in both. The real change is found in a comparatively recent and greater plasticity in the west, the more elastic use of the apparatus of thought, and the consequent loss of influence of well worn channels by which custom—especially of thinking—had directed the lives of men. It is in going backward therefore toward mediaevalism and far beyond that these differing civilizations of East and West begin to come together; and by following the same process, reasons of divergence can also be found; causes which have been the major influence in the development of the West.

The dictum therefore that the "East is East and West is West" does not strictly hold for the two civilizations involved. The difference between these two great racial divisions of the world lies in their history. The springs of action are the same in both. Men, East and West, do not think differently, although they do at times illustrate the fact that the same result can be reached by different roads and at different periods in their history. Eastern thinking and acting is to be judged by exactly the same standard as western thinking and acting. The practical

precepts laid down by Confucius for the guidance of the greatest nation of the East can have the earnest endorsement of the man of the West. When we find in the writings of a Japanese philosopher of the eighteenth century—Kyusō—an expression such as the following:—* “The mountain rears itself on high but the base clings to the earth. The earth is its source. So are rulers to make the top small and the base great. Then is the empire at peace, like the mountain. But if the top is increased and the base diminished there is danger; it is a mountain up-side down,” we have a piece of political wisdom directed to an end so much a part of our own thinking and political experience of to-day and long past that the necessity of examining the two civilizations in the same light can hardly be denied. If this be true perhaps more congruities can be found than contrasts. It is to be admitted that is not the view usually taken. There is the westerner who has spent his “thirty years and more” in the East to acquire the comfortable assurance that the longer is his stay the greater is his ignorance. At least so he says. But these gentlemen need not be held strictly to the letter of their utterance, for they are usually found ready to give their views and to correct the misconceptions of those favoured with a shorter residence or shorter insight. It is fair to assume that they do have opinions on the people and the land in which they have lived; and these opinions and conceptions—the ones of real value—will be found to be as extensive as their modesty.

The Eastern civilization, therefore, can be assumed to be not a special phase of the evolutionary process as applied to the *genus homo*; and its progress can be legitimately compared with that made by western nations. That the methods are identical is not pretended; only that the general principles on which those methods are based are the same. For all civilization is based on thought. Nations, like individuals, have their idiosyncrasies. The Frenchman differs much in thought from the German, although he is the West Frank. What we are dealing with in the East is often a distortion, or a stunting, of some perfectly normal process which in the West has had a freer development. We have never wrapped our women’s feet in bandages, and we have learned comparatively early to cast off mental bandages—to some extent. The East is suffering from arrested development. We are seeing ourselves as we were many generations back and as our history teaches us; and we do not recognize the picture. Whether this arrest has worked to their disadvantage, or has been a lucky accident of Nature to train them in certain conservative habits peculiarly efficient to the maintenance of the race, remains to be seen. It can be admitted that our Aryan civilization is far more likely to die of brain fever. It is a grave mistake to regard that of the East as fallen into a senile decay. The two civilizations resemble in some respects the two flowers

* Dr. Knox’s translation, Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan Vol. XX.

which can be taken as their types. There is no more complete flower than the rose as known in the West. It is perfection of grace in form and delicacy of perfume. When it dies, it dies quickly and the petals fall in a pink or crimson shower. The camelia is also a flower of grace in form. But in place of the living beauty of the rose it shows a waxen texture that gives it an appearance of artificiality. It remains for weeks on the tree. On examination it is found that perhaps for weeks it has been a dead thing. The whole flower falls to the ground at a touch. The Japanese say that it is unpleasantly like a decapitation; a proceeding with which they were very familiar as an every-day process and but a few years ago.

Civilization, East and West, can then fairly be contrasted on the same terms, and lessons can be drawn from, and made applicable to both. To do this it is necessary to sympathize with both, and this the writer thinks he can claim to do as having a stake in both hemispheres. Of course there can be a different interpretation of sympathy. To express sympathy with a "People" admits of some doubt as to the meaning of the term "People," but the interpretation perhaps is clearly enough marked in the following pages. There are many social questions troubling us to-day, East and West, and their history and their solution are much alike on both sides of the world. What we are struggling with is the question of the relation of men to each other; that is of men to the State. And this question hovers, and always has hovered, between two poles—public control and public ownership of what goes to make up the national stock. It was the case in the days of the children of Heth and of the children of Israel. It holds as good for the times of Julius Caesar as for the twentieth century. Such a thing as private control has never existed. The question simply is—shall men combine in the State to preserve such conditions under which all can equitably exert themselves to their full powers and enjoy the fruition thereof; or shall men unite to form an abstract entity known as the State, and abandoning all effort to preserve equity among men, either enforce an equality which does not exist in nature or exact by force—as far as is possible—the full power of its units? If the experience of history is worth anything on this point it teaches that the solution of the present ills that our civilization suffers under is not to be found in monopoly—of any kind. Whether it be Government monopoly, individual monopoly, or communistic monopoly they are all equally bad. This question of monopoly, this old inheritance of ours from the ancient past, is quite within the fundamental powers of any state and always has been. The only basis of human society is equity; protection against each other. The State is really the police, and these questions are simply questions of police.

Throughout the term *communism* is used interchangeably with *socialism*, its special meaning—community of goods—having a retrospective not a present day meaning since the shibboleth of modern socialism—"all competition must cease"—reduces both

to the same level.* Communism is really communityism and socialism is merely a new name for an ancient practice. Communism or socialism can be defined as the fusion of the individual into an abstraction called the State, as distinct from that combination of individuals to form the State known as democracy. In communism the State enters into control of the individual to exploit him for the benefit of the community. It therefore goes far beyond the relations between individuals and takes possession of his person and his private life. There has been every grade of such extension of State power; from the community of goods of the savage and the Shaker in actual practice to the Utopias of Socialism in theory. All those put in practice on a national scale have ended in a despotism of the Asiatic type. Starting therefore with the old Japanese State which was based on a family and clan communism of the patriarchal type, gradually in time widening its sphere, there is obtained a system in which the voice of the community becomes everything, and that of the individual is not heard. Monarch, family, ruling caste, all go down before the iron law of custom; the necessary outcome when individualism is crushed out of the State. This is made the central theme. The development can be summarized as follows:

Chapter I.—Is a sketch of Japanese history in its formal development from earliest historical times. This is not a repetition of the sketch given in another book—*Sakurambō*—but is that phase which explains the present political and economic position of Japan. All history forms a connected whole, but what is sought here is the living *nexus* binding together past and present. It is not a question of where, or when, or why a battle was fought or a thing done a thousand years ago. It is the question as to why it still influences living issues to-day:

Chapter II.—Deals with the Japanese house from this point of view—its influence on Japanese thought in the past, and hence on the present:

* Thus Mr. Belfort Bax (*Outlooks from the New Standpoint* p. 141) says that collectivism "presupposes a communistic organisation for all, by all." And of scarcity talent and its reward, he says (*Religion of Socialism* p. 77) "the gifted man should rather forego a portion of his own legitimate share in such material things. The utmost, however, that is contemplated by the socialist is his being placed on an equal economical footing with his naturally inferior brother." This is simply following what Louis Blanc said (1839) "Genius should assert its legitimate empire, not by the amount of the tribute which it will levy on society, but by the greatness of the services which it will render." Louis Blanc followed Proudhon. Janet's definition of Socialism here holds good "we call Socialism every doctrine which teaches that the State has a right to correct the inequality of wealth which exists among men, and to legally establish the balance by taking from those who have too much in order to give to those who have not enough, and that in a permanent manner, and not in such and such a particular case—a famine, for instance, a public calamity, etc." (From Mr. Kirkups' "History of Socialism" pp. 5, 46). Socialism only deals with two political forms—the highly centralised state advocated originally by St. Simon, and the autonomous commune advocated originally by Fourier and the ideal of the socialist anarchist wing.

PREFACE.

Chapter III.—Deals with circulation, material and mental. The means of transporting persons, things, and ideas from one part of the country to another has a powerful influence on development:

Chapter IV.—Treats of the general course and possibilities of crystallization or development—as the case may be:

Chapter V.—Treats of the subjects of the preceding chapters as reacting with religion—and the mutual influence:

Chapter VI.—Deals with the influence of mere living on custom. It does not seem possible for any higher organization to provide for everything in advance, trusting to development on a fissile process of life units to the parent stem. Custom itself will be made a basis for such differentiation as the inelasticity of mould allows. After all, that abstraction known as the community must find expression through certain units; and these units are unable to erect any scheme broad enough to cover all future possibilities. This is well illustrated in the growth of the Japanese State, and there is no reason to believe that it would not be the fate of an artificial product—such as the socialist State:

Chapter VII.—Deals with the existing Japanese State in its relations to the pre-Meiji era and to the individualism introduced from the West. The influence of individualism on progress comes out clearer in the contrast of the two forms of development—evolution and substitution:

Chapter VIII.—Deals with woman as a modifying factor in the communal life. The fact that women should enter into industrial life as an independent competitor is of least as much importance in Japan as in the West. The position of woman, East and West, therefore determines her power and influence as a competitor:

Chapter IX.—Closes the book in general terms.

The first four chapters seek to fully define Japanese civilization and its influence. With this definition constantly in mind, contrasts and similarities in the succeeding chapters do not require an awkward interweaving and interrupting of any theme under discussion. The development of the last five chapters is therefore always to be taken in connection with the leading exposition. It implies a mental transfer of East to West, and *vice versa*.

More particular reference to authorities accompany the text. In a book covering so many subjects it is only possible to claim a fairly wide course of reading and to stick to widely known and accepted facts and theories. The general reader can be trusted to determine the source of such truisms as “go to the ant thou sluggard” etc., without the aid and distraction of many footnotes. For the interlacing and development of the facts and theories, however, the writer must accept the full responsibility. The authorities as to “Things Japanese” have already been given in the preceding volume—*Sakurambō*—and need not here be repeated. I would add to them, however, Doctor Gulick’s

"Evolution of the Japanese," Mr. K. Asakawa's "Early Institutional Life of Japan," and a paper read by Doctor N. Gordon Munro on "Primitive Culture" (Asiatic Society of Japan, March 8th, 1906). "Coins of Japan" by the same author contains, in addition to the treatment of a special subject, much general information connected with it. The text for early Japanese history has been Mr. W. G. Aston's translation of the Nihongi. The notes of the learned commentator enable a free use to be made of this early record which in many ways lays traps and pitfalls for the unwary. The same author's "Shintō" is the chief authority on the native religion, apart from the translations of the "Ritual" by Sir Ernest Satow. The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan can be referred to in general terms. To do otherwise would be to reproduce the Index to the numerous volumes practically confined to "Things Japanese." Mention is also to be made of the original articles and *resumés* from the Japanese religious and secular Press found in the "Melanges Japonais" published in Tōkyō and displaying the learning and acumen usually found in its clerical editors and contributors. With one exception (from the Satyricon of Petronius) quotations from the classics and old English chronicles are taken from Bohn's translations.

The nine sections (or chapters) forming the volume practically stand by themselves. The same idea, however, controlling the whole the chapters follow in logical order developing the theme through its different phases. Many questions are touched upon and as there is no attempt made to confine them strictly to Japanese soil but to make a contrast with the corresponding phase in western thought the treatment is necessarily discursive. Everything, however, has its special application to the theme. What has been sought is completeness. It has also been attempted to put everything in as light a form as the subject allowed so that he who runs may read. Plainness of language has been the intention all events. "Plainness of language" can be repeated, for subjects have to be touched upon which do not always admit of delicate handling. One cannot always write *virginibus puerisque*. On this point, however, we will take refuge in a quotation from the clever Welsh arch-deacon. Giraldus Cambrensis says:—"Since, therefore, no man is born without faults, and he is esteemed the best whose errors are the least, let the wise man consider everything human as connected with himself; for in worldly affairs there is no perfect happiness under heaven. Evil borders upon good, and vices are connected with virtues; as the report of good qualities is delightful to a well disposed mind, so the relation of the contrary should not be offensive."

Omarudani, February 27th, 1907.

I.

FROM FIRST BEGINNINGS.

"It is fit that the Past should be dark; though the
"darkness is not so much a quality of the past as of
"tradition. It is not a distance of time but a distance
"of relation, which makes thus dusky its memorials.
"What is near to the heart of this generation is fair and
"bright still. Greece lies outspread fair and sunshiny
"in floods of light, for there is the sun and daylight of
"her literature and art.—"A Week on the Concord."

§ 1.

It would be interesting to speculate as to what would have been the history of Europe if a continuous chain of islands forming a barrier reef, physical and political, had extended from the North Cape of Scandinavia to the Azores. Indeed to some degree the effect of such a barrier has been seen, and is seen to-day, in the influence exercised on the mainland by Scandinavia and the British Isles thrown athwart the north western corner, lands inhabited by a fierce and enterprising sea going population; and which for many centuries practically confined the enterprises of continental Europe within its own borders. The sea going power of Scandinavia, and later of England, has writ its name large across the history of Northern Europe, and when we find a similar physical condition existing to a far greater degree along the eastern coast of Asia, from the extreme northern point at Behring Straits to the southern continent of Australia, we very naturally attribute the difference in political results to the human factor involved. There must be a difference in the mental development or equipment of the men who in East, and West were placed under such similar conditions of environment. It must be confessed that at first sight the cause for such difference does not clearly exist. In both cases for many centuries, great empires with a high civilization existed, to cast their influence over more uncivilized neighbours, and in both cases these great empires were overrun by invading hordes, in turn to conquer their conquerors by their improved arts. The Aryan brain, however, seems not so much to need a model as to have the impetus given to it. If they lacked originality in their pastoral condition they did not lack imagination, as the remains of their folklore show. Restless by habit and essentially enterprising from reaction of mind on matter, the past never satisfied the race, and if it was not change of habit change of condition has spurred them on. The history of the peoples of Asia has

been radically different. The Mongolian races do not lack either in fierceness or mobility, but they do lack imagination. They have ranged from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean. In their raids they have been brought into violent contact with the great civilizations of the western Mediterranean, but the contact has aroused in them no originaive process. The vitality expressed in the western civilizations has aroused no answering chord in their mental equipment. On the contrary, the unimaginative, unbending system evolved by the greatest of these peoples—the Chinese—has instinctively appealed to them. Based on their own paternal system it has been the model of all the Mongolian peoples of Asia. It has made no call on them for what was not there—imagination and progress.

How long man has been an item on Nature's ledger is not very germane to our subject. One western scientist gives him about seventy thousand years; others more liberal make it three times that period. If, as the geological maps of Europe in the Tertiary and early Pleistocene give reason to believe, his original habitat was that Eur-African continent represented now by the British Isles, western France, and the Mediterranean shores of Africa, he has had plenty of time to wander far and wide. The two extremes present peculiarities of type due to isolation in their respective corners. The American, early cut off from all association with his kind, evolved a civilization* of no mean order. These peoples had walled and fortified towns built of stone and brick, a representative government, an industrial population whose skill in the textile arts and in ornamental gold and silver and copper work aroused the admiration of their Spanish invaders, and their skill in the use of feathers as a material for ornamental dresses is now practically a lost art. Most important of all they had a phonetic element in their alphabet which was not mere picture writing. That this civilization under its then conditions had a very promising future before it there is some reason to doubt, for it seemed to be crystallizing into fixed and

* The term civilization is used here in its looser sense to avoid an awkward inter-repetition of the two terms, "barbarism" and "civilization." The latter does, and the former can, describe a society in which there is a settled form of government, a people practising the arts and living in settlements and in houses of more or less elaborate construction, and with what we would call in our modern sense "improvements," and possessed of a written language. The best distinction between the two terms is perhaps found in Professor Fiske's "Discovery of America" Vol. I p. p. 84-88, in which he follows and elaborates on the theory of Mr. Lewis Morgan. One can readily appreciate why Professor Fiske withholds the term civilization from the bloody Mexican confederation, although it was possessed of the qualifications of government, a great city, and a written language; as also can be understood his hesitation in withholding the term from the more advanced Peruvian empire, which added to most of these qualifications, great public improvements in the way of roads and posts, and a highly centralized imperial government over a vast territory, but reached no higher than the *quipus*, as a method of recording events, a purely mechanical apparatus the key to which orally given and once lost was lost forever.

set formulas which barred further progress in their narrow limits, and in this respect presented a curious analogy to the great nation separated from them by the wide expanse of the Pacific. Their Asian neighbours, however, had an advantage. The Mongolians, as represented by the Chinese, had undoubted contact in remote antiquity with the great civilizations of western Asia—Chaldea and Assyria—and in more recent times with the Aryan races of India. The Chinese were not absolutely isolated in their development, and the Chinese were the standard for the Mongolian races of the North. Whether subjecting these peoples to her rule or being over run and subjected in turn by them, all that the Chinese possessed, whether original or borrowed, passed into the heritage of the Mongolian tribes. The Semitic element in Chinese civilization is of no small importance. Antedating in their authentic history the legendary history of China by two thousand years, the Chaldean shepherds early evolved an astronomy, hence mathematics, hence an influence on architecture and the arts that have left their traces even on the ancient Middle Kingdom; and, more important, have turned her philosophers to the contemplation of order on earth as exemplified by order in the heavens, a condition of thought which in Confucius and Lao-tse took a peculiarly practical and prosaic direction.

§ 2.

Now it is a matter of history that the European peoples were not on such terms with each other that their different migrations took place without internal friction. It was by no means a happy family arrangement, but on the contrary largely an apt illustration of that negative law of Nature known as the Survival of the Fittest. In these family collisions the victor took the young women, knocked the aged on the head, and of the surviving able bodied male prisoners among his opponents turned such portion as he was able to digest into soup and ragouts and made the rest slaves. Perhaps we can exempt the Aryan from the more immediate and recent charge of cannibalism which seems to have been practically universal in prehistoric times. Even in recent times, however, our ancestors were addicted to drinking an enemy's blood or eating some of the more important organs of the body as a specific for courage. Aggravated mayhem we might also call the action of the Irish prince, Dermot MacMurrough who, on seeing the head of his particular aversion, savagely bit and tore with his teeth the lips and nose. This was in 1170, A.D. There is no reason to believe that there was any less family friction among the yellow races, and by the time the Japanese reached their island home we need not believe that their frame of mind was so cast as to lead them to dispense with

the mailed fist and adopt a milder form of persuasion. Nowhere and at no time has such been the case and the only peaceful immigration has been into unoccupied lands—if such have ever existed in the World's history. Hence the first appearance of the Japanese in the archipelago is in the rôle of a warrior race, for the islands were already occupied by a people but little advanced in barbarism, fairly comparable perhaps to the negritos or to the Australian tribes. As to who this indigenous people were there is no little amount of controversy. The Stone Age is well represented in Japan by neolithic implements, which lead to a belief in a type of savagery or barbarism not so far advanced as the lake dwellers of Europe of about 1,500 B.C. That is as much as can be gathered from Japanese sources. These deal with legends relating to contests with two widely different peoples. They had to struggle with early immigrants of their own race and the accounts so marked can be readily distinguished. But these legends also refer to struggles with an indigenous race—the Yemishi—and to “earth spiders” as the *Kojiki* calls them. Beyond the fact that in part, at least, they seemed to be Troglodytes or cave dwellers little information is given of them except to distinguish them as aliens and to carry on a war of extermination with them. It is the nature of this warfare, the absolute irreconcilability of the two races, by which the legends mark off this indigenous race. Cave dwellings, to-day, are common enough; but those now in existence have been plainly proved to be Japanese. Although the Ainu, now only found in Hokkaido, are mentioned—as Yemishi—in the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*, this may be a name given to them later than some of the earlier legends, and the same people may be referred to throughout in the old records. The absence of any tradition of an immigration among the Ainu themselves, or of a contest to gain their present habitat has led good judges to believe that the “earth spiders” were the Ainu themselves. In fact evidence of the existence of a third contestant is purely negative. Indigenous names have all been traced to known sources—Ainu, Japanese, Chinese, and Korean. Indigenous implements do not differ essentially from those attributed to the early Yemishi, and indigenous habits, even to cave dwelling at the present day, is in no wise different from that attributed to the present aboriginal race—the Ainu. It can be added that no such settled condition as was known in Europe during the Stone Age existed in Japan. No such collection of stone dwellings evidencing not only settlement but some industrial and even religious development as at Trer Ceiri in Wales.*

* The term *tsuchigumo* (earth-spider) undoubtedly is often applied to mere robbers and bandits—as in Kyushū. However, there is some reason to believe that this is not its sole application. Every opponent is a bandit—specifically mentioned as such—who opposes Jimmu's triumphal progress (*Nihongi* p. 120 and 122—Vol. I). But it is notable that he proceeds against them usually in a set campaign or expedition. He is unable to deal with them except on even ground in war or in treaty or in

Even at his best in these civilized times man as a propagandist is rarely disposed to adopt gentle measures. His method is the *argumentum ad hominem*, and the early Japanese were no exception to this rule. There is no reason to believe that their emigration from the Asiatic continent was *en masse*. Indeed there is reason to the contrary. They probably swarmed over in small bands from Korea as a centre, much as did our Anglo-Saxon forefathers in their descent from Germany on Britain. Of an emigration from the islands to the south, an invasion of Malay tribes, there is but little evidence, linguistic or ethnic; although there is evidence of a Malay element in the peoples of North Asia, including the Japanese. Some authorities have placed the date of these early comers at 1200 B.C. although on just what evidence such a definite period is assigned is not at all clear. Japanese legendary history properly begins with a first "emperor" Jimmu Tennō, who with his successors are of that shadowy character belonging to Homer's heroes of the Iliad. This date is fixed at 660 B.C.† All we can reasonably assume,

treachery. They are his intellectual equals. The *tsuchigumo* mentioned however (Nihongi Vol. I p. 129) form a different class of opponents. They are beguiled and trapped by simple methods. Keikō's exploit in Kyūshū makes a very different episode (loc. cit. p. 194). The Osaka episode (loc. cit. p. 123) is referred to bandits. The Kojiki (p. 141 Prof. Chamberlain's trans.) refers to them as earth spiders and from their guilelessness and carelessness in the presence of the enemy they fall much easier prey to Jimmu than the organized opposition he meets with. The chief mention in connection with *tsuchigumo* are brought together by Professor Milne (Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan Vol. VIII) It can be gathered from these notices (1) that the *tsuchigumo* were widely scattered through the country, and the term was used for certain disorderly elements (2) that the term was applied outside the settled or even Japanese portion of the island (3) that it was applied to people of different habits of living from the Japanese themselves (4) that it was applied to people who were not only alien but savage; to which can be added (5) the description is not unlike that given of the Yemishii or Ainu (Nihongi p.p. 200, 203 Vol. I), and (6) The Ainu were cave or *muro* dwellers as shown by Dr. Batchelor (Koropok-Guru, 1904) There is against this the weighty opinion of Mr. Aston who points out that the names are all Japanese and that the *tsuchigumo* are also found in the settled portions of Japan. All the records of course are of the seventh century, and might it not be possible that a term used in reference to disorderly elements had obtained its general and later use in "dishing up" old legends? And whereas Ainu place names might hold their own occasionally it would be unlikely that Ainu individual names would hold their place?

† The immigrations may have covered a comparatively short period. At the time of Jimmu's northward movement: (Whenever that actually did occur) the Japanese did not extend north of Lake Biwa; that is they were in possession of less than half the main island. As the Japanese come into the light of real history the Ainu rapidly retreat before their advance. It can be noted in connection with this question that in the case of Britain the German invaders effected the conquest of the natives (Britons) in somewhat less than a century. The scanty accounts preserved show that in spite of their civilization the Britons were physically and intellectually the weaker race. Scotland never was subjected because the indigenous race was the equal of its opponents and maintained a political and social progress somewhat near the same level. Ireland, on

however, is that at some period antedating the Christian Era the Japanese occupied the archipelago. They first appear in Chinese records of about 200 B.C. as well established in the islands with some form of tribal government. According to their own legends there were several centres of such tribal government—Kiūshū, Idzumo, and Yamato. They are not absolute savages at this early date, although their reputation is none of the best among their neighbours. Pressure of some kind, the restlessness usually found in tribes accustomed to a wandering life, or growing insufficiency of food in their habitat, started a part of the southern or Kiūshū tribe again on their wanderings. In all Japanese history these southerners—the men of Satsuma—have played a conspicuous part in the warlike annals of the nation. They seem to have been then as they are to-day, the more restless militant part of the people. And it is to Jimmu Tennō, to the Satsuma chieftain, that the nation, through its ruling dynasty, even to-day traces its origin.

That there is small reason for this, however, appears in their legends. The invasion from Satsuma slowly spread eastward along the inland sea. Even in Yamato, the most westerly point, the fighting is plainly with tribes of kindred race, the result being submission and amalgamation of the conquered, the defeated chieftains becoming vassals of their overlord. This is accentuated in Yamato where first there is contact with the aborigines—the “earth spiders” and Yemishi. At this date there is but one remedy for this question—extermination. Later we find a different treatment meted out to the Yemishi or Ainu, and they are made slaves. We are by no means absolutely lacking in some indications of the nature of the barbarism of these days. The Chinese describe this early people of 200 B.C. as living mainly by fishing and the chase. Their homes are built of reeds. They have horses and iron. They manufacture a rough kind of jewelry, weave garments from the different grasses, and understand the cultivation of rice. They are a rough independent people. Their chief dwells among them, and is regarded as of

the contrary, was subjected in a generation by a much stronger civilization. Now if there were no record of the conquest of Britain, it might be argued in the face of Scotch and Welsh history that the subjection of the southern half of the island had required centuries of fighting. The Welsh maintained their ground on account of the physical nature of their country. The Ainu, even within the more difficult country to the north of Biwa Lake, could not retard the conquest always gaining weight with advancing civilization; and the conquest does not wait on civilization but goes on steadily from the supposed reign of Jimmu. Keikō sends Yamato-lake to the Kwantō as part of his recognized dominions. He goes to subdue rebellion and to conquer. Keikō's date is given as 71 A.D.(?) and the Kwantō is nearly four hundred miles north of Kyōto. The frontier seems to have followed a line across from Shin-osu to Kotsuke and Shimano cf. Nihongi Vol. I p.p. 200, 202 seq., 206, 207, (Aston's Trans.) Professor Kumae Kunitake (of Waseda University) puts the date of Jimmu Tennō's accession as 24 B.C. and that of Keikō as 283 A.D., this latter being two hundred and eleven years later than the official date. Ojiu's date is given as 347 A.D. as against the official 200 A.D.

divine origin but mingles with them. Their villages are not yet of a settled character, but, much as with the natives of Polynesia of recent times, they are moved from site to site, as the restlessness of the people, their superstition, or better opportunities of procuring food dictate. Chieftainship, it can be added, was not confined to males, for in these Chinese records we have mention made of a Queen of the tribes, regarded as the sole head of the people; and this is supported in the later Japanese legends by the account of an Empress Jingo. They are, it must be confessed, known as great pirates, and have already adopted the practice of making slaves of their Korean neighbours whose annals contain constant complaints of these piratical and kidnapping descents on their coasts. In fact the situation is so analogous that when we read extracts from the Korean annals we seem to be hearing a faint far eastern echo of the lamentations of the Britons, only in this case the more formal invasions of the Chinese alternated with the raids of the Japanese.

These complaints of the Koreans have no occasion to grow fainter with time. At the close of the second century of the Christian era the Japanese are fast coming into light. By this time there has been a practical consolidation of the tribes under one head. Record of rebellion against this head are frequent but the strength of this central chieftain has become such as not to make these attempts serious. We are passing from the dimmest twilight into history, from the time in which the deeds of a tribe or clan are confused with the deeds of its leaders into the dawn of genuine history. We are not yet in the period when events are handed down by written records; and folklore handed down by tradition invariably contains more myth than fact, but in the following two centuries genuine history begins to take a due proportion to myth and the miraculous element rapidly becomes tempered with the rational. Contact with neighbours is becoming frequent and the complaints of the Koreans are more numerous and serious. In fact at this time part of the mainland people—particularly Imna and Pekché—seem to have been in a sense tributary to the Japanese. Factors were established in these countries and tribute was paid to avoid the raids of the islanders, a practice common enough in European history, especially when the break up of the Roman Empire threw the civilized portion of Europe open to the barbarian hordes clustered on their borders. The Japanese factors do not seem to have exercised any power in the Korean Governments. They were watch dogs over Japanese interests as to this tribute. Unfortunately for the Koreans their neighbours were no longer divided among themselves, and the resource of playing them against each other was not available. Korea, herself, placed another weapon in Japanese hands, and that the most subtle and powerful known to human progress. Northern Korea had for a long time been in contact with China through what is now known as Manchuria; and Southern Korea, with which the Japanese were in more immediate contact, for a generation had been imbibing in

turn the civilization of her great neighbour, China, and hence Korea was in advance of the islanders. But at the beginning of the fifth century, the Japanese were first brought in contact with the means of handing down records by means of writing, for among the tribute sent by the King of Kudara (a Korean kingdom) were copies of the Chinese classics and teachers to interpret them and to instruct the Japanese.* To the Japanese the needed stimulus had been applied, and woe it was to the unfortunate Koreans, for the raids and exactions increased, and Korean slaves to instruct their captors in all the forms of Chinese civilization were in great demand. A direct communication seems also to have been opened up about this period (500 A.D.) with the greater Empire, but it was of a fitful nature being confined to an interchange of scholars, Japanese going to the Middle Kingdom to imbibe at first hand its great civilization and Chinese scholars entering Japan in the specific character of instructors. It is curious that this special relation between the two Empires was always maintained during later centuries, for immense as has been the influence of China on Japan it has been strictly an influence of artists and literary men. No great commercial element enters into it to overshadow or even to temper it. It is no small matter of interest that this has been case, for

* That the Japanese previous to the sixth century A.D. were any further advanced than the South American Empire or the Mexican Confederation is more than doubtful. We have no evidence of the wonderful skill in the arts shown both by Mexicans and Peruvians; no evidence of public improvements; and no written language. The use of iron we touch on later. We must place them therefore, previous to the year 552 A.D., in the state called "middle barbarism." But the passage from this to civilization is easy, given the opportunity. As to their literary qualifications we can compare one of the songs of the Kojiki with following specimen of Nahuatl poetry translated by Doctor Daniel S. Brinton in his "Essays of an Americanist" p 300. "Let us drink together amid the flowers, let us build our houses among the flowers, where the fragrant blossoms cast abroad their odors as a fountain its waters, where the breath of the dew laden flowers makes sweet the air; there it is that nobility and strength will make glorious our houses, there the flowers of war bloom over a fertile land."

The following is his metrical translation of an Aztec love Song: p. 297.

"Do you know that mountain side,
Where they gather roses?
There I strolled one eventide
In the garden closes,
Soon I met a lovely maid
Fairer than all fancies
Quick she gathered in my heart
With her buds and pansies,
But take heed, my pretty may,
In reaping and in sowing,
Once with thee, I'll ever stay,
And go where thou art going.

Professor Fiske notes the "ecstatic allusion to flowers" in this Nahuatl poetry. It shows that the smell of blood sometimes got out of the Aztec nostrils, although otherwise it must be confessed the picture of this communal barbarism is a dark one.

a general commingling of the elements of the two peoples so greatly differing in mental characteristics, as is supplied by an active commerce between the material interests of the two nations, would have been a great stimulus to both. Literary men and artists, however, can only supply each other with models that have a tendency to take on a fixed form. They must have material to work on for development, and that material can only be furnished them by the development of the race. Instances of this are commonplace in European history. The almost dead halt of the Middle Ages in Europe developed a scholasticism which fairly wound itself into a chrysalis of dead logical formulæ, and as literary men in Europe at that time formed a separate caste, marked off not only by method but by language, it was an almost hopeless effort to break through the web. Contact of the peoples with each other, and with the east through the Crusades, however, prepared the way for the Renaissance. And before this had fully lost its effect the Reformation which grew out of it, the overthrow of the Aristotlean Schoolmen in theology, and the discovery of America, opened another new world, both material and mental. A faint reflection of this is found in Japanese history. The occasional introduction of isolated specimens of a new art, of bronze work; of painting, of porcelain, from time to time gave an impetus not only to Japanese artists but to Japanese literary men; but the stimulus was not strong enough to cause them to strike out into any great self-developing line, and at the close of their mediæval history at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Japanese thought had sunk either into formalism, or in the more abstract branches into a dead scholasticism.

At this early period of Japanese history we are confronted with a phenomenon of which numerous instances are found in the world's history:—Namely, the sudden expansion of a people from barbarism into civilization. There is a question in relation to it which it will be well to examine. The analogy running all through national relations has been carried into every form of development and the social development of man has been no exception. More recent philosophy* however has pointed out that the biological conception of man's evolution must be strengthened by psychological elements, that the development of the brain power had practically exempted man as contrasted with the lower animals from the more drastic law of Natural Selection. It has also been pointed out, however, that magnificent as is man's equipment in this respect, it is by no means so far reaching as is ordinarily supposed, and recent study of the child has led Professor Baldwin to the belief that man owes far more to his social environment and power of imitation than any congenital equipment. It is man's successful

* The work of Professor James Mark Baldwin supplies the standard texts on this subject. Cf. "Mental Development," "Social and Ethical Interpretations," "Development and Evolution."

break from the deadening force of habit, his avoidance to a large extent, of the binding chains of instinct that has been the secret of his success. To bring this about he is more than ordinarily helpless in his early years, but in exchange he has gained a plasticity of brain that has raised him from an animal that merely acts in response to present stimulus to one that thinks. The series of this development is fairly complete and this power of extended thought is not only exemplified within races but between races. This modern development of evolution is the more satisfactory in that it postulates nothing but the vital function, leaving the nature of that function to be solved by the chemist and the physicist. But it does connect the whole biological chain with the psychological, two co-ordinate factors running through natural history.

The history of the race is therefore to be found in the history of the child, and it has been pointed out that the child's history begins not with his birth but some weeks after that event. The child is of course born with certain hereditary capacities, and one of these is the greater plasticity of brain which is to be the feature of his future development, but everything is to be learned by him, and to be learned from the medium surrounding him. He acts by imitation and language. It is obvious, therefore, that his early ideas are simple in character, pure perceptions and simple concepts. Abstract thought he knows nothing of and it is a matter of hard labour first to be gone through before it is added to his equipment. So far the modern psychology carries us, and it has been no difficult matter then to apply it to the grown up children of the human race; namely, the savage and the more primitive peoples. The great lack of the savage is the abstract idea.* His thoughts therefore are confined to the present and a very limited range of the future, and in their application of that future are confined purely to the practical perceptions of his daily struggle for existence. In the lowest races ethical ideas are entirely lacking, and his so called religious ideas equally so, as they have been shown to have a purely perceptive basis grounded on his personal experiences. But the savage has one accomplishment. He has that primary characteristic, plasticity of brain power. In fact it is that plasticity that makes him a man, quite as much as any anatomical peculiarities. Such plasticity may be limited to a great degree. Habit, the retention

* The savage is capable, of course, of abstraction in the wider sense as defined by Whately. That is, of the concept or universal notion. But his capability in the narrower sense as defined by Mill—"by abstract name, I mean the name of an attribute"—is very limited. Cf. McCosh's "Logic" p 9. For his definition of the Concept p 81. It should be added that our abstract use of concrete terms is *not* to be attributed to savage thinking. This has often been done, as Dr. Tylor has shown, with disastrous results as to conclusions drawn from such thinking. A complete presentation of savage psychology is found in the pages of Messrs Spencer and Gillen.—"The Native Tribes of Central Australia," and "The Northern Tribes of Central Australia."

of rudimentary instincts as in great power of sight, hearing and smell, binds him into a much narrower rut than with civilized man; but the plastic quality is there, and he therefore admits of development. The question could well be raised, could a Bushman be trained into the average drawing room dandy, seen hanging on the fringe of our modern society? Many thinkers would at once answer "Yes;" perhaps from uncharitable motives based on the average mental equipment of both; but more conservative thought would hesitate. The Young Bushman, the undeveloped infant, might be so trained to some extent, but the adult would be almost hopeless material. Man has progressed by breaking up instincts and habits that tend to grow into instincts. With such instincts the Bushman is far more endowed than the civilized man, and granted the proper surrounding medium they will develop and gain and retain their full force. At best it is a struggle against them. This has been shown in the training of the North American Indians in the United States. Away from the native environment the best results have been obtained, although not without difficulty, as at the Carlisle school in Pennsylvania; but even when the civilized man seems to have gained the victory and thoroughly broken up the hereditary equipment, on return to the aboriginal surroundings the race habit has asserted itself, and the brilliant graduate from an eastern university has sunk into a hopeless savage.*

Granted the influence of a model on a people who have already made some advances from the savage state, the rapid progress seen at times in the career of different nations is no more unexpected or unusual than in the rapid mental development of the child. Indeed it is the common course of history, and is well instanced in the history of the European races. The early history of Greek art from its rudest stages shows a rapid transition to the brilliant period of the Age of Pericles. Probably a hundred and fifty years will cover the whole of this development. Caesar found northern and central Gaul inhabited by a people without literature other than folklore, and with government and the arts in a very primitive stage. The Gaul of the Antonines was dotted with magnificent cities which were Roman in basis but with Gauls as inhabitants. Sidonius Apollinaris, a hundred years later, finds the Burgundian invaders very unpleasant companions, mainly on account of their rough harsh language and somewhat emphatic method of feeding. That there was any occasion for banqueting together is evidence enough that their brief contact with their civilized neighbours had already begun to have a subduing effect on the invading Germans, and the complaint of the courtly prelate could well be transferred to the pages of

* To "aboriginal" surroundings, not to the civilization of the towns of Indian Territory. The college graduates of the Indian contingent to the Oklahoma Convention are said to have literally torn in pieces the nicely laid plans of bewhiskered populists. They had the men, they had the votes; they had the money, too, and the populists took what was left.
— Cf. Daily Papers.

Horace Walpole writing under much less strenuous circumstances and under a civilization priding itself on its civility. This adaptability is not a privilege of the Aryan race. It has been exemplified from the earliest times, and perhaps in the earliest times its most striking instances have been afforded. The art of Assyria, under its earlier kings, is of a very distinctive character. With great vigour there is a roughness which hardly compensates for its originality and its truth to nature. In the short period between Tiglath Nin II and the death of his successor Asshur-izir-pal this art takes on the highest polish and reaches in the short space of thirty years a point from which the advance was marked by minor elaboration of detail. That this may have been the effect, not only of foreign contact through the wars of the great conqueror but of local genius is of minor importance. Adaptation from the genius is but an internal development—a period of rapid self acquisition of the nation, as contrasted with the period of rapid acquisition by imitation from a more developed, more adult, people belonging to a foreign nation. Intrinsically they are the same.

There is a third feature involved here which supplies an argument which can indeed be used in two divergent senses, but which I think finds its proper direction in application to the line of thought just followed; that is, the nature of early civilization and the range of its development. Metallurgy has had a great, a predominant, influence on the development of civilization. The stone implements of the savage races could never form the complex material required for the higher races, but it is equally so that the advanced metallurgy required by the manufacture of iron is not a necessary factor in such development. Iron played but little part in the civilization of Egypt. The chances of its preservation are, owing to chemical causes, much less than with brass or bronze, but even at a comparatively late date the use of iron was applied to very minor purposes. In the early Accadian civilization it does not figure at all, and the early Accadian civilization was of a high character, even when contrasted with that of the present day. Their metallurgy was so far advanced as to afford material for ornaments of elaborate workmanship; their weaving and dyeing was an object of admiration and desire from the earliest times; and their knowledge of astronomy and skill in mathematics was a heritage to their successors and made the "wisdom of the Chaldee's" a proverb of nations down to the present day; their written language became the Latin of the East. The same point is illustrated by a widely separated people living in America. Dr. Brinton, speaking of the Aztec and Nahuatl civilization in Mexico, says—"they dwelt in populous cities built of brick and stone, were diligent cultivators of the soil, made use of the phonetic system of writing, and had an ample literature preserved in books. . . . In welding and hammering gold and silver they were the technical equals of the goldsmiths of Europe of their day." Knowledge of the manufacture and use of iron, therefore, is no *sine qua non* for the

development of a great civilization. On such a ground one might therefore consider that a people among whom the use of iron for implements of war (chase) and agriculture was not uncommon, had already reached a considerable civilization. Such use of the metal undoubtedly existed early among the Japanese. They possessed the art of metallurgy at their earliest authentic appearance in history. In fact the same can be said of their Korean neighbours, who were, however, in a confessedly crude condition when first brought in contact with the Chinese officials then managing what is now known as Manchuria. They knew enough of agriculture to grow some scanty crops, lived mainly by the chase and fishing, and dwelt in the meanest of hovels.

The knowledge of the manufacture of iron, however, is, it happens, no positive evidence of what can be called a civilized condition. It is a valuable factor of future progress and nothing more. Its manufacture and use is to-day widespread among the Negro and Bantu population of eastern and southern Africa side by side with a most degraded condition. It is there used not merely for ornament but for the essential purposes of their life-weapons and their rough implements for household uses and agriculture. It is, as far as is known, a native art. It antedates any contact with the European races and there is only the somewhat obscure source of the Arab invasions of centuries ago. So also with the Gypsies, a people of a low grade of civilization living in intimate contact with the most advanced peoples, and possessing but one partly useful art of all those they might acquire if they had any tendency to civilization; as far as they have any history they figure as blacksmiths and tinsmiths—workers in iron. Working in iron is therefore no criterion of an advancing condition of a people. But there is one evidence of an advanced civilization, a factor possessed by Accadians and even by Mexicans and not possessed by the African races—a written language. The Accadians possessed a language which, in the earliest forms known to us, had widely departed from a primitive type in its separation and use of the parts of speech; a language, and records in that language, preserved in a script, partly ideographic and partly phonetic. The same statement applies to the Nahuatl tongue of Mexico; and does not apply to the Japanese. Their first introduction to writing was from China via Korea, and no evidence, even of a nebulous nature, has been offered of an earlier native writing supplanted by the Chinese ideograph. Combining this significant fact with the positive accounts we have of them from Chinese and Korean sources, and with their own legends as handed down in the Shintō rituals and in the Kojiki and Nihongi, we have at the beginning of the third century A.D. a picture of a people little differing from the Britons and Germans as described by Tacitus. That they were a little more advanced than the Angles and Saxons of his time, perhaps, can be admitted because of their piratical contacts with Korea and hence China. That they were less advanced than the German tribes on the Rhine can also be

admitted inasmuch as the civilization of Rome was far in advance of China, and many of the German chiefs acquired considerable polish from their contact with their Roman conquerors, a contact which had obvious influence on their methods of war and politics if not on their manners. Once altered the status of the contact, make it an active instead of a casual one, as when the Germans were brought into the heart of the Empire, or the Chinese civilization was brought into the centre of the budding Japanese State, and the result will be immediate; both peoples, it can be added, having been prepared by a long period of casual contact so that the useful features of the new civilization were not unfamiliar to them—a very essential point. The Japanese had a long period of such probationary learning. From 200 A.D. they were actively, if spasmodically, in contact with China through Korea by individual and sometimes government raids. In 405 A.D. the contact had become official in character; and in 681 A.D., the date of the compilation of the Kojiki, a period of two hundred and seventy years had elapsed, admitting of a development in art and literature still widely conducted by Chinese and Koreans and in which the Japanese are as yet learners. Down to the close of the Nihongi, completed in 720 A.D., there is constant mention of the importation of these foreign teachers. The full flower of a native art—architecture in the eighth century and painting in the ninth century—had full time to develop. The most ancient of their arts, lacquer, dates from the seventh century, but only in crude form; and the bronzes are confessedly due to the introduction of Buddhism. A native art in bronze is late in development. The clay figures obtained from the Misasagi, or royal and noble tombs, are interesting specimens—archæologically. They have every mark of belonging to an early stage of development; and all the grace, or lack of it, that belongs to that period. On the point of rapid development of their civilization, therefore, the Japanese offer nothing peculiar as distinguished from other nations, east and west; and this rapid development can be shown to be perfectly natural on a basis of evolution and does not postulate a long antedated period of native civilization.*

* Peru possessed no alphabet or other means of writing. The *quipus* took the place of picture writing. This is so arbitrary in principle that, although it admits of some extension and can be made sufficient temporarily, it is a positive bar to progress for that very reason. It is infinitely more artificial than any arbitrary written signs. But the advanced condition of ancient Peru is proved not only by the records of the Spanish conquerors but by the massive ruins of Tiahuanacu and Sacahuaman. Prehistoric Japan, on the contrary, left no record of its own and an unflattering record in the annals of its civilized neighbours. On the confession of its own annals the arts of civilization—engineering, the mechanical, and fine arts—were introduced from their neighbours. The civilization of a country is more likely to be exaggerated. As is witnessed by the tales current in the China of the thirteenth century and recorded by Marco Polo Lib. III C2 (cf. Klapproth's trans. O. Dai Ichiran p. 265). Japan is there the fairy land of gold, precious stones, and palaces.

§ 3.

In considering the political and mental effects, therefore, of this first contact with Chinese civilization we must put aside the Japanese preconceptions of an already long dated civilization which merely took a change in its direction. Information as to the condition of the Japanese previous to 681 A.D. is drawn from three main sources. The *Kojiki*, the compilation of legends and practices as taken down from the dictation of one of the professional reciters, common to the early history of all peoples, was begun in 681 A.D. and finished in 712 A.D. The *Nihongi* is substantially of the same period being issued in 720 A.D. There is one superficial difference between them. The *Nihongi* is confessedly, from a literary point of view, an illustration of the Chinazation then in progress at the Court. Its model, its whole effort and intention, is the inculcating of Chinese ideas literary and political. It cribs whole pages from Chinese books long post dating the events of which the *Nihongi* is supposed to be giving the true account. As a record even of contemporary events its authors are looking through glasses of one special tint, and while it can be given much credit for its account of contemporary events it can be given very little as to events of the past. When we add to this the revision of the records in the interest of reigning monarchs, as repeatedly takes place during Japanese history, revisions devoted to bringing past records into line with present interests, it can be seen that in using the *Nihongi* as a means of determining the condition of the past it is necessary to pick out strictly the facts involved and separate everything extraneous especially as to those matters relating to ceremonial. The authors of the *Nihongi* were interested in two things, first, to elevate the dignity of the Japanese Court and People; second, to carry through some sort of analogy in the past with its larger and civilized neighbour. The *Kojiki* is much in the same boat. It is written in Japanese (the Chinese ideograph being used phonetically to a large extent) and may slightly ante-date the compilation of the *Nihongi*. It is, however, far less formal a document than the *Nihongi*. It is supposed to be a narrative taken down from verbal dictation, and its presentation in the native dress and not in the laboured style and dress of a foreign language gives reason to believe the account of its origin is correct. It is decidedly more spontaneous. Its author was also (later) one of the compilers of the *Nihongi*. Important indications of those early times are, however, to be found in the *Shintō Rituals*, or ceremonial of the native religion. Although those were not collected in book form until much later (the 9th century) they bear on their face much ancient matter. The primitive forms had to struggle against being displaced by a later and hostile religion, the date of the introduction of which is known—552 A.D. Good authorities allow them therefore a date as early as the fourth century A.D. We can glean from them the existence of a priest-king, one of the main duties of whom is to perform oblations and

purifications before the gods in behalf of the whole people. This priest-king is supposed to be of divine origin, descended from the very gods to whom he makes the sacrifices. He is assisted in his duties by two priestly clans and from the nature of the sacrifices some form of taxation and of slavery was in existence. The offerings made are those of an agricultural people. The prayers are made in behalf of an agricultural people—for rain, good harvests, freedom from unfavourable natural phenomena such as earthquakes, floods and pestilence. These prayers show a people which have abandoned their nomadic life and have developed some manufactures—rough pottery, weaving, jewelry. They are purely ceremonial and are without ethical value, a fact of no little importance in showing that the nation had not yet risen beyond the purely practical matters of their daily existence. Mentally they were still living in their tents on the plains of Asia.

Conclusions drawn from these Shintō Rituals can be dovetailed in with what can be extracted from the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*. These in their earliest history can be taken to give us a people gradually consolidating by means of tribal wars into one people through the predominance of the conquering Southern clan. By the third century A.D. a national element in politics begins to develop. With records of wars and rebellions—the latter becoming more and more accentuated—we begin to hear more of foreign neighbours, of improvements in the way of public works, of operations requiring some system in the army and the civil service. This element increases from monarch to monarch. Myth and legend are badly intermingled but the troubles following the death of Shujin (B.C. 33), the improvements carried out by Nintoku (310-399 A.D.), and the reign of that turbulent monarch Yūriaku (456-479 A.D.) have enough kinship in tone to give the impression of some real history in reference to the first named, although the date is purely imaginary. We can very safely assume that when the Buddhist missionaries landed in Japan in 552 A.D. they found a Court in which some forms of etiquette had sprung up common to neighbouring peoples, and naturalized now among a people who for a hundred and fifty years had had an opportunity, through Chinese books and intercourse, to familiarize themselves with "Things Chinese." Etiquette, it can be added, is not a plant of slow growth. It is more or less elaborately developed among savages and is a plant that needs but favourable nourishment to develop into an overshadowing tree. When Captain Cook landed in the Sandwich Islands in 1778 he found a naked savage as king, with a very elaborate court etiquette. A scant hundred years later, at the collapse of the Hawaiian monarchy, we find an etiquette rivalling that of the proudest European States; and modelled on it. The king had put on more clothes and altered the cut. That was the change. Indeed, if we consider for a moment the ceremonial of this Polynesian people, their developed myths and worship, and a by no means crude political system, we have

very little reason to give the Japanese of 405 A. D. the preference; beyond the fact that events following the same conditions carried the Japanese onward into the career of a great people. King Kamehameha and his people, if born into a different period of the world's history and into a different habitat, from all mental characteristics would have done the same.

The change in Japan came confessedly with the introduction of Chinese learning. We have said that the times were rough. They were a people who still buried in dolmens, heaping up huge mounds over their deceased chiefs, and sacrificing human victims at their tombs. The very nature of their worship is suggestive of their lives as nomads. Their object of worship was a mirror and a sword; which, even in the legends, were not given a settled home until the first century A.D. The nature of this worship curiously recalls that of another wandering and kindred people. Herodotus, writing in the fifth century B.C., tells us that the Scythians worshipped a naked sword planted in the ground. Other gods they had none. They, too, buried their chiefs and heaped huge mounds upon them, and bloody was the human sacrifice at their tombs. They, too, buried victims up to the neck in the earth, and left them to perish of thirst and starvation and to have their eyes picked out by the birds. If there was any doubt as to the Tartar origin of the Japanese their kindred habits to the people of the great plains of North Asia would dispel such doubt. It is not the place here to enter into a discussion of Shintō. Shintō, at the time we first get a glimpse of it, crude as it is, had become a genuine religious cult carried far beyond the household worship. The king worships gods, his own ancestors to be sure, but still removed from any earthly habitat; and as the people base their own worship on that of their leaders, the people likewise, it can be presumed, had given to their own ancestors a wider range in the post-mortem condition than that of mere ghosts.* The important point to us is,

* [Note.—1907]. As to the question of nature worship and ancestor worship in ancient Japan, it should be said that the only authorities—the Kojiki and Nihongi—are records of the deeds of the imperial house, and religion, when mentioned at all, is incidental. The Kojiki is the more valuable record of the earliest period as being mainly a plain tale of folklore; whereas the Nihongi gives distinct evidence of being part of a propaganda in favour of the imperial house. The gods are indeed referred to in the Kojiki much as nature gods; but (1) the term *kami* (translated “deity”), used indifferently for gods, emperors, ghosts, or living chieftains—any superior—is in the “Records” equally hazy in its use. With the exception of the “heavenly deities,” who do nothing and disappear, gods and men are thoroughly intermixed; a temple is raised equally to the sun goddess and to Yamato-taki (Kojiki p. 198, 222). That is, the gods are thoroughly anthropomorphic. It should be added that the prefaces in reference to the “heavenly deities,” in both Kojiki and Nihongi, are plainly manufactured. (2) The deities worshipped by these early emperors are their divine relations. In fact, the gods form a great family of relations—with the exception of certain swarms of bad deities, the tales concerning whom are plainly enough an echo of the difficulty experienced by the imperial clan in subduing the land. (3) There is direct indication that it was not only the emperors who worshipped their ancestors.

that at the period of the Buddhist invasion in 552 A.D. there was a priesthood of no small power to contest its advance. That Shintō was to go down before the advanced cult of Buddhism was a foregone conclusion; but the struggle was a severe one lasting, despite of official support for the invading creed, at least a generation, and in its victory Buddhism had to incorporate a

The chiefs of Adzumi worship Izanagi as their ancestor. (*Adzumi no muraji*). This term, *muraji*, we are told (Nihongi p. 27) is a designation of rank. These chiefs, it can be reasonably concluded, were not the only chiefs to worship their ancestors. Descent from "earthly deities"—i.e. deities born of earth or living on earth—is frequently mentioned (Kojiki p.p. 50, 110, 112, 132, 137, 144, 178, 223). (1) It is of interest to find the sun goddess practising the same rites (*oho-nihe*; first rice) as is practised by the emperors acting as chief priests. Priest and king are identical in these early records (Nihongi p. 155). This connection with the divine ancestress is direct throughout. Jimmu is, of course, divinely descended from the Sun goddess who is his great-great-grand mother (Kojiki 136, 137); his children are deities on both sides for he marries a deity (Kojiki 145, 149); and it is the sun goddess and her sisters who send Jingō travelling to Korea. Chuai is worshipping them when stricken down (Kojiki p. 231). It is difficult to find support for Doctor Knox's hypothesis that the family is a late institution in Japanese life and that ancestor worship was introduced from China (Development of Religion in Japan p.p. 27, 31, 66-67, 173-175, 189-191). There is marriage and giving in marriage and display of deep marital affection, from the fabulous tale of Izanagi and Izanami down to the time of Ingio (415 A.D.) who had to revise the family lists in order to separate the sheep from the goats. There is no break in the record until the time of Richū is reached—i.e. the introduction of Chinese literature 405 A.D.; and then it is a political break, not a religious one. With Buddhism (552 A.D.) comes a religious break; but, as stated above, there is long before reference to ancestor worship. It can be said, of course, that the writers of the Kojiki and Nihongi carry back into the past their own ideas, but the same can be said in the reverse sense and with more reason as to nature worship, that the writers, in their apotheosis of the emperors, have removed their divine ancestors further from the human sphere. In fact the question between ancestor and nature worship is really a psychological one. We have lost or misused existing evidence. The early explorers were not anthropologists or archæologists. These sciences did not exist. Existing savage races are now tainted with the suspicion of contact with the cults of higher peoples. It comes down then to a question of mental development: as to whether physical affections, such as found in animals and the child, have priority; and whether religion did not have to wait on the development of a science, primitive and defective as it was, to ask the question—"Why?" To-day, savage or civilized, we labour under a load of "social heredity" which clouds this question. It is difficult to grant any such very primitive condition of the early Japanese as Doctor Knox's hypothesis requires. There are indeed traces of matriarchy (Kojiki p.p. 113, 129, 264, 266, 268) but they are significant of what is there merely as an echo of the past. The importance attached to dreams; the elaborate burials and sacrifices at tombs, the confusion between *miya* as palace and temple, the influence of curses, the influence of spirits, the negative evidence in reference to Japanese religion as pointed out by Professor Chamberlain (Kojiki-introduction p. LX)—viz: that earthquakes and tidal waves were not objects of superstition in this country devastated frequently by both, that there is no trace of star worship, or any idea of incarnation or transmigration, certainly do not support nature worship as the original foundation of Japanese religious life. The nature worship is entirely too formally developed in the only ancient authorities to there claim originality.

large number of Shintō beliefs into its own worship. Shintō always held its own among the populace at large, even if its separate practice fell into disuse. It can be added that there was not a heart-felt conversion of the nation, a turning away from false gods. Such events rarely take place in history. The change was imposed by the higher on the lower. It was a change of conviction or convenience or possibly both of the men in power; and when these had settled their differences, largely by the sword, the new cult was imposed on the lower people.

By the close of the seventh century A. D., therefore, we find monarchy based on Chinese models fully established and secured by several generations of usage. But this early period also contains the first development of most of the institutions later found in its history. The most important of these is a caste system. Slavery, in the sense of man as a chattel, existed for a long time in Japan. All through the early period it is as much an institution as slavery was in Europe up to the 16th century. The slaves were prisoners taken in war or kidnapped—Koreans and Chinese—remnants of the Ainu aborigines who had chosen to remain on the land and submit to the conquerors, or criminals. They had no rights of any kind except that natural interest which sometimes impels a man to get the best use out of his live stock by keeping up their condition. The common people, in comparison, had some privileges, but serfdom is a well marked institution at the beginning of the historical period (4th century). A man was not so placed that he could come and go whither and when he pleased. That is purely of recent growth, common to savages (at their own risk) and to the more highly developed races of modern time (at no risk). The different occupations were classed and herded together and their practice became hereditary. The Nihongi chronicles the formation of the people into these *Be* or guilds, in due time turned over to the control of an hereditary chief. There is little reference to the people outside of these *Be*. In the rough and tumble period of the third century of the Christian era their condition was palpably better than it was later. In the tribal condition the clan partook or was supposed to partake of the blood of the chief. Much stress is laid in these early times on the *Uji*, or clan house. But at the close of this period (the 5th century) the immediate retainers of the chiefs are drawing apart into a separate and dominant stratum. Less is heard of territorial nobles in their fiefs and more is heard of ambitious chiefs at the head of soldiery. When such men began to move beyond their bailiwick in this hostile style it is safe to say that the professional man-at-arms had made some development. We have the more mercenary spirit displayed in Sashihire who betrays and slays his master Prince Nakatsu (A.D. 399), a deed in which not the mere act of treachery is involved but the knowledge of the traitor that he can deliver to the enemy the full fruit of the treason. The position of the clan chief has changed previous to this period. He first appears at the head of a hostile or allied clan; later, even when the

imperial supremacy is assured, he is often in open rebellion as a right; or comes to the support, as a favour, of his suzerain. At the close of the period, although his ancient relation to his clan remains unchanged in theory in many cases, as shown by the genealogies compiled for him by the authors of the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*, yet also he is now transferred from place to place. The conferring of the headship of a *be*, the formation of a new *be* and appointment to its headship, marks the increase of the central power by its changing its officials at will, and more palpably by the nature of such changes as rewards and punishments. As we have said, the caste system is fully formed, but some elasticity still remained. This is shown by the appearance of new names and the evident assumption of dignity by people who had little claim to it, for in the reign of Ingio (412 AD) there was a grand overhauling of the whole College of Heraldry. Claimants to titles and dignities by descent were put to the somewhat strenuous test of plunging their arms in hot water, the uninjured being supposed to have proved their claim. As it is unlikely that the cake was too widely distributed and the importance of the upper classes thereby diminished by too wide dispersion, it is fair to presume that none of the king's important adherents suffered by this test. "God tempers the wind to the shorn lamb" or in this case the hot water.

Finally we have to consider the mental effects of this change of their environment on the Japanese people. Their early literature not being reduced to writing its form will be more or less influenced by later writers who would hardly be swayed by archæological enthusiasm. The rituals of Shintō would be given a severity and completeness of form by the reciters that the secular poetry would not enjoy. There are no Japanese epics comparable to the Homeric poems which took on all the sanctity of religious recital. The Japanese poems are lyrics, almost street songs. Fortunately their very insignificance bears on the face the probability of their originality. The poems of the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* show a great deal of vigour,

"Ho! now is the time;

"Ho! now is the time;

"Ha! Ha! Psha!

"Even now

"My boys!

"Even now

"My boys!

Sang the warriors of Jimmu. We can almost hear the tramp of their hoofs.* However there are poems showing love of nature

* The song is taken from Mr. W. G. Aston's translation of the *Nihongi*. Dr. Daniel G. Brinton ("Essays of an Americanist" p. 285) comments on repetition as the essential of poetic form in the poetry of savage races. Note however the real depth of thought in the following specimen he gives (loc. cit. p. 292) of a Pawnee war song:

"Let us see, is this real,

"Let us see, is this real,

and no little ingenuity of thought, and later poems of the sixth century show no small gift of expression.

Perhaps the following will be more satisfactory. It is a picture of connubial grief of the reign of Kōtoku (649 A.D.). It has its limitations.

"On a mountain stream†
 "Two mandarin ducks there be,
 "Well matched together:—
 "But the wife who was a like mate for me
 "Who is it that has taken away?

Fancy has never been a trait of the Japanese. To personify Nature or his mistress's eyebrows does not come within the range of the Japanese lover. His comparisons are direct. The oranges on a bough are "strung as pearls are strung on the same string." His mistress's hair is *like* silk; her eyebrows dark as the raven's wing; but she never

"hangs upon the cheek of night, like a rich jewel
 "in an Ethiop's ear; Beauty too rich for use, for earth
 "too dear.

or as little would the maiden invoke her lover in such terms as

"Come night, come, Romeo, come, thou day in night;
 "For thou wilt lie upon the wings of night
 "Whiter than new snow on a raven's back.

The last line might have been written by a Japanese poet. The effect given to it by the accompanying lines is not part of his equipment. Even in their dealings direct with nature this unimaginative, almost prosaic, standpoint is taken. This is the more striking as their religious system of ancestor worship in its early form is so mixed with nature worship that it is difficult to separate the two. Their gods are intensely personal gods, so Japanese in character and attributes that they cannot be conceived as the gods of any other people. Their living memory still clings to the nostrils of the race. This is a very different stage from that of the Greek gods who were so cosmopolitan in character as to be often fathered by the Greeks themselves on other nations, and so akin to strange gods as to be readily adopted by other nations. But this very intensity of personality seemed to prevent the attributing of the powers and peculiarities of existing men to the visible powers of nature, and the historical character of these gods was still too fresh to

"Let us see, is this real,
 "Let us see, is this real,
 "This life I am living?
 "Ye Gods, who dwell everywhere,
 "Let us see, is this real,
 "This life I am living.

There is, of course, no reason to believe this idea to be Indian. It is probably (or certainly) borrowed from the civilized thought of the environment.

† Translation of the Nihongi-W. G. Aston. Vol. II p. 235.

be lost in a personification of these visible powers of nature. Man, nature, and woman were still on those even terms of which says Poliziano

"Zefiro il prato di rugiada bagna,"
 "Spargendolo di mille vaghi odori;"
 "Ovunque vola, veste la campagna"
 "Di rose gigli violette e fiori:
 "L'erba di sue bellezze ha meraviglia
 "Bianca cilestra pallida e vermiglia."*

A savage people are characterized by thoughtlessness. The Japanese for generations, however, had reached the thinking stage. Independently they would have probably developed a limited civilization of their own. That it would have been of a high grade is doubtful. No nation has done so in the history of the world. The friction of external stimulus is necessary. The mind must have extraneous material to work upon. It operates largely by what has been called "suggestion." It is the material so received that is elaborated and to which progress is owing. The development of nations follows the analogy of the development of the child. If the Japanese had been left strictly to themselves to develop a national civilization, the mean of the individuals composing the people, we should probably have had such results as we find in America in the fifteenth century. This is to some extent shown by the subsequent history of the Japanese themselves; although the isolation they succeeded in maintaining at times was never so great as to entirely exclude the ideas obtained from their continental neighbours, and later on from Europe. One impression we get of this early time is the smallness and insignificance of the nation. It is inconceivable that an ambitious, warlike, and thickly populated country, thus brought into contact with neighbouring peoples should have been satisfied with leaving that contact in such an undeveloped condition. The Japanese plainly were not pressed for room, either physically or commercially, or the immediate result of the vista of this rich booty but a short distance across the sea would have given rise to a reflex wave of invasion, which would have sent them again toward the continent; as it did centuries later when Japan had become populous and strong. On the contrary, this contact with Chinese civilization in 552 A.D. had the startling result of putting an almost immediate stop to the raids on Korea. From the beginning of the seventh century to the invasion of Hideyoshi

* Appreciation of nature as living—the "pantheistic spirit"—is not universal even in western literature. Such an acute critic as Mr. Momment considers it a peculiar gift of the northern nations of Europe. The South—ancient and modern—he regards as decidedly given to making man the central theme around which fancy and imagination are to weave their thought. Nature is only used to set off and emphasize the importance of this central theme. Painters, poets, and prose writers appreciate nature but do not make themselves a part of it. This is a new feature of Italian literature. See his graceful "Life of Antonio Fogazzaro" pp 75—95. The quotation is from Poliziano's *Prose Volgari*—"La Giostra etc." Lib I. C. 77.

at the close of the sixteenth century, Korea is not attacked by her warlike neighbours. A result due to and concomitant with the fact that the relations now assumed between the Japanese and the Continent were not of a commercial character. This is a fact of great importance, for instead of the lively friction due to the clashing of the vital interests of the two peoples, the turning of excess energy into such practical channels, we have the deadening influence of a purely literary contact of a people far advanced in development on a people as yet in a very crude condition. The Japanese at this stage could not compete with the Chinese. They could simply borrow. It was necessary first for them to make themselves thoroughly familiar with their model and to confine themselves within its limits.

This conservatism is largely due to the classifying functions of the mind. The multifold facts of life to be of use must be passed into various categories, and in the absence of fresh material everything tends to pass into hard and fast formulæ. It is Nature that supplies the new material for the mind to elaborate. The Japanese, at this period, on the mental side had nothing to bring to the new combination. They were far in the rear of the Chinese and first had to learn their lesson before they could turn to account the new phase of their former surroundings, the new light shed on such surroundings. So they did in subsequent contacts with China and with Europe until they exhausted the different phases of their fresh materials. Their first contact with China—simply of the Japanese mind (the upper classes) and not also of the Japanese body (the lower classes)—was unfortunate. It stunted the growth of an active people. They were also unfortunate in the nature of the model presented to them. This had long passed any active stage of growth. It had reached the point of pessimism and distrust. It preached the illusory unstable flux of man's contact with nature and advocated not conservatism but resignation, not stability but dry rot. There was no ideal goal to be sought by man. Unrest, change of environment, is the cause of all the world's difficulties. The ideal was to rest content with the accustomed; the past, as made familiar to the present, was to be clung to at every cost to avoid the pain of change. For this purpose it turns to the practical. It excludes—or ignores—everything not related to the immediately tangible. The Japanese ruling classes took over this philosophy *en masse*. They swallowed the bolus whole and it was never modified in digestion. The lower classes had not reached that stage where they think at all. It is not often, and in but few places, where they think to-day. And as the mob, so this Japanese people were ruled by the "suggestions" passed on to them by their rulers. No hypnotic patient could act more automatically. There is very little ethical element involved at this stage of Japanese progress. Even their intelligent efforts are clumsy. They appropriate whatever they can grasp the use of—caps and feathers and white pheasants and general court plunder—and their appropriation is clumsy enough if one can

judge by results. The friction caused by constant changes in the political system gives no small amount of trouble. There are constant reports of inefficient and oppressive officials, who have to be removed, sometimes by force. The people suffer from famine and pestilence and forced labour. Brigandage is common. And at least two adjustments are found necessary before any degree of smoothness is obtained for the new machinery; in 604 A.D. and again in 645 A.D. Co-ordination of parts is therefore not good as yet although all the elements are there. The earliest specimens of art deserving the name appear at the end of the seventh century. They are Chinese and Korean or copies of Korean and Chinese art. The demand for these foreign teachers steadily holds. At the close of the period covered by the Nihongi the native has not yet come forward. What the period, therefore, has mainly to show is the imitative power of the people. It is a power in which, as yet, the plus factor, that excess of effort in response to stimulus, has barely made an appearance.

§ 4.

The close of the seventh century, as described in the Nihongi, shows us the Japanese monarchy in its full development. We have an absolute priest-king of divine descent, and a caste system of great elaboration in which the different layers are sharply marked off. The upper layer—the nobles—is highly differentiated, and ceremonial has stiffened into elaborate formulas. The whole system is copied but the very lack of present ability to originate makes the sanction of the model still more severe, and the nature of the model is not such as to encourage innovation. A system purely bi-polar in character and confining the relations between the *Ego* and the *Alter* to formula, it is hardly necessary to say that there is not the faintest trace of altruistic development. There is much written about the benevolence, the patriarchal character, of the early Japanese government; the fatherly care of his people by the priest-king. This is far wide of the truth. Altruism implies a transfer of one's personality into the sphere of the *Alter*, and nothing is further from fact than any such relation existing in the mind of the Mikado. Or, for that matter, in the minds of the nobles. Or, for that matter, in the minds of the Japanese people. Every change involving the political condition of the people—and few are for the better—have common and easily traced political reasons. Benevolence is at a discount. We shall have to speak of this trait more than once as we deal with later times, and see how it either never developed or how the reverse—the iron law of custom—became more and more ground into the general character of the people. Benevolence is ethical. Custom

is not. What the people received from the new development was formula. A formula far in advance of anything of their own but which bound them hard and fast. The relations between the classes, and between the classes and the king, was summed up in the word "Duty." The faint patriarchal and clan system detected in the earlier records now disappears altogether. The imperial system shines out in all its nakedness in Kōtoku (645 A.D.), "Now no long time has elapsed since the capital was removed, so that so far from being at home, we are, as it were, strangers. It is, therefore, impossible to avoid employing the people, and they have therefore been, against Our will, compelled to labour." The saving clause "against our will" does not hide the compulsion of the labour. And so the registration and enumeration of the people in this reign does not hide the increased efficiency in taxing and controlling them. One feature is a general disarmament; except that on the frontier, subject to attacks from the Yemishi, the people were allowed to keep their arms. The "black headed people" have a distinct duty to their monarch. He has a duty to the gods, and in this indirect way only a duty to his people; for failure to propitiate them may make his people suffer, cause disturbance in the land, and imperil the peace of the monarch's throne. An unworthy monarch is unworthy to reign, and the throne of these early Mikados was very unsettled ground. Reigns were short and retirement or assassination figures frequently in their annals. On the assassination of her powerful favourite, Iruka, Kōtoku's aunt abdicates in his favour and conspiracy is doubly crowned with success. It is a familiar enough fact that the obsequious flattery and formulæ of eastern courts has no real foundation. These affectionate demonstrations of the people are confined to the lips. It is only those so far above them as to be out of contact to whom these oriental peoples can feel not fear but some measure of affection. Only to a god can they turn with respect mixed with personal regard. These old Japanese were no exception. The nobles feared and detested their monarch, if their treatment of him is any criterion. The people feared and detested the nobles and looked up to their monarch; but their monarch was far removed out of their reach. He no longer moved among his people. There was no medium by which they could be brought together. The political institutions of the East have provided no machinery for this purpose. Hence the future political history of Japan was almost a foregone conclusion.

We have elsewhere pointed to some features characteristic of this period of Japanese monarchy, a period which can be placed between the introduction of Buddhism in 552 A.D. and the victory of the feudal chiefs of the Taira clan in 1156 A.D. One of these features is the gradual withdrawal of the monarch. This is marked by the delegation of his political power to agents, and the crystallization of this delegation into a hard and fast custom, a result incidental to the Chinese system

introduced, which became a dominant feature of Japanese civilization. In earliest times we have the monarch an active fighting chief, subject to all the accidents of his position. He is frequently assassinated, sometimes removed by successful conspiracy; and suppression of rebellion is the main feature of his reign. Later the wars against the aborigines have drifted off to the northern and distant frontier; which, roughly speaking, lies east and west across the island from the Idzu peninsula. Even above this line the Japanese settlements had been pushed, but all this fighting is as remote from the court at Kyōtō as the Indian wars from Washington. With the firm establishment of the monarchy however, and the delegation of the monarch's power and his retirement from their active exercise, his sacerdotal character becomes greatly enhanced. He is no longer assassinated. If he shows any desire to reign he is removed and an instrument more pliable to the ruling class is substituted in his place. Custom has bound him fast, and any really able man who reaches the imperial throne finds it necessary to abdicate in order to reign. This, of course, implies successful conspiracy on his part against the ruling clique, and it does not often occur. Only toward the close of the period was the power of the Fujiwara clan thrown off, and at that time the Emperor himself had become a Fujiwara, so long continued had been the practice of taking the imperial consort from this clan. The regency of the ex-emperor was really only a shifting of balance within the family circle.

Let us merely note here this inviolability gained by the transfer of active political power to other shoulders, this enhancement of the sacerdotal character of the priest-king, this stripping of his temporal power from a Japanese Pope, and make a slight reference to one other point; that is, the influence of the geographical situation on the development. This has taken a course practically the reverse of that of Europe. Japan won her civilization easily. Contact with China came at a time when she had established peace at home, and from her situation, and still more from the character of her neighbours, was not exposed to attacks from the outside. The dates curiously coincide, being the sixth and seventh centuries, both in Japan and in western Europe. The fall of the Roman empire, however, took place under the attacks of many hostile peoples, and the supremacy had first to be determined between the victors before the civilization of Europe could resume its course. Fortunately for the world's history, the barbarian tribes were not so unacquainted with Roman civilization as to totally disvalue it. Under the fury of their attack, when all passions were at white heat, it suffered fearfully; but a high value was placed by the barbarians on everything Roman. They knew enough about it to be curious concerning its method of working, and that was a very important factor in its partial preservation. They had also been converted to Christianity—Arianism, and a bitterly hostile sect to the Roman Church, but still Christianity. With a skill and organization which it has shown through all its history, the Roman

Church at once set to work to win over these barbarians to herself, and her success still more ensured the preservation of the wrecks of the Roman world. But it could only be a preservation not a development, and hence the Dark Ages of Europe follow on to the immediate contact of the barbarian tribes and Roman civilization. Hence a period of continual warfare for supremacy among the different peoples, and the preponderance of the military class and early development of feudalism. The Japanese show a reversal of this development. Art and Government developed at a period of their national life when the internal peace was being daily strengthened and when external troubles did not exist. The Golden Age of Japanese art and literature followed the introduction of Chinese civilization. The whole energies of the nation were poured into this one channel.

It is necessary, however, not to let the brilliancy of this period (800—1200 A.D.) of the Japanese monarchy dazzle us as to the condition of the people. It is to be remembered that the reform not only came from above, but it came entirely from above; and the people in general had no part or parcel in it. It was not such as to be affected by the tenor of their daily lives. "God helps those who help themselves" and we can be sure that the theoretical reformers surrounding the throne took good care that none of their privileges were poached upon. The reform of 645 A.D. resembles the reform of 1867 inasmuch as we find the leaders of the reform and their partisans all occupying snug berths after the hurly hurly. Pensioners blossomed out into officials. Never had the theoretical reformer such a chance in the world's history as in this Japan of 645 A.D. The institutions suitable to themselves were imported ready made, and the main thing the lower classes seem to have gotten out of them was "Duty" with a capital letter and unto the third and fourth generation. Great public works were undertaken, but as villages were the reward of public officials, as guilds were specified whose duty it was to construct and guard these public works, as the idea of personal remuneration is a new feature to-day of Japanese social life, it is safe to say that the labouring population were substantially serfs. Slaves certainly were used in the early part of this period. The tendency, however, seems to have been toward an elevation of their status and a depreciation of that of the general populace. There being no foreign wars the supply of skilled Chinese and Korean artisans came to an end, and the value of their services raised their *status*. We have increase of privileges granted these people in recognition of the value of their services. Slavery, as such, if it existed at the close of the monarchy was confined to the criminal classes. As it was, comparatively speaking, a time of peace, the caste system became very inelastic. The governmental inquiries and instructions are devoted to measures directed to keep the different classes within their due bounds. The importance, especially, of keeping the people on the land, of thus preventing a diminution of the taxes in kind due to

the royal revenue, is repeatedly impressed on the different officials—whose interests were diametrically opposite. The population was to some extent able to change its habitat. The "reform" and registration of 645 A.D. had not been completely successful in that direction. They were not yet immoveably fixed to the soil. Sharp control, however, was kept over their movements and constant are the rebukes to the officials for failing to prevent the invasion of the Go Kinai provinces—the district around Kyōtō which had special privileges as to taxation—by people from the adjoining provinces. In fact the condition of the Japanese *plebs* during the monarchy seems to have been a limited serfdom. That they owed services to their lord was true; but it was the service of the village, and if individuals could be spared from their services to the community they could obtain permission to leave. Communities being interested in retaining their effective members and preventing the dumping of useless members from other communities on themselves were probably the real reason of the scanty movement of the population. That the position of the *plebs*, however, was not an enviable one, is plain enough from the annals. Their margin of safety was small, and relief of taxes owing to scanty crops, famine, earthquake, the activity of Fuji or Aso or Asama, and particularly the pest, marks the frequent elision of this scanty margin of safety.

Nobles and the military class can be more summarily treated. As the monarchy developed out of war, so the throne from the first was surrounded by a militant class with all its elaborate ceremony and dress dear to the military heart. As the fighting line, however, faded away into the North the court appointments became of a purely civil character. In fact this seems to have been the most civilized period of Japanese society. Brutal quarrels, assassinations, duels are common enough; but they are a minor part of the code, and are largely confined to the military class as yet an unimportant one; and *harakiri* and the iron code, the rudiments of which were collected together by Iyeyasu, significantly begin to appear as a major feature with the rise of that military class into control. At first the court nobles carry out all the duties of their position. Men wrapped in the luxury of the court, spending their time in composing poetry, painting *kakemono*, and writing memoirs of court life, buckle on their swords and go to the frontier to maintain or to extend the limit of the Mikado's government. In time this earnestness fades away and this work is left to a rougher class who make it a life business to carve out with the sword a career and fortune in frontier fiefs and fortresses. A striking feature to be noted in this period is the high position of woman. She is not shut up as in most oriental countries. In literature she stands in the front rank; and generally her position is that of woman in the court of Louis XIV. She has never before been and is never after so flattered and sought after, but her political power is nil. Woman in Japan never reached the power in the *salon* that she had in

the France of the days of Louis XV and XVI, or as she has to-day in the less militant nations of Europe.

The ninth and tenth centuries form the Golden Age of Japanese art and literature. To be sure there were later periods in which the detail was worked more elaborately, but substantially nothing was added to the principle involved. This early period has all the advantages of freshness, great vigour, polish and originality. There is nothing blasé or overwrought or hysterical in it. It advances with a firm hand, its resources well under control. The Japanese use their materials with a master hand. The model, the groundwork, has, of course, been Chinese but there is no slavish imitation. Artists and literary men turn to the abundant materials around them. These consist of a rich and varied native environment, the new wonders brought in the train of Buddhism from far distant peoples of southern Asia, widening acquaintance with China allowing many ideas to filter in from western Asia, and there is a distinct trace of Persian influence among the many strands that go to make up the new woof that the Japanese are weaving. It is a distinct era in the nation's life and is marked by a breadth of view not found later. Now there is one stimulating factor to be found in such a condition. The use of the surplus energy itself gives rise to pleasure. The control of the means to use the many stimuli surrounding and acting on us leads, through the excess of nervous discharge, to many combinations between the materials on which we act. Every outlet is sought for the discharge of this excess. Mere imitation becomes positively painful. The Japanese were very much in this psychological stage at this period. They had a working model, abundant materials, and were overflowing with life and energy. Their model did, in some respects, act as a drag on them. As said, China had passed the age of optimism. Her influence on Japan at this period was that of old age on youth. It was restraining. It held up before their eyes a mirror of high polish but warned them that the objects seen in it were only reflections. It, however, prevented extravagance and in spite of its vigour and life Japanese art does not break out of bounds. It is powerful but it is sober.

The hardening effect of this model is mainly seen on the political side. There is no freedom or spontaneity here. A young and developing nation have, politically speaking, made their home in this hard inelastic shell of the Chinese mollusc in which crystallization is complete and to whose inequalities the enclosed living matter must perforce adapt itself. All subsequent history up to the close of the feudal regime in 1867 confines its movement within this shell of Chinese formalism. It reaches its highest detail at this period. Every little minutia is provided for its ceremonial. Every function has its separate official. Where the upper classes are all attached directly or indirectly to the Court and Government, this formulation, this inelasticity, is bound to spread to the private relations of man to man, and so it did, to be formulated into a legal code after centuries of informal

practice. In other terms, "suggestion" in its psychological sense had fastened itself on the main spring of the Japanese mental machinery. It was not the feudal system that put an end to Japanese progress. The feudal system of Japan, unlike that of Europe, did not spring up of necessity and in the midst of surrounding disorder. The feudal system of Europe brought some compensation with it, in at least a strong arm of protection to the weaker members of the community who clustered around the feudal stronghold. It was an improvement on what immediately preceded it. The Japanese feudal system, on the contrary, sprang from the selfishness of a peaceful prosperity. A prosperity in which there is not a trace of any altruistic sentiment. With the weakening of central power came the opportunity of self centred and powerful men to grasp all the advantages within their sphere. It was a very vulgar and commonplace scramble for the scraps of power, not unlike a raid of guests on their host's table. It had none of the redeeming features of European feudalism. There is nothing extraordinary in this. The Japanese were much in that stage of childhood in which, with their eyes opened to all the possibilities in front of them, with the faculties developing by which they could make use of these possibilities, they can only see such use from a personal point of view. The child is shamelessly egoistic at such a stage and only bends to superior force and fear of punishment from those in control of him. All is grist to his mill for these personal uses; and so with these Japanese. The Golden Age was a magnificent but a materialistic advance only tempered by its political conservatism. The Renaissance in Europe was equally shameless, and in its turn was only tempered by a powerful ecclesiastical organization and the mutual jealousies of rising political organizations which kept a sour eye on all innovation in reference to government.

We have said that the conservative factor of this Japanese civilization of the ninth century was political. Political can also here be read religious; for in many places in the East, and especially in Japan, the two are so interwoven as to be inseparable, mutually entering into the structure of each other. The survivals that enter into this new civilization are of interest as far as they preserve for the Japanese people the influence of their origin. Such influences are mainly religious and are found in the influence of Shintō on Buddhism. The esoteric theology of Buddhism and its exoteric manifestations as shown in its temples, priesthood, and gorgeous ritual, took strong hold on the Japanese people. But to effect this it was necessary to adopt the Shintō pantheon wholesale. All its more important and popular deities had their avatars in Buddhist forms. The old ideas cling like wax. The common people especially, while adopting the new, cling tenaciously to these ideas of the old, simply modifying and fusing together both religions. This is shown not only in Roman Catholicism and Buddhism but is markedly the case of Japanese Shintōism. Even such a dominant monotheism as Islamism makes a concession to the common and weaker minds

among its worshippers by presenting to them the more immediate personality of saints. And Islamism has kept its skirts clear of such dangerous ground far better than any of its theological rivals. Shintō passed, therefore, almost bodily into Buddhism, so much so that a closer official recognition of this union was felt desirable and gave rise in the ninth century to a hybrid known as the Ryōbu or Shingon sect. But the main importance of this survival of the Shintō feeling was its keeping alive the old feeling of race isolation; a race isolation as cherished as ever was the case among the Jews. Their gods, even their Buddhas, had to take on a thoroughly Japanese tint. They had, at least, to be naturalized and adopted as part of the nation. Now this old Shintō was a fierce religion. Its offerings, to be sure, were cooked food, and fruits, and grains, and flowers, and its altars were rarely stained with the blood of victims cajoled to the sacrifice with gorgeous pomp and procession; but its history was the nation's history, and kept alive in one continuous stream the bloody and turbulent tale therein handed down. The Japanese, of that day at least, could not draw the dividing line that the European nations could between the times when they were savages sacrificing victims to their gods, and their existing condition when all their civilization seemed to be woven with and due to the changes which came to them with the religion of Rome and the East. The Japanese, on the contrary, gloried in this continuous tradition—there is a strong party that glory in it to-day—and it was their ambition to continue that strain and hand it on unimpaired to their descendants. Chinese ceremonial and Buddhist theology had both to admit into their fellowship this strange bed-fellow from a primitive condition of life.

These Japanese of the old monarchy, however, deserve well of their descendants. They were not philosophers. They cared nothing about abstractions. They cared little about the "heavens above, the earth beneath, or the waters under the earth," except in so far as these afforded them scope for their own very materialistic purposes. They were joyously materialistic—optimistic. A poet gloried in the beauties of the sky and sea, the glittering constellations; and the wavy mists thrown over Nature; but as to the ultimate destination of these phenomena, their intrinsic nature, whether real or illusory, he cared nothing. No Japanese poet dreamed of a "*De Natura Rerum*." Japanese society of that day wanted to enjoy and they were not at all particular as to the means by which this was effected. There was no William Langland or John Ball to sing the woes of the common people. We learn of them through the grim statistics of famines, pestilence, taxation, and other signs of distress. But all great advances must be paid for, either by the gaunt and stricken caricatures that haunted the fields of the France of 1750, or by the silk clad and dainty men and women that crowded the prisons during the Terror of '93 and went as bravely to death on the scaffold as the others had patiently starved in the fields. What we gain is in social heredity, and

the patrimony which the ancient Japanese handed down to their descendants, both in art and literature was well worth the price paid for it. In the aggregate it is the race—as the unit—that counts, not the individual. Society to progress must foster certain individuals even if the majority have to suffer for the development of these hot-house plants. The greatest proof that these Japanese performed their part well is the fact of their retaining and hence deserving this name given to their times—the Golden Age.

§ 5

“Lapses from homogeneity, however, or rather, the increase of such heterogeneity as usually exists, requires that the parts shall be heterogeneously conditioned; and whatever prevents the rise of contrasts among the conditions, prevents increase of heterogeneity.....Conversely, it is to be anticipated that where the several parts of a social aggregate are heterogeneously conditioned in a permanent way, they will become proportionately heterogeneous.” This principle laid down by Mr. Spencer finds excellent application at this stage of Japanese history when feudalism is to develop internally out of the homogeneous condition of the monarchy, and not to be a nucleating of previous disorder as, on the contrary, was the case among the nations of Europe. There is a wider difference of dates here than is usually conceived. Feudalism in Europe can be said to take its rise at the close of the sixth and beginning of the seventh century, when Alboin and the Lombards descended on Italy, and the German and Roman systems were brought into a more intimate contact than had ever been the case hitherto. The germs of the feudal system are found in the customs and laws of both people. The nature of the grants of land to Roman soldiers, and the relation between the tenants or serfs and the masters of the great *latifundia*, who were, from their official character, many of them exempt from taxation, contained the germ of the system. But the Roman Empire, the central authority, overshadowed all in vastly preponderant mass. Its writ ran everywhere and the great land owner was as helpless as any slave on his land before its governing power. The German brought to it his idea of the tief as developed in the *comitatus* or companion of the chief and whose rewards were often granted and held on terms of service to be rendered in the future. But the bond was a loose one and the political supremacy of the chief in no sense akin to that of the great Empire. The whole tendency of their system was to collect power in the hands of these units, a fact well illustrated by the loose-knit structure of this Lombard monarchy and the small and diminishing control of the king over the counts and dukes. These frequently succeeded in maintaining a condition of quasi-

independence, in spite of the efforts of such really great monarchs as Agilulf, Rothari, and Luitprand. Feudalism in Europe, therefore, although often dated from Charles Martel, seems justly to go back a full century in this earlier record. The legendary indications of a feudalism antedating the historical period in Japan can hardly be taken in any other sense than similar indications of subordinations of sub-chiefs to a head chief found practically among all barbaric and partly civilized peoples. Feudalism in the scientific sense is that *institution* which is based on the contract implied or recorded in the granting of a fief. In this sense its beginnings in Japan are obscure but date fully three hundred years later. Up to the middle of the eleventh century the Fujiwara or Court regime were in full and active control. There was not a cloud on the horizon of the monarchy. It is with the abdication of their control over the military power that the decline of the monarchy begins, and from the middle of the eleventh to the end of the twelfth century this period is marked by the steadily increasing independence of great barons in the North and West. The twelfth century which marks the highest point of European feudalism, marks but the beginning of Japanese feudalism, which, after a period of disorder lasting to the sixteenth century, was to perpetuate itself under a more stable form in the Tokugawa Shōgunate. There were Shōguns from the end of the eleventh century to the close of the period, nominally governing the country; but in this early stage they quickly fell into the same helpless position as the monarch himself, and the real power lay in the barons whose sway was limited to their fiefs within which they were absolute. The name is not entirely apt, but the period from the rise of the Taira clan (circa 1180) to the rise of Nobunaga (1550) can be called the oligarchical period in contrast to the monarchical, the affairs of the central power being practically administered by the party then strongest among the barons.

Heterogeneity within the monarchy was therefore a matter of progress, and is marked by the rise of great estates on the frontier, grants of lands to men with interest at court. Owing to the official character of most of these grantees these lands were free from taxation, and hence their owners could offer terms to settlers highly advantageous as compared with the taxed government land. The Government was too weak to prevent this enticing away of its human cattle. While, therefore, it lost not only in its more immediate brawn and muscle, it lost also seriously in revenue, and the great mass of government land left untilled and abandoned by its tenants affected the revenues to such an extent that by the twelfth century administration was becoming difficult. Another interesting feature is shown here. These frontier provinces, owing to the laxity and weakness of the governing power at Kyōto, rapidly became almost independent of it; and the curious contrast is presented of a severity of caste system near the centre and a comparative loosening of it as we near the periphery. From the earliest times there had always

been a class of men who held their lands in fee simple, who paid a tax to this central government but who owed no further service to it. These *kumitsauko* probably went largely to form the noble class; but they also seem in their independence on their estates, their lack of connection with governmental function, to be the legitimate predecessors of the *gōshi*, a class of men much heard of in these disorderly times. They were not necessarily noble, seemed often simply to be men marked by wealth and great influence in their locality; and increase in power of men among these *gōshi*, their ability to give protection to their neighbours, soon raised many of them into the position of petty barons. From their strongholds they ruled the surrounding country with small regard to the wishes or interests of the central power. This elasticity of caste is a feature of this earlier oligarchical period. As military rule concentrates into stronger hands at the close, once more the caste system hardens on new lines, but in its earlier stage any adventurous man with will, courage, and a good sword at his side, could carve out a career for himself. Its last and most illustrious representative was the great Taikō, Hideyoshi.

We have, then, at the time of the fall of the monarchy, not a king ruling at Kyōto but a family council. The Chinese system of eliminating the people as a factor of public life left but two classes face to face—the nobles who had adopted civilian life and the military barons. The substitution of the military government was therefore an easy step. The rule of Taira Kiyomori was too short to admit of any permanent steps being taken in this direction. His system was simply that of plunder. The public offices and revenues were appropriated to his family, but without method or provision to perpetuate control. It was his rival and successor, and a really great man, Minamoto Yoritomo, who gave the finishing thrust to the expiring monarchy by establishing military chiefs side by side with the civil representative of the nominal government. These military chiefs soon took the whole power in their hands, and left the title and an honourable poverty and insignificance to their better born rivals. The progress toward heterogeneity did not stop here. These military chiefs as little respected the power of the nominal head of their caste; and with the death of Yoritomo, the Shōgunate itself sank into an empty title. A man took and held just as much as his strength or his alliances permitted. Nothing but foreign invasion could bring about even a semblance of unity. For three hundred and fifty years Japan was a scene of strife between these barons, great and small, in which each unit was trying to enlarge his dominions at the expense of his neighbours. The people probably fared as did the people in Europe. The strongest of them were drafted into the struggle and more than one peasant came out a man of rank. The weaker suffered still more, and there is a hideous roll of pestilence and famine, both of which scourges became almost periodical. Woman sank practically into a chattel. She lost her high position as a

member of the social aggregate and became a mere breeding machine. Concubinage, always a factor in the East as a general practice, must have become most accentuated at this period, for the drain on the male population, through the constant warfare, was very great. The condition is familiar enough in history. It was that of England during the Barons Wars of Stephen's reign; of France during the period of the English invasion; of Germany during the thirty years war when bigamy was legally permitted on account of the slaughter of the male population.

Descriptions from Japanese sources of the plebs during the constant wars lasting from the twelfth to the sixteenth century are not numerous. The Japanese chroniclers speak often enough in general terms of the wretchedness of the country due to the disorder, and the different rulers of the fiefs come in for praise or blame according to the prosperity of their people. The misfortunes of the poets, or their friends, or their party, come in for generous treatment together with odes to the moon, to the dew on the flowers, and to the shimmery surface of Biwa-ko; but a sharp defined picture of the then existing misery is lacking, such as Rakuo, minister of finance under the Shōgun Iyenari, gives in the seventeenth century. There is, however, a sketch of famine and its resultant misery given in the Hōjōki of Chōmei, although no mention is made of the class whose continual quarrels and petty wars were the real cause of the land lying untilled. It is a tale of drought and flood and consequent failure of harvest, in a country in which the Government did nothing but levy and absorb taxes instead of showing foresight of the needs of its people. Naturally the people leave their land and seek sustenance wherever they can find it. As the mountain will not come to them, necessarily they take to the mountains, or in other terms—to brigandage. The great city, dependent on these supporters, must suffer in its turn; and its luxury of dress, and furniture, and gold, and silver, and silk is offered in vain for the greater necessity of a handful of rice. "By garden walls or on the roadside countless persons died of famine, and as their bodies were not removed the world was filled with evil odours." They rotted where they fell. The isolation of the capital was so great, the discouragement and weakness of the country people so extreme, that houses were pulled down and sold for firewood, and to advantage. One touch of human nature shows that these old Japanese of the twelfth century, despite their iron rule, were kin of these later days. "Another very pitiable thing was that when there were a man and a woman who were strongly attached to each other, the one whose love was the greatest and whose devotion was the most profound always died first. The reason was that they put themselves last, and, whether man or woman, gave up to the dearly loved one anything which they might chance to have begged. As a matter of course, parents died before their children. Again infants might be seen clinging to the breast of their mother,

"not knowing that she was already dead."* One is curious to know how many men were the victims of sacrifice in Old Japan. That is, judging by New Japan.

One would think that all the beneficial effects of the monarchy would have been utterly lost to the Japanese. This is rarely the case even when the destruction is by foreign foes. It was not the case among the Japanese. The energy of the nation was poured into these wars, and art and literature were frightfully hampered but they were not suppressed. These very warriors were still artists, and the time that they could give to aesthetic pursuits they devoted to them. A new wave of Chinese influence invaded the country; of the same scholarly or artistic character as had been always the case before—except the unfortunate and abortive attempt of Kublai Khan. Artistic metal work takes its greatest development and Japanese porcelain dates from this period. An important contribution was the study of Chinese philosophy which, from the influence it exerted, deserves some extended notice. The condition of the times was such that a man could only rely on his own efforts to obtain redress for injuries. Right had been supplanted by might. The civil law of the land lay prostrate and the only tribunal open to the oppressed was the military tribunal of the feudal lord in which the ethics and practice of military procedure held sway. The great majority of men were therefore helpless unless they could get the protection of some stronger arm. This helplessness had the effect of giving rise to a feeling of altruism unknown hitherto in Japanese social economy. It is almost incongruous that the selfish egoism aroused by social war should give rise to such a feeling and not to the selfish egoism characteristic of the purely material prosperity of the preceding age. The well balanced political system, maintaining everything in equilibrium, had, however, gone to pieces, and it is the gratitude to a chief, the give and take of a very personal relation that had an extravagant development in the loyalty of the *samurai* to his lord. The warfare of this period gave rise to a special class of fighting men—professional soldiers, personal retainers of the chiefs. They form almost a family, certainly a clan, in which connection between head and members takes on the very special relation found in the real family. There is no getting away from the utilitarian basis of all our human relationships, but the more intimate the personal relation and dependence is the less conspicuous is the utilitarian element. To get at this utilitarian basis in any relation we must not be too close. We cannot focus it properly at short range. In western life to-day we do not appreciate always how far it enters into our relations although the wide and widening distance between Government and individual, even between individual and the family, shows us that what we have cherished most as part of a supposed inherent moral trait is after all simply our necessity for support of others in order to

* The translation is from Mr. Aston's "Japanese Literature" p. 149.

live, certainly to progress. In the very narrow limits within which the Japanese and European feudal systems moved, in this very narrow range within which the relations of lord and retainer were confined, this utilitarianism springing from the political system of the times is lost to sight. This is especially the case with the Japanese over whom the code to which such relations were reduced, commonly known as Bushidō, exercised a much longer influence than the code of chivalry in Europe. So much so that the idealized form of this code governing the relations of a petty chief with his retainers, and as expounded in the writers of romance and fiction, receives a serious hearing in this age which has long begun to understand the veil with which we decently cover the past. In Europe the broader, more rational and philosophic, relations as embodied in modern patriotism, and in which the country and not a man is made the object of individual affection, have long supplanted this primitive form of hero worship.

In spite of the fact that in the oligarchical period the physical savage—the militant man—is again in command, mental development did not necessarily regress. It took a much narrower range. Its material was also of a different character. The general relations of life were not those that aroused interest. To men whose existence was so precarious the present had to lose something of its value. And this frame of mind was nourished by the pessimism of Chinese philosophy which was peculiarly attractive to these warriors. China, to them, is still the model. Her formalism and ceremonial inherited from her own militant days were peculiarly suited to the turn Japanese political life had taken, and the supremacy of the military caste merely fastened the bonds more tightly on the political life of Japan. The people changed to harsher masters, that was all. It was in the study of Chinese politics that the great organizers of the close of the of the sixteenth century—Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu—found their inspiration. They were not like the men of the first period who planned as much, if not more, for present benefits to be derived from the borrowed system as for any future effects. The triumvirate of the sixteenth century were men on the contrary who were essentially laying a foundation for the future generations. Not only a foundation but the very building itself, so thorough was their work; but it was a work the usefulness of which lay in future time, a fact that must have been very plain to the makers themselves. That their legacy to the future was a frightful one does not detract from admiration as to its efficiency. They worked to ensure the perpetuation of the interests of a military caste as against the interests of the community at large. To ensure this, all progress above and below had to be eliminated. Even within the range where the mind was allowed action there was careful censorship. The system of education, governmentally supervised, was adapted to crop off all excrescences of thought. Everything was so systematized as to necessitate conformity or starvation. This exclusiveness was not made at a step. We see

it progress regularly from the liberal minded Nobunaga to the narrow minded Iyemitsu, grandson and successor of Iyeyasu.* One great cause of this narrowness, and of interest to us, is the first important contact at the end of the period—1550 to 1625—with western Europe. And here we can make a remark which will not sound at all complimentary to western ears. We are surprised that the superiority of European civilization did not so overwhelm the Japanese as at once to cause them to welcome and adopt it. There were very good reasons why they should not do so. Their introduction to European civilization was through sailors and adventurers, and it can hardly be imagined that such rough characters would cause much flattering comment when they appeared at the elaborate and formal court of Hideyoshi and Iyeyasu. Indeed to the punctilious Japanese officials, the pretentiousness on very slight grounds, and freedom of manners on no grounds at all, would give a very unfavourable impression of the country from which these foreigners came. To them, these outer barbarians had the useful but clumsy weapon of war the superiority of which at that time, however, in the nature and the methods of Japanese warfare over a very difficult country, was so little marked as to make practically no change in their system of warfare. The same can substantially be said of 1867. The country had then been closed against foreigners for many years on strictly political grounds, based on the disadvantages of such intercourse. This inherited prejudice was therefore added to the fact that European civilization as presented to their eyes lacked novelty and interest. Of its art and literature they knew nothing, and any possible advantage from exchange of manufactures was balanced by possible political disadvantages arising from the intercourse. In 1867, however, they were quick to appreciate a vast difference in material resources from the point of view of a warlike people. It was a case of survive or perish. For re-armament it was necessary to open their doors. To many men of that day, perhaps the majority, the fact that the rest of European civilization would enter with it and permanently become a fixed institution of the country was not taken into consideration. To many it must have seemed an accident that it did so; and to-day, to all but a few moss grown conservatives, it appears to have been a happy accident.

§ 6

The period initiated by Iyeyasu with the beginning of the seventeenth century is, properly speaking, that of the Tokugawa

* The immediate successor of Iyeyasu, Hidetada, was a blockish man well qualified to carry out his father's orders. Iyeyasu died 1616, and although he retired in 1635 was the real ruler. Hidetada died 1623.

Shōgunate, although its features are so characteristic that it goes commonly under the simple title of the Shōgunate. The liberal policy of the earlier leaders was abandoned by Iyeyasu. His object was the permanent elevation of his family by means of the permanent elevation of his caste. This was no difficult task. The Japanese People as a factor had never existed. The nobles (*kuge*) had been eliminated, and—his rivals crushed—it merely remained to organize the military class into a standing army whose acquired habits of military obedience to their chief, whose *esprit-de-corps* and jealousy for their privileges, would prevent any successful opposition from the disarmed classes. It was, of course, no slight matter to bring the dangerous unruly elements of the military class under such control as to eliminate dangers from ambitious members of the class. There was at this point nothing original in the work of Iyeyasu. He did what the French kings succeeded in doing with the French nobility at a similar period in their history. He made them into a caste strictly hereditary in its nature. A caste from which degradation was easy but to which elevation was well nigh impossible. This policy was strictly impressed on and carried out by his successors, and there were none of those easy elevations to the privileged class granted by the later Shōguns such as in the latter days of monarchical privilege greatly diluted the titled classes in Europe; those wholesale creations of nobility from the rich plebeians. Previous to the times of Iyeyasu it was not only possible for the sturdy peasant to elevate himself and his family into the privileged attendants of some great lord but he reached the seat of honour; and in one conspicuous case saw the whole country gathered around his throne. Hideyoshi, born and bred a peasant, saw himself elevated to a position in which he not only held the shadowy monarch a puppet in his grasp, but himself entered into the pantheon of the Japanese gods under the name of Shin-Hachiman. That his apotheosis was of short duration was more owing to bad luck than bad management.

Iyeyasu made no innovations. He was too wise a statesman for that. What he did was to take existing customs and codify them. No man found unusual conditions imposed on him. He simply found his place in a system in which the relations of every individual were strictly defined and limited. Men's passions must have an outlet. "He who slays with the sword shall perish by the sword." Iyeyasu had no intention of hampering his system with a band of carpet knights. His *samurai* wore two swords and were supposed to use them—against each other; but under strictly defined conditions harmless to the Government. In other terms, public war came to an end and private war was substituted therefor. The code of the *samurai* was a code of minute observance of an elaborate etiquette, any infraction of which was an insult to the party whose rights were disregarded. This brought about some curious legalized offences against the code itself. The extravagant devotion to the Chinese philosophy, together with the intense personal loyalty to the chief developed

in these feudal times, led to the clashing between duty as due to one's superior and duty as due to one's lord. The inferior had no right to raise his hand against his superior. It was likewise his sacred duty to avenge his lord. The retainers, therefore, of some nobleman slain in a quarrel found themselves often in this position where they must violate one or the other of these injunctions laid down by Confucius and the Code. In the days of the civil wars this gave rise to no difficulty, the strongest prevailed; but when a firm and settled Government ruled in the land, such breaches of "etiquette" could not be tolerated. A curious and bloody exit was found from this *impasse*. Under such conditions the *samurai* was under the necessity of avenging his lord, but he must also satisfy the outraged majesty of the law which forbade the soldier to raise his hand against his officer. His execution took the honourable form of suicide which was carried out in the ghastly farce or drama of the official *harakiri*. The term farce may seem out of place here, but strictly speaking is not so. Official *harakiri* had all the elements of incongruity attached to that term which too often closely approaches tragedy. Tragedy however is strictly logical, the incongruous is fatal to it. The fate of the forty seven *ronins* is the classical instance of this clash of principles in the Japanese code.

In providing for the future however—and all the work of Iyeyasu was for the future—it was necessary to do more than simply and thoroughly organize the military class. The whole population must be brought into such a condition that an effective opposition could not arise from it. Their duties also were codified to the most minute particular. We are not troubled here with questions of privilege. The code allows them to do certain things necessary for life and taxation. What is not specifically allowed by the code is forbidden. This is simple enough, and easily understood by the most ignorant, especially when it is understood that infraction in the way of experiment meant severe punishment or even death. The custom of the country as laid down in the code was strictly to be followed. It is perhaps this binding force of "custom" that has given rise to the idea that there is an inherent element, a substratum, of democracy in the Japanese body politic. The low class man must be allowed to live. He must live to work, or otherwise the two-sworded man might have had to undertake that displeasing pastime on his own account. Some retriCTION must be placed on the caprice of the upper class, and hence there is a line beyond which even the *samurai* was not allowed to trespass on the "right to live and work" of the plebeian. But the organization of the Japanese people is not democratic. From the earliest times the classification into small units—the *go nin* units—the subordination within these little groups, is strictly governmental. It is to enable the central power to lay its hands easily on any member of these units and they had no influence whatever on the governing power. They did not even govern themselves. Their system of procedure, almost the details of their daily lives, was laid down for them,

They were never even an element of consideration in the political structure of the ruling power.*

The one other element—the nobles or *kuge* or imperial court party—were already paralysed. Many had deserted to join the new military government. The others were poor, inefficient, stripped of all power, and hence without influence. It was no policy of Iyeyasu to drive them to desperation, hence the maintenance of the imperial court was always provided within such limits as to keep them in a decent poverty without becoming dangerous. They lived in an empty dream of shadowy precedence. The envoys of the Shōgun himself had to take rank after high officials of the Mikado's court. This Kyōto court was not without use in Iyeyasu's system. It was the balance to the great wheel on which that system was carried. It always held something else up before the eyes of his followers. A shadow without any real power, and which he took care should have no real power, for the mingling of the two classes was carefully prevented. Posts at the Mikado's court were forbidden to the *samurai* class, nor could the nobles enter the ranks of the *samurai*. There were no inconvenient channels by which life could flow from strong healthy Yedo into the anæmic limb at Kyōto. It was more than once discussed in later times whether this useless member had not better be amputated. Arai Hakuseki hints at this discussion and it seems to have been an idea familiar to the thought of the higher statesmen of the Shōgunate. There was nothing to prevent it in 1740. The Tokugawa were absolutely supreme, with no opposition to raise a question in a country in which the opposition had been carefully split into small and widely separated units. But such a proposition did not come from the Tokugawa. It came from the *samurai* who by that time had displaced the *daimyō* who were but nominal rulers of their fiefs, the real power being in the hands of their retainers. That this balance wheel of the system of Iyeyasu, however, was of great value to the Tokugawa family from a dynastic point of view there is no question. Usurpers not only of the power but of the name of the throne their position would have been doubly open to attack. It was much easier and safer to attach the power of the name to the power of rule by controlling the individual who occupied the throne at Kyōto. That it was the ultimate cause of their overthrow in affording a nucleus around which the discontented elements could collect is also evident. The main strength of the system of Iyeyasu was, however, shown in its long duration in spite of the headship of very mediocre men. The *samurai* were

* In the discussion of the valuable paper of Dr. Grinnan on "Land Tenure in Tosa" (Trans. Asiatic Society of Japan vol. XX), Dr. Knox pointed out that the down trodden merchant had one resource. If he spat on the *samurai* the latter was under the obligation of committing *harakiri*. Perhaps we can assume a still longer range to his power, and say that if he said he had accomplished this feat it was equivalent to the deed. Of course his own life was sacrificed, but like the venomous serpent he was deadly if too closely pressed at a disadvantage.

paralysed by a military code which foresaw everything, and every generation fastened its chains more firmly on their minds; the nobles were paralysed by their poverty, their insignificance, and the routine of vain ceremony to which their thoughts were carefully confined; the people had no existence. The two upper classes did not come together in 1867. When the fall of feudalism became inevitable, the *samurai* simply extended their sphere and ousted the nobles from the ground they still held. They appropriated the Court.

One other factor remained, and as an outside influence which might disturb the operation of this delicate machinery its exclusion seemed necessary. It is hard to believe that the warrior Iyeyasu seriously believed in the possible success of European invasion. But support might be given and found in the discontented elements within the country itself. This purely practical reason of family politics seems to have dictated his course in excluding not only foreigners themselves but all contact with foreign civilization and ideas, and for centuries the only contact between Japan and the outside world was through the little wicket gate at Deshima, where everything mental and material was carefully censored by the officials of the Shōgunate. It was a period of profound peace; one therefore in which art and manufacture found ample opportunity to develop all the capacities of the material presented to its hand. To some extent this was new. A livelier contact with China during the sixteenth century, the brief experience with the civilization of European countries, afforded lively stimulus to the Japanese mind. The very repression applied to all outlet of a personal and social direction threw this surplus of energy into art and literature. It never grows extravagant, the social discipline prevents that; but it runs to eccentricity. Its material is too scanty and the legitimate combinations are necessarily limited. Art devotes itself to an elaboration of detail carried out with marvellous skill, but it develops few new principles. Literature sinks into a dreary scholasticism in which the learning of the country, the really solid section of the world of letters, devotes itself to commentaries on worn-out Chinese metaphysics. The upper classes, forced by a jealous Government, bent on stripping them of all resources, into an extravagance and competition far beyond their means, pass their time in courtly ceremonial, dilettante trifling with æsthetics, or the worst vices. The lower class, ground down into the earth, only labour to have at least half and sometimes four fifths of their labour taken from them. Their only appearance in the records is when half starved peasants appear in the streets of Yedo in their rain coats and with their farming implements in their hands, and cluster around the great gate of their lord's *yashiki*; a silent protest against their suffering; a very extreme step of protest on their part and usually unsuccessful. Some of the material details of this life so praised and regretted by those who bemoan the "good old times of feudal Japan" have been touched on elsewhere and it is not necessary

here to repeat them. As a matter of fact the disappearance of these good old times was a "good riddance to bad rubbish" and the appearance of Commodore Perry in Yedo bay, by giving a *casus belli* to the clans discontented with Tokugawa rule was a godsend to the Japanese people. Tokugawa would probably have fallen anyhow, but it was a case of the sooner the better.

The Tokugawa Shōgunate had been weakening for nearly a hundred years. The iron rule which had characterized Iyeyasu and his immediate successors sensibly lapsed with time. The Shōguns were most of them great patrons of art and literature; but not always wisely as to the last, for although Hirata fell under the ban of the Government, the researches of the great triumvirate—Mabuchi, Motoori, and Hirata—into the past history of the Japanese people were if not positively encouraged, at least tolerated. But the past could not be called up before the eyes of the people without bringing before them the phantom monarch and his court still leading their shadowy existence at Kyōto. With growing weakness at the centre came growing strength and discontent in the distant fiefs. Iyeyasu could not completely carry out his system, and the great clans of Satsuma, Choshū, and Tosa, although stripped of much of their power and with Tokugawa *Daimyō* planted among them to watch them, were in a position to take advantage of that weakness. By the first half of the nineteenth century the question had come to be very much one of the "ins" and the "outs," and the uncertainty was as to where and when the spark would be applied to the train and the whole existing system blown into limbo. Curiously enough this question of internal politics was brought to an issue by events so purely foreign to it that they can be regarded as accidental. The policy of isolation in the course of generations had become thoroughly popular with the ruling class. It was an axiom of political faith on which there was no difference of opinion. When Satsuma and Choshū therefore, early in the sixties, took positive action against European encroachments they had a right to expect support from the Yedo Government, and it is very doubtful if they gave even a glance at the ultimate effect their action was to have on the internal relations to the Government. The Yedo Government not only could not support them but had to promise to punish them as offenders against the hated barbarians. This brought the opposition together into one solid mass, the whole object of which was the removal of the Tokugawa from control of affairs as a preliminary to future arrangements. The only natural centre of the jealous interests in this opposition itself was the priest-emperor of Kyōto. The double pressure, foreign and domestic, and it is to be suspected the lack of the great leader really necessary at this threatening crisis, paralysed the Tokugawa opposition to this move. They temporized, and early dissensions, and hesitation on the part of Satsuma, at first gave them the advantage. Choshū rose prematurely and advanced on Kyōto. Met with vigour by the regent it was disastrously defeated. No advantage, however, was taken

of this check. This temporizing policy exposed the weakness of the Tokugawa position. Satsuma stepped in to prevent any punishment of the offending clan, and a few months saw the opposition again lined up ready for battle in the face of their scattered enemies. This time Satsuma formed its head and strength. The Tokugawa leaders accepted the situation, and with the single—and honourable—exception of Prince Aidzu handed over, without a struggle, the power to their victorious rivals.

The whole rise and course of this little civil war, and the results it brought in its train, seem sudden, but this is only in appearance. The material it was to work on was by no means unprepared. The long peace had given rise to a manufacturing population. A luxurious society had need of many articles, and a vastly increased population called for machinery of supplies and distribution that necessitated considerable expansion. Hence the rise into prominence of great cities like Yedo, Osaka, Nagoya, and Gifu, and the development of a population in which the personal relations between lord and retainer and serf were much more lax. As in Europe, Japan had begun to develop that city life which is fatal to feudalism, and as the rule of the Shōgunate grew weaker this is shown in the expression of the rising class. The people were beginning to think, and to note the flaws in their system. The existence of a class of fighting men who were of no use but to keep up private brawls soon appears as an anachronism. Such writers as Jippensha in the "Hizakurige" take many sly hits at the unwieldy *samurai*. These were the more palpable and legitimate in as much as while the people changed, the military class whose mould was more rigid than the others remained the same. Open ridicule of a man who not only carries two swords but has impunity and absolute injunction to use them is, of course, out of the question. The *samurai* was both judge and jury as to the necessity of punishing any disrespect from the lower class. But the spirit was there. The change in masters was viewed with something more than indifference by the people at large. The wide distribution for a generation of prints and pasquinades made the appeal to a Japanese people something more than a mere threat when a constitution and a legislative body seemed to be obstinately withheld by the leaders of the victorious clans. Such an appeal was received sympathetically even if such sympathy could take no effective form; but there was always the danger of a combination between the people and the "outs." From 1867 the question had taken on a national phase. It was no longer one between the clan leaders and their retainers.

§ 7.

Leaving historical questions aside, for the moment, we must return to political development. With European contact we break with the past, but the web merely takes on a new dye. It remains to be seen how much of the old can still be detected through the superficial layer of the new, and how much of the legacy of Old Japan still remains to influence the career of the New Japan. Here we shall look at this entirely on its political side, and as closely as possible thus confine our view of it, leaving to later chapters its development in other forms of social life. The first question is the nature of this legacy from the past. We have no such brilliant pen pictures of the first Japanese settlers as were made of the early stages of many other nations by Herodotus, Strabo, Pausanias, and other early geographers. A few scanty hints from dry Chinese official reports, the reading between the lines of Japanese traditional lore as handed down in books put into print much later in their history, is all we have to go on; and in dealing with these we must read between the lines very carefully so as not to confuse the period of the writer with the past for which he had little sympathy. They adopt and come under the binding influence of the code of a highly civilized nation at the earliest period of their historical career. The question is as to what extraneous element exists at this date. The distinctive element can be safely set down as at least non-Chinese. Now the introduction of the Chinese political code was marked—: (1) by the formation of a great number of *be* or guilds, the people being sharply set apart in classes. Hence it can be assumed that the structure was much looser in the preceding period.* This is the more likely as it is found necessary to introduce an elaborate governmental framework. The new code contains minute provisions for the formation of small units such as the *gonin* and fifty men units, and the relative responsibility of its different members and authority of its headmen. There is no mention or hint of the previous existence of

* Five out of the ten notices of *be* antedating Richū (400-405 A.D. ? introduction of Chinese learning) refer to the Age of the Gods. This is plainly an interpolation dishing up old legends to provide the basis of a cosmogyny. The *mibube* instituted by Nintoku is there formed for the nourishment of the divine infant Hiko-nagisa-take-u-gaya-fuki-akezu-no-Mikoto, or in plainer terms Jimmu's father. From Richū to Keitai (405-531 A.D.) there are twenty-six notices of *be*, fifteen of which come under Yūriaku. After Keitai the industrial organization can be said to be established on the *be* system. Under the tribes or clans it probably had existed, in a loose sense, for generations, Mr. Aston—on strong grounds—regards the *miyake* as a broadening of the function of the former *be*. The whole process is a nationalizing of industry.

such an elaborate structure, although we can assume that, with a people who had reached the agricultural stage, some unit had been evolved. It was plainly not serviceable under the adopted new and elaborate code. (2) Some of these *be* are set aside and specifically referred to as for imperial service. Chiefs are set over them and the headship is a reward granted at will by the king. As private *be* are formally abolished by edict in the seventh century their existence also is unquestioned. The two kinds, public and private, had existed side by side. The abolition it can be added was formal rather than effective. Private persons and officials remained as much as ever in ownership of the people. The relationship to the chiefs therefore ranges from the patriarchal to the bureaucratic chief. Some of these *be* were unquestionably made up of slaves; the temple *be* are constantly referred to in such terms. The claim to their services was arbitrary and unlimited. Many of them consisted of foreigners—Chinese, Korean, and Ainu. They are chattels, and are transferred at will. Some of them as plainly are serfs. The claim to their services is limited and their habitat is fixed. Some of them are of the military class, and to the man who has arms in his hands and on whom his leader must depend for supremacy neither serfdom nor slavery can be applied. These are the armed retainers of the chief. (3) These *be* are settled in one place. Movement of the units is forbidden or restricted to movement on official order when some public work is to be undertaken. We know that in early times movement was much freer. This follows of necessity from the nomad condition of the early Japanese as shown by their tradition. Jimmu's invasion of Yamato would not have been possible with a slave or serf population. (4) Transfer of chiefs implies their headship over something else previously existing. The hereditary chieftain is distinctly referred to in imperial annals and an abortive attempt made to make him entirely subject to appointment by the imperial power. This hereditary chieftainship is also shown by (5) the hot water cure applied by Ingyō to existing genealogies. (6) The classification is confessed as Chinese, and necessarily implies a pre-existing, if inefficient, condition of affairs on which it is an improvement. It can be added that a people that have reached the settled agricultural condition have already developed a somewhat complex political structure. (7) At the base of the whole structure we have the legend of the divine descent of the people, a "peculiar people" favoured of the gods, and this invariably implies kinship in tradition even if much diminished by time. If we add to these seven capitularies the fact, that the Japanese appear in their traditions as invaders; that at the time they are still in a migratory condition; that their head is a military chief ruling over a hunting and fishing population in which the agricultural element slowly increases with time; that the warfare with the aborigines always makes the militant element the potent factor in the budding civilization; we can assume that from the earliest times

the Japanese civilization has always taken that form described by Mr. Spencer as "compulsory co-operation"; and that this earliest type was made rigid by its crystallization into an inelastic caste system by the adoption, subsequent to 405 A.D., of a code from a people sympathetic in thought and far in advance in development—the Chinese.

It is this supremacy of the militant type, therefore, throughout their history that leads easily to the second question—how much has the past affected the Japanese type? We pass from the qualitative to the quantitative. The two predominant qualities of a people under military discipline—impersonality and obedience—are such a striking feature of the Japanese that these qualities have been early impressed on everyone who has made a study of them. To this day among the nations of the West, it is an axiom that the type of the military mind—whether found in the organization of the army or of the ecclesiastical hierarchy—is essentially narrow. Broad minded liberal treatment of a subject is not expected from a man trained to regard authority with reverential awe, and whose first and only thought is to take the word of command without question. The mind easily moulds itself, and it is a very essential quality of our military unit that it should take this rigid cast. His aims are purely practical not speculative. His value lies solely in being part of a machine ready to answer automatically to the pressure placed on it. In the narrowest sense of the word he is a specialist. As far as thought is concerned his one idea must dominate—that of obedience to authority. This has been the case and the curse of this Japanese people. Inheriting the military conditions of their nomad life, adopting a code formulated under like militant conditions by an advanced civilization, they have never been able to break with the past. The whole value of the military system lies in the fact that it acts by "suggestion." The head or chief must be able to direct not only his own physical forces but also all those of the units under him. And the deeper the hypnotic stage the more efficient the action of the head. We could adopt Professor Baldwin's illustration of mob rule, where the mob, swayed by the will of a few dominant men, rushes without thought like a herd of wild cattle, committing crimes which no constituent of it apart from its contagion would dream of in cold reason and as an individual. When we have not a short period but centuries of such rule by suggestion in which obedience, the soldiers obedience, to all the minutiae of the code is enforced on the people, it is not surprising that the elements have been grooved deep in the Japanese mind. There is absolutely no relief from this restraint in the whole history of the Japanese people. In the one brief period of the Golden Age the political code was entering more deeply into the minutiae of ceremonial. The scanty new materials offered the mind were purely æsthetic in character, and perhaps illustrate how incidental æsthetics are to man's development; a deduction

which will be little pleasing to those who like to think that art and the higher life are the dominant features. There is a curious practical illustration of the extent to which this paralysis of the mind has been carried among the Japanese; in common, be it added, with other peoples of the East, for long centuries subjected to their rulers. They are admirable hypnotic subjects, and hypnotism is a common feature in their religious practice. Possession by the gods, so ably described by Mr. Lowell, is not an outside feature but an ancient and essential element of Shintō. Thus the god took possession of the Empress Jingō in the legendary past. The subject is the means of contact with divinity and they treat the god very much as a member of the Japanese family. The whole performance is merely a hypnotical exhibition based on what Gibbon, in connection with eleventh century mysticism, has most lucidly described as "the production of a distempered fancy, the creature of an empty stomach and an empty brain."

There is one final question in reference to Old Japan, and that is the influence of their physical geography. The Greeks in their mountainous country developed a number of separate tribes independent of each other; but whose origin was probably homogeneous, separated only by time and difficulty of communication, and who were only brought together again by the outside pressure of a great invasion endangering their existence. Why did not the Japanese, under what seems the similar character of their invasion of the islands develop a series of small republics instead of an absolute monarchy? To some extent the answer is both geographical and geological. The Japanese islands are formed from a central volcanic ridge whose trend was broken by subsequent disturbances at oblique angles to it. The intersection of these ranges has given a structure not unlike the starring of a sheet of glass at any one point when broken. Several such subsidiary ranges cross the main range and complicate the system of valleys and ridges of which the larger portion of the country consists. One of these disturbances of the original simplicity lies East and West approximately across the island at about the parallel of the Izu peninsula, and the axis of the Fuji range cutting across the older central axis forms a physical barrier cutting off the narrow strip of shore line and breaking communication with the great Kwantō district, what is now known as the Tōkyō plain country, to the North. In the early history of Japan all this country was still in the hands of the Ainu, and the monarchy was well established before its conquest was undertaken. In fact the early monarchy was confined to Yamato and the country to the West and South of it, particularly the plain surrounding Kyōto. This plain is easily accessible to invasion through sheltered water channels, and it is noticeable that it is by water that the traditional emigration of Jimmu's tribe takes place. The inhabitants here had but one alternative, to fight or submit. The savages and wild country to the North cut off their retreat in that direction. They fought and submitted, which, with their incorporation as

equals, is indication enough that they were of the same race as the invaders. The conquest of the inland mountain country to the West could be carried on without difficulty by expeditions having their base on the inland sea, and such conquest was plainly one of some difficulty as the record of fighting and of frequent rebellion shows. The viceroy of Tsukushi at times claims his independence of the Kyōto court and does not hesitate to meet force with force. Sometimes they let him alone until a favourable opportunity rises to subdue him. At other times such rebellion is at once made the object of a punitive expedition. Feudalism in the twelfth century did split the country into a number of small and practically independent principalities, and the necessity of retaining this system, now spread over the whole great extent of the islands, only enabled Iyeyasu to adopt a series of checks and balances by which one portion could not grow at the expense of the rest. In 1860 Japan is properly described by resident foreigners as a collection of such small kingdoms whose chiefs were becoming more and more independent of their suzerain at Yedo. Foreign pressure here stepped in to maintain the balance and finally to bring the whole together in an effort to find some means to preserve their existence as an entity. The situation is curiously analogous to that faced by the leaders of the great western republic in 1783. As that "rope of sand," the Confederation was out of the question as a system efficient to resist foreign aggression, the Convention held at Philadelphia, by a sacrifice of certain rights to a central power, gave rise to the Federal Government of the United States of America. As that "rope of sand," Feudalism, was inefficient to protect Japan from foreign aggression so in 1867 the feudal chiefs sacrificed certain of their rights to the priest-monarch at Kyōto and formed the Japanese Empire. The situation was infinitely more critical in 1867 than that of 1783.

§ 8.

Foreigners, at least, have no object in surrounding this period of the restoration with a halo of romance that never existed. It was a case of sacrificing a part or running the risk, through dissension, of losing the whole. A new element had come into being—the People. It was impossible to recruit an efficient army from the military class alone. To form a militant society based on modern methods it was necessary to take the people into partnership. And for this partnership concessions of some kind were necessary. During the period from 1860-1875 foreign ideas had been filtering into the country either directly or through Japanese who had their inspiration from the fountain source in Europe itself. Too much credit cannot be given to

some of these men who secretly left the country at the risk of their lives and from pure desire to benefit their native land. Many of them were men, not commissioned to study western institutions with a view to their usefulness to the existing regime, but men whose object it was to try and bring Japan abreast of the whole range of modern western thought. It was these men who led the opposition in the struggle for a constitution, and they did wonders with their inefficient if earnest backing. The leaders of the military class were forced to make a concession in order to rule; but in granting the Constitution of 1890 they had no intention of imperilling their own position, and provision was carefully made ensuring that position by laying down the fundamental proposition, that no change was to be made in the Constitution without their consent—that is without the consent of the absolute head of which they were the mouthpiece. This having been secured the next aim was to limit the resources of the opposition by the exclusion of their most efficient supporters from any active share in the government. The great mercantile class, whose growth in the future could be easily predicted here as elsewhere, were carefully excluded from the suffrage which was limited to those holding revenue from land, and the basis of which was made so generously high as to seriously limit any influence that the small farming class might have obtained. This political castration of the greater part of the nation performed, the clan leaders could well rest satisfied with their work. The shadow of a representative body was tied down by an irrevocable constitution and by a hereditary upper house appointed by the dominant class, and was dominated by an irresponsible ministry who could dissolve them at will and rule on imperial ordinances and the last successful budget. Their very personal inviolability as members of the national assembly was nullified by a clause excepting cases that threatened the internal peace of the country. A most catholic exception, the limits of which lay within the determination of the Executive. A modern bureaucracy, therefore, stepped into the place of the old bureaucracy of Bakufu days; a bureaucracy quite as domineering and omnipresent in the life of the people as was ever conceived by any Japanese or Russian statesman. And to the present day the struggle of the liberal section of the Japanese Diet has been with this bureaucracy. The growth of the country has required extended resources, and from these hard necessities the Diet has gradually extorted from its enemies a limited extension of the suffrage to the mercantile classes, but it has been able to effect nothing in the way of a ministry responsible to the nation or of a serious influence of the nation on the national policy. One of the leaders of the military regime, in these days of 1906 when even among the military powers of Europe it is the People and not a class that direct the foreign policy of the nation, could at a public banquet cavalierly refer to the social order as requiring such distinctions as “nobles, officials, business men and so forth;” although just what essential rôle the first

played the noble speaker would have been puzzled to show, except to maintain their personal property in worn-out privileges. Very little have "the business men and so forth" to say in Japan.

Accepting the military system, however, there are a number of liberal minds whose object is to reconcile, if possible, the individualism necessary to an industrial society and the militarism which they conceive to be necessary to the peculiar situation of Japan and to the present period of the world's history. It is a class of men strongly influenced by the ethics of modern liberalism. In a sense this qualified support, enhanced by their known sentiments, is a tower of strength to the clan leaders. The struggle is found elsewhere and its solution has been attempted more or less successfully by the separation, as far as possible, of the civil and military functions of the government, the exclusion of the military spirit from the civil service. The army is growing less and less a menace to the French Republic; and England has always sharply differentiated the two principles ruling the bulwark of her military defence, her great navy in which absolutism exists, and her civil service from which the military spirit is rigidly excluded. The clan leaders are also maintained in their position by the timidity or unwillingness of the Japanese people to encroach on a sphere which they have been taught by generations of education to consider entirely outside their sphere. This calls to mind the early unwillingness of our own burgesses to mix themselves in the affairs of the nation which they had been taught to regard as exclusively the business of king and council, and which might involve them in affairs unfamiliar and remote from their interests. This spirit is carefully fostered among the Japanese to-day, and the unfitness of the people to have any direct influence on their own affairs, the fact that the Japanese lower house of the Diet consists of personal units acting on their own ideas and not representatives of a constituency, is carefully served up on every possible occasion. It is to be granted that the populace anywhere in their gatherings are largely swayed by their emotional temperament; and the Japanese, in spite of what is asserted to the contrary, are a highly emotional people. But responsibility always tempers emotion, and in the greatest heat of party strife in America, when the moment comes in cold blood to prepare the monumental blanket ballot, every man has an opportunity to act with thought and comprehension, and the test of a man's personal interests involved has been shown in campaign after campaign. It is education and discussion and the secret ballot cast in the retirement of the polling booth that prevents revolution and the rule of the mob carried away by "suggestion." Every effort of those social "reformers" who seek "popular rule" has been directed to breaking down this cold calculated expression of the individual will. They want a return to the good old days when men had to come out in the open. Hence we hear a great cry for simplification. Education is widespread in Japan, and the intelligence

with which the Japanese of the lower class considers and comments on his own interests and public interests as gathered from his newspaper is patent to everyone brought into contact with the common people. In the practical affairs of life they are as fit to rule themselves as any other people; as fit to select their representatives assembled in the Japanese Diet and to make it a truly representative body. The danger lies in their present helpless position, and hence the terrible anger of a people who feel that their vital interests have been sacrificed to a class, a feeling which would be much modified if action on the said interests were carried out by their own representatives. There is no danger in such a course. Hasty action aroused by debate is coldly reviewed in the committee room. The dangers of a wide franchise have been relegated to the land of myth, and the only section of the community interested in limiting its range are those interested in maintaining their special privileges. The "submerged tenth" cuts no real figure in political action, which is carried on by the solid elements forming the great majority—the ninety just persons—of the community. It is when the solid element stand aside indifferent, disgusted and unable to exercise any control over a small but politically supreme minority, that the extremists come into control. Hence the French Revolution; and perhaps similar explosions will arise in countries where the community is sacrificed to the selfishness of a caste. It is a matter of regret that in this respect, instead of showing signs of a widening of the political power of the *plebs*, the Government is invading the sphere of private life; and all kinds of schemes of Government monopoly, whether in mercantile pursuits or in finances, and the practical operation of some of these schemes, indicate a still greater extension of the paternal system exercised by the existing bureaucracy.

The situation is rendered simpler in Japan by the absolutism of the head of the State—the Emperor. Where the monarch stands apart from the two contending elements, and is not the head of one of them, the removal of the intervening class between him and his people is much easier. That a monarch must be surrounded by a court with more or less glitter seems to be what Mrs. Gamp would call "a dispensary of Providence," but the glitter can be reduced to tinsel and the cut and breadth of its coat left to the people who have to pay for it. A people who cannot forego the pretty picture of princes and nobles for the simplicity of a republican establishment can at least prevent such dangerous pets from developing dangerous qualities, and if the operation of emasculation is to be performed on any part of the community it is better carried out on this portion of the body politic. The vigorous portion should be left untouched. No particular difficulties arise in this connection in Japan. The present bureaucracy is not a hereditary class. It lives on the sunshine of that fountain of honour, the emperor through his ministers. In Europe—in Germany for instance—it is a hereditary caste of which the emperor is the titular head. In Japan,

loss of position reduces the holder to an original (and oriental) insignificance. This renders the military system in vogue all the more severe; the control of the leaders all the more drastic. The position of the Japanese official who has fallen under the displeasure of his chiefs is pitiable. He is a soldier dismissed in disgrace. He must in a positive sense lose caste in seeking his daily bread by mercantile pursuits, and to ~~beg~~ he is ashamed. The real nobility of the country the *kuge* or court nobles—are a worn-out and faded remnant. They have lost all political prestige and represent nothing but a past ceremonial. The men of influence among them do not owe that influence to their position, but to their wealth or their ability or to both.

Nations in the course of their development owe much to each other. It is a debt not always acknowledged. We in America are pleased to think that the early connection with France was confined to such assistance as was given when that country stepped into the arena to distract and divide the energies of an antagonist already worsted in the fight. We like to think that Englishmen, developing English institutions under conditions more favourable than those of the mother country, were enabled to dispense with certain superfluous and worn-out portions of the machinery, and that the whole represented a regular and normal growth. That the American Constitution was a regular growth is true, and that it is the development of our institutions brought from the mother country is also true; but in adjusting it to the new conditions the men who wrought it into shape were men who had made a deep study and were greatly influenced by the liberal French philosophy of the eighteenth century. Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, and the Encyclopedists, with their revised study of the *Jus Naturale* as exemplified and developed out of the Roman *Jus Gentium*, made a deep impression on the minds of the American legislators, and largely guided them in removing anachronisms from a code based on custom but in which privilege to a large extent had entrenched itself, and so with the Japanese. Their modern thought they owe and must continue to owe to Europe. It is to the liberal thought of modern Europe that they owe the wide expansion of the fine but limited ethical treatment given to personal relations in their native Bushidō or Knight's Way. It is to this liberal thought of the west that they owe its expansion from devotion to a petty local chieftain to a magnificent patriotism to country in the modern sense. Bushidō was not only local but at its best was only racial. The new Bushidō—patriotism—is not only racial but binds these different units into one community of interest through a common country, which the Japanese epitomise in their Emperor, not in their bureaucracy, be it added. It was unfortunate that this influence did not preside over the birth of the Japanese Constitution. It was still more unfortunate that the most reactionary, most ruthless, and the most experienced of European statesmen should have had the moulding of the new nation. Another might have done

the work less completely. The Iron Chancellor of Germany, as he fastened the medizeval Constitution of Prussia on this people ready to rise and take their place in the world struggle, must have smiled at the new stumbling block he was placing in the way of liberal thought and progress. To him indeed "nobles, officials, business men and so forth" were distinctions necessary to the body politic.

II.

RES ANGUSTAE DOMÛS.

"Hark you me, dear soul, a word with you;—but "
"pray be not angry. How thick do you judge the "
"planks of our ship to be?' 'Some two good inches "
"and upwards,' returned the pilot; 'dont fear.' "
"Odschilderkins,' said Panurge, 'it seems we are "
"within two fingers breadth of damnation.' "

Rabelais. (Urquhart and Motteux-trans.)

§ 1

Morphological changes in the embryo, and certain anatomical peculiarities reminiscent of a previous state of culture and which adult man of the present day, and in polite society, carefully conceals from public view, lead us to believe that at his earliest appearance on the world's stage he was an arboreal animal, took a more elevated view of the world, and consorted with birds rather than beasts. Hence he built his first habitation in the trees, and life being in part devoted to hanging on his arms took a length in relation to his legs which would to-day call forth comment. Also his legs took the graceful arch of a curve still found among mariners of the old school and gained by shinning up masts, or by gentlemen much devoted to straddling a horse. He was palpably gifted with a tail, which he has seen fit to leave off on coming to earth, retaining only the memory of it in the habiliments of his females and among some savage races; some of these latter have been so conservative as to maintain the old ancestral habit of roosting aloft. Man as a race, however, reached the ground and stayed there. As he probably found much trouble in his first manipulations of the rough flint implements he certainly took his first dwelling ready made and esconced himself in such caves and corners of the rocks as admitted of easy defence against undesirable visitors; it being his main object at this date to eat and not be eaten by larger and more powerful beasts, his own kind included, for his penchant for human marrow is lamentably evident from the scorched and cracked shins and other bones collected around his ancient fire places. Indeed in this quality of feeding to-day we can not claim any superiority over our simian cousins, for man has always remained a carnivorous animal developing and strengthening his appetite for flesh by domesticating flocks and herds of more readily managed beasts with the specific purpose of rending them apart and devouring them; his only limitation in some cases being not "to seethe the kid in its mother's milk." But even the more powerful of the simians, the anthropoid apes, live largely on fruits and nuts, and confine their destruction of

...ing attacked their host
...ance and diet—from the

...the then existing animals when
...appeared among them, with his
...intelligence taught them instinctive-
...directing the otherwise weak form. The
...to use a weapon was a terrible advantage
...him to attack at a distance convenient
...advantage that even the savage cave bear would
...learn when he found his sides pricked and torn by
...pointed claws in the paws of the tormenting crowd of
...safely out of the reach of his claws. But man had other
...for animals than their use as food. For some cause,
...less constant exposure to the weather, he was becoming
...Not bald in our ridiculously limited sense of the term, but
...in a general sense; for at that time his fur was much more widely
...scattered over his person than even among the hairiest races of
...our day. This disappearance or thinning out of hair from the
...limbs, back, and belly, must have been widespread enough to
...become fashionable; or hairy men were at such disadvantage,
...physical or æsthetical, as to cause their disappearance through
...disease or inability to compete successfully for the favours of
...the fair sex. The early cave dwellings were undoubtedly
...very damp; and, while other things being equal the hairy man
...at first would have gained some advantages from his covering,
...he would have lost it when the use of skins of other animals
...came in as a protection from cold. His hairy covering would
...have retained moisture much longer than the bare skin of the
...hairless man. To this day we seek to dry our hair as quickly as
...possible after bathing. The use of fire would have accentuated
...his drawbacks, and certainly the preference of the female in
...choosing between a man arrayed in his own selfish pelt and the
...man arrayed in the fur of some animal, palpable proof of his
...powers in the chase, would fall on the latter. Woman was given
...but little choice in matters of courtship in those days but in the
...presence of two claimants to her person she would naturally add
...her feeble powers to the most attractive. In the absence of a
...competitor the hairy man would have taken possession of her
...anyhow, which perhaps accounts for the remnants of this article
...of adornment still clinging to our person.

The question as to how man first obtained the idea of fire is
an interesting one. That he was acquainted with it as a terrible
element is simply to associate his feelings with those of any other
animal. Forest fires, started by lightning, doubtless drove him at
times from his lair. In southern Arizona there is a great forest
tract so laid low and subsequently fossilized. Volcanoes also were
a natural exhibition of this element. These, however, presented
an agreeable feature in warmth of the ground and of hot springs
in their neighbourhood. As far as he dared primitive man
doubtless took advantage of this warmth, but volcanic fires would

hardly teach him a method of imitating them on a small scale. The kindred nature of sparks obtained by striking two flints together would, however, soon attract the attention of even the lowest savage and the accidental kindling of some dry moss on which the sparks fell would give him the necessary clue. The warmth obtained, his power of control over it would complete the mental process. This desire for warmth could lead to much the same discovery, for the swinging of the arms to keep warm is a very natural process which would lead to the vigorous rubbing of two sticks together to get the necessary exercise. Friction of this character would lead to the same discovery and its improvement in time to the pointed stake and its anvil which has been handed down to this day in the religious rites of some highly civilized peoples; as for instance in Japan. This picture of our Neanderthal ancestor and the man of Spy is perhaps not an attractive one, but unfortunately is supported by the remains they have left behind them. This uncouth savage, almost animal, with pronounced prognathism, with bent legs and long arms, was our pioneer in the discovery of shelter and fire, of which our modern civilization with all its complexities is nothing but a development. The first use of cooked food "though puzzling is not beyond conjecture," and has been attributed to some such happy accident as that to which the gentle Elia attributed the discovery of roast pig. Facility for keeping led to the partial cooking or smoking of food and to a gradual development of the taste for it in that form. Boiling is almost a natural step toward softening any object. Boiled meat-soup would be early used. Cooked food was certainly an acquired taste. Man still prefers some forms of raw flesh, as shown in its use in that form of fish and some kinds of game. As with animals, shelter of some kind at this earliest period, especially during the hours of repose and sleep, was of absolute necessity. Man must have the protection of his lair during his period of unconsciousness. Such shelter has been man's "two inches" of salvation from damnation.

The nature of the covering man puts over his head is of the greatest importance. It is characteristic. It shows whether he means to stay in the place he has selected for a home. A people who live only in tents—whether it be an Indian's tepee or the gorgeous shelter which covered the rough barbarism of the Tartar Khans—have never developed a great civilization as long as they made use of such temporary structures. The flimsy shelters made of wattles and mud are little better, and the flux and flow of such population according as game or fish became scarce in a given district show the same reciprocal influence of habitation and people. It is only when man gives serious labour to permanent structures, strong enough to last for some length of time and protect his harvested grains from one season to the other that he begins to enter on that career which has meant so much to the world's present history. It is safe to say that not until he became an agriculturist did he begin to build in the true sense of the term; and as is often the case in

rural districts to-day, his barns or granaries were probably much more important than his dwelling; that is, when the two did not coincide. Permanent residence in one spot, which in itself would indicate in primitive times favourable conditions of living, would give rise to more elaborate building and hence finish in place of roughness is an important indication as to how far a civilization has been carried. It implies long residence not only in the nation but in the individual, for no man would think, then or now, of spending great efforts or his reserve (money or its equivalent) on work which he expected soon to abandon. The influence of a man's shelter therefore comes home to him not only in its physical sense as a protection from wind and weather, but it has had its influence on his character. He began to think. He planned not only for the present but for future harvests. Any disadvantages that his chosen spot possessed had to be nullified or turned, if possible, to advantages. Hence dykes and drainage ditches and irrigation channels. The more labour he expended on it with an eye to the future the more eager he was to reap the benefits in that future and the greater his tenacity of possession. The longer man's life is passed on a given spot, the longer the association of his past with it, the stronger the tie between them as he grows older and begins to live more and more in that past. This feeling for "the old homestead" as it is called to-day finds vigorous expression in most unexpected quarters and the influence of a locality with which men have long been associated through their forebears, but from which their own affairs have separated them, is shown in the sentimental maintenance of some old house or the adornment of some little village with which the donor has long since lost any practical connection. Indeed in the present flux and flow of population, this interknitting of communities through the sentimental feelings of its individual members is of no small value. The term "mother country" has a real meaning apart from its sentiment.

Coasting along the islands surrounding the Arafura Sea, or along the Philippines, there can be seen a number of the native villages dotting the shore or the inlets. The houses of these villages are all constructed substantially in the same manner, being erected on piles or pillars and raised some distance from the ground. A platform is built on top of the piles and the house itself is erected on the platform and is reached by means of a ladder. I have here used the term "piles" advisedly for many of these houses are built over the water high above reach of tide or freshet. The inhabitants thus secure easy access to their boats, and an easy, if slovenly, method of disposing of all refuse. The same type of residence can be seen on the outskirts of Honolulu where the Hawaiian Chinese adopted this method of living. Now this kind of house answers almost exactly to the description of a house often built in ancient Japan. In fact this building on piles over running water is almost the only evidence of a connection between the Japanese and their Malay neighbours on the south, evidence of no value ethnologically as the same

habit has been adopted all the world over by peoples similarly situated. It is found in South America, in Melanesia, and was widely extended in Europe of neolithic times. Herodotus describes the lake dwellers of northern Thessaly as living in just such a manner in the fifth century B.C.; just as Columbus so describes the tribes living along the shores of the Pearl Sea in 1500 A.D. Whenever peoples live close to the water to-day, civilized or uncivilized, the practice is still continued whether it is a village of southern Sweden, an amusement pavilion on the Great Salt Lake of Utah, or a fishing hamlet along the Shimono-seki Strait in Japan. This type of structure, however, was not the only form of ancient Japanese house. The most important model—of which the Japanese house of to-day is a near and lineal descendant—was the house of the land dwellers. The floor of this was the beaten earth, and the walls were wattled and plastered between stout posts. The door was not the sliding panel such as is used to-day but the hinged door familiar to the western world. Inside the house a hearth occupied the centre and a narrow elevated platform ran around the side walls and on this the inmates slept; a custom attributed by Sir Ernest Satow, from whom this description is taken, to the greater prevalence of venomous serpents in the Japan of early times. This narrow platform or *yuka* gradually widened until it formed a platform without break occupying the whole surface, as is the case with the present Japanese house. Now it is an important fact that the old style Japanese house has by no means disappeared. The narrow *yuka* and the hinged door, if not a common are a frequent sight in the mountain districts, and it is only as the settled neighbourhood is approached that the *yuka* widens and the central hearth becomes more and more encroached on by the *tatami*. Even in the villages a remnant of the old style is found necessary for the exigencies of an agricultural life. Passages are left open to give access to the rear or to a court, a most inconvenient arrangement. The houses are often divided into two portions, the chasm being bridged by removable boards thrown across it. That the present Japanese method of living in such cases is not well adapted to the multifarious comings and goings of a people largely engaged in outside work is self evident. They are conservative, however, and instead of moving the passageway to the side of the house usually keep it in the centre, and if the bridge is not handy *Ojisan* or *Obasan* scramble down on their clogs to cross the three or four feet separating them from the other section of their abode.

It has been pointed out by Henry Thoreau, somewhere in his diary, that the lines of the Chinese roof recall the graceful sweep from the centre to the supporting poles of the old Tartar tent. In the general lines of their building there is no reason to believe that the Japanese have borrowed anything from the Chinese except the grouping of the different buildings. Hence the lines of the Shintō temples at Ise, the model of which carries us back nearly fifteen hundred years in history and which

can be carried still farther by a tolerably reliable tradition as to its general lines, can be taken as native in their origin; and their similarity to this tent structure referred to can be regarded as a remnant handed down to the Japanese from the times when they were tent dwellers, perhaps on the plains of northern Asia. The destruction and rebuilding of these temples on exactly the same lines and every twenty years, not only at Ise and Izumo but at other places of religious importance in the islands, has kept alive a form of architecture which might have perished if renewal had simply been left to periods of necessity when accident or decay required a new building, erected not according to any religious formula but according to the necessity of the moment. Once more the habit of Japanese formalism has stepped in and even the religious bias of the race leads them to an unchanging standard. This constant remodelling on the traditional lines of the ancient hut or house to-day sets the standard for all civil architecture except a few exotics imported from Europe and the foreign settlements. There is one feature to note in reference to this early Japanese house; namely, that it was generally confined to a single floor. We get a hint of this in the episode concerning the fiery emperor Yūriaku (457 A.D.) whose eye was attracted, during one of his hunting expeditions, by the two storied house erected by one of his nobles. This was a privilege exclusively reserved for royalty, on whom under any circumstances it is forbidden to look down. Indeed the royal palaces contain but a single floor obviating any danger of some plebeian unconsciously and metaphorically trampling over the royal scone. In this case Yūriaku seemed to be in a better temper than usual, for the offender escaped with a heavy fine but preserved intact his skin. It can be added that this feeling exists at the present day. When there is one of the rare appearances of the Emperor, there is no rush to obtain upper windows that would be found on a kindred occasion in Europe. This would be a grave offence in Japan—to overlook their Emperor. It is safe to say that when he passes along the lines of thousands of school children, not one in a hundred gets a glimpse of his face; for as he approaches the word is given along the line, hands are folded on the breast, and eyes are turned to the ground until the imperial shadow has passed.

Even among buildings of public importance there are but few of genuine age still existing. There are near Nara remnants of the early Golden Age—the seventh and eighth centuries—which have escaped Time, and more particularly fires which generally account for Japanese temples and palaces. Art treasures are usually kept in fire proof buildings—*kura*—and hence a fire does not mean the general destruction ordinarily involved by that scourge. The existing structures are mainly of Chinese origin—pagodas or bell towers—but the practice of rebuilding temples and palaces on a fixed model renders description of these early buildings easy, and their ground plan is equally interesting in existing structures coming down to us from

the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The first thing that strikes the attention is the Chinese system of approach by courts. These become more complicated with the rank and importance of the occupant until in the imperial palaces are found long series of such approaches to the inner sanctum or private apartments of the emperor. The separation of the chief's dwelling or tent from his followers is still carried out to-day in a high wall enclosing the whole compound which is entered by an outer gate or gates. Within this wall is a large court surrounded by buildings, further entrance being effected by a second gate and a second court the buildings surrounding which are devoted to officials whose duties bring them in closer contact with the head of the State; and so it continues through courts and buildings devoted to public receptions or audiences to the actual dwelling part of a vast establishment. On a small scale we find the same arrangement in the nobleman's *yashiki* of pre-restoration days. A great gate gave entrance to a court faced by buildings in which were lodged the *samurai* in attendance on their lord and always ready for his defence. To right and left were buildings for the use of his higher household officers, and for store-rooms and other necessary purposes. Raised on a terrace, and usually separated by a low wall and a second gate, was the lord's mansion. The whole was surrounded by a high wall pierced only by the main gate and a postern gate, the latter kept locked and not for general use. The dwelling portion was the same in plan as to-day. Of prince or peasant, the difference lay only in fineness of the material used, softness and thickness of the tatami, and the occasional rare and costly ornament displayed in the *tokonoma*.

Now there is one thing which, I think, will strike the attention at once. The similarity displayed here between East and West. We must remember that in an examination of this Japanese civilization we are considering not a people who have passed through many phases, so much so as to be radically altered from their primitive condition, but we are considering a people who have lived on one model continuously to within a very recent period and are essentially, in habit of mind and thought, the same to-day as they were a thousand years ago. The Japanese system is still patriarchal. The family is the unit. And this is the secret of the Japanese house, ancient and modern. Just as it was the secret of the Roman house two thousand years ago. In fact the architectural similarity is most striking. If we compare the Japanese *yashiki* or nobleman's house with the house of a Roman noble; in the first we find the retainers and household officers interposed between the public and private apartments of the master; in the second we pass into the *atrium* given over to the household retainers and public business of the master, then we pass through a narrow passage into the *peristylum* or private apartments of the family. Even the Roman *oculus* or family general room cannot be said to be lacking in the Japanese house where all was open; and the garden in the rear is a common feature, although the Roman *peristylum*, a court

surrounded by buildings and devoted to ornamental gardening, is quite commonly found. Now this retirement within the family life means extended formalism in the relations with the outside world. The family makes up a little world of itself, and beyond it relations are purely official and regulated by a formula. This was the case both in ancient Rome and in Old Japan, and this formalism cannot be carried to a great extent with the outside world without influencing the inside world. Hence both in ancient Rome and in Old Japan we find formulæ largely governing family life. Nothing seems to be able to split this apart but the friction caused by international relations. It was the case in Rome, and the change from that condition in which the father was absolute in his control over the lives of his children, to that condition in which the Roman woman was in complete control of the enjoyment of her property and had a personal license perhaps better if somewhat restrained, is marked by the progress of Rome's international relations. There is undoubtedly a difference in racial character also involved. The Roman people always remained a factor to be cajoled with vast public spectacles; and the life of the people was in a sense a joyous one with their *lustralia* and the games in the Circus and Arena, at which all classes of society were intermingled. The Germanic element brought into the combination, as found in the modern nations of Europe, was not of a kind to foster formalism. Hence although the iron rule of feudal times was such as to separate class from class, yet they were brought together in such spectacles as the "Mystery" and "Miracle Plays" and the festivals of a religious organization which, in theory at all events, levelled all ranks before its hierarchy. There was no sullen separation, such as the *samurai* to the *No* and the people to the degraded dramatic representations. Modern Europe, especially the nations of the South—France, Spain, and Italy—have become widely separated from the old theory of their household life. The home, in fact, seems to have become only the centre for legitimacy and relations with the State. The real life is found in the social or public life, in which relations have become almost purely individual. Hence has sprung up a life of *cafés* and theatres—the life of the *boulevardier*—which has reached to the smallest towns and even villages of continental Europe. Strange to say the remnants of formalism have clung more closely to some of the nations still more advanced in individualism, but that is largely due to a religious influence which as yet associates pleasure of any kind with moral sin; and hence the Anglo-Saxon drinks his coffee or tea at home for fear of being damned if he drink it in company. Only in large cities can the unbelieving swine find company to keep them countenance, and the very recklessness of the procedure leads to a call more frequently for cocktails than coffee, on the principle perhaps that it is as well to "be hanged for a sheep as a lamb." Of this general daily public out door life the Japanese even to-day know nothing. They go to their festivals and flower shows *en masse* but these are very set occasions.

If European society underwent an evolution developing in itself functions, and machinery for those functions more and more complex, Japanese society, however, adopting ready made from a foreign nation a completed form, proceeded to adapt itself to that form, thereby cutting off all incentive to initiative so valuable at a certain stage of life whether it be the life of a man or of a nation. That change goes on in Japan during this period is true, but it is a change bringing units into more perfect harmony with environment—the system. That there is great differentiation within the system is also true but here again the changes are akin to chemical changes tending to crystallization, not to biological changes involving vital functions. The Japanese house played no small part in this phenomenon. As it is to-day, so it was in the past; a platform raised a few feet from the ground, with just enough wall to give the structure solidity, the only division of the dwelling space so secured being by means of paper screens sliding in grooves and easily removed, thereby throwing the whole into one large room, a course often adopted in the hot summer weather. Built, as it often is, around a court or garden, the general view of the interior structure is still more readily comprehended at a glance. In fact there is less privacy in the average Japanese home than in a barracks. The different members of the household carry out their avocations or the necessary calls of daily life very much under each other's eyes. Such a thing as privacy in the Japanese house barely exists and was still less visible in olden times before any western ideas had filtered into the country. We have no parallel to such a condition to-day in the west. Open as was the life in the Roman family the *cubicula* were walled-off apartments lining the *peristylum* and afforded a considerable degree of privacy, and their furniture with articles of more unmoveable nature, such as beds, couches, chairs, stands, adapted them to uses of particular people and thereby setting aside for private use certain specified portions of the home. That the Roman *pater* shifted from *cubicula* to *cubicula* as suited his fancy, exchanging his own softer and ampler couch for the harder pallet of one of his sons, is as unlikely as that he dragged this ampler couch after him in a migration from room to room. Besides, the private apartments, especially of the Roman lady, are a frequent object of description in their literature, and their luxury is at times an object of satire. The impersonal cushion to squat on the floor, the futons or sleeping quilts rolled together and put away during the day only to be brought out and divided at night, a little table or writing desk, hardly give ground for the development of that individuality so prominent a feature in western life. As for one's own room—it is not known. Indeed our nearest comparison to this life of Japan in past and present among the mass of the population—apart from certain rare and isolated examples still found among the "Blue Smoky mountains" of eastern Kentucky and Tennessee—is found among our Norse ancestors. These, it is true, often slept where they fell

overcome by the heady ale or mead ; but the usual place was in open bunks lining the great hall, a partial privacy being afforded to a few prominent individuals by doors closing the front and which could be secured on the inside. To our more rabbit-like mind of the twentieth century, the individual so distinguished would be no object of envy, for the reason for this privacy was that the occupant should run less risk of sleeping his long sleep with a dagger in his heart. Under such conditions of publicity did these old Norsemen live and multiply ; and the same can be said of Japan.

In the family life, therefore, the different members are under the eyes of each other almost continually. Where, as in children, action is almost entirely by "suggestion" and imitation, it can be seen that the complete control of them by their elders paralyzes any initiative, and perhaps to it can be set down the lack of spontaneity so characteristic of them among the Japanese. Even in their little games among themselves the idea is not to devise something new, some variation, but to faithfully follow the model in front of them. But the whole object of Japanese education was not, and is not, to teach the child to think. It is to teach them to think and act in a certain way. It is the only way if the object be to ensure the continuance of a given system selected as ideally good. The development of the mind, the evolution of the "sport," whether crank or genius, can only be obtained through the individual and through freedom of thought. And, as has been pointed out by Professor Baldwin, it is to the genius and to the exceptionally able individuals that society must look for that compounding of its materials which will give the race an onward push in its evolution. The whole object of the Japanese system, however, was exactly the opposite. Segregation at any cost was to be prevented. Similarity of type was the object sought. No advantage was to be granted to individual peculiarities, which, on the contrary, were to be thwarted and stunted in every way, and if necessary crushed out. Our socialists and communists, who are to-day nosing around and devoting reams of paper evolving schemes by which liberty, equality, and fraternity in its literal sense can be made a real feature of social life, and by which this pestilential brain power can be equalized in the community, are undertaking a very superfluous search. The whole scheme has been worked out ages ago, and carried to completion by these Orientals in China and Japan. To study the goal toward which the modern socialism tends, and all the consequences following in its train, there is no better object lesson than Japan past and present.

This constant influence of the older generation by precept and "suggestion," this rebuke and crushing out of any individuality as soon as it raised its head, this insistence on the conformity of thought to the prevailing system, was therefore greatly aided by the public life carried on in the household. As there was but little change induced in the system itself by contact with the outside world, the whole tended to harden more and more into

the inelastic machine which marks Japanese life, public and private. A second important feature was found in the picture of the system itself thus presented to the eyes of the young. Its different castes were continually before them, public and private. As the family life was public, so the members in their personal relations were more or less always on dress parade. Family and dependents were all grouped together in this open structure. The due reserve must be maintained between the different layers, and hence that intimacy of family life, that abandon which exists between parents and children, was much less developed among them than in the West. In its unreserve this is only given to very young children. Probably if the old Japanese had ever dreamed of the importance of guiding babyhood in its acquisition of knowledge it, too, would have been subjected to the system, but comparatively speaking it is unrestrained. Indeed so purely imitative is the child in early years that no further discipline is necessary. It sees the system in operation before its eyes and naturally adapts itself and its little bows and salaams and young-old behaviour to what it sees in its elders. As soon as it begins to think seriously however,—at the school age of seven or eight—it is already subjected to the family discipline, and the line is drawn with a tightness unknown in the western world. Japanese parents rarely have to physically punish a child. Beating or slapping is considered very bad form, even among the lower classes. The cold calculating torture of burning with the moxa (punk) is oftener resorted to. But the system is so important among the Japanese that a trifling violation of its precepts gives an earnestness and a seriousness to the few cold words of rebuke and the manner of the offended parent that the child quickly feels its misdeeds widen to some unknown range. The mystery of overhanging misfortune is thereby much enhanced. There is a sense of sacrilege committed, awful even to much older minds. The intention is, without any reference to age or ignorance, to wound and cut to the quick. The essential point, therefore, is to fit the child into the system as far as it is to bear on it in the future. Its place in the caste is determined. Its permanent niche is already formed, and deference from an inferior and deference to a superior form a necessary and accentuated part of household training, easily effected where the ceremonial on the part of all is constantly in operation. There is no such republic as the English public school for the young Japanese of the upper class. Indeed the object of his education is the direct opposite. It is to impress on him, throughout, the importance of ceremonial. His liberal ideas to-day are all borrowed from abroad. The brotherhood of man is an exotic in Japanese feeling. Charity in Old Japan was confined to the caste.

Privacy strictly speaking is a privilege of the great. Even in the West as we filter down through the layers of the population it diminishes in value and practice. The poor too much need the assistance of their neighbours to maintain reserve. In

fact such reserve arouses a sense of hostility among them. In the Old Japan what privacy there was belonged entirely to the upper classes, and its value was much diminished by the constant call of ceremonial which practically brought the circle as represented by the household into the larger circle as represented by society in general. For the great mass of the population only privacy of a very minor character existed. Their houses were built closely together in rows lining narrow streets, and as the structure of the house was in no way altered the family life was as much open to neighbours as the different houses in the nobleman's compound were open to each other. This may be a great convenience in studying Japanese life to-day, and to a Japanese whose attention would only be aroused by some abnormality, rare among them as a subject of dislike, it possibly causes no inconvenience. Vain as he is man soon gets tired of the same sight, and very few men care to spend their time before a mirror. To a European with his marked individuality, and who often gives a sigh of relief when he feels himself alone and free from the light restraint placed on him and his thoughts in public life, it would be intolerable. To the Japanese, however, such displays of individuality are displeasing, the discipline of the community is readily accepted, and a man's house is in no sense his castle. Government supervision of the complete militant type, therefore, has been rendered very easy by these centuries of discipline of a people who practically live in the open; their actions and their very thoughts, as displayed in their actions, patent to every passer by, and in which any peculiarity, every deviation from the norm would attract the attention at once. Language is not the only means of displaying the inner man, and it is not necessary to be within earshot, although earshot has a wide range through paper walls. We talk as much by signs as by words and are almost as readily understood. In fact the dictum that words are given to conceal thought has frequent application, but control over the emotions is a rarer quality than control over one's tongue. "Trusting the tongue and slippery speech of man; though in his acts alone you truth can find" says old Solon, the law-giver. We do not mean to say that this publicity eliminates curiosity. Quite the contrary. No people are more curious than the Japanese. With them curiosity takes the widest license. It is a common experience with foreigners to find some difficulty in teaching servants to knock before entering a room. The same practical test can be made in a Japanese hotel, where closed *shoji* soon arouse comment, and it is not long before they are softly pushed aside the intruder accounting politely for the act with the most transparent "white lie." They practice it equally among themselves, and it has its amusing side to watch a group under such circumstances—the fatal attraction of the closed *shoji*. First discussion and glances; then the committee of one, probably self appointed and the most impudent of the group; then the intrusion always taken in good part, mutual explanations and courtesy on both sides; and this little secret service

expedition carried out for the benefit of the community, the committee rejoins the group to retail the information gathered and to continue the interrupted conversation.

§ 2.

It has been said that the social unit among the Japanese is not the individual but the family. Let us examine this unit and see just what is meant by the family in Old Japan and in Japan of to-day which has legally preserved the ancient establishment. It is the family in the patriarchal sense that we find occupying the house just described and on which the nature of the dwelling is to exercise its influence, whether conservative or otherwise. The family has a much wider extension than with us in the West. At the head is the father; but as the sons grow up and marry, instead of setting up an establishment for themselves they bring their wives to live in the homestead. If a daughter marries she severs her connection with the family to enter that of her husband. (Except in those cases where there is no male heir and the son-in-law is adopted by his wife's father.) The sentimental relation of course still exists between parents and child, but her father and mother to whom her obedience is due are now her husband's father and mother. She is more than daughter in law; she is daughter. The Japanese household, therefore, normally consists of parents, children, and grand children. The different interests of several establishments in the western sense are brought not only under one roof but into one household. Such different interests, therefore, cannot exist in Old Japan. If one of the lower classes—sons followed the father's trade and were in the status of apprentices. If a noble family they formed part of his train. At the present day movement of the population is freer. Among the upper classes, especially where they have been brought into personal contact with western thought, the call for a separate establishment is more frequently heard when the son takes to himself a wife; and the exigencies of a great central bureaucracy, sending men to far distant points are breaking up materially the concentration in one narrow centre. The widening circle of modern life in time will be too strong for the old system. The upper classes are still in intimate contact with the State and the militant system has full sway over them. With widening sphere this will disintegrate, more and more, the Japanese family circle. With the great mass of the people the early practice of following the parent's trade is still pursued but the development of manufactures has caused some modification. However it remains a fact, that no matter how great the personal sacrifice,

as soon as the call is made to return to the paternal roof it is promptly obeyed; and it is also a fact that the parent rarely consults the interests of the child. The average Japanese lives very much in the present and change of status is so difficult that the rise in the world of his offspring is rarely dreamed of as a possible outcome. Cases of a most unpleasant indifference in this regard are frequent enough; as when some old *saké* drinking scoundrel sends his daughter off to the brothels of the Yoshiwara to certain disease and probable early death, and pockets the price of her body, not so much of her shame for that can hardly be said when her part in the transaction is such an innocent one.

In Old Japan the father's power as head of the family was very drastic. In fact there is little to distinguish it from that of the Roman *pater*, as well in its original extent as in its gradual diminution. He had as much control over the life of a son as over the life of a slave. As relations in the State were not between individuals but between families, and as the offence of a member of the family could be visited on the family, perhaps it was felt necessary that such power of control over its members should be vested in the head. However its unlimited sway was soon trenched upon. In both Rome and Japan we early find the family in relation to a central power in the State which controlled and directed them through their head. Such central powers are notoriously jealous and encroached on the power still left to their units. In Rome, therefore, public opinion acting through the censor early limited the exercise of the *pater's* power. This interference could be invoked by the family council. Even late in the time of the empire the power of the father extended over the life of the son; but it had fallen into innocuous desuetude, and in the rare cases in which it was exercised to the limits of the death penalty punishment of the parent by confiscation of property and banishment often followed. That this paternal power was exercised under the supervision of the state is shown by the scene described by Seneca, when Tarius, whose son had plotted against his life, called on the Emperor Augustus and other friends to be present at the confrontation of the guilty man with the evidences of his crime; and the merciful action of the father in this case met with the applause of the emperor who had only consented to attend in his capacity of friend. Even slaves had some protection under the same monarch. When the slave of Vedius Pollio let fall and break the valuable crystal goblet, his master, disregarding the presence of Augustus, at once ordered him to be thrown to the lampreys. The unfortunate man fell at the emperor's feet begging the boon not of life but of an easier death; and Augustus in anger and disgust revoked the sentence, ordered his master to free the slave on the spot, and ordered the crystal goblets and vessels to be broken into fragments. This was distinctly an exercise of imperial power, but in neither case be it noted was the right of either father or master to pass sentence disputed. It was the same in Japan. A restraining power is evidenced in the family council. We find early record of the power

of this council in the history of the imperial family. With a woman on the throne and an ambitious minister, it is the family council that steps in to restore the waning prestige of the monarch, and it is through the family council that the Fujiwara waxed so strong as to govern the state through its head, the emperor. In fact we see it long before Fujiwara, in the Soga family; and the Empress Suiko (592-627 A.D.) indignantly refuses to violate her imperial duty to carry out the family mandate as laid down by its head and her uncle, Soga no Iname. The father had unlimited power over the lives of the family in Japan, but he too had a central power in the State to deal with, and to which the family council could turn for a hearing. Indeed the necessity of this as a corollary to the family theory held by the State is evident, for otherwise an individual could, and often did, use the family as a lever for his own purposes and with small regard to its interests. But the family, not the individual, was of importance to the old Japanese State, and hence action which menaced its integrity and prosperity were to be controlled in the interests of the State. In these times marriages, involving the entrance of new members or loss of old ones, were of much importance both as strengthening a body concentrated within a narrow circle and as preventing the waste of its resources through the introduction of members not bringing but requiring support and hence trenching on the resources of the little commune. The power therefore exercised by the head over the movements and the alliances of the family membership was a very real and important one. But as the headship was real and important, and the centre of the family interests were much more confined, so his personal range of action as head was all the more limited. So confining were these bonds that the practice of *inkyō*, or retirement from such headship, rapidly on the increase, became only a matter of legal permission still carried out in the existing civil code, in which in some cases headship is compulsory and retirement not allowed until a certain age, and only then if there is a member of the family suitable as substitute for the retiring head. This retirement of the aged to the enjoyment of rest and peace free from care, the giving over of the reins, so to speak, to the hands of the young and active generation, is one of the most beautiful and trusting features of Japanese domestic life. The ethics and practice of *inkyō* are well worth studying. The old privileges of the head of the family have much diminished in value. It is not a particularly vital matter to such head as to what marriages take place among its members, or as to where they live. When family pride in the West, where compulsion is slight, prevents it from allowing its members to become inmates of the poorhouse and objects of public support, the burden of sustenance of pauper members is hardly more felt by the head of a Japanese house. The family of Old Japan—as of to-day—took care of its weaker members, and the duty primarily falls on its head and wealthiest member, given for that purpose a preference in the laws of inheritance. The same happens in the West for sentimental reasons. In Old Japan,

however, the whole family might be so weak that misfortune brought it to the ground. When the bottom of the ladder had already been reached in such cases there was no outlet but starvation. The outcast class had no resource to which to turn but beings as miserable as themselves. Old Japan was entirely lacking in any machinery of public charities.

In our early lives as western children we can remember the effect of a prolonged visit of some uncle or aunt, and perhaps a brood of cousins. As a rule it meant more or less holiday, coddling, and presents; but the pleasure was not entirely unalloyed. There was the sense of restraint caused by the intimate relations of two separate families impossible to entirely fuse into one mass. On their departure there was a feeling of relief (on both sides), a re-entrance into complete possession of the home, a relaxing of certain bonds the presence of which had hardly been suspected. The effect of such a continued restraint as is found in the Japanese family is not hard to see. The child models himself on those with whom he is brought into contact. In a restricted family circle peculiarities are likely to be initiated and passed on to future generations until they become a true inheritance. But the Japanese child's parents have been brought up under the same conditions, and he sees a number of models—father and uncles—all very much alike, and hence this similarity takes a greater importance in his eyes and any deviation from it is a cause of greater concern. Is it any wonder then that a certain monotony in the Japanese type has become practically an inherited characteristic? It is the merest truism both of the evolutionary process and of the logical method belonging to the evolutionary process that they influence each other. We have said that the child's parents have all grown up on the same model. We can go farther back than the existing generation. It has been the process for generations. The Japanese child has not only his adult generation to copy from but he knows he is following the ancestral type, and the importance to be attached to that ancestral type is continually held up by the veneration paid to those ancestors by this adult generation. Every Japanese home has the *kamidana* or god-shelf on which are kept the ancestral tablets—the tablets of the *kami*, for the Japanese word for the ancestral ghosts and the gods is the same in both cases. He sees the great importance attached to these. The lamp is burning before them; offerings are daily made before them by the family head; and it is impressed upon him that the ways and thoughts are those handed down to the present generation by their forebears, and as they have been good in the past so are they to be held good in the future. Wide and convincing as is the mass of evidence that dreams, visions, nervous derangements are the dominating factors in giving substance to our spiritual life it is hardly to be expected that this should be a popular view-point. Civilized man does not like to associate his genuflections, chants, and petitions, with the prostrations, the howls, and often bloody offerings of the

primitive savage to the ancestral ghost or the fetish of a recent indigestion. It is much nicer, at least, to develop them out of the worship of some great natural object, to deduce the myth from that object, to go behind the visible object to some unknown maker that controls its operation; and so on, until we can spin out a speculative philosophy to suit the mental requirements of the highest—which simply means a Platonism, ancient or modern. Unfortunately the average rustic, as the average savage, is not in the least attracted by natural phenomena familiar to him. The rising and setting of the sun arouses no inquiry in the farm hand except in its relations to his morning and evening feed, and to the hour of work and of rest; and it arouses as little in the mind of the savage. The word painting imagery found in the tales concerning the North American Indian, in its application is confined to the pages of Cooper and Longfellow. What there was of it was due to the scantiness of his vocabulary, his lack of specific terms to express thought. His terseness and comprehensiveness of expression is due to the primitive structure of his language based on what Dr. Daniel G. Brinton has called "incorporation"—the effort to convey meaning in the form of a single verbal (usually) expression which takes the place of a whole sentence. In all simplicity and gorgeousness of imagery (to the western mind) the Huron or Iroquois might refer to the gory scalp of some Hibernian "Tommy Atkins," slaughtered during Braddock's retreat and adorning his girdle, as "red as the setting sun, fringed with flames of fire." But that is simply because his definition of colour is not very exact, and he takes refuge in the nearest natural object to supply the place of an abstraction. It was but a few years ago that there was a colour known to the fashionable milliner and haberdasher as "dying frog," but it had no reference to any ethical sentiment aroused by the unfortunate animal.

Now ghost worship or ancestor worship—petition to an ancestor—as existing in the ancient world finds early application in Japanese records. It certainly goes back to earliest recorded times (681 A.D.) when it is represented as part of the tradition handed down from very early times. Jimmu Tennō is represented as appealing to his heavenly ancestors for assistance. And it is in the specific character of a descendant that such aid is given. Be it noted also that all the gods mentioned in the *Kojiki* are intensely anthropomorphic. They are not only men but Japanese men who have power over certain natural elements. Some of them are little better than medicine men (*Sukuna-bikona*); others (*Susa-no-wo*) rise to the dignity of a department, and are comparable to Thor and Odin, to Aeolus and Neptune or Pluto. If then direct connection with living descendants is lost in later times it is more due to the obscurity of the descendants. *Amaterasu*, the great sun deity, had better luck both in her descendants and in the natural phenomenon with which she has been connected. And it can be added that the genealogies of the nobles given in the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* are many of them traced

back to such divine ancestors. Some of the later monarchs used forcible means to suppress this rivalry with the imperial house. An excellent instance of a modern apotheosis of this character is given by Mr. Aston in a citation from Lafcadio Hearne who describes the raising to such godship in his lifetime of an old peasant who had done an act of memorable and heroic service to his people. An instance is yet to be pointed out where a people have been in a religious sense more advanced than their rulers. Nature worship is a distinct advance on ancestor worship. It is a step from the particular and pressing to the universal, and probably, as Mr. Spenceer thinks, has to pass through a period of fetichism in which strange resemblances of stocks and stones are gifted with the spirits of dead men. To imply that the scandalous old Zeus of Hesiod is a degenerate from a more elevated idea of him, in other words that Plato resuscitated this ideal Zeus and did not create him, is to imply a previous advanced Greek civilization of which there is not the slightest archæological evidence. And this also can be claimed of the Japanese pantheon. If Jimmu Tennō, or an early Japanese king, worshipped his ancestors, it is safe to say that his people did the same and worshipped their ancestors. That no mention would be made specifically of such worship in books like the Kojiki and Nihongi, given over to the glorification of the monarch alone, is quite likely. They involve suppression of everything unrelated to him and his exploits; his deeds admit of no rivalry, direct or implied.

It should be added moreover that while the lower form of ancestor worship presumably precedes Nature worship, the two go closely together and are inextricably intertwined in the Shintō of the Japanese. If a man peoples his environment with the ghosts of countless ancestors the earthly differentiation of these ghosts will be quickly lost and they will be fostered on all kinds of natural phenomena, and all kinds of favourite haunts will be attributed to them. Even to-day we have this among our rural population, who people every forest dell and grove with pixies and gnomes which certainly have little relation to a worship of Nature as such. Pure Nature worship, on the contrary, is a very high development. The metaphysics of Neo-Platonism as found in Plutarch and Plotinus and in the Emperor Julian's "Address to the Sovereign Sun" are of a high order. Its final application moreover is not the degradation of a creed but its degraded application by minds of a lower order to their own superstitions. All creeds based purely on speculation and not on the unchanging laws of Nature are likely to lose themselves in a verbal labyrinth, to degenerate into a pure logomachy. Such results, however, can never satisfy the average mind of man who is seeking not mental gymnastics but something tangible to which to cling. To the common mind, entangled in the intricacies of such a transcendent dialectic their application gives an authority to hasty judgments based on mistaken or insufficient observation of natural phenomena, which

in time gives support to the crude magic and astrology of the later Alexandrians.*

This ghost theory of Mr. Spencer, as applied to the Japanese, finds support in a quarter least expected and in which protest would probably be raised against any such implication. The Christian missionaries in Japan are a set of men, who, if they look through glasses of a special tint, are yet personally interested in gaining a particular knowledge of the religion which it is their interest to combat. One and all they adopt the theory that the Japanese *worship* their ancestors. If in the minds of these men there was no association of worship of ancestors in the rites performed before the ancestral tablets; if there was any essential difference between such worship and the worship of Hachiman or of Fudōsama; if the tablets and the rites carried out before them were to be regarded only in the light of memorial services; then the positive stand taken by all the Christian sects in this question would have no meaning. But they say, rightly or wrongly, that the tablets are not mere memorials. That it is a religious ceremony carried out before them to the *kami*. Even the Roman Church, which permits worship of the dead in the form of invocations to the saints here admits of no compromise. It could hardly tolerate worship of "heathen" ancestors or saints. It might allow prayers for "heathen" ancestors wriggling and burning in hell fire, but certainly not prayers to such ancestors. Most people brought in contact with the Japanese will think the stand taken by the missionaries on this point is correct. This of course does not involve any endorsement as to the course they adopt in reference to it. Such course among themselves has not been absolutely consistent. Those most skilful of propagandists—the Jesuits—considered the point to be one admitting of casuistical treatment; and they adopted conciliation, allowing the presence of the tablets, developing the memorial nature of the rites, minimizing any religious element, and trusting to time to bring about their disuse or to give them a purely formal character. This was the policy of the early Christian church in dealing with such questions among the pagan nations. A well known example

* Since writing these three paragraphs I have met with an idea perhaps applicable to the same in Professor Baldwin's "Genetic Logic" (Vol. I. Chap. X § 3 p. 211), where, speaking in reference to the dualism existing between mind and body, or in the "mind-body," he refers to theories of belief as to separate souls resting "upon cases of apparently *varying persistences*, on the one hand, and those which cite cases of recognition of *differences of control*, on the other hand." The early stage being *persistence*; the later, *persisting spirit* being self controlled and independent. Thus, "portents, omens, visions, auditions, etc., all illusions of the presence of the departed after death, are cases of persistence of the soul without body. On the other hand, dream phenomena, possessions, ravings, religious and other ecstasies, etc., are phenomena of alteration and variation of control, on one side or the other. It is relatively distinct as a motive to dualism, from the persistence cases, since both sorts of persistence here alike endure; the spirit in control takes the place of the proper soul in the body of the possessed." He goes on to apply it to Fetichism etc.

is the famous letter of Pope Gregory to Augustine,* his missionary bishop to the English. To-day this policy is abandoned altogether, and not with very happy results—from the missionary point of view.

On this wide open platform of the Japanese house, therefore, the mirror held up constantly before the eyes of the young generation not only reflects the action of those older and wider in experience, but the fact that those actions are based on an unchanging past. Not only have they been found good in the experience of the present adult generation, but they have been handed down as good from past generations. The authority thus given to an unchanging conservatism in the Japanese household is tremendous. Literally speaking it is the ancestors that rule such household, not the living descendants. And there is no broadening of this basis, no means of rectifying its defects or adjusting it to new conditions. Life is naturally not confined to a family circle. To live and let live requires a wide circulation through the community, but ages ago a standard was set by the rules of this oriental people. Nothing can be brought in from the outside community, for there too everything is drawn on an identical plan. There is undoubtedly a racial difference here between the Mongolian and Aryan races. Standards have been set time and time again by rulers among the European nations. Standards have been set by leaders among the classes of European nations, and such standards enforced not only by the members more immediately interested but by the central power interested in maintaining subordination through the ranks of the nation. But always there have been found recalcitrants to break through these bonds. One great factor has undoubtedly been the international exchange of ideas among nations. "They do some things better in France" (or elsewhere) is a saying of fundamental importance. Favouring conditions giving rise to great commercial communities in Italy, Germany, and Holland; and especially the long peace and manufacturing development of England led to an interchange of commodities, the agents of which became so many ferments in the interchange of ideas. Reasons of state, and particularly of revenue, led the royal power to foster this growing strength in the community; with small idea that in the future numbers and the money power were sure to transfer the power into the hands of the common people, as soon as physical force, from being the trade of a few, became easily accessible to many. Gunpowder—used by the Chinese and Japanese to blow toys and rockets into the air—was turned by the more practical West into blowing their fellowmen into fragments; and the cheap and practicable argument supplied by the addition of an iron tube and some lead put the inexperienced burgher on a ground immeasurably above the unwieldy knight.

There are three main channels in which the "social heredity" of the psychologists acts on the individual. The fundamental

* Really. The letter is addressed to Mellitus but is meant for Augustine. See Bede. Bohn's trans. p. 56.

principle briefly is, that as the environment acts on the individual and he responds to its stimulus it is not simply a matter of give and take. We transfer our personality into another person, but in the reaction there is something that is unfamiliar to us, something we cannot accurately gauge and foresee in their action toward us. This necessarily modifies our first idea, the transfer of ourselves bodily into the actions of the stranger. In technical phraseology, the reaction between the *Ego* and the *Alter* gives rise to an *eject* unlike both, containing the elements of both, but in nature biological not chemical and hence capable of growth.* The great importance of this principle as so laid down can be readily seen in its reference to progress, whether it be of the individual or of the community. Let us therefore try and apply it to the case in hand, and first in reference to its purely local social function in which is secured the existence of any society at all. In our western world the whole trend of our education is, or ought to be, primarily to teach the child to think for himself. A careful guard is kept over him as to the selection of the materials presented for assimilation; he is helped in the grouping of those materials; but the main object of our teaching, whether in home or in school, is to keep danger away from him and only to afford such assistance as is necessary. The rest is left to his own powers of observation of the world around. And a grand mess he makes of it. When he stumbles and when he falls he is picked up and set right again. Now it is not for one moment to be pretended that the original processes of the child or boy are of any great value to the world at large, but they are of great value to him. He is getting valuable exercise in his thinking powers. He learns at first hand the necessity of grouping and developing properly his scattered data. Many strange and unwieldy combinations he makes of them at first, but the mental machinery gains smoothness by practice, so that when as trained and educated man he comes to deal with combinations between old and new data he is master of his instrument, able to judge the possibilities of his material, and reject the impracticable for he is bound by no hard and fast rules. Hence the originaive power of our great inventors. They bring about new combinations, they do not create material. Their material is all supplied by their environment. There are many failures of course due to insufficient knowledge or grasp of the data; hence any amount of energy has been spent on search for a philosopher's stone, or the elixir of life, or a perpetual motion machine; but the nett result has been of use to the community at large. The energy has not been wasted. It has led to a greater knowledge of the material world around, as in the development of modern chemistry and the modern applied mechanics of the great engineering professions. The West has recognized the value of this unrestricted effort, has encouraged it and rewarded it liberally.

* See Professor Baldwin's "Mental Development" p.p. 335-348: "Social and Ethical Interpretations" p.p. 52-53:—as to the *eject*.

Now turn to the condition of affairs in Old Japan, and still to a large extent hampering New Japan. The individual is met by a model which he must closely follow. This model it is assumed at the start is perfect, and is not to be called in question. Conformity and imitation are the only two qualifications called for. This system eliminates at once the questioning frame of mind, never taking into consideration that it is this questioning, the sceptical standpoint, that is the real thing of value. Change in the system should of course be left to experts, but men who are responsible for a system can see very few faults in it. If the sceptical, the inquiring spirit, is crushed out in the rising generation everything will soon begin to again go in the old circle of scholasticism. If the Japanese child is not allowed to make mistakes and forced to correct them by his own originaive powers he will undoubtedly become well drilled in the system, but he must still continue to get his inspiration from the outside. This is recognized by the men in charge of the higher education in Japan, and their complaint is loud of this defect in originaive power in the material supplied to them by the lower schools. It is not very hard to see a reason for this. A western school is silence itself except when the play hour is sounded. More and more attention is being given to individual *viva voce* exercises. Class room marks are given higher value in making up grade, and written examination is correspondingly given a lower value. It is to be hoped that some day the sway of the wet towel, black coffee, boiled eyes, and other systems and symptoms of cramming, will be entirely relegated to the past. Everything is directed to make the child understand, and hence think and not memorize. The noise of a Japanese primary or secondary school rises high in the air from entrance to dismissal. With the young children much stress is laid on recitation in unison by the whole class, and usually in rhyme and song. A whole band of children are seen and heard singing away for dear life, and their little black eyes wandering heaven knows where with small thought of the words passing haphazard through their heads. And amid all this row the older children pursue their studies when not similarly engaged. Spring on the Japanese boy of sixteen or eighteen a question requiring thought not an answer by rote from some text book, and their own best authorities on the subject say the material for the answer is sadly lacking.

Let us now turn to a second great factor involved—the ethical function as developed in the social aggregate. Again we are told that as the individual gets his “copy” for the ordinary physical acts of his daily life from the social environment, so in the ethical sphere of life his material in like manner is to be sought in that environment. What he does not get through “social heredity” he does not get at all. It is in recombination, not in origination, that ethical advance consists. Here the West up to recent times has had but little if any advantage over the East, for ethical has been confused with religious. Questions of purely moral science have been interwoven into theological

dogmas whose very existence depends on their conservatism, their rejection of anything which does not fit into the formal scheme laid down for them. On the ethical side there is little to choose between the two great religions which have swayed East and West; Buddhism in the one, Christianity in the other. The outsider in the eyes of one will certainly be damned; the other more charitably simply indefinitely postpones his final release from this world of matter and pain until his eyes are opened and he learns the illusion of Karma (the phenomenal world), and turns his attention to gaining merit and Buddhahood. Both of them promise life beyond the grave. In the one case the ideal ranges from the milk and honey and golden streets of the negro camp meeting, to the rapturous ethical enjoyment of a Chatauqua Society or a meeting of the Association for the Advancement of Science in which is learned the mystery of the Universe under conditions more favourable than we find in this life. The anticlimax is found in an ingeniously devised hell, which the vulgar mind peoples with flames and instruments of torture under the direction of a gentlemen in a red shirt and long tail aided by other minion imps; the more enlightened limiting the torture of the future state to a keenly refined mental suffering; in the both cases carried to eternity. The Buddhists are equally ingenious in their hell, but a system of rebirths at least gives the victim a chance to reform and to extricate his karma if not himself from it. In so far they are more charitable. Their offered reward of good living is not so positive as in the Christian creed, as it consists substantially in annihilation or an absorption into the universal Spirit and loss of individuality which is hard to distinguish from annihilation. It is properly speaking not an agnostic creed at all, for discussion of the nature of this absorption into Nirvana, and the condition therein, is not out of the range of the metaphysics of the creed. In its explanation of the universe esoteric Buddhism is the far more scientific of the two religions. Its universal spirit can be, and has been, confounded by modern and western adherents with the universal energy of science, and on the surface its crude doctrine akin to metempsychosis is strictly in accordance with the doctrine of the conservation of matter in chemical changes. It has, however, no real ground for any claim to extra consideration in such a coincidence. It stands in this respect on the same ground as the more or less lucky guesses of the early Greek philosophy. Purely speculative, and based on deductions drawn from the laws of mind, they had not an iota of evidence in the matter of fact. This is shown conspicuously in the poem of Lucretius, which as an example of deductive reasoning, logically exact, is brilliantly successful, but as soon as he endeavours to support his deductions by appeal to the defective science of his day he makes a fearful mess of it; showing how purely mental the whole process was. Julian's "Address to the Sun," already cited in another connection, is of the same character.

The ethical teaching of the two creeds is common to both,

but is far better and more tersely summed up in the command of Christ, "Do unto others as ye would they should do unto you."* A general ethical teaching, however, apart largely from anything but the slightest religious element is found in the teachings of Confucius, and this has had, and has to-day, in Japan far more influence than the religious dogmas of Buddhism or the purely ritual formulae of Shintō. The *ten* or heaven of Confucius is a very shadowy affair with which man has little to do. The real matter of importance lies in the relations between men and is summed up in duty to one's parents, to one's lord, and to one's sovereign. These relations were brought together into a system by Confucius, and in such complete form that practically the only business of subsequent philosophers has been to write tons of commentaries on the sage's maxims; of which every ideograph has been an object of special study, for Confucius wrote twenty five centuries ago and there has been time enough with such a script for controversy to rise as to the exact meaning of the ideograph at the time the philosopher used it. Confining, however, man's life to this purely practical side progress was fearfully hampered, where not put an end to altogether. In one sense Confucianism is a religion, for its maxims are thoroughly dogmatic. They admit of exegesis not of development. In cutting off all connection between man and his relations to the universe all advantage gained from knowledge of the moral order in that universe was limited to what was contained in the maxims. This was a poor exchange for a broad philosophy based on evolution. The result in China was the same as in Europe at a kindred period. It developed a scholasticism which narrowed itself to a discussion as to the meaning to be extorted from words, with small reference to fact. At times China too has her Friar Bacon, her Paracelsus, and her Monk Schwarz, but the bonds are too strong unless this twentieth century succeeds in breaking them. There is strong belief to-day that his principles were not original with Confucius, but that he merely codified practices that had long been in existence among the primitive Chinese; and that he therefore occupies a position like that of Solon and Lycurgus among the Greeks, if indeed all three are not merely inventions conveniently formulated to account for a nation's first steps forward in civilization. The same principles are found at the base of all codes, whether Greek, Roman, Egyptian, Assyrian, or Chinese. They imply that a nation has at least reached the patriarchal stage; for it is only among savages that old age is to be dreaded for its loneliness and neglect; it is only among savages that they knock their venerable parents on the head, and even eat them. Solon when he was asked why he had made no law against parricides, answered that he did not conceive of the possibility of their existence; and Cicero, writing hundreds of years later, under the stimulus of a code patriotic to an extent that few have reached—the code of Republican Rome—says, "is

* A very ancient precept. Found in the almost identical language of Confucius, of Shaka-Muni, and in that of other religious leaders.

not our country then paramount to all duties? Yes, indeed, but it is advantageous to our country itself to have its citizens affectionate toward their parents." As the Athenians with Solon, so the Chinese accepted the code of Confucius with all its limitations; and for twenty five hundred years have loyally clung to it, rejecting all outside influence of any character for fear of its possible modifying effect on what they regard as the groundwork of their existence as a people.

We have seen that the code lies at the base of the system early imported by the Japanese from China. It moulded all the forms of their early national life, and during the Middle Ages and the supremacy of the military class, when loyalty and duty were of such paramount importance as guiding principles, it was an object of special study and admiration within this class. On its narrow lines they gradually built up their Bushidô, the ethical principles which were to guide the perfect not the "gentil" knight. It is a fine code but, we think, not only built on a narrow basis but still more limited by Japanese politics which made the ideal loyalty to some petty chief, who, from an ethical point of view, might and often did have very contemptible motives. It is, however, frankly a question which is of greater disadvantage, this narrow limitation, or the sentimentalism imported into the chivalric code of Europe; an emotional condition on which theological influence could, and did, do most effectual work. Granted the wider basis afforded by western ethics of to-day, and one can cheerfully admit a better prospect for its future than for any code which still clings to worn out theological dogmas weighed down by remnants of old superstitions which still make children afraid of the dark. This freedom of ethics from religion found to a large extent in this old Confucian code is of great value. Religions are necessarily dogmatic. They are grounded on certain principles which do not admit of question without bringing the whole superstructure to the ground. All of the religions of the world have been handed down from remote ages when man's ideas and man's knowledge were necessarily much more limited than to-day. Hence they all contain a supernatural element to which our further knowledge of the physical universe must be adjusted. This means that piece by piece these old supernatural elements must drop off; but the present stage is more or less ingenious distortion of fact to fit dogma. It used to be said of a new discovery in science that it could not be true because it was contrary to the sacred books. To-day its truth may have to be admitted, but the sacred books are shown not to be contrary to the discovery. Sometimes an *impasse* is reached, as in the wide extension which science has given to evolution. Then the only step for a great ecclesiastical organization to take is to limit for its members the range of legitimate discussion, and to cast out and deprive of its privileges those who disobey. A dogmatic sentence in a matter of science pronounced by infallibility seems in the nineteenth century an anachronism belonging to the Middle Ages, but really is not so. Discussion is fatal to dogma.

"Religious evolution" is a contradiction of terms. Progress is only obtained through advancing ethics. It is the ethics of the prevalent religions that have advanced, not the religious and dogmatic element. The last has had its value in history. It has its value to-day in as far as it works on the emotional temperament, and so by "suggestion" on great masses of men. But this is merely mob law. The unthinking many are guided by the thinking few who in the world's ecclesiastical history have quickly turned it to their own advantage. Morality and mob law have little to do with each other. Ethics are necessarily mental. An unthinking morality is not morality ethically speaking.

The basis of ethics is supplied by "social heredity." It is not woven out of man's brain but, as Professor Baldwin puts it, we form our ideal from those persons familiar to our experience whose powers we realize are greater than our own. Accumulated experience of ages handed down in writing prevents previous acquisitions being lost. As we have seen the difficulty with the Japanese was that his ideal was bound in political swaddling clothes. By this having developed his material as far as he could he stood still from lack of means to go on. Mentally he was tied down by Chinese philosophy. Politically he was tied down by a Government that said not only what he should do but how he should do it; and among the things he should do was to have no contact with the outside world. Put in this positive form the element of command perhaps has stronger emphasis. The European on the contrary has bound his ideal in religious swaddling clothes. One arm and his legs he has managed to free more or less, but the Church with a large C is still fastened on him and dictates what he shall think in one direction; not altogether leaving him free in the other direction, for the old command "serve God and honour the king" is still served up together, and Church and State to-day recognize the reciprocal value of their assistance. The same is true of the militarism in Japan which has fastened itself on the nation. Ostensibly as a matter of protection the military government is gradually extending its restraining influence into every channel of national life. It has modernized its educational establishment but retains full control over the teaching. The Government to-day directs the national thought as much as in the days of Old Japan. It says what they shall think. And what it shall think politically is laid down in an unchangeable Constitution—practically unchangeable, for such change depends on a privileged class—and officially ensured by the perpetuation of a caste system by which the people are classified as in pre-restoration days into "nobles, officials, business men, and so forth," and in which the passage from the lower class to the upper is made practically impossible. Ordinary speaking, one would say that the problem of freeing himself was more favourable for the Japanese than the European. The man with the gun in his hand is a powerful weapon, but he is many and his rulers are few, and even military discipline is marked by a certain line beyond which, in a country where the

man goes back to the rice field again in three years, gives some hope for his ultimate control of his own affairs. The power of a superstition, however, is stronger than any physical power, and it will be long in the West before the relations between men will be such that, religiously speaking, they will not be allowed to tread on each others toes. That is, as in business they are allowed to do as they please provided they do not injure another, so in religion they will think as they please without its entering as a factor into their personal relations; a phase far from being reached to-day even in the most liberal communities. The important point to us just now is, that in the ethical as in the social function we find the Japanese tied hard and fast by a system which has worn deep into his mental structure by fourteen hundred years of constant pressure. The question is, can he free himself from it? Material civilization imported from the West and guided by this system will come to a standstill, especially when the popular cry is to cling to the old mental training as all sufficient and truly national. There is such an active element crying for the return to the old scholasticism of China as containing everything of value philosophically speaking. Chinese philosophy was popular with the *samurai* class of Old Japan, and once more this advocacy is heard among them. Only the material civilization of Europe is of value and to be borrowed, as if material and mental were not intimately interwoven. Japan therefore has not broken with the past. It will take a long time for the old ruts to be filled in and overlaid, and the Government is taking its measures to prevent this by perpetuating the old system under new forms. To-day, therefore, except as it comes through the more liberal thought of the West, there is no aid given to break with the past on this side. When they do break through the net the prospect is more than bright.

The third factor—the religious function—has necessarily been largely dealt with in dealing with the ethical function as found in the society of Old Japan. There remain, however, a few points which belong more particularly to the purely religious side, and which complete the review of both. Turning to the same authority, Professor Baldwin, for our definition of the religious function in man's mental equipment we learn that, as our ethical conceptions widen and our ethical ideal widens with experience; as we begin to separate the dross from the pure gold in the examples constantly under our eyes, and while we find nothing perfect in itself, we find much of the perfect in things; we begin to form an ideal of a Being who is without the defects so patent to our moral understanding. This ideal Being is God.* Necessarily our ideal of God is limited by our under-

* Professor Baldwin in his exposition deals purely with the question from the point of evolutionary psychology. Belief or disbelief in revelation is an entirely separate question. Cf. Note § 294, p. 453 "Social and Ethical Interpretations." See also p.p. 336-366 for his development of the Religious Sentiment. Cf. also Mr. Crawley's "Mystic Rose" p. 140 close of paragraph at the top of the page.

standing, and the ideal of the negro on the west coast of Africa, of the shopman in the heated contest of the commercial life of a great modern city like London or New York, and of the philosopher contemplating the wonderfully complete structure of some insect or plant, are widely different. Making use of this conception of the religious function let us turn to the material supplied to Old Japan and so widely influencing New Japan. Confucianism, as said, while not a religion in one sense of the word—the worship of a supernatural being—closely approaches one in the nature of its fundamental principles. These are axioms in the sense of dogmatic theology. A geometrical axiom, such as “a straight line is the shortest distance between two points” will show here the difference of treatment accorded by Science as contrasted with dogmatic theology or Confucianism. To the theologian such an axiom would not be a matter of discussion. It would be an offence to so regard it. Science does not require proof of this axiom. However if anyone should choose to question he is at liberty to do so, to mount the scientific rostrum and preach away vigorously to what audience he can get. It is true that there are scientific bodies who have been anything but liberal in their treatment of new ideas. The “Origin of Species” was met with the contemptuous comment—“froth of science;” but the real spirit of science is liberal, and such conservatism is merely the balance weight to prevent the endorsement of too hasty generalization. No scientific body has or can have limiting authority. The different branches are too woven into each other, and what one society would refuse to consider, another society weaker and more ambitious of notice, would be ready to discuss. For even scientific societies are fond of a little notice from the public. Any new idea therefore is ensured a ready hearing to-day in the scientific world.

But if Confucianism is not in a strict sense of the word a religion it has had all its tremendous influence. Buddhism preaches, and always has preached, the Five Duties. Every advanced religion preaches them. But Buddhism has done more. In the Far East—China and Japan—these Five Duties of Confucianism have been made the directing force of Buddhism. Certainly to the outside observer Buddhism in Japan seems to be the theology of Buddhism grafted on to the tree of Confucianism. Tree and graft are readily distinguished. This is of prime importance to our argument, for it means that the directing force of Confucianism has been acting without modification on Japanese character for fourteen hundred years, with the effects that we have been trying to show. There is here a distinction to note between Christianity and Buddhism. Christianity, no matter how much it preaches humility, is essentially a militant religion. It carries the practice of religion into all the affairs of life. It is this practical application which has given it such force among the Aryan peoples of Europe, to whom dreamy abstractions as to a dim and uncertain future life would appeal but little. It was the constant militant action of his Christianity on his daily life, the daily and

hourly contest between the passions and interests of life and this spiritual intruder, that aroused interest in this fighting man. Clovis, if he could not grasp the ethical, could readily appreciate this militant side of his new creed. Thus influenced he cried out "why was I not there with my Franks" when he heard the tale of the Crucifixion. And the same fierce militancy aroused the passions of Europe to flock to the Crusades. It cannot be said that Christianity comes out unsoiled from this struggle with the more material needs of life, but it gives it an immense value to the material minded European. It teaches him not only that the spiritual is immensely superior to the material, but that the spiritual life must be carried into the material life. It teaches him that as a man living in this world he cannot avoid contact with sin, and hence he must combat sin wherever he finds it. Sin, it should be said, is translated into offence against, or difference from, the prevailing theological dogma, the application of which definition has altered from time to time, and makes the definition of "Sin" in the first century and in the nineteenth century radically different. Such a religion can absorb, and has absorbed, outside practices, reconciling them as well as possible with dogma. But such a religion cannot admit a rival of equal power with itself. Confucianism therefore, which rejects the supernatural as unknowable or not worth knowing, is met at once in a hostile spirit by Christianity which claims to have the only key to the supernatural, and which says that the practical ethics of Confucianism is of no value except in so far as it is woven into this supernatural. Buddhism on the contrary raises no such controversy. It separates, far more widely than Christianity, this world and the next world. Their spheres do not touch each other. Their object also is escape from this world which has no real value. It is Karma, a law of action which deals with Illusion. The main object is to separate oneself as far as possible from all contact with it. Buddhism has the genuine spirit of monasticism in it, and this form of devotion has always been one of its great features. Avoidance of the world and hence avoidance of sin. Merit is to be obtained by combatting sin but can equally be obtained by avoiding temptation. Where Christianity preaches war against sin as the only practical means of salvation, Buddhism on the contrary, preaches resignation, the uselessness of struggle for this world which is merely phenomenal. The difference in the object sought is illustrated not badly by the somewhat sensual Christian Heaven and the restful annihilation of Nirvana. The worldly renunciation preached by both, it is hardly necessary to say, is rarely lived up to by their votaries.

Between the practical ethics of the limited system laid down by Confucius and the resignation preached by Buddhist theologians, the Japanese has suffered under the iron heel of the old political ethical system of the seventh century in practice within very recent times. Whatever struggle there was between the two elements was of purely political character. *Esprit de corps*

brought the great Buddhist monasteries forward as a political force, and from the ninth to the seventeenth century they gained great wealth and were an important factor in Japanese politics. The question, however, was a purely political one, and moreover they were at some disadvantage in having no central organization. Buddhism is on a congregational basis. The units are independent of each other's discipline. The basis of both Church and State being the same—Confucian ethics—the only question at issue was what power the monks should have in the State. The position was identical with that in Europe between Church and State previous to the rise of the Reformers. There was no such contest between two rival religious elements as in the subsequent contest between Rome and the Reformation, in which States became pawns in the great game between the two religious combatants. The political quarrel in Japan resulted in the subjection of Church to State. The political quarrel in Europe is resulting in a separation of Church and State, and as yet such separation is only partially carried out. In Europe, Church and State still find an alliance of value to each other, a new contest having sprung up between States headed by an oligarchy in whose material advantages the Church is a partner. These material advantages therefore bring them together. Even liberal England still retains an Established Church whose support and patronage is of no small value to the ruling element. Spain is hardly more free from ecclesiastical control than she was three hundred years ago. Between East and West it is difficult to say which has the advantage, or rather disadvantage. If the European has the disadvantage of having his ethical ideals controlled by religious dogma, still the political contest between the two, Church and State, resulted in a balance of power that advanced his political freedom by some centuries. Free thought was a germ of the Reformation, although the leaders on both sides had no suspicion of such an undesirable outcome. The Japanese, however, on his side has been at a disadvantage in having, during the period of his development, no balance weight to his rulers, no rival power in the State. So much so that it is hard to speak of "Japanese Development." It has rather been a suspension than a progression. And the same holds good to-day. In Europe, people and rulers stand face to face demanding the fulfillment of equal responsibilities. The rise of the power of the People was at the expense of the Church, and during the long contest the People had an ample period of preparation. In Japan, the Church went down before the State; no opposition was left standing. The People were not, and never had been a factor in the body politic. On this religious side therefore we find Japan tied down and hampered by its old inherited system.

The structure of the Japanese house, therefore, bringing all the different units of the society into this intimate and constant contact, has an influence which reaches to the utmost limits of such society. We find the political, social, ethical, and religious bonds fastened on the nation at its earliest

childhood; and by imitation and "suggestion" working exclusively through the same material, always presented in the same manner and carefully kept within given bounds under penalty of expulsion from society—with nowhere to go and nothing to live on. Social heredity in such cases means an inheritance of much more limited range than that of the nations of Europe. Would it not be well therefore to keep this in mind, and when statesmen, and politicians, and economists, and civil service experts, and educators, come to spend a month or two in Japan, for them to look below the surface and see not what is being taught the nation but the basis on which it is being taught? In such case I think there would be far less admiration when it was found that the idea was not to teach the people to think, but but to teach them what to think. It was told by a prominent Japanese that the Imperial Rescript on education excited great admiration in America, the remark being made that it was no wonder the Japanese were successful when devotion and self-sacrifice to country through the Emperor were to be obtained through education, and that whereas the Decalogue only taught us what *not* to do, the Rescript taught the Japanese what they ought to do. It is to be regretted that there were Americans—presumably of thought—ready to give expression to any such hasty conclusion. The least consideration would have told them that just what men fought and suffered for in the early history of the country was to make it an axiom that the law should tell a man what he was *not* to do, and should carefully *avoid* telling him what to do; that positive regulation is to be avoided as far as possible. Nothing can be more opposed to the ideal of American political and social thought than such a regulative system as that of Old and New Japan.*

* The accompanying translation of this admirable Rescript appeared in the Japan Mail (1906) with the signature of Baron Kikuchi as translator. Americans, I think, will still turn for a fount of pure patriotism to George Washington's "Farewell Address" or to President Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address."

IMPERIAL RESCRIPT RELATIVE TO EDUCATION.

Our Imperial Ancestors have laid the foundation of Our Empire on a broad basis and have deeply implanted their virtues: Our subjects all united in their loyalty and filial piety have for generations achieved their beauty. This is the glory of Our national constitution, and on this also must Education be based.

Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers; as husbands and wives be harmonious; as friends be true; bear yourselves in humility and moderation; extend your benevolence widely to all; cultivate knowledge and practise arts, thereby developing intellectual faculties and perfecting moral capacity; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves to the State loyally and bravely; and thus support Our Imperial Throne coeval with the Heavens and the Earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but make manifest the character inherited from your ancestors.

This Way is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors and to be observed alike by Their Descendants and Their

§ 3.

There remains to be considered man's last home. When a man is dead he is a long time dead, and all civilized nations seem to have realized this in the elaborate nature of his resting place. This has run through a wide gamut. There were nations to whom the tomb was also a temple, and among whom the dead were still supposed to haunt the scene of their life time. Such were the ancient Egyptians, the peoples bordering the Mediterranean, the Etrurians, and the Greeks and Romans. The western modern world regards the tomb merely as a memorial, although, even among people of education, belief in ghosts and unwillingness to visit a graveyard or a vault at uncanny hours of the night are still common enough, and show the remnants of the former ideas still acting on the modern brain. And indeed visions and a feeling of the actual presence of the dead are so common in our western life that the collection of its data has not only become of interest to students of neuro-pathology but even to a sort of pseudo-science, in which ill understood facts are cemented together by worse understood scientific theories which have legitimate range only within the sphere of their application. Such are many modern theories of hypnotism, which combined with a little chemical theory on a primary matter of the Universe, and a little Berkleyism and Hegelianism in philosophy, and a little esoteric Pantheism, has given rise to many things from Christian Science to Theosophy. Indeed it is not without interest to our criminal classes who thereby see a means of more comfortably conducting their operations by proxy, or at least escaping uncomfortable results through the pseudo-science of a lawyer acting on the pseudo-science of a sappy jury educated through the Sunday newspaper. The wholesale transfer of the methods and results obtained in one science to another science—as of chemistry and physics to the fields of biology and psychology—without the least attempt of show their legitimate application, is arousing protest in scientific circles.†

The ancients believed that not only did the ghosts haunt the scene of their life-time but that they had the same physical needs. Hence provision was made for their requirements, and it is to this anthropomorphic nature of the ghost that we owe largely our knowledge of their civilizations which can thus be traced up from very rude times. The contents, therefore, of a nation's tombs are an index of the advance they had made up to

subjects; unerring for all ages and true for all places. We hope and trust to take it to take it in common with you, Our subjects, that We and ye may thus attain to the same virtues.

30th day of 10th month of 23rd year of Meiji.

Imperial Sign manual. Imperial Seal.

However "the negative side in the doctrine of rights is the most important. . . . Hence obligation often, if not generally, in laws takes a negative form. Thus the Decalogue" Cf. Woolsey "Political Science" I page 16.

† Cf. Professor J. M. Baldwin—"Development and Evolution" p. 334 (the last).

a given date. The roughness or finish of the pottery and the jewellery, the more or less archaic forms of the inscription, and even the care taken to render the tomb safe from intrusion, gives us an insight not only into the material but into the mental condition of these ancient peoples. The great care the ancient Egyptians took to preserve the body, or a representative of it, is a valuable indication of their ideas of the nature of the soul and the life after death. So also with the Greeks. The Ccsnola collection in New York gives a picture of a civilization of which every trace has been lost except that preserved in these fragments of pottery and jewellery, but in which one can read the history of a people living in most unsettled times. The old Greek civilization is admirably illustrated by the dramatic discoveries made by Dr. Schliemann at Mycenæ. No such find has been made before or since, and, with only the legitimate word painting allowed to the dramatic poet, we can turn for its description to the pages of d'Annunzio's "Dead City." "The greatest and strangest vision ever granted to mortal sight; a bewildering apparition; an unheard of richness; a terrible splendour, revealed at a blow, as in some superhuman dream. . . . A succession of tombs; fifteen bodies intact, one beside the other, on a bed of gold, with faces covered by masks of gold, with foreheads crowned with gold, with breasts bound with gold; and everywhere, on their bodies, by their sides, at their feet, everywhere a profusion of golden things, innumerable as the leaves fallen from a fabulous forest; an indescribable magnificence, blinding in its immensity, the most dazzling treasure that death has ever heaped up in the darkness of the earth, for centuries, for milleniums.....Marvellous vases, with four handles, adorned with little doves, like the cup of Nestor in Homer; great bulls' heads, all of massive silver, with horns of purest gold; thousands of plates worked in the form of flowers, of insects, of shells, of polypi, of medusæ, of stars; fantastic animals of gold, of ivory, of crystal; sphinxes, griffins, chimeras, little figures of goddesses with the arms and the heads laden with doves; little temples with towers crowned by doves with open wings; the chase of lions and panthers, chiselled on the blades of swords and spears, combs of ivory, bracelets, clasps, seals, sceptres, caducei....." * Whether Dr. Schliemann had actually found the burial place of "Agamemnon, King of Men," is not much to the point. Here was an advanced civilization, swamped by the downpour of the Dorians in the twelfth century B.C. whose ruder implements and pottery are found with evident traces of the influence of the more civilized people they had conquered. From that time there is no break in the advance.

No such gorgeousness as the "tombs of the Atridae" has rewarded the prying eyes of archaeologists in Japan. The early Japanese, as with many other nations, buried "their counsellors and princes" in dolmens. These consist of a central chamber of stone slabs over which is heaped a great mound of earth. In

* La Citta Morta Act. I Scene V pp. 66, 73.

many cases a passageway leads toward the exterior of the mound. The warrior was buried with his implements of war and the chase and the few ornaments which were then of value. These are decidedly rough in their manufacture, and there is reason to believe that the more finished necklaces and other glass and gold jewelry were of Chinese manufacture. A number of retainers and animals were buried with a dead chief, the substitution of clay images for the living being gradually introduced. Japanese tradition dates this substitution from the first century A.D. but the living interments took place much later, at the funeral of the legendary Jingō; and in the reign of Kogyōku (641-645 A.D.) the ministers had to issue an order forbidding the sacrifice of horses and animals on the occasion of funerals. It can be said, moreover, that the Japanese dolmens do not show any trace of a great civilization antedating the historical period of the Japanese, and these burials in dolmens lasted down to the seventh century. The great mass of the population, however, were simply planted in the ground much as according to modern practice of burial, the body boxed in an extended position or in jars. This is the method of Shintō to-day (barring the jars) and there is no reason to believe that it has been influenced by any modifying factor except that of convenience. The Buddhist method of preparing the corpse consists in drawing the knees up to the chin and bending the heels against the hams. The body in this position takes up the least possible space. It is a practice found among nations from extreme western America to extreme eastern Asia. Cremation also was introduced with Buddhism. The empress Jitō (697 A.D.) was the first of the imperial line to be so treated.

The real importance of the form of burial, however, lies in its relation to the idea of a future life. When, therefore, we find these vessels for food, and implements for daily life, and horses; useful to the chief in that future life, we can reasonably conclude that the ideas of the early Japanese were very like those of other primitive nations, and that such future life involved necessities not unlike those required by the living. Furthermore when we find that the *kami* are supposed to actually dwell in the *miya* or *yashiro*—the Shintō shrine—and in the ancestral tablets, and when a prevalent belief exists, even to-day, among the lower class of Japanese that the offerings presented before the *kamidana* are grateful to these ancestral *kami*, it is fair to presume that this future life is passed in the same place in which the deceased lived during his visible life. That they believe that the *kami* actually partake of the viands is not probable. Savages do not so believe. They believe, or so express it, that the essence of the offering is pleasing to the ghost; and the place where they expect to find the ghost is at the tomb and in the dwelling of the descendants. One cannot be brought in contact with Japanese, especially of the lower class, without feeling how intensely real is this constant personal presence of the ancestral *kami*. There is, however, a ceremonial element in part undoubtedly involved, for the ghost has not unlimited power over his movements. Thus the return

to the abodes of the living is limited to the three days of the Bon Matsuri, during which a plain lantern is kept lighted before the house, so that the ghosts can see their way coming and going in this annual visit to their living descendants. This is the Buddhist side of their thought. But the daily offering is also maintained during the year. An exception, however, seems to exist for angry ghosts, or those whose spirits have not been properly treated, and these have power to return and plague the living. Thus mothers return to suckle infant children, mistresses to console their lovers, and wives to take drastic vengeance on the woman who has supplanted them in their husband's affections. This personal presence during the Festival of the Dead is certainly a valid answer to those who would confine the worship before the tablets to a purely memorial service. With the Shintoist the *kami* are always present. But the real existence of the ghost is further emphasized by his honorary treatment by the living. There would be but little object in honouring with earthly rank a man long dead, if such honour was not supposed to reach him in his posthumous life. This is, however, the common practice among the Japanese, and it is but a short time ago that the Emperor, as the representative of the gods on earth and head of the ecclesiastical establishment, advanced Motoori the great eighteenth century Japanese scholar to higher rank in the official bureaucracy, just as with a living man his services to the imperial house had entitled him to this material reward. The proclamations of the heads of the victorious army and navy, which emphasized the services to the country of the *kami* in the struggle against the great northern power, were not mere paper formulae. The purely scientific rationalist is as rare in Japan as in the West, even among highly educated men. There are few willing to admit the iron fact of the unknowable, and hence they transfer this unknowable to a "spiritual" world. The Japanese people this spiritual world with the *kami*; and the Christian peoples it with the saints, the elect, and the damned. Hence even when there is not strong belief among the Japanese there is reverence in their treatment of the *kami*, and with unbelievers it is not a subject of discussion.

Indefinite, vague to extreme of shadowiness, as the nature of the future state is in the old Shintō rituals, it is more indefinite in its practice. Every Shintō shrine shows this in the past and to-day. It is a difficult matter to separate the worship of Amaterasu, ancestress of the Mikados, from the kindred ceremony carried out before the shrine of Hamaguchi Yohei, the deified farmer described by Lafcadio Hearne. All through the Kojiki it is the worship of the ancestress Amaterasu, and the "Sovereign Sun" is thrown far in the back ground. The cooked-up cosmogony and cosmography of the Kojiki never loses the anthropomorphic character. They are widely apart from the tradition and read like a made up story with a strong admixture of Chinese philosophy. The artificial character has impressed more than one observer. Of course the battle is warm between the advocates of

intuitive mythology and the advocates of an evolutionary process, and the evidence on the one side is looked at with a jaundiced eye by the other side. Euhemerism and "disease of language" come in for equal discredit. However it remains to be shown that primitive man has ever passed from the abstract to the concrete; that the primitive man in whom instinct is as yet so powerful has begun by fastening the general on the particular, and not by passing from this more pressing and immediate stimulus in his physical life to apply the thoughts aroused by such immediate stimulus to more general objects. We can hardly attribute a knowledge of objects of Nature to a dog or other animal. They show fright and fear of unknown objects simulating living objects, but the fright and fear is specifically due to the old train of thought (or instinct) called up in their brain by association. They also show fright and fear at times during a thunderstorm, a phenomenon that they have learned to dread in their wild life from the necessity of seeking shelter from injury, sometimes to preserve their lives. In the same way, on cool days a dog seeks the sun, rolls in it, shows every appreciation of its warmth; *vice versa* it avoids it in hot weather. Certainly in neither case does an idea of Nature worship, inspired either by fear or gratitude, rise in the dog's brain. At least there is no evidence of any thought on the animal's part; and yet we have good reason to extend the animal's powers of association far beyond simple association of ideas relating to its physical necessity. They have good memories; and at times display excellent judgment in acting on things remembered. There is an association between a beating and some offence committed; hence the anxiety to avoid the beating by carrying out the master's orders. Of course the dog's understanding is limited. In his own particular inherited line he can think with a good deal of capacity. But it is no easy matter for a human being to translate a gesture and the dog's opportunities to make mistakes are enormously multiplied. His accomplishments are strictly limited to the concrete in the simplest forms. His main equipment is largely instinctive, and if we translate his actions according to his immensely sharpened sense perceptions, and not according to our dull ones, we must discount actions that appear voluntary but are really instinctive. The savage, however, deals almost entirely with concrete thought, and his instinctive equipment is decidedly greater than that of civilized man. We can accuse him of superstition but we can hardly accuse him of the abstract conceptions required by an esoteric mythology.

The mythologists, however, are not very likely to bring the dog forward as a possible myth maker, their main affiliations being in another direction. But the question of the dog's action is not without interest, for the difference between primitive man and civilized man lies not so much in what would be called antithesis between instinct and thought as between something suspiciously near it—custom and thought, custom being handed down by "social heredity." Primitive man does as little thinking, apart from the immediate necessities of his life, as he can

well avoid. It gives him a headache to think, an expression by the way not seldom heard among our own lower classes. Every thing they can take on trust they do take on trust. In other words the plastic machinery is there; but few nations, and a comparatively small number of men among those few nations, have so trained the thinking function of the brain as to enable them to break in any wide sense with custom. And to-day the man who deals with abstractions—the philosopher drawing generalizations from his concrete data—is a *rara avis* among educated men. Perhaps two or three great thinkers in a century is all a nation can reasonably be supposed to supply. Now let us turn for a moment to the structure of the average myth. The Greek myths have afforded admirable examples, any identification with a definite hero or other ancestor being entirely lost. The anthropomorphic element, however, is deeply grained in the Greek mythology. Its gods are not only men but men with very ungodlike qualities. All the scandalous vices of Greek society are found in these unworthies, portrayed by the Greek poets from Hesiod and Homer down to the close of their civilization. They are teacherous, lying, adulterous, dishonest, given to the worst Paphian vices; and no decent Greek, ancient or modern, with a young daughter or son, would have had one of them in his house. Certainly not over night. But most of their vices are not vices among primitive men; and most of them, on the contrary, are highly esteemed, even religiously regarded, in such a society. Especially is this the case with the successful thief and liar. Now to carry out successfully the apotheosis of such a thief and liar, to prevent his being lost in the night of time, unless he has such luck as Thersites and Achilles in being embalmed in the verse of a great poet, nothing is more efficacious than to connect him with a phenomenon of daily and natural appearance. In fact unless he obtained such endorsement he certainly would be so lost. As is the Unkulunkulu, the Very Old One, and the New Ones that Mr. Spencer cites among the Zulu superstitions. The cult of Æsculapius so wide spread in the later Roman Empire is an excellent instance of translation and advancement from a comparatively humble to a very elevated sphere in the worship. Æsculapius in his latest development was regarded as the son of Apollo. A Japanese example is the war god, Hachiman. The Kojiki, our earliest Japanese authority, tells us that Hachiman in his early career was the Emperor Ōjin, who, whether he existed or not, was certainly believed to have existed by the orthodox Japanese of the year 681 A.D.*

That the insufficiency of these very base gods would be seen by a more refined element as the nation advanced in civilization is not hard to see. The change, if evolutionary, would necessarily be gradual; a gradual substitution of a higher element; and to

* The subject is treated from various sides in Mr. Spencer's "Principles of Sociology": Doctor Tylor's "Primitive Culture"—especially the Chapters on Animism: Mr. A. Lang's "Custom and Myth," "Myth, Rituals and Religion," "Social Origins": and many others.

the average man such higher element, which necessarily has to be taken out of his experience, would be found in the great powers of Nature. It is only as there is some appreciation of Nature that such a worship could arise. Nature worship is an attempt at explanation on insufficient grounds, but for this very reason it is a wide step in advance beyond the primitive unreasoning man. Now side by side with the base mythology and its interpretation in a Nature worship, although somewhat later in date, appears a highly developed philosophy, an esoteric development of the cruder worship. Which is original? Is there a degenerated form from an original which was formerly highly developed? There is no reason to believe so. On the contrary, it is known that the Greek philosophy owes its origin to an ancient religion—the Egyptian—which had already outgrown such childish features and had developed a really advanced philosophy and science, an esoteric religion known to the priests but undreamed of by the lay masses. These priests were the teachers of the Greek philosophers, and Thales and Pythagoras and a long list of great names drew their inspiration from Africa and Asia, not from the early mythology of Greece. These were men living under a high civilization, of a race gifted as none has been, before or since, in its power of thought; and very fit to develop all the material supplied to that wonderful Greek brain. The contempt for the popular mythology was but thinly disguised, and Socrates lost his life from his unwillingness to accept, even in appearance, the popular interpretation. This esoteric Nature worship, the connection of the anthropomorphic sun with a power behind and moving that sun, was a development of still later times, reaching its highest point in the philosophy of Plotinus and Porphyry and the early Neo-Platonists.

Finally, in connection with these Japanese ghosts, there is one feature related to their immediateness to the life of the living. Their condition is not believed to be an entirely comfortable one. The *bake-mono* (ghost) figures largely in Japanese folklore, never with relish and at times with positive dread. They often display great hostility to the living, and the power of wronged husbands and wives to return to wreak vengeance on the living has been graphically told by Lafcadio Hearne in many charming ghost stories of the Japanese. Indeed the Japanese very much pity the condition of the outcast ghost; for if they are given to wandering at unseasonable times and occasions, it is, as with us, due to some wrong which prevents their due rest. Haunted houses and good old family ghosts, quite as pertinacious and threatening as Hamlet's sire, are common features of Japanese ghost lore. It is hardly necessary to say that with the whole surrounding medium peopled with supernatural beings, there is not a wood or a fountain, or a waterfall, or a ravine, or a river, or any other natural phenomenon that is not attached to some ghost. And the natural phenomenon plays but little part in the transaction. It is only the habitat, or the medium of making the ghost's power felt. Certainly this is a very limited Nature worship.

III.

FROM PILLAR TO POST.

"Adoncques, en ceste hostellerie, les trois pèlerins
"deslièrent prou leurs langues et convindrent gaigner
"Rome de conserve, à ceste fin de se bender contre
"les destrousseurs de gens, oyseaulx de nuict et
"aultres pistolandiers qui faisoient estat de des-
"chargier lesdicts pèlerins de ce qui leur poisoyt sur
"le corps paravant que le pape leur ostast ce qui
"leur poisoyt sur la conscience. Après boire, les
"trois compaignons deviserent, veu que le pot est la
"clef du discours, et tous feirent cet adveu que la
"cause de leur despartie estoyt ung caz de femme."

Les Contes Drolatiques.

§ 1.

In these modern days of the world one thing or another—pleasure or necessity—takes a man from the little narrow circle, the unit of the community to which he is more particularly attached, and sends him wandering at a distance which makes it necessary for him to pass the night under another roof than his own. Indeed it is almost a normal phase in man's development. Man resembles some species of cirripods which in their early life swim freely about, apparently enjoy themselves—those that escape being eaten—and finally settle down on the shell of some other mollusc, on some rock or other stationary object, to complete the term of their insignificant existence. So in man relieved from the helplessness of early childhood the passion for this movement from spot to spot quickly develops. The days spent away from the homestead are gala days. In fact they are not seldom associated with relief from the daily round of his toil. Old people, however, rarely take a genuine pleasure in travel. They know they cannot see the whole surface of the earth, and what they do see they begin to appreciate only varies superficially. As barnacles, however, become attached to a vessel which moves them willy-nilly from place to place; so it happens at times with old people, and some unfortunate he or she is found attached to the younger and more active generation and dragged by them from place to place, spending nights in train and steamer, taking meals at irregular hours, sitting around on the hard benches of railway stations, and when in luck ending their day's campaign in the hired and often shabby comfort afforded by a wayside inn. Such cases are pitiable.

Travel among primitive communities was small. The movement of one man generally implied the movement of a whole community, and the reception of such a host of guests was in

those times regarded with a very hostile eye; it almost invariably involved a fight. Hence, as shown in the migration of nations, host and guest literally fell on each other's necks. The question became one of personal status, and one of the contestants emerged from the strife as master, the other as slave. When, therefore, an individual man found occasion to spend the night away from the protection of his community his mission was of such importance that it took on practically the character of an embassy. We have a remnant of this in the guest house of the old Japanese Annals, and existing to-day among savage peoples in New Guinea and elsewhere. This guest house is set aside for the reception of such formal visitors, whether for the greater facility of spearing them in a bunch if the occasion should arise, or because the visitors themselves regard it as safer to keep together and not allow themselves to be split up into small parties. Such peoples of course have but little peaceful business with each other, their commercial relations being confined to short truces during which a sort of fair takes place, and these interchanges of commodities take place under conditions of a general camp, both parties keeping very much on their own side. The extension of these relations among people somewhat more advanced has only in appearance a change in the base on which it rests. Hospitality here seems to rush to the other extreme. The man who has broken bread or eaten salt at his host's table becomes sacred, to be defended at the cost of life itself. The difference is more apparent than real. The guest temporarily has become a member of his host's family, and all the obligation to protect him as such rests on the host. Men's interests in the semi-civilized stage had broadened out. They had unconsciously reached the commercial stage without the machinery to protect it. The widespread hospitality of the Arab tent is simply the first step to these outside relations. It is found to-day in the unsettled parts of highly civilized nations, where some little community's business with the outside world is not large enough to warrant a man devoting himself to the entertainment of strangers. It is paid for in time, whether in presents or blackmail to the Bedouin chief, or to the hostelry maintained by the mediaeval baron who alone had the right and the capital to supply the needs of the small travelling public of the day. Indeed all the baronial hotel keepers have not gone out of the business, and especially in the Austrian Tyrol old inns are to be found whose landlords can boast the bluest blood in Europe. And very good landlords do they make, trained by ages of heredity to all the peculiar, if simple, necessities that their locality calls forth.

It is, however, with commerce properly speaking that inns come into prominence. It is a matter of record that the cities of ancient Egypt and Babylonia were well supplied with such conveniences. We know the extremes to which classification of the population was driven in those great bureaucracies, and the lower classes were herded into easily controlled units. The police probably kept as sharp an eye on travellers as they do in Japan

to-day. Such travellers seemed to lodge in preference with their countrymen settled in the foreign land. To take a biblical incident, it would have been better for the Levite if he had turned aside to the stranger city of the Jebusite instead of lodging among his own people at Gibeah and among the Benjaminites. It was natural for the two strangers to come as Hebrews to the house of Lot in Sodom. Any other Hebrew would have done the same. It was probably early that such men found their hands full in attending to strangers come to the cities on matters of business. If indeed it was not a primary reason for their own settlement in a foreign land. Thus we find the innkeepers of earliest record to be strangers in a strange land. Their clientele does not seem to have been of a high character. The merchant, as yet, was an object of contempt and plunder. The traveller of rank and for information found shelter in the temples, the priests of which made it part of their business to entertain such visitors as Thales, Pythagoras, Solon, Herodotus, Strabo, Pausanias, and a host of lesser lights; if indeed the monarch himself did not place them near his throne. In the fully developed civilizations of the ancient world, however, inns had taken a position such as they hold with us to-day. Many strangers were innkeepers and travellers of their own nationality gave them the preference, but commerce had also its national side, and native innkeepers, were numerous. These catered not only to a travelling public but to local needs and Diogenes gibes at Demosthenes when he catches him emerging from an inn, perhaps staggering and certainly stammering.* Indeed we can draw but little distinction between these inns of ancient Greece and Rome and a modern Italian *osteria* or Spanish *posada*. The first were certainly not furnished with gas, electric light, or a telephone in each room; and the latter are also very unlikely to possess these twentieth century "necessities." We have no difficulty in understanding the method of life in these old days. In the vivid picture given of such life in the "Satyricon" of Petronius, we are told by his hero Encolpus that when they returned from the vulgar feast set out by the parvenu Trimalchio "there was not a torch to show the way to wanderers: "we went at venture, and the silence of the night, already "advanced, left no hope of finding a lantern. Add to this "intoxication and but little knowledge of these dark places even "in the day. Thus after having wandered around for at least "an hour, stumbling over stones and heaps of muck, we emerged "at last by a miracle, with torn and blood-stained feet, thanks "to the foresight of Gito who, the day before, fearing to lose "his way in full daylight had the foresight to mark with "chalk the pillars and columns along the road, so that these "marks piercing the darkness with their clear whiteness, at

* More likely a *Καπηλειον*. But these wine shops were also used as 'inns,' as well as those regularly licensed for such business. Cf. Becker's "Charicles" p. 281, English trans.

"last showed us the way. But another complication awaited us at the inn. The old hostess, who had passed the day in tiptoeing with every comer, was snoring away, and not even thunder would have aroused her. And we would have remained outside all night if there had not come a post courier of Trimalchio with ten vehicles in his train. Without further fuss about the matter he broke down the door and made entrance for us also." With other incidents, not overly nice in description, and during which he manages to scrape acquaintance with an infamous old scoundrel named Eumolpus, we learn that the inn was furnished much as one of to-day. The rooms had tables, beds, chairs, hangings, braziers; the meals were served at the guests' orders in their rooms; and when Eumolpus comes by invitation and knocks at the door:—"I asked, 'who are you?' and ran to peep through the keyhole to see if Asciltos also had not come," a friend with whom he had quarrelled, and whom he was particularly anxious to avoid. The dinner was served in the bedroom of Encolpus, and among other interruptions is that of a public crier and his assistants, "brandishing torches that gave more smoke than light" and in search of the runaway boy slave. Asciltos accompanies them in search of his lost property, and unable to obtain access to the room of Encolpus, the bum-bailiff makes use of his skill and authority and picks the lock in the name of the Law. Now this description, condensed from the pages of a Roman writer of the first century A.D. could just as well be transferred from the pages of Cervantes, or still later of Fielding or Smollett. We can go still further and venture to say that it reads perfectly familiar to ears of to-day. In other words we are entirely at home in this first century of the Christian era, and, granted a knowledge of the language, could have walked in on the ancient hostess, or into the inn above described, thoroughly prepared for the nature of our entertainment. Now if there is any business of practical application entirely apart from any higher meaning it is that of eating, drinking, and sleeping; and in showing that man has changed so little in the groundwork of his means of supplying these needs it is evidence enough that the groundwork on which we now rest is the same as of olden time. Electric light and filtered water for scanty water drinkers are the only additions we supply to our modern feasts. In plate, cookery, service, wines, adornment, the ancients were at no disadvantage. In fact we would be a little puzzled to say what the upper classes have gained from the progress of nineteen centuries. The lower classes have gained some unquestionable privileges; better sanitation, freedom from slavery, the right to work harder and keep what they gain, the Sunday newspapers; but our material civilization is largely gloss—all on the surface.

George Borrow said to the landlord of one of the many inns touched upon in his wanderings:—"I will tell you that you have a fault which will always prevent your rising in the world, you have modesty; those who have modesty shall have no advancement, while those who can blow their own horn lustily, shall be

made governors." Bearing in mind the many gorgeous posters confronting the traveller in every hotel and steamship and railway station in the West, together with a liberal and often gratuitous use of the blank wall space of our cities and country, let us turn to Japan past and present and see how far any such kindred principle has found expression. If Japanese inns are to depend on the commercial development of the country it will be necessary to postpone to a late development the important part they play in any community. The savage race described by the Chinese, before the Japanese had even a decently formed tradition, certainly possessed nothing in advance of the guest house. Besides, a people moving from place to place, as their food supply varied, dispense with any other method of getting what they want except by the taking what pleases them, and forcibly by preference. Even much later in the early historical period we find little reason to believe in their development. There is no hint of them in the early annals, and the Korean guests and embassies are entertained in Government "guest-houses." Mention is made of them in eighth century poetry, an inn by the river side—perhaps at one of the numerous ferries for crossing the rivers—calling for the praise of the poet. But the eighth century is comparatively late. Even then we cannot suspect any extended development. The early empire was in no sense commercial. We find the people mainly fastened to one spot. Any movement among them was of a very minor character, furnishing a clientele too scanty to give rise to such a special occupation as inns. Masses of the people were moved from place to place by official order as necessity arose for some new public work, or convenience prompted their formation and grouping into a new guild or *be* which to the official mind of that day were to be herded together. Such movement *en masse*, however, if to a distance would be carried out by quartering them on the people at whose villages they rested; and arrived at their destination they would find their houses prepared for them or have to prepare them themselves. It is a common occurrence among oriental peoples living under an absolute Government. The only real travel through the country was by the official class, and these would naturally find their quarters with the representatives of the public service whose districts their route traversed. Indeed in Japan, as elsewhere, inns seemed to take their rise with spreading commerce. Their development, probably, would have been quicker had it not been for the practice of the temples which always provided shelter for the pilgrims during the *ō mairi* or great summer exodus to the many sacred shrines at the holy places of the islands. This practice is pursued at the present day, the long barracks erected for these people and the provision made for their sustenance being no small item of the priestly duties. At a squeeze the first idea of official authority is to make use of the temples. When large numbers of people have been rendered homeless by fire, when private quarters have been filled to over-

flowing with the troops quartered on them, they turn to the temples as public property in a sense that is even more unpromising than with the people. The official may not be a public servant, but there is no question as to priests and people being servants of officials.

To-day in lack of other accommodation, in remote places, the traveller can usually find shelter with priest or headman. This is undoubtedly a survival of the practice of early days. With the development of the monarchy, however, and specially after its centralization at Nara and later at Kyōto, we have every sign of a people among whom an interchange of commodities is taking place. It is still local in character. The taxes were almost entirely paid in kind and internal traffic would be largely confined to forwarding them to Kyōto or to the local centres. This, however, meant movement among the people to reach these centres; and disputes and claims would often keep them beyond the time required for mere delivery. There was much complaint of the robbery and extortion practised by the people who took charge of relay horses left by the peasants in their care until the return journey. It is early found necessary to regulate these "liverymen." All the apparatus for this collection of tax products and its inspection, the manner in which the tax rice was to be packed, the labelling of quantity, quality, and producer was most carefully defined, and defects had to be made good. In addition there sprang up a manufacturing element around the luxurious court at Kyōto, and these people had to be supplied with their raw materials from the country districts. Very early—by the seventh century—there is strict regulation of the people of Kyōto town, and elsewhere; constant supervision of their business, of merchants and apprentices, and especially of the strangers within the gates for these came in no small numbers to pick up the crumbs that fell from the imperial table. Most significant, however, of this rise of commerce is the coinage of money. This coinage promptly followed the discovery of copper in Tsushima. It was always behind the need for it, if not behind the demand; for the Japanese plebeian, as elsewhere, much preferred rice in the hand to the bird in the bush coin of the Government which it was only clear to his mind was not good to eat. It was found necessary, therefore, to prevent the unloading of these coins on the Government in payment of taxes; another palpable proof that business largely consisted as yet of such taxes. And this early citizen also had his pleasures. The small fry imitate the larger fish in the pond. As the emperor and suite went pleasure seeking and picnicking from temple to temple, so every class sought their pleasure in the surrounding hills. Temples, however, if provided for the recreation of kings, princes, and the learned, were not for the people. It is safe to say that in purely pleasure jaunts the Kyōto citizen did not wander beyond the nearby slopes of Maruyama. As time passes and we advance into the eleventh and twelfth centuries he was fairly the toad under the harrow. Indeed it is only the utter contempt of him that saved him from

the swords of the militant monks and the bullies that began to fill the streets of the imperial capital and the highways of Old Japan. But the life of the day must have been a varied one. There were minor poets in those days—literary men in search of a job—as well as to-day; there were bullies of the Benkei variety—plenty of them, they swarmed like bees only in no way so useful—whose sword was their fortune, and for that fortune they had to set their faces from all directions to the ruling powers at Kyōto; there were the bailiffs of smaller nobles, who had to forward the raw silk, or even the finished article, from country looms to the metropolis; there were nobles themselves, not travelling on official business but on their way to the central power at Kyōto to explain or to seek explanation. These men called for accommodation superior to the rough sheds and coarse fare supplied to the pack-horse men, sheds whose lineal descendants are seen to-day on every Japanese highway. The innkeeper's life during this period of the Middle Ages must have been far more unhappy than his confrere in Europe at a similar period. No old man-at-arms would have taken up such a despicable business; whereas such a course under the powerful protection of his master was common enough in Europe, and he often repelled force by force and the might of his own arm, sure of such support against the unattached stranger. One thing would protect the Japanese innkeeper and that is the absolute necessity to these times of his business. As a useful animal he was preserved by a tacit agreement. It is not meant to imply that the Japanese plebeian had come as far down the ladder as he did in the days of the Tokugawa Shōgunate. But class was sharply marked off from class, and the inferior could not raise his hand against a superior. If he could force his way up a little by his proved usefulness with his knife, not only as a trencherman but as a possible man-at-arms, then his position was altered, and the turbulence of the times sometimes gave him opportunities of this kind.

Great lords had always traversed the country. In early times on business of State when presumably they lived on the country, quartering themselves in the emperor's name on the local magnate, and their suite on the villagers. A practice largely pursued in later times when they began to travel on private business and a man's interest would not permit this transient guest to undergo the scurvy treatment of a plebeian inn. They, too, at times, however, would have to resort to such accommodation as they could get. No bills of course were rendered in those days. They are a modern institution anyhow in Japan. The great lord's reputation had to be maintained, and if his presence was a nuisance to the peasants of the country through which he passed it was a god-send to the innkeeper. The purse he left behind munificently covered his entertainment and his exalted position. So with all classes, not according to their means but according to their position. There is a modern instance of the practice. It is told that an

attaché of a great western Power took such a progress with one of Japan's well known great men. As they stopped with their train at a tea-shed out came a good sized bank note from the major-domo of the general. The next stop it was the turn of the *attaché*. And so on during the day, the stops being fast and furious; and a mighty hole was threatened in the modest salary of the *attaché* if his home Government refused to foot the bill of this not strictly official excursion. Probably they did so, as the Power in question treated such expenditures very liberally. The peaceful days of the Tokugawa Shōgunate of course saw the full development of the Japanese innkeeper. Commerce took a great stride in advance in Japan, and a different class of travel quickly sprang up, much more numerous and important than that of former days. Manufactures in great centres such as Osaka, Nagoya, and Yedo, called for a rapid interchange of business relations. These inns are familiar enough. We live in them to-day as we travel through Japan. As preserved in the old prints they show no distinctive types as compared with the modern type. They are piled up in two and three floors, with a garden and perhaps pond, and balconies acting also as passage-ways. They are represented as crowded with people, eating, drinking, and enjoying themselves just as they do to-day. The service of the food, the respectful posture of the inn maid (*nesan*), the *futon* spread for the night, the flimsy *Shōji* and the awkward *contretemps* they occasionally give rise to—all are found in modern as well as in old Japan. And how old this identical structure is we do not know. From description perhaps as old as the eighth century *inn* itself; for temples and palaces have not changed in their structure from those earliest times, and the structure very much rules the kind of life that goes on in it. In New Japan we can to some extent live, if not think, the life of long ago.

The innkeeper of Japan is, and was, essentially modest. Perhaps in one sense of the word this is why he has not got on as to his position. Japanese inns have never been associated with the public life as has been the case in Europe. With their earliest appearance in the life of modern Europe we find the general public flocking to the courtyards of the inns in which some travelling show or mystery had set up its stage for a public representation, the inn balconies being walled off as boxes for the elite of the town. The practice was universal. It extended from Italy and Spain to England and Scandinavia. In the thirteenth century a theatre as a separate institution was unknown. Now the stage itself has always been a vehicle for ideas more or less heterodox in the view of the powers that be; and the inn in Europe was, as the saloon is to-day, the poor man's club. If any new ideas were to be found and propagated it was from the inn as a centre. Boniface has therefore always been looked at askance and sharply controlled by the police. But Boniface as the centre of the popular pleasure was a power likewise to be conciliated. To suppress him through forbidding these representations would have been dangerous. In Japan he

never was allowed to gain any such means of courting popularity and making himself the nucleus of a local clientele. His own troubles, on the contrary, made and make him a faithful ally of the police. There have been and probably always will be "gents" who travel with a collar as their only visible supply of collateral; and there are gentlemen who travel with such a vast array of bags and boxes and other paraphernalia as to put their financial status out of question. This is a peculiarly national institution in which, perhaps, there is ground for criticism of both extremes. It certainly is not necessary that a man should have all the comforts of home around him during the twenty four hours of the day. The reasonable immediate necessities for purposes of personal cleanliness of any man can be condensed in the shape of a change of linen into the compass of a very small bag. The rest of his baggage he can easily wait the two or three hours necessary to deliver it through the carrier or baggage express. In the practice of American travel, where public conveyances are supposed to be maintained at 70° F., a vast array of rugs and wraps are not necessary. Hence everything goes into the van, and we have been unjustly criticised because we walk from the train with nothing but a small grip in the hand. In England and on the continent of Europe, on the contrary, no provision is made for an equable temperature, and the railway carriages are filled up at all seasons, summer and winter, by the masses of small bundles and to the discomfort of every occupant of the compartment. It is a curious fact that the average European, who as a military man has been trained to reduce his impedimenta into the smallest compass, should be such an offender against common sense. The Englishman sins from his spirit of over-cleanliness which drives him to lug a rubber bath tub into a compartment six by eight feet and jammed with people; conditions under which he certainly cannot use it. The continental European, who on the contrary is accused, perhaps unjustly, of anything but over-cleanliness, seems to regard travel as so unusual as to call for one of those outbreaks of indulgence that we give to children on gala occasions. So he fills the racks with fruit, cigars, and confections, which are a constant source of expectation and hope to some that a new comer will plant a heavy valise in their vitals with the result of a splutter of *sacré*s, *teufels*, *caramba*'s and black looks. But to return from this little digression.

The relations of the Japanese Boniface are purely with the travelling public. The Japanese inn is in no sense a public club, in which it is sharply differentiated from America where the hotel fills this peculiar position and probably draws the greater part of its clientele from this source, or from England where the inn has been the gathering place of the local interests but in a more special and limited sense than in America. It does to some extent form a ground for the intermingling of men, but in a very moderate sense as yet for the range of public interests allowed the mercantile classes is still limited. Questions of

national policy can hardly be a matter of serious discussion among men who have nothing to do with the direction of such policies ; and they have hardly begun as yet to discuss the practicability of obtaining their right to such direction. Very academic are such discussions even among the newspapers which are pointed more directly at men in public life, and such discussion does not become a matter of public concern unless their feelings are very much trampled upon. The fiery discussion over free trade and protection, home rule and government regulation, prohibition and license, as matters of public not Government interest, common political questions in America and England, are purely academic in Japan. They discuss them intelligently as affairs of interest to Europe or America. They take the position much of the German and Frenchman, and feel rather relieved that they have a Government to bother about these questions ; and nothing can be more depressing and more a subject of criticism than that their public men should applaud this mental attitude. It is only as questions of tariff and taxes are beginning to press on the people through recent development, the change caused in their daily scale of life, the paring down of a very narrow margin, that is arousing them to these questions of politics as applied to their daily life. Official solution of such questions is becoming less satisfactory, and the expression *kawaiso* (pitiable) is becoming more and more frequent in Japanese mouths as war and taxes are driving their lack of control home to the people at large. Personal exchange of views is worth a dozen local newspapers colouring their views to suit their party and politics. In America we do not take our newspapers as seriously as we used to, and are beginning to recognize the editorial colour, yellow and otherwise. This may come to be the case also in Japan, and the Japanese bagman of the future has his mission of distribution from one end of the land to the other. Unfortunately his medium of exchange is not a favourable one. The landlord of the inn is not a citizen in the common sense of the word. He has not that independent standing that he has in the Anglo-Saxon world. He is a police spy, and one of their sources of anticipation and repression. He is held responsible for everything that takes place in his establishment, even down to reporting the personal opinions of his guests. He is absolutely dependent for his good will and business on the police who have wide powers for revoking his license on very flimsy grounds of public necessity. Public necessity lying within their definition, not that of a court of record. It does not do for the ordinary Japanese citizen to have the police eye him unfavourably. This applies with tenfold force to the publican.

§ 2.

Inns are but the stopping places on highways and byways which lead to somewhere. We have a better illustration in Japan of the condition of our own primitive times than in any other thickly settled country, inasmuch as the use of wheeled vehicles drawn by cattle and the construction of the necessary roads has only been a matter of the past fifty years. To-day they are the rare exception, the old methods of conveyance by packing on the back of man or horse being generally in use in all country districts away from the immediate vicinity of the railway and the large towns. Even near these larger country towns, where small carts drawn by man power are in use to bring in the country produce, the roadways are rarely more than six or eight feet in width, and it is sometimes a nice business to negotiate their passage when two such vehicles meet. Many of these pack trails must be of great antiquity. In some cases the object has been to ease the grade by cutting, and then narrow passes will be found cut through the solid rock; but in other cases it has been palpably a slow wearing down of a very hard tough clay soil; there is no object in intentionally lowering the grade. In fact the upper stratum makes for the best roadway, and a new path begins side by side with the old worn one cut down six or eight feet below the surface of the ground by the constant passage of generations of weary feet. One sometimes gets an apt illustration of the use of those old Roman covered-ways, cut in the slopes of the down in Britain and which enabled them to descend unsuspected on the inhabitants of the valley below. Not suspecting the neighbourhood of such a ditch you suddenly find almost at your feet, the ears of some horse, his pack of dried grass or brushwood moving like Birnam wood apparently by its own volition over the surface of the ground. The straw sandals worn by man and beast enable them to approach without their presence being suspected. These straw sandals are of great use on the steep clay footpaths so liberally sprinkled through every valley of Japan. These narrow trails are pitched with absolute indifference to grade and are often carried jauntily along a bare grassy slope as steep as the roof of a house, where a slip would mean a fall of many feet to the bottom. For centuries these narrow mountain trails were the only internal means of communication. Indeed we find, up to the nineteenth century, a large part of the rice shipments from the west coast are forwarded once a year by the slow and tedious sea route through the Tsushima and Shimonoseki Straits, and so by the Inland Sea to Osaka. Sea travel in the early days, it can be added, was none too safe. There were not only dangers from storm but from pirates; and we have a vivid description of such a voyage in the tenth century, as made by Tsurayuki returning from his post as governor of Shikoku. Piracy has disappeared from Japanese waters but is still a frequent episode of river travel in South China; and these Chinese pirates are

far more dangerous than the average Yosemite highwayman. In Japan there seems always to have been two main arteries; the central mountain road, afterwards known as the Nakasendō, and the east coast road known as the Tokaidō. The great mass of the Hida and Etchu mountains was impracticable for a west coast road; this was deflected by them down the centre of the islands. The condition of both Tokaidō and Nakasendō has been better and worse than as they exist to-day. An idea of the former, and the care bestowed on it, is shown by that portion which still passes through the Hakone mountains and which for miles is paved with broad flat stones. In the plain it broadened out somewhat as is shown by the lines of *matsu* (pine) marking its confines. Its real importance dates from the days of the Tokugawa Shōgunate and the founding of Yedo in the seventeenth century, and during this period it is described as a well maintained roadway with smooth hard surface. But even in the days of the Kamakura Shōgunate military necessity required something better than a mountain trail for the movement of troops on the refractory capital at Kyōto. Beyond a few such main nerve channels, however, to keep the larger ganglia in communication a feudal system does not encourage road building. Each petty baron is much interested in keeping his own bailiwick in guard and not to render it too accessible to more powerful neighbours or his overlord.

The centralization of the country under the strong hand of the first three Tokugawa Shōguns, wrought a great change. Iyeyasu based his government on the feudal system, but as suzerain he held a control over the fiefs, almost as great as that of Louis XIV in France. His grandson Iyemitsu, the third Shōgun, made the attendance of the *daimyō* at court compulsory for half the year, and the permanent residence of their families ensured their good behaviour during the remainder. This constant passage of the *daimyō* with their bands of retainers, their war horses, their shining silken banners, and the closed and heavy *norimon* or litter in which the lord rode concealed from sight, and which let us hope he abandoned from time to time to bestride his war horse and give the bearers a rest, gave an importance to the Tokaidō and Nakasendō that bore heavily on the peasantry living along them. Constant were the calls of the post on their labour and live stock, and this corvée service became a source of serious complaint. The Government, of course, resorted to elaborate and minute rules to direct more of this traffic to the more thickly populated Tokaidō. The popularity of the Nakasendō was owing to a curious reason. Precedence on these journeys was strictly by rank, and the lesser *daimyō* was compelled to lower his dignity before the greater lord—as gauged by their incomes. This was less likely to occur along the Nakasendō which hence became a favourite route with these minor nobles. But this mountain country was comparatively speaking thinly populated, and the draft on men and horses was such as to seriously hamper agriculture. Any idea of compensation to the peasant for his

labour, thus causing an inflow to supply the needed article, of course never would occur to the mediæval brain in Japan or elsewhere. Forced labour was the only labour familiar to a feudal system. The Government was caught between the desire to maintain its supply of tax rice and the demands of the *daimyō* who travelled post free, and their remedy was to distribute the *daimyō*. A method of little avail for then the cry rose from the peasants of the Tokaidō. That the labour called for was severe and wasteful goes without saying. Good roads are a purely modern institution dating from the beginning of the nineteenth century. In Queen Elizabeth's day a journey by coach was more dangerous and unusual than to-day is a journey in a flying ship. They were a new institution and almost as useless for general purposes as a carriage and pair of horses are in Japan to-day. Men rode on horse back and the women on a pillion. In Italy in 1532 Pope Clement VII made a progress through Umbria to avoid some of the larger cities, especially Florence whose recent siege and the wounds inflicted on it in restoring his precious family—the Medici—were not grateful to the eyes of one who must have felt some of the twinges of a parricide. His Holiness, however, had to walk much of the way, the horses legs having been broken in clambering up and down over the rocky trail; and he and his suite slept on straw or whatever else they could find. The glories of the old days of coaching, their accidents and incidents and hairbreadth escapes can now only be experienced on some stage routes of the western United States and Canada or Mexico. In Old Japan, that is up to railroad days, the dangers were numerous but different. As they travelled on horseback or on their legs they ran less danger of being smothered in the mud, but still ran some risk of sliding over a precipice or coming to grief on a road little better than a mountain torrent. Their great difficulty was in crossing the numerous broad, rapid, and often swollen rivers, which even now give railway engineers great difficulty. Passage in these old days was effected by ferry, or on the backs of sturdy rascals who did not hesitate to take advantage of their freight and heavily mulct them in mid-stream under penalty of the punishment meted out by Robin Hood to Friar Tuck—depositing them then and there to make their way to the bank or the bottom of the river as their good fortune chose to direct them.

The Peace of the Shōgunate, the rise of Yedo, and the extension of commerce, made a great difference to the main highways of Old Japan. The internal network of travel still was carried along the numerous mountain trails and on pack horses, but the central arteries of traffic were such roads as we now see running north and south and marked by the fine avenues of pine and cryptomeria. They were well kept and were adequate for the great traffic that streamed along them carrying the tax rice to storage at Yedo and other great centres. There was still considerable shipment by sea. The west coast districts seem to have been practically cut off and only sent their fleet once a year

to Osaka. Sendai was the centre for shipment from the district north of Yedo. Between Osaka and Yedo there was a steady stream of junks, the owners of which protected themselves from loss at sea by a complete system of insurance. Osaka was the great producing centre, especially for manufactures, Yedo was a great agricultural centre and also the residence of the luxurious court of the Shōgunate. At regular intervals the balance was struck and Yedo or Osaka remitted gold as the case called for, the gold itself being insured in transit. We can understand therefore the familiar features at the base of the old Japanese prints representing the traffic as it streamed along the Tokaidō. It is only strange in its outer form. There is no such difference between the eastern and western mind as is so much talked about to-day. Psychology acts by well defined laws for all mental phenomena. The deduction so often drawn is highly unscientific. The Easterner adapts circumstances to his formula. We must learn this formula. The Westerner usually adapts formulae to the circumstances. One thing we miss in these old Japanese landscapes is the wind-mill. No man seems to have ever thought of putting to good account the toy whirling-gigs so ingeniously devised and on sale by every Japanese toy dealer. Not likely, however, in a land and under a regime which forbade thought and laid stress on following blindly and exactly past methods. The reason why the Japanese did not make use of a power so abundantly supplied them lies in the fact that they never travelled. Such an invisible power as air is not evident at first sight, and if it were not for the travel of pilgrims to the holy places of the East, Europe might have waited long for the same idea. Gibbon, citing Ducange, places the first use of wind-mills in Normandy at the beginning of the eleventh century. Water power, on the contrary, was adopted for grinding corn as early as the sixth century in France. The use of animal power was well known to the ancient world, and a graphic description of the ill-treatment meted out to the unfortunate beasts in the treadmill is given us by Apuleius in his novel of the "Golden Ass." Water power, so abundant in Japan, has always been turned to use in crude but most ingenious devices for raising water to irrigate the fields and for purposes of milling and grinding. Its more indirect use for driving a bellows for winnowing grain seems to have escaped their notice, the old process of doing this by hand being still seen in practice in every country village. As in other countries these water wheels afford picturesque bits of scene that would delight the eye of an artist. On the surface there seems nothing of strategical value in such retired scenes, but, as we have said, the Japanese policeman adapts the circumstances to the formula, and pencil and paper, confiscation and confinement, are the incongruous ingredient of any such haphazard sketching in the land of the "Risen Sun." Finally we can touch on one other subject attached to the question of highways and byways; streams and the method of crossing them. As said, a river in Old Japan, when too wide to be bridged by

one of their flimsy structures was crossed in flat bottomed scows, or if fordable pig-a-back. Making use of the mechanical force of the current by means of wire and trolley, common in Europe and America, never seems to have occurred to them. The small streams in travelled districts are crossed to-day by substantial bridges, and the skill the people show in hastily throwing together these structures is indication of their long use. They are often covered with earth and give very firm footing to animals. It is on the pack trails that these more permanent bridges are found. On the foot-trails through the mountains, and when not intended for use with a pack horse, the bridge is often nothing but an open bamboo frame work thrown across in suspension bridge style. They are strong enough but hideously suggestive of the reverse as they bend and sway under the foot. The native with his *waraji* (straw sandals) crosses them as nonchalantly as the cat on the fence. Another feature of old Japanese bridge ornamentation is the *wobashira* (male pillar). This ornamentation is nothing but a *phallus* plain and simple, and its use is very widely extended. Perhaps we can assign to the prevalence of these erotic emblems the wide-spread use of fans by both sexes in Old Japan.

These narrow trails and the practically exclusive use of pack trains involved an economic question of very serious import to Old Japan. The question was that of cost of freight. Pack trains, no matter how cheap is labour, involve at least the cost of food and shelter for man and beast, and therefore are necessarily very local in application or confined to those articles the great value of which leaves a margin of profit. This was the case in Japan. Important as were the Tokaidō and Nakasendō, the traffic along them (barring that costly and useless luxury, the *daimyō*) was practically a local traffic. To send, for instance, rice from Osaka to Yedo by this route was practically prohibited by the cost of transportation. Any pack animal, man or beast or woman, would long have eaten up the value of its load. Such traffic, however, was carried on by the line of junks kept in operation between the north and south districts. The service—and incidentally the whole development of shipbuilding in Japan—was limited by a restriction in the size of these vessels and of course of a consequent loss in efficiency and cheapness as freight carriers. This was one of the brilliant ideas of the third Shōgun Iyemitsu, whose idea in such limitation of size was to prevent the building by his subjects of large ocean going craft, and hence their temptation to wander into the dangerous commerce with foreign lands. The burden of proof lay on any unfortunate Japanese who was driven to the Philippines or the Chinese coast. Imprisonment or death was his portion if he was fool enough to return and fall into the hands of the suspicious officials of the Shōgunate. But the most serious effect this inefficient system of transport had on the country at large was felt during the occurrence of famines. These were many and severe and date from the times of the earliest records. The cause for

them in these earlier times is easy to see and lasted down through the centuries. There were not only the effects of bad harvest due to natural causes but also the population at times were drafted off into public works, during which period the economic condition of the country was more or less deranged. Internal wars added to the devastation of the districts in which they were carried on, and ignorance of scientific agriculture, especially of fertilizers, necessitated allowing cleared ground to lie fallow for long periods. The results obtained from the rest under a primitive system would be far below its capabilities. This wasteful and precarious condition resulted in severe local and general famines. We have a constant record of these beginning with the times of the Kojiki (681-712 AD) and extending down to the Restoration of 1867. We can even antedate the Kojiki, for such stress is laid on the harvest in the Shintō rituals that its importance to the mythical age can be equally accepted. Now for these local famines in the early days there was no relief whatever, except such as could be obtained from their immediate neighbours. If these too were short handed there was no remedy left but to sit down and starve together. And this the Japanese people did. Officialdom could not move itself from red tape and give free movement to the people over the land, and their feeble efforts at relief were consumed long before the victims were reached. This localization of the people had another evil effect. It limited the range of their sympathies. As one district had to struggle through the agonies and death of a severe famine, without hope of relief, so it gave little thought to another district when in its turn it was afflicted. This system of thus severely limiting the people within their habitat gave rise to an interesting contradiction in the character of the people of Old Japan, and still affects New Japan. Probably among no people can there be found a finer and tenderer sympathy within the range in which it is allowed to act. Perhaps it gained strength within those limits. But as said it was strictly limited to their surroundings, whether of place or caste or family. The broadening effect of modern life, the bringing together of the scattered units of an intensely racial people into an intensely national people, has gone far to dissipate this feeling, and in modern Japan private charity is broad and wide even if public charity has been too busily occupied in building navies and drilling armies, to turn itself to building asylums.

By the times of the Tokugawa Shōgunate the water traffic and easier communication between North and South gave some relief to the strain of these periodical famines. The relief was small, however, and the difficulty of communication with interior districts still paralysed the efforts of otherwise earnest and well meaning officials. This difficulty lay in not only overcoming the physical but the mental inertia. Official sympathy—a very cold comfort—must be inspired by private sympathy at the bottom. No real change could be made before the introduction of railways and modern machinery of transportation. But if

sympathy was lacking towards men it is hardly necessary to say that it was practically a minus quantity in regard to animals. Kindness towards animals even in the West is a plant of recent growth. Their much wider sphere of usefulness has taught the lower classes that to get the greatest return from their labour it is necessary to treat them well, but the feeling even to-day is almost entirely based on this utilitarian principle. In Japan, on the contrary, their use has been limited, and such use has, if anything, made the lot of the brute worse than before. Owing to the strong influence of Buddhism the standpoint of the Japanese toward animals is largely one of indifference. Where they did not waste over-much sympathy on their fellowman they were not likely to go out of their way in displaying it toward brute creation—except theoretically and sentimentally in giving them burials honours as creatures possessed of a soul. The Japanese lower classes, it is to be suspected, also are a little afraid of the animal creation. To their minds metempsychosis takes a decidedly gross form, and wickedness in this world can be rewarded by a rebirth under an inferior form. Foxes, badgers, cats, all figure malevolently in their folklore; and the general tendency from the point of superstition is not to regard such ghostly interference of the lower world with favour. The feeling leads rather to avoidance than to maltreatment. The more useful, however, the beast, the more indifferent they are in treatment. "Familiarity breeds contempt," and the recognized helplessness of the unfortunate horse or cow used as draft animal leads to a callousness and brutality which finds constant exhibition. Let us hope that perhaps there is a glimmer of excuse to be found in the bottom of the peasant's mind that by such ill-treatment he is, through suffering, aiding the unfortunate brute to a better rebirth in his next life. In the West the prevalent religion has in no way inculcated the kind treatment of animals, if indeed it has not had the opposite effect. Christianity widely separated man from the brutes, denying the latter a soul or any future prospects whatever. A dogma be it added which has always been a point of casuistical treatment as shown in the commentaries of Saint Ambrose and Saint Thomas Aquinas on a passage of Saint Paul in the Epistle to the Romans,* where he says "because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now." Mrs. Katherine Bates gives an excellent instance of this feeling in her picture of Spanish life and manners; a people the most religious and the most cruel in Europe. To her strictures on the cruelty displayed to the wretched horses slaughtered by the slow process of disemboweling in the bullfight, she only received the answer "but they are brutes, they have no souls." Progress in this kindly sentiment

* Cited, be it added, in another connection (Evolution) by Antonio Fogazzaro in his "Ascensione Umata" p. 57. The quotation is from Romans VIII 21.

has been entirely due to a widened ethical responsibility, and this wider ethical teaching has sprung from modern science with its wider knowledge of the material world. To a priesthood engaged in maintaining the power, privileges, and the prestige of the hierarchy; in writing controversial sermons against each other, in which texts are tempered with bile, and burning heretics in this world and the next, it has been necessary to call to mind that text of their founder—"Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father." Theological dogma could find no room for it. Quite the contrary. Just as it could not find room for many other duties, so much so that the priests have allowed social amelioration to pass into the hands of socialists, and anarchists, and nihilists, and other undesirable "ists." But their opportunity was great.

Two other features impress us in relation to these Japanese highways. The first is the great antiquity of many of the places along the different roads. Not antiquity in itself, for Japanese towns are young. They barely reach a majority before a fire necessitates their rebuilding, in sections at least. Old buildings are very scarce in Japan. But they are old in their records. This is a common feature among all peoples. Often a town is located in a spot which seems to offer no visible advantage, but the force of custom long maintains it, and all said and done a deserted village in a living nation is a great rarity. An instance of such hale survival, off the route of commerce, is the Devonshire Stannary town of Lidford. Again, people build in the most extraordinary places. Nineteen hundred years ago many Italian villages were wiped out on the slopes of Vesuvius. Their records and traditions pointed to similar disasters in previous years. But the building still goes on in the same dangerous proximity to the volcano, and when in 1906 again Vesuvius devastates the surrounding country and almost repeats the disaster which overwhelmed Pompeii in the year 39 A.D., we find newspapers cackling over the event as if the former destruction had been some myth which men find out to their astonishment had good ground in fact. Earthquakes and subterranean disturbances are so widespread in the country that the Japanese literally would have to get out of it to remove from all danger; but even now they cling to the old spots. The villages are sprinkled over the floor of Asosan; they are closely clustered around the base of Fuji whose last outbreak is barely a hundred years old; they are again growing up around the dangerous Bandaisan (1888); and the greatest health resort of Japan—Kusatsu—is under the cone of an active volcano that "goes off" at short intervals. One other example is the baths at Unzen in Kyūshū, but as these are a collection of inns and hotels and largely frequented by foreigners it would perhaps be an interesting "good riddance to bad rubbish" if it did go up in the air.

The second feature to be noted on these highways is the palpable evidence that the Japanese never were, in ancient times,

what can be called a great people. The local nature of civilization is displayed—or rather not displayed—as one passes along them. The kings of old writ their names large as they passed through any land. The inscription of Sargon the Old (3800 B.C.), carved in the solid rock on the shores of Cilicia, and facing the western sea, is but one instance of many. It was an excellent habit of these ancient kings of Assyria and Egypt, thus handing down their deeds for future generations to read. Their interests were large and they have shown us those interests in a form that will still be legible and interest men ten thousand years from now. Not Macauley's New Zealander, but the native of Europe will have a more astonishing task at that distant period, when perhaps he wanders over the great plain of north-western Europe, the sea having long since retired a good hundred miles to the West. The Armada was perhaps the greatest event in Britain's modern history, but about the only record left of it will be the pedestal of some statue or pillar dug up from the strata covering the site of Plymouth Hoe, and having the inscription—"He blew with his winds and they were scattered." The reverse carries the tale of the event which is commemorated, but then its interpretation will be complicated by superimposed civilizations resurrected from the ruins of the large city several hundred miles to the East, and of which BRIT.....MUS...M will be one of the extant inscriptions. The archæologists of these days, however, will be infinitely more puzzled in the ex-United States where practically his "finds" will be limited to stone tablets marked "Here lies John Sm—th." A doubtful form of expression, well qualified to give rise to endless controversy.

§ 3.

Inns and highways, however, have a function to perform in the social economy, and to this it will be well to turn for a few pages. In connection with the completeness with which the Japanese State has taken possession of the individual we have spoken of the inquisitiveness which has thus been developed among the people, an inquisitiveness which reaches the shape of an almost universal espionage on a man during the whole twenty-four hours of the day and night. It has had the effect of making the Japanese among themselves one of the most sociable people in the world. Two such units almost unconsciously gravitate together. Between superior and inferior lies the right of the former of the knowledge what the inferior is doing on that particular spot of the earth's surface. Between equals it is the duty ground in by centuries of training to account for and be responsible for everything on two legs within his district. To-day it is largely habit, but this outside expansiveness had a very real meaning in the Old Japan. Any signs of secretiveness, of withdrawing from the

public eye would have attracted as much attention as in the Russia of to-day where a passport to official favour is to throw open private life to the inquisitive gaze of the bureaucracy. Japanese travel along the highways, and the stops at the inns and tea sheds, is not characterized by the individual closely wrapped in his own affairs, sticking doggedly to his side of the road, and shutting himself in as soon as he reaches the night's resting place, his nose buried in a mass of papers, and obviously put out of countenance if anyone intrudes on his privacy. The Japanese tea shed, on the contrary, is a general centre of conversation, and it is rare to see a Japanese leave it without a word even if that word is only about the weather addressed impartially to *Obasan* and the company collectively. Foreigners are not so different in this respect from the Japanese as to stamp their predominant trait as unsocial. Very much the reverse for in their intercourse they are far more frank and open with each other than the Japanese. But it is curious to notice the first instinctive desire to accentuate the individuality, and two foreigners arriving simultaneously at the same rest house will plant themselves as far apart as the space allows, pay as little attention to each other as if they were on separate planets, and probably spend a whole day in proximity or keep running across each other for weeks without the slightest effort for closer contact. They find greater difficulty in breaking through the crust of their individuality. *Savoir faire*, which after all is only applied formalism, is widespread among the Japanese of all classes. Indeed this ease of contact so widely displayed among Japanese travellers is all on the surface. They are very guarded in their expression, and an effort to draw out their real opinion on any subject is more likely to be met with a quotation from some poet or a jesting application of some Japanese proverb. It is not meant to say that Japanese of the lower class are skilled in such diplomatic fencing, but the quality goes much farther down in the strata of their society than in the West. This necessity of concealing nothing and hiding everything (possible) has developed in the Japanese peasant a *savoir faire*, a nimbleness of wit, and a skill in turning to good use the protection of set forms of social intercourse that puts him, in the opinion of the writer, in some ways in advance of his class as found anywhere in East or West.

The nature of the country assists this amalgamation. It is ideal for pedestrianism. Indeed in many places in the interior a horse or one's legs are the only means of getting from one place to the other. It is only in recent times that railways have widened out Japanese commerce. Previous to their introduction a journey of any length was only taken by a Japanese for purposes of pilgrimage or sight-seeing (*kembutsu*); or if the merchant was called on to look in person after his contracts his journey was far more serious than a journey from New York to Charleston by coach over the bad roads. Only therefore to be undertaken for weighty matters. Under such conditions, carried out with little or no pressure as to time and often in the informal character

of a foot traveller, these journeys in Old Japan read much like the description of a holiday outing. Pedestrianism was, so to speak, one of the outlets of their aesthetic and religious feelings. From the earliest days in the summer season the roads were filled with pilgrims to the various holy places of Japan, and whether deserved or not the mission was a guarantee of respect to this class of traveller. Japanese pilgrimages lack much of that earnestness which is a prominent element in such cases in the West. They favour of a grand holiday, for the visit to the shrine of the god seems to be more in the nature of fulfilling a formula than with any deep religious sentiment. Certain good will follow the observation, but the omission of a visit to the shrine or a series of these shrines does not weigh heavily upon them. No such terrible necessity as leads pilgrims in Europe to the countless different shrines where the ills of humanity are supposed to be miraculously healed. There is much very earnest prayer to supernatural power in Japan, but it is rather to be found at the local temples than at the great shrines of Ise and Izumo, Minobu and Zenkōji. The great gods are a little far off to the Japanese peasant. His local divinity possibly can pull the local wires more efficiently and with a greater personal interest, and perhaps is more ready to pay attention to his prayers than a god whose ear is deafened with the petitions of thousands. These quiet heart to heart talks with the divinity are constantly in evidence at every Japanese temple. But the other worship, the *ō-mairi* or pilgrimage, is a great event, a holiday event, in the life of every peasant if he can manage to carry it out.

Roadside travel is not confined, however, to business and religion. For reasons perhaps the same as found with his western confrere—poetical and economical—the Japanese literary man up to recent times travelled largely on his legs. Wherever he went he found an appreciative audience. Poetry has sifted down much further into the lower strata of Japanese life than in the West. It has always been a passion, almost a pastime, even among the lower classes. Taking the analysis of it given by those who have made it a study the form seems to be much more confined than with western poetry. It is unfortunately restricted. The form is all important. The subject matter must be bent into very narrow limits. To the westerner this gives a very mechanical look to a Japanese poem, and to the more condensed forms of it—especially the *Haika* or seventeen syllable poem—it has introduced an element of the conundrum intolerable to many western minds. The conceit wrapped up in these little poems is often most beautiful. To the Japanese expert who carries around a key to the many forms of conventional expression this condensation of meaning into a very narrow form may be an object of admiration. Even then it is admitted the expression is often obscure and gives rise to controversy over the exact meaning. To the western mind this simply admits that there is a meaning not found in the form of poetical expression. Another element, entirely apart from the literary element, is

involved—the riddle. According to western canons of literary taste, the form to be aimed at by literature is conciseness with clearness of expression, and obscurity in any form is to be condemned. However this Japanese literature of form took a wide range. It had its rules and its conventions well understood by its devotees and its more ingenious applications met with well deserved applause from a circle often made up of travellers brought together by casual circumstances into the shelter of a tea-shed. Just such an incident is described in the life of Bashō, an eighteenth century poet, who having criticised one of these *Haika* the production of a local expert and one of the company into which he had stumbled in his endless travels in search of an opponent worthy of his steel, was challenged to do as well. His reply, in its exactness of form and beauty of thought, at once showed his questioners that they were dealing with a master hand, and his name was enough to at once place him on the rustic throne of the little knot of *litterateurs* gathered in the wayside village. Many such scenes are part of the incidents of this not very strenuous travelling life. A people not deeply immersed in their own affairs, to whom any outlet was forbidden in the form of political discussion, naturally turned to such neutral subjects; and poetry and literature among the higher classes, and poetry and folklore tales among the lower classes, added zest to their real experiences of the trials and often positive dangers of their journey. The author of the "*Hizakurige*" draws a picture of the Japanese road in the piping days of the Tokugawa Shōgunate—the middle of the eighteenth century; which he jots down, pen in hand, as he rests at the little tea sheds. A picture of packmen and travellers; the former jesting and chaffing with each other while their *saké* is being heated up in the little stone bottles; the latter not so much engaged on poems and story telling as in disputes over coolie hire. Eiyara! At last he has it all scribbled down, the results of his tramp through more than fifty towns on the Tokaidō. Chattering useless talk he calls it; swapping lies and forced puns with these rough travelling companions; seeking shelter at one night stands where pickled eggs and rice are the only food, and in which maids in name only seek a husband for the night. Votaries of venal love and skilled at Cupid's game are these inn-mates as he calls them.

Accustomed to but little privacy in the home it can be imagined that but little more is afforded in the Japanese inn. "One mat, one man" is the practical rule of division of space. Only carried out, of course, in case of a crush. Having another man quartered on them therefore does not arouse the ire it does in the more unsettled parts of the West. Indeed they are only charged—not for a room—but for their *katago*, lodging and supply of food. The charges are quite high enough from the Japanese point of view, although low to a European who, however, requires different treatment and therefore pays more for it. This publicity is carried still further in the bath. This is a single apartment, sometimes (not often) a pool of hot water large

enough to accommodate several bathers at once. There is an equal indifference in Japan as to the naked human figure as existed in Greece in olden days. It is quite true that in the country districts promiscuous bathing of the two sexes is practised, but this is only in the case of a public bath and a large assembly. The rule in households and in the inns is to occupy the tub in turn, and the hour for the women is different—usually after—that of the men. As the Japanese wash outside the tub and only use it for the pleasurable stewing, the process is at least as cleanly as in our own public baths where the preliminary process of washing is often omitted altogether. But we can understand how under such circumstances of eating, sleeping, drinking, bathing, and living together, the right of the individual to himself is not understood. That the western system is infinitely the better it is not hard to see, although this is not the place to develop that point. It is a fact, however, that in a sense caution as to one's companions is less needed in Japan than in Europe and America. Be it said with limitations. There are also Japanese wolves in sheep's clothing, and the skill of these light fingered gentry is most notable. However in the West we stand on our personal privileges and we find the support of our fellow public in doing so. Every man must take the full responsibility of his actions towards his neighbour and the authorities are not going to shoulder any of it for him. We all pose as lambs in this world, but alas! there are a great many wolves among us; so skilfully disguised that we find it necessary to treat all the public as a possible enemy. We must use our experience in determining the actual status of our *vis-a-vis* in the hotel and railway carriage before we determine on even the most casual acknowledgment of his existence. Not so in Japan. Here every man's business is public property, and especially that of the police. Their process is summary and is not contingent on some overt act committed. They are not at all bashful in coming forward on their own initiative. They are set in motion by the unknown and are not hampered by any rights of the individual raised against the investigation of his interests and purposes. Any rights of the individual lie in subsequent proceedings. The Japanese police are at times an unmitigated nuisance, but they are also at other times a blessing in disguise.

This miscibility of the Japanese people therefore differs from such as we have in the West, especially in America. Its lines are predetermined, and therefore this wider contact of the people simply shows them the same picture to which they have been everywhere accustomed. They have little to learn from each other where they all think on the same limited subjects and on the same lines. The miscibility of our western world is very different. Every variety of thought is brought together, but the drift is not toward uniformity but toward differentiation. This is simply because up to recent times we have been giving greater and greater reward to individual powers. To conform to a model is to stand still. The object is to improve on the model

with the material available, and to grasp the reward offered for such improvement. In this sense there is far more isolation among the thousand and more people gathered together in one of our "skyscrapers" than in a Japanese town with its business and professional men scattered over a square mile of territory. And yet our isolation, our leaving the individual to go his own way very much unrestrained, influences very little the capability of drill in the two men, East and West. There can be no greater contrast found than that between the self poised, concentrated, selfish perhaps, American, and thoroughly drilled Japanese. To outward appearance the former is impatient of any restraint, occupied simply and solely with himself as the centre of his universe. And so the German, and Frenchman, and Bulgarian, and Montenegrin point the finger of scorn at him and predict his downfall. It is the fashion nowadays to turn to this eastern people—the Japanese—for an example of a well drilled people. So concentrated is their mind on the word of command that the whole people swing as one man. But it is to be doubted if the results obtained at such tremendous cost to their political life are as good as those shown by the citizens of the western Republic in facing such national disasters as have taken place at Chicago, Charleston, and recently at San Francisco. Long political drill has taught the American just where to draw the line, and his self-abnegation for the public service has never been found lacking at the critical point. It may cost a little more to get the machine running at the start, but there is nothing erratic in its action, and the price paid is for this privilege of non-interference. One item of interest to Japan and to the Japanese in this San Francisco disaster was the test made of steel buildings. Land is valuable in Japan and is becoming every day more valuable, and in a country of earthquakes the question of building material is an important one. The steel building is the solution for the building of the future. Where the iron is to come from is another question. It cannot be obtained at home unless the Japanese choose to make the "at home" apply to Manchuria and its great deposits of Bessemer ore.

It is not easy to realize how much individuality there is in a landscape. In our earliest years there is stamped upon the mind certain relations existing between man and his environment that cling to us as long as we live. The result is that we transfer these earlier impressions to all our subsequent experiences, and hence chafe more or less, or feel at ease, according as our surroundings correspond to our prejudices. This translation of mind into matter is racial, not local. An American or an Englishman can never feel toward his life in a French or German town or village exactly as the native feels. No matter how long he lives in such environment he is always a foreigner. We may understand such life but we lack full sympathy with it; and in the contact something is missed, comparable to that subtle aroma only appreciated by the expert. There is something in Molière and Balzac only grasped by the Frenchman; in Goethe

and Schiller only appreciated by the German, and in Shakespeare and the long roll of our English dramatists and novelists only understood by the Anglo-Saxon. We are curiously creatures of our law and customs. We find this in the scenes of environment portrayed by some of our great imaginative word painters. Take the opening scene of "Chuzzlewitt"; the late fall day, the country village, the deserted street, and one does not have to go to Amesbury to have a picture of Mr. Pecksniff's abode. We have no difficulty not only in understanding but in transferring ourselves bodily into the action of the plot as silent onlookers of its action.* And whether we take them from the pages of Dickens describing English village life, or the pages of Bret Harte describing towns of the Sierra they are pages of our own lives into which is intimately woven not only personality but environment, the scenery being of as much importance as the action. The Oriental, of course, has the same feeling toward western life. The lack of that "something" which is really its essence. But to him such scenes are still more mental conceptions. We of the West can grasp a good deal of the continuity of that life which has been handed down in the past of nations not our own very kith and kin; not only from partial sympathy but from relics of that continuity held up before our eyes. Europe is a museum of such landmarks. We not only know that Tilly and Wallenstein fought their battles with the Reformers on a given spot, but we have the church and square before our eyes where their rough riders tossed infants on their spears and with due deliberation cut the throats of the children before the agonized eyes of the parents. The only difference being that whereas on that day the square ran red with blood, to-day the sun shines on a busy people passing in front of the church which has stolidly and indifferently witnessed both the scene of peace and that of bloodshed. The western mind feels this lack of accentuation in the eastern scene. Our own local histories are marked in this positive way by the hand of man. A historical landscape can be centred in an old house. A clump of woods may be cut down, a hill levelled as at Waterloo, but an old farm house at La Sainte Haye is cherished as a living witness of a memorable scene. A great city has grown up around the old Chew house of Germantown, but the marks of the bullets on its stones recall to every passer-by the darkest days of the American Revolution. The landmarks marking every scene of man's past life in Europe and in young America are not a feature of the Japanese landscape. Literature and tradition mark the spots of their past history without any indication of a possible change of scene. And as to tradition we get a valuable hint of its real value in the legends which spring up among a people who have once been the greatest in the world. The memory of ancient Rome was preserved, not among the Romans who had wrapped that past in the most absurd stories of saints

* A subject treated scientifically and most skillfully by Professor Baldwin in his "Genetic Logic." See more particularly the Chapter "On Meaning" and § 5 seq.

and magicians, but among outside peoples to whom was due the credit of the revival of the past. Petrarch who visited Rome at a time when the story of the past had aroused an interest in all the rest of Italy, says—: "Who to-day is more ignorant than the citizens of Rome of the matters in regard to Rome? I repeat with unwillingness; in no other place is Rome less understood than in Rome itself." Dr. Daniel G. Brinton gives five generations (two centuries) as the limit to which tradition can carry any ordinary event of history. A confederation or a genealogy may carry a longer life in man's memory. He bases this opinion on "a great many examples in America and elsewhere."

But on the whole we think the palm must be given for interest to the strong individuality of the westerner brought out by circumstances. Travel necessarily is a very humdrum affair. It relates to the personal and petty interest of men and not to the striking scenes of battles and sieges. And yet it commands the attention. Take the accounts given us of the old stage coaching days. We have a little republic, with a coachman as president and the guard as executive, and the general public often called upon to actively interfere in the case of highwaymen, a breakdown, or when as in the case of a storm like that of 1836 in England the whole company would be snowed up for a week in some country inn. We have exhibited in these pictures and within the narrow limits of a stage company a whole gamut of passions—bravery, cowardice, bragging, resignation, recrimination, ingenuity, and suivelling incompetence. "The proper study of mankind is man" saith Pope, but if our company when snowed in were to sit down in Japanese style and compose poetry and tell stories to each other, the conduct on all sides being carefully maintained within the regular forms set for the ordinary conditions of life, they might entertain each other but they never would entertain us. We might admire the self control—or rather the admirable exhibition of social drill—but we would find the week's chronicle very poor reading. Indeed it is a question whether with the added safety of our modern methods of travelling we are not undergoing some loss. We are beginning to turn to the man in uniform whenever difficulties arise. System is of great value and the old adage "too many cooks spoil the broth" is of double application in these days of complicated methods; but we do not want to lose entirely our American habit of largely helping ourselves out of a difficulty. The peacefulness of Japanese travel, due to over-regulation, has moulded the people into a form in which the relations of life go on in carefully defined paths much as in the condensed machinery of a watch. Such a mechanical structure is foreign to our western ideas or wishes, but we are drifting into this kind of formalism imposed not by a Government but by ourselves, and which leads in the end to the same result. This formalism leads us to conceal the self under one social veil; to give to the world the results not the methods of our thought and action. It has the same drift toward one dead level of character, for the energy

we devote to maintaining the social level is energy lost in developing individuality. In spite of what the socialists say, individuality means evolution and progress. Nothing else answers the purpose. One feature of Japanese politeness is not as well-controlled as it might be; and Boniface, all smiles on the surface, displays a craft or naïveté, as one chooses to regard it, that is not without its amusing or annoying side. Foreigners are troublesome. They expect many things that would require no little ingenuity to supply from the native material. Boniface does his best and a very good best it is, seeing that on the average the custom of the foreign traveller is too small to be any object to him; but he takes advantage of his incomprehensible language, and smiles and bows and gives his opinion of "things in themselves" as related to the foreign stand point in anything but complimentary terms. Usually such incidents occur under conditions in which the Japanese innkeeper has good ground of complaint on his side, but there are cases where they are entirely gratuitous. We can recall George Borrow's experience with the Welshman who expressed the utmost concern in English and made fun of him to the company in Welsh. "Dwy o iaith, dwy o wyneb." (Two languages, two faces) said George, who understood Welsh as well as his questioner. George had ample revenge for the suspicious Welshmen, who had been discussing their affairs with the greatest freedom, a thing they would not have dreamed of doing before a Sassenag who understood their language, were much put out of countenance.

The flaunting signs of to-day, displaying the picturesque Chinese ideographs, we are told are an invention of modern Japan. But there is one form of such advertisement that must be very old. It is the practice of the pilgrims to the shrines to make a present of the various towels they receive to the inns that please them. Such inns have an array of these towels strung before them, nets hung out so to speak to catch other pilgrims, their number testifying to the good entertainment accorded by the inn. These Japanese towels recall a useful article of dress which they resemble much in size, but which in Japan is a modern institution--the handkerchief. In spite of the fact that handkerchiefs are a staple of export it is a manufacture to cater to foreign taste. The Japanese prefer to use soft paper for the same purpose and then cast it away. The decidedly filthy habit of Western Society caught the attention of Montaigne in one of his bitter jesting moods, and he asks why we should so cherish this excrement of our bodies as to carefully provide for it, wrapping it up in the costliest linen and then putting it away about our persons. The criticism is a just one; and curiously enough this decidedly unpleasant usage that we maintain in the West has developed into a great elaboration of what can be a very costly article used for a very trivial and nasty purpose. The Japanese towels, as substitutes for the more necessary uses of the bath or miscellaneous cleaning, are cheap

but always artistic, and their display before the inns is of course in this immaculate condition. The towels and the advertisements of to-day have the duty of relieving to some extent the deadly sameness of Japanese towns. But on the whole this sameness, going back through the ages, is not without value. We may get tired of the monotonous Japanese vista presented alike by town and country, the sameness of this generation to the generation preceding, but it has made the task easier of reconstructing the past. There is real difficulty in calling up any past merely from description. The reconstruction of even the most complete of the ruins of Pompeii is to some extent guess work, and actuality is still more unsatisfactory than the softened lines of a photograph. As to the life of early days, the physical appearance of its streets, its blind alleys and narrow passageways, these were too commonplace to deserve anything but the most casual mention. It is only under stress of some great public festival or public *emenda* that these streets appear alive to us, and then only behind the living interest which occupies the foreground of the canvas. In fact it is only during some such terrible scene as the sack of a town—the scene of hunter and hunted—that the walls and narrow streets and steep stair ways of the tall houses stand out clear to us; that real life is given to these mute walls limned for us by the greatest painters of the age. But their influence on the lives of that day, and their influence on our lives to-day can be traced from stage to stage—not in one continuous line, for evolution can only hand down through the uncertainties of time those intermediate types whose numbers ensure their obtaining a place in the records, points of pause in the record. So in Japan. The openness of public life in these inns and on these highways has done its part too; not in differentiating the type but in keeping the single model constantly in front of its people wherever they moved.

§ 4.

Gregory of Nazianzen points the finger of scorn and wrath at Julian for appropriating the Christian idea of hospices, by which communication between the different little communities was greatly facilitated, and the circulation of the faithful both in coin and person greatly comforted. The worthy but hasty tempered bishop was right in his general application but decidedly wrong in the particular application. The quick witted emperor grasped this idea of bringing about unity among the faithful by keeping them together and ministering at the same time to their personal comfort, and Gregory is properly enraged at him for stealing this card out of his ecclesiastical book and putting it to the scandalous uses of a pagan propaganda. As a matter of fact, however, for ages the heathen temples had served an analogous purposes. Many of them to all intents and

purposes were hospitals in which patients came to reside for long periods of time. Most of these patients were good pay to the temples and to the attending physicians who were often priests of the temple. Free beds, however, were common, as also endowments to the temple for free service to poor patients. The connection between the hospice and religion was particularly close all through the Middle Ages, and there are countries in which this connection between the public service and the Church is still maintained. A genuine public service early appeared in the form of almshouses and other relief for poor bedesmen supported by private donors. England's codified law for poor relief dates from 1601; previous legal enactment, although going back to Saxon times, being mainly directed towards regulating vagrancy. France never had a poor law but relied on private philanthropy and some few state institutions to take its place. The communes had no general relief for the worthy poor, and legal enactment was all directed towards licensing the beggars (the really helpless) and suppressing the sturdy vagrants. As has been said, the Japanese temples have long performed a service akin to that complained of by Bishop Gregory in his "Invective." They have taken care of the crowds thronging in pilgrimages to the shrine, and still maintain the custom to-day. In both cases it is fair to presume that nothing is lost by the custom. The early Church sheltered the brother, but the brother was expected, not specifically invited, to contribute according to his ability. The legend of Ananias and Sapphira is a classic instance of this ecclesiastical "squeeze;" a pointed reminder to recalcitrants.

Japanese highways have had another particularly practical application. As elsewhere they have been the scene and the means of Japanese warfare. From their very nature much of this warfare was of the nature of personal encounter at close quarters. But military science reached a high stage of development among the Japanese, and their professional soldiers have had but to give wider extension to principles already thoroughly familiar to them. Both horse and foot were used in Old Japan, the war horse being a matter of particular care to the knight. The *samurai* were carefully graded as to who had and who had not the right to figure on horseback. The nature of the country does not admit of a wide use of large masses of cavalry; the mountainous nature of the country covered with great forests, and the poor means of communication made flanking operations difficult. Frontal attacks, therefore, which are a common feature of their battles—as of the battle fought by Iyeyasu before Osaka—made Japanese warfare a costly business to those engaged in it, where firearms were but little used or not used at all and men trusted mainly to skillful use of their swords. There were also castles to be stormed, and even such a great pile as Hideyori's fortress at Osaka fell when its moats had been filled in with the fascines. Sometimes the remedy was a long and tedious siege only rendered successful by

some engineering device, the offspring of a military brain of the first order, as that of Hideyoshi before Takamatsu. Naturally there were all kinds of obstruction to travel in these days. Barriers were built across the main roads, and at these barriers passports had to be presented for inspection. Almost at the time when Perry was knocking at the gates we have a record of this restriction against movement. An old peasant sought redress for his wrongs only to get into greater trouble. An agent in search of material for the Yoshiwara near Yedo had induced him to bring his two grand daughters from his home in the mountains of Kii to Yedo. They were smuggled out of their home district by mountain paths and brought north with the idea (in the old man's head) of getting the girls into service in Yedo; and it was the nature of the service or the failure of the plaintiff to realize that brought the affair to light. They all, of course, had fallen into the most absolute bondage to their master, the girls as *Jōrō* and the old man as dependent on their earnings. The deceit used, and apparently his ignorance, enabled the venerable man to escape the penalty of his transgression in leaving his district without permission. Properly speaking he should have been put to death. A strong reason for this lay in the fact that the people were really attached to a fief; were, so to speak, one of the improvements that went with it as it passed from one lord to another. The system of registration was therefore necessary. The same system long prevailed in Europe; and when man was released from attachment to the soil it was long retained, even in America and England, as a police measure. In the American Colonies it was necessary for the labourer or serving man to have a master ready to stand as security for his good behaviour. Such regulations were particularly drastic in New England. America and England to-day are practically the only countries which allow freedom of movement, and it is to be regretted that the stinginess which refuses the maintenance of an effective rural police is leading, in America, to a curtailment of this right through local laws passed against tramps. The power placed in the hands of some petty official or magistrate to fine and imprison strangers is out of all proportion to the offence. A man on foot in a poor coat and without the price of a meal has short shrift with these worthies, who from education and class prejudice are little likely to give the case much consideration, especially where they are allowed to use such labour on the country roads. If the man can find friends and prove the innocence of his intentions the law is so loosely drawn and the power given to these officials is so wide that there is no remedy against them; and the victim accepts the ten days or the month's imprisonment, and is glad to escape to other quarters. Then we hear of the energetic official who has rid the country of tramps—at the cost of grossly trampling on the rights of another, who has had the *luxury* of a technical chance of appeal and a hearing by the time he has served his term. The farmer is hardly to be blamed. Outrages do occur which it is the business of the com-

munity to suppress, but the community leaves it to him, and his powers of distinction are not great. Meanwhile it is another nail in the coffin of that freedom of the individual which we have gone to such cost in past years to enlarge. The question has taken on a new interest in recent years in vagrant laws directed against the negro population of the southern states of America. The negro having been disfranchised and class government substituted it is hardly necessary to point out that such laws would be administered against the negro and to maintain a form of state slavery allowed by several southern states in the letting out of criminal labour to contractors. The claim that the negro is not wanted in the South, and that he can go when and where he wants and the sooner the better, is a specious one; as the treatment meted out to more than one contractor in search of black labour has repeatedly shown. There is no wish or intention to let the negro go. The supervision of the white man by the authorities, if unfamiliar to Americans and English, is familiar enough elsewhere. France and Germany and continental Europe generally make no pretence at any such freedom. The citizen is the soldier, always liable to be called on to give an account of himself. And the same supervision is carried out in reference to the stranger within the gates.

There is another form of public service attached to the highways, and one that has been brought home very directly to the people affected by it. Public and private business passed over the great Roman highways and one of the most important was the Post. This strictly speaking was a purely Government affair, whether engaged in forwarding messages or supplies, or in forwarding officials on public business. Its privileges later were grossly abused and its facilities were largely turned to the private uses of individuals. A great establishment was maintained, much of it on paper only, the actual number of animals in use being put to such unremitting service that the whole stock was chronically on the point of a breakdown. The Post of feudal Europe maintained the same aloofness from private interests and was subject to the same abuse of its privileges. The granting of monopolies to forwarding companies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a step toward providing for the interests of growing commerce by a medium better adapted than the wallet of the casual merchant. To-day Government has only taken over part of the carrying business, adding to the forwarding of its own despatches that particular (and compulsory) branch known as the Post—post office—and dealing only with correspondence or packages relating to correspondence. This is a police measure as much as for the general convenience of the public. Up to recent times therefore the tendency of western Governments has been to withdraw from all connection with questions of transportation, leaving that to the facilities afforded by private enterprise. The actual forwarding even of the Post being contracted for with the common carrier. Even where the common carrier is owned and managed by the

State this distinction exists in fact and in the limitation of the postal facilities. It is indeed possible in some countries to send a grand piano by post, but the freight cost in such cases discriminates against the Post. Public ownership of the common carrier has not been such an undisguised advantage to the community at large. This is perhaps illustrated where recently the transportation facilities have been absorbed by the Government. The United States, where private enterprise has been given full swing, has driven the cost for freight traffic per mile far below that found on the State owned railways of Germany and France. Cost and comfort of the passenger traffic shows the same ratio. Nearly every improvement of value has had its initiative in the United States. Corridor cars, sleeping cars; dining cars, questions of speed and ventilation, of heating, of continuous air brakes, and the vestibule system which brings the whole train into one solid mass with so much added resistance to shock and diminution of risk, all have had their origin in the United States. About the only originality to be granted to the European engineer is perfection in block signalling which their crowded traffic over short lines makes a pressing question. Far more so than in America where the questions of separate trackage and an elaborate system of signalling must bear a certain ratio between cost of installation and danger of accident with its resulting damage suits. The elaborate system needed east of the Mississippi River and in the neighbourhood of our large cities, if made compulsory on trunk lines and across the great plains of the West, would have meant no railway building unless at Government expense, which simply means no building until the traffic is there to pay the interest on the bill. The result of Government ownership of railways can be seen from Germany to New Zealand. In Germany, improvement and extension is due to military necessity and everything is subordinated to this necessity; which perhaps is fortunate or otherwise they would not advance at all. Just as in New Zealand they are using stock and methods "good enough," but that make it a delightful country for those to travel in who have forgotten what the make up of a train was twenty years ago.

Japan up to forty years ago was very vitally concerned with the Post,* as the term is used in its old sense. Where there is a privileged caste they will usually find means to travel at the public expense and at the public crib; and the amount of corvée labour the unfortunate peasant was called upon to perform in forwarding worthless or useless *daimyō* was enormous. Up to the past year the Post in its modern sense has had the same meaning as in England and America, and the transportation service was left largely to private enterprise hampered by the knowledge that a not overscrupulous and irresponsible bureaucracy could at any time engage them in a competition ruinous to both

* A post service between Japan and Korea is mentioned by a Chinese chronicle as existing as early as the Second century A.D. That is a messenger service.

but far more so to them. Under such conditions Japanese railway enterprise did all that could be expected in a country which had to develop its system, importing at first all the finished material. Energy has therefore been mainly directed to such development and extension, with less regard to improvement of the public service which was also a matter of less pressure on account of the structure of the country, competition being practically cut off by lack of room for the two competitors. There is some excuse—indeed it is the only excuse—for the recent action of the Japanese Government in taking over the railway system of the country. Military efficiency requires high efficiency in the railway service, and this is only ensured by competition. This competition is not likely to spring up in Japan. The public at large also are not likely to profit by government ownership, the only legitimate aim of which can be this increase in military efficiency. Governments move no more quickly to lower freight rates than a private company, and the maintenance of the revenue is quicker to catch the ear of the Diet than increased service to the public and perhaps the necessity of additional taxes. Any surplus is more likely to give rise to further expenditure than to reduction of taxation.

§ 5

Sumptuary laws were as numerous in Japan as in Europe, and more rigidly enforced. The laws promulgated by the Tokugawa Shōgunate were, however, in the first instance caste laws, and in the second instance directed to preventing extravagance among the lower classes. This last was of the more importance as the Government took largely of what the peasants did not spend. It was important, therefore, that these latter should maintain their efficiency—represented by their average income—and not run into extravagance and debt. Everything therefore was minutely regulated as to what they should wear and eat, and even to the presents they should give and receive at their festivals of birth and marriage. Cotton coarse and fine, even children's playthings were carefully specified. With the upper class the policy was just the reverse and expenditure was not by any means regulated by a man's income; by a beautiful dispensation of inconsistency the Government felt bound to encourage. In Europe they were not troubled by inconsistencies, but they had the weaker and more ingenious sex to deal with. What was the Florentine magistrate to say when the fair dame, cited into his court for having a head-dress of cost far beyond any allowable limit to any income of her husband or her country's laws, calmly pleaded that it was not a head-dress but a mantle—and proved it, sartorially. Alter the laws as they might there were too many married men at the council board to

make it possible or safe to render a contrary decision. In Japan this interference with personal habits is by no means a thing of the past. Legally it lasted down to the present era of Meiji. It is just as strong to-day, by centuries of training and force of public opinion, as it ever was; but this long heredity makes young Japan, trained on the military model, feel the yoke very little.* And we cannot say that we have entirely freed ourselves in the west. We have on the statute books the so called "blue laws," not only unrepealed but spasmodically in force where peoples' thoughts cover a wide range and some crank is always to be found who has not learned the lesson of to-day and asks their enforcement. But there is a far more dangerous element in these old unrepealed laws. There is always a class of people of limited ideas whose object is to force their ideas on the public at large, and if they can make use of one of these anachronisms instead of giving their idea a thorough thrashing out before the people they are only too glad to accept the repressive measure at hand no matter how different the original rationale of its imposition. These people could do little damage, and the enforcement sometimes means the legal retirement of the old time legislation. But they find to-day support among another class whose whole system is bound up in forcible contribution—what Mr. Spencer calls "involuntary co-operation." The more the public is accustomed to repressive legislation, the more the individual is subjected to the action of the social aggregate, the easier will become the acceptance of their ideas which are primarily based on such repression. They have found the ground prepared for them in continental Europe by the system of military conscription. Individualist America distorts their ideas out of all resemblance to the parent stock and American Socialism is so different from the original German and French Socialism that it is hardly recognizable. And the difference is widening. The cloven hoof appears in the denial of the right of inheritance. American Socialism to-day advocates most of the schemes of "amelioration" and "regulation" advocated in economic circles, although they must recognize that their own only hope is not in "amelioration" but in exaggeration.

Alcohol and the Excise is one of these questions of sumptuary legislation confronting Governments of the present day, and bristling all over with the difficulties usually involved where the passions, prejudices, and conveniences of men are factors. There is a small but growing circle of dispassionate observers who are adopting the view supported by modern science, that alcohol has no place in the social economy except in its application to the arts in which it has a very wide application. Like mustard it is for external use. Its value as a food is an exploded

* A recent instance is of a man seized and searched by a policeman whose eye had singled him out in the crowd as dressed beyond his station. The policeman was right. A number of stolen watches were found in the ample sleeves of his kimono and he promptly confessed.

theory, and its value as a stimulant mainly lies in the fact that it is safer in the hands of the ordinary layman than some of the other more energetic poisons which should only be administered under the direction of a physician. The nature of the evil is too patent to escape the most casual observer. It is safe to say that of all products, natural and artificial, alcohol has done more injury to man than any other; and to its widespread use as a beverage a great part of the poverty and misery can be attributed. Physiologically it acts on the circulation, but this increase of blood pressure is inevitably followed by reaction. At best, the powers of the individual are rendered uneven, the explosion of nervous energy being followed by a necessary period of depression more or less severe according to the amount of the poison absorbed and the tolerance of the system. Unfortunately the heightened sense of vitality due to increased circulation gives rise to pleasurable excitement. The drug itself is an acquired taste, but the almost instantaneous action on the circulation has brought about that association of ideas in which man's palate works by anticipation and confuses the pleasurable effect with the cause. It is doubtful if any old toper would be satisfied with the most scientific concoction of succinic, malic, and butyric ethers—*minus* the alcohol. In fact it is certain that he would turn from it in disgust—no matter how much "science" he really does get in mixtures over the "bar." Place ten bottles of beer before the average drinker and he will have little trouble in disposing of the whole at a modest sitting. Place ten bottles of one of those mixtures of sugar, water, and "spices," known as "soft drinks," before the most enthusiastic of temperance advocates, and it is doubtful if he could get beyond the third bottle. Indeed the nasty Roman convenience—the *vomitorium*—would be more likely to be needed in the last case than in the first. Many men therefore reach by a different road the goal aimed at by the Prohibitionists and would relegate the use of alcohol to the pharmacopœia and the factory. But the question is not one of cold dispassionate science or for the well intentioned crank to deal with, and the efforts of both have usually been of that misdirected kind which run counter to all human prejudices by trying to make men good by means of legislation. The dangerous nature of alcohol has always been recognized. Even the most primitive peoples have sought to secure, if not its absence from the council chamber, at least that affairs shall be debated both drunk and sober; usually in that sober stage following a debauch in which they seemed to recognize a value in its sense of depression. Stable and civilized Government, ancient and modern, has of course taken a far more positive stand; and in times of disorder the first move has been to close the wine shops.

Recognizing—as we all do—the immense evil caused by the liquor traffic the prohibitionist campaign against it is based on moral grounds. There is no denying his philanthropic motives, and there is no denying the good grounds on which those motives are based. But the prohibitionist is rare who can see any

difficulties in the road. He is blind as a bat to all teaching of experience past and present in reference to human nature. He has one remedy—force. His arguments are so overwhelming in his own opinion that when men cannot be made to see and apply them they must be forced to do so. Now the evils of alcohol in individual cases are not so plain to first sight. Alcohol is useless, and is in a general sense a poison—an entirely modern view; but it is a very slow poison. It is safe to say that ninety per cent of habitual drinkers acquire such tolerance to it of their systems that it does not appreciably injure them at all. Probably ninety per cent of that ninety per cent, calmly considering the evidence for and against, would say that the risk of injury was so slight that balancing the actual pleasure they received from the use of liquor they preferred to accept the risk. Here the prohibitionist steps in with his moral grounds. "But you have no moral right to imperil the good of this remaining ten per cent," usually mixing his arguments with theological data which anything but add to their strength. The ninety and nine just persons of half a dozen creeds who like their tippie would not give his "dam" for the drunken tinker of an opposite creed. In fact it is not unlikely that they would regard his lack of self control as due to his heterodox opinions. And on broad ethical grounds the ninety and nine just persons are right. Every man must work out his own salvation. Society holds up a mirror in which he can see and follow the ideal if he chooses to do so. It is for society to draw the line at which the action of the individual imperils that ideal. Then it exercises restraint, and eliminates him or shuts him up if necessary.

Now the highest type of modern society recognizes the right of the individual to go to the deuce if he wishes. This is based on the growing recognition of natural law in man's development as well as in the other departments of nature. It seems hard not to bolster up the incapable, but the experience of the ages has taught everyone but the socialist that the safety of society lies in this self elimination. Savage races whose resources are limited are accustomed to bluntly put their weaker members to death, either actually by a knock on the head or indirectly by abandoning them to starvation. Modern society practically is forced to do the same thing for the salvation of the race. Any other course is the true race suicide; and all the efforts involved in the schemes of modern socialism to avoid it run against this rock of a natural law. It is the shock given to really kind hearts when the veil is stripped from this hideous truth that gives any strength to these schemes for amelioration. Man has had it so ingrained into him by centuries of theological training that he instantly rebels against this steady law of the "survival of the fittest" which he sees going on in its cruelest form in plant and animal life. He seeks a means to withdraw himself from its operation, not recognizing that he is redistributing the burden at the cost of the race. But modern society has done more than simply recognize the existence of this natural law applied

to man. It recognizes that its salvation depends on progress, and this can only be found in the individual. It is quite possible for the worthy baker and candle stick maker to sit under theological dogma on Sunday, and be taught that all this tale of progression is a conceit of men without the true light and who but think themselves wise. It is quite possible for them to believe that one set of animal life was created after another, the whole preceding life being cruelly wiped out by a catastrophe and at the wave of the hand of an omnipotent deity. Apply such doctrine to man's progress and a protest is at once raised. Say that man's progress is to be obtained by wiping out the present race, root and branch, and creating a new one; and they would cry out against such a God. And the first thing they would point to would be the progress men have made, from the condition of savages to the use of electric light, and prayer meetings, and "yellow" newspapers, and the recognition of the one and only true God. And in the last case the acquaintance claimed often savours of impudence, and with small regard to "I know you not whence ye are; depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity." Man's whole daily life teaches him this; the value of ideas given out by individual men. The result of his increased knowledge has indeed placed him in a cruel dilemma. He must recognize the necessity of progress, the disaster involved in stagnation, and the material evils always accompanying poverty. There is no compromise possible here; the only resource is an amelioration which has to be carefully measured out so as not to compromise that delicate balance on which progress depends. Socialist and Prohibitionist are confronted with this terrible dilemma, but they rarely recognize it; or regard it as a hideous painted screen to be torn down from in front of the promised land of their dreams. They are usually men of a single idea. The slow action of natural law is beyond their ken. A campaign of education with them has for its object to get a law on the statute book by the action of a tidal wave majority and trust to the difficulty of repeal to keep it there. As if laws enforced against public opinion ever did anything but bring the law into disrepute.

Government treatment of the subject of course represents the compromise conscience of the community. And the progress made by that conscience could well teach the prohibitionists to conduct their campaign of education on other than political grounds. Originally the question, as far as excise is concerned, was purely one of an impost for revenue. And in so far as the moral element has intruded it has managed to make a mess of things; the result being an arrangement, in the United States at least, that is satisfactory to nobody. The people of the United States show no sign whatever of intending to adopt the repressive measures sought by the extremists. Largely it is to be suspected because of their repressive nature. Regulation of the liquor traffic has been sought on a high license system, which if based on the right and necessity of police supervision has reasonable

ground of existence, but in the minds of a large part of the community has been confused with a hazy idea that the rum-seller's business is an immoral one. This is the more unfortunate as it brings the liquor question into politics; for these business interests naturally seek to protect themselves. Moreover, it has led to a confusion of the public mind on a question of morals not without danger. Restricting a traffic of which there is an ill defined feeling of some wrong involved, they at the same time see the necessity of its continuance from the point of revenue. There is no getting around this by any plea of taxation of a luxury. If the liquor traffic is wrong in the sense that public prostitution is wrong, then certainly the United States Government should not seek its revenue from such sources. But the people do not feel there is a wrong involved in the liquor traffic so much as in its methods. There always has been, and there is to-day, a sympathy with the "still owner;" and unless there is a tragedy there is a chuckle when in more or less dramatic fashion he escapes the clutches of the revenue service. We are all smugglers at heart. There is a feeling in most good Americans that a man should be allowed to eat what he pleases, drink what he pleases, and do what he pleases, provided that he does not trample on the toes of other people. It is this feeling that perhaps makes the repressive measures advocated by the prohibitionists so repulsive to the American public. Teach a man that the use of liquor is harmful; teach it to him practically, as our railroads and other great corporations are doing by giving preference in employment to non-drinkers; as in our insurance companies who tax his policy according to his habits; as in settlements with restrictions as to use in the land titles; and there is a more efficient advocate than any prohibition measures passed by legislatures and disregarded by the public. No matter how warm the worthy statesman from Podunk may get over the idea that his laws should be disregarded, the fact remains that they are disregarded. The practical teaching has been going on for the past hundred years, and it has done more than all the prohibitionist propaganda. It is to be suspected that the remedy will not be found in prohibition. If we could get back to the old ground when every man could drink when, and where, and how, he pleased, *provided that he made the liquor himself*, we would be on much solidier ground than is the case in some places where the law forbids a man to offer a glass of wine to a friend. It is to be suspected that in these modern days, when a man would find but little time to do his own brewing or distilling, the consumption of liquor would be much less and the number of teetotallers much greater—especially in the places where temperance is most needed, our large cities. And it can be added that the purity of the product would be ensured. There would be less beer and ale made from glucose, and less whisky made from potatoes and flavoured with prune juice. At all events there would be none of the prying inquisitive interference with purely individual action, as sought for by the prohibitionists. The police to-day

are occupied in tracing out the "speak-easies" and "blind-tigers," so no new function would be involved on that point. And a host of our civil service army would again be returned to the army of producers.

From the prohibitionists point of view the question in Japan is very simple—and a far more difficult one. In Japan the views of an individual in regard to repressive measures adopted to coerce him are not of the least account. So far their work is all done for them. This problem lies in convincing the ruling bureaucracy that the adoption of prohibition would add to the efficiency of the country. Few Japanese public men probably would dispute the advantages of a diminution in the consumption of *saké*, or even the advantages of its total disuse. With them, however, the easily regulated source of revenue outbalances any visible gain in efficiency; a conclusion also reached in the West at the present day. The disadvantages in the minds of public men are outweighed by the advantages. In Japan, however, this official action purely on the ground of expediency is uninfluenced by any sentimental feeling on the question, a position which gives their attitude toward the *saké* trade far greater consistency than with public authorities in the West, particularly in England and the United States. The prohibitionists are confined to their legitimate range of action—to persuade the individual that his personal use of the drug is harmful to himself. And in this direction prohibition sentiment can be said to exist in Japan, and where it finds plenty of work to do. The bureaucracy having apparently adopted the view of taxable value of the industry outbalancing any disadvantages, have encouraged and protected it; and the figures, yearly published, of the increase in production and consequent revenue are cause of congratulation in the discussion of the yearly Budget; not the reverse.* The Japanese have the reputation of being a very sober people, which is much the reverse of the truth. To the western eye there are few visible signs of the dram shop, but that is merely because the retailing department of this industry in Japan is a bird of very sober plumage. A few benches with scarlet coloured blankets (usually) and some very innocent looking bottles, recalling the many China shops, hardly distinguishes it from the neighbours. The more pretentious tea sheds which are found in parks and near places of public resort, and the rest houses found along the public highways, seem more for the use of those on pleasure bent or for the consolation of the traveller. But if one looks for the sign of the *saké-ya* [酒屋] displayed among the numerous banners and signs lining the narrow streets of the Japanese towns, he will find it of such frequent occurrence as soon to lead to the belief that there is as much consumption of liquor by the general casual drinker in Japan as in any other country. A little

* It is under discussion to make *saké* a Government monopoly—for profit; which certainly does not point to discouraging manufacture or consumption.

personal attention directed to the clientele of these little drinking shops, from day to day and from place to place over a period of some months, will quickly convince one that in this habit the Japanese differ very little from the West. There is the low wine shop with its clientele of coolies and ricksha men. The presence of a woman drinking in these places is as rare as it is in America. The number, however, that come to buy liquor to be consumed at home is quite as large as anywhere. Home drinking is widely extended. Another *chaten* will be given over almost entirely to the merchant class; and so we rise, just as in the West, to the exclusive restaurant with a large private garden and a large bill, and to the still more exclusive "club" only supplying entertainment to its own membership.

It is properly said that there is but little drunkenness in Japan. This is more due to the nature of their tipples than to any innate sobriety of the Japanese character, although long use of alcohol in the diluted form of *saké* has undoubtedly drilled into the Japanese mind a repulsion toward the results of the use of the stronger form of the drug. Drunkenness is decidedly under the ban. The same can be said of the wine drinking countries; and properly speaking Japan is a wine drinking country; *saké*, the weak liquor brewed from rice, contains about twelve per cent of alcohol, and in its physiological effect and its social use is like wine. It exhilarates, even intoxicates, but rarely reaches the point of absolute stupefaction. While the commoner forms are well within the reach of the lower classes, it however takes a considerable quantity of the drug and some expenditure of money to reach the drunkard's Nirvana, and the more hardened drinkers resort to other means. Thus we are told of "white horse," or *saké* fortified with proof spirits and enhanced abilities therefore of "getting there" quickly, a favourite beverage of the Tōkyō *kurumaya*. The general use of *saké*, however, is both as stimulant and as a social factor. It is generally served hot, is taken down in sips not bolted at a gulp, and therefore requires time for its consumption; all three factors militate against pushing its use to the point of intoxication. But it is a wide spread agent of evil even in its comparatively modest use. The Japanese of the lower class is a very improvident creature. He hardly looks beyond the end of his nose; a quality encouraged by their family system. The wide spread waste of money squandered on *saké* is something that he can ill afford, and even if he does not go beyond the condition of a chronically tipsy state—common enough—his desire for the liquor must be met out of very narrow funds. As with any other form of alcohol, the use of *saké* means diminished efficiency as a workman, and the chronic cases go through the usual stages, where everything in sight goes to the pawnbroker and the daughter goes to the brothel to provide funds for the appetite. It has been said that to the Japanese official mind the question is one of efficiency not of morals. The use of *saké* is not allowed to interfere with the national efficiency within ascertainable limits. One can live for years in Japan and not

see a drunken soldier or sailor belonging to the Japanese army or navy. Simply because a man is off duty or given shore leave is not supposed to mean the loosening of the bonds of discipline, and none of the disgraceful scenes mark shore leave of a Japanese man-of-war, such as are unfortunately a common sight when a western warship enters a Japanese harbour.

There is one view of this question that is not without interest; and that is the choice of a national beverage as made by different nations. This seems to be largely a racial factor in which, although there is a reciprocal reaction, the human factor dominates the material. The wine drinking peoples of southern Europe find this form of alcohol much better suited to their highly emotional temperament than the more concentrated article used in the North, which plays too harshly on their nerves. It is as easy to grow corn and barley in France and Germany as to grow grapes, but the idea of such a substitution has never occurred to them. This difference is to some extent accentuated in the difference between the German and the far more stolid Dutchman and Englishman. The German finds his delight in beer, a liquor which but rarely stupifies to point of insensibility. Beer contains so much proteid that it can properly be said to be a food. Likewise it not only acts as a stimulant but gives the stomach work of its own kind to do. A German full of beer is like a man who has overeaten himself. The alcohol must act against a mass of food in the assimilation of which, to some extent, the excess of nervous energy aroused is turned to use. The Germans have a most undeserved reputation of being a stolid people. Their restrained mannerism perhaps is rather to be attributed to the almost constant military training to which the nation has been subjected from the beginning of their history. The writer remembers witnessing some most heated discussions in a knot of travelling Teutons; arms (not weapons) were flourished, beards (their own) were grasped with gestures of fury or despair, eyes flashed, and they fairly spluttered in each others' faces—over the respective merits of Westphalia hams and the kindred article from some other less favoured part of the Fatherland. The Englishman really is stolid. The difference between his ale and the German beer is characteristic. It is heavy, highly alcoholic, a good substitute for his real stimulant—whiskey. His attitude toward this latter is also characteristic. It is literally the wine of the country. By the addition of water he brings down its strength to the limits of his favourite ports and sherries, and thus slowly enjoys this extension of the period of its smoky flavour and stimulating qualities. His temperament calls for a stronger stimulus than the light wines of Southern Europe and Germany. There is no greater difference between the two Anglo-Saxon peoples than in this treatment of alcohol. The American inherits the racial taste for the stronger stimulus in the shape of spirits in preference to wine or beer, but his high strung nervous temperament seeks an immediate effect. Hence the national habit of gulping down his spirits "raw," with a

subsequent Dives draft of just enough water to enable him to get his breath again. There is an old and coarse but characteristic story on this national peculiarity. A German having praised the economy of his national beverage, with which one quart mug could be made to last a good part of the evening's entertainment: "Shucks!" replied the American, "it would take all night to get drunk at that rate." The *saké* drinking Japanese is not to be classed with these people. He belongs to the wine drinking peoples of Southern Europe. If the Government finds its account in encouraging the *saké* trade, it is to be hoped it will discourage the use of spirits in foreign style; to which, with his highly emotional temperament, the Japanese is entirely unsuited.

§ 6

Inns and highways therefore have a more far reaching effect on development than at surface would be suspected. When a society which can only act through suggestion therefore limits the range of that suggestion, and furthermore sets a model within that narrow range, we find that all its factors show a one-sided growth toward the centre. And growth is by no means to be mistaken for development. A paternal form of government adopts for its system a philosophy the methods of which are purely deductive, and proceeds to determine the lines on which a people shall live. The structure so raised can take in nothing from the outside; and in Japan the course of its history, as influenced by other peoples, was such as to cause no serious innovation on their archaic model. For ages their commerce was local in its origin and its destination, and their highways corresponded to the needs of this commerce. Under ordinary conditions such localization would have given rise to peculiarities which in their subsequent contact and development would have perhaps given rise to a healthy interaction of interests among themselves; but along these highways passed the official of the absolutist bureaucracy at the centre, substantially the only circulating medium in the Empire, armed with his set formulae which entered into the minutest details of the national life, and watchfully suspicious of the least deviation from them. This lack of co-ordination among the people at large, and the control of the units, made the task of the Government easy. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, how they could, and why they did, maintain feudalism down to 1867; and that too in the face of a material development. To Iyeyasu the centralized absolutist government of the royal power in Europe was a matter of pure theory as applied to Japan. Absolutism was of long establishment in Japan; and to his mind feudalism could be made to support it. His success was shown by over two hundred years of supremacy. But this long continuation of feudalism, its isolation

and the enforcement of one model as the political ideal, have resulted in a monotony of type which promises little for future development. Politics in other words have reacted on the individual. The outlook of the Japanese is limited and his mind runs on particular lines. He has for so many generations adjusted facts to formulæ that he finds it no easy task to reverse the operation and adjust formulæ to facts. Hence the distrust of the individual among them, the rage for "system" under official direction. They have the idea that system as so applied is analogous to that found in continental Europe, especially under the military Government of Imperial Germany; without seeing that system and education in Germany permeate all ranks of the industrial society, and stand on a very different ground from the little clique of Prussian and Bavarian aristocrats who have absorbed the military establishment, and whose usefulness, such as it is, is confined to their rôle of professional soldiers. The German system at least aims at a widespread knowledge of detail, a comprehension not a mere cognition, through the mass of the people. It teaches *how* to think. The present Japanese system, however, is simply an enlargement of their old subordination of feudal times. The people are to be taught to fill one given place; to carry out orders of mechanical detail handed down from above. The whole principle of the present Japanese adaptation of European material civilization is based on tuition, not origination; on teaching the people how to do a thing, not why it is done. The thinking department is to be entirely left to the little official class—just as it was in the past. And that is why so much is heard of the cry to go to the past; that the principles of the past are wide enough to cover these purely material gains and make greater use of them than any directing principles borrowed from Europe. As if the experiments of the physical laboratory did not find their inspiration in metaphysics; as if what could not be evolved from the system of China and Japan in the past could be evolved from it in the future. A new line of thought is no light task for the human mind. Study and memorizing are two different things, and this effort not only to adopt European material but to understand European thought has cost great effort in the past, and must cost more in the future. At first too much was tried. Men went crazy in their efforts to at once bring about an adjustment of the train of thought on new lines. More than one mind, not eager to imitate but to understand, went down under the strain. The Japanese to-day are still deep down in their old rut; but they must either develop something out of their old system—a not promising task—or frankly turn their faces to the new. Otherwise they will come to a standstill. To-day when they are owing everything to the methods of the West, the self-satisfied cry of "back to the past" comes with very ill grace, although the West could well be pleased to see the Japanese schools shut themselves up in the circle of Chinese scholasticism. No well-wisher of Japan, however, would like to see the delicate machinery of our western

civilization put in such clumsy hands. It is not the training of adults in western methods that is needed in Japan; it is the training of the coming generation in western thought that is needed.

As in Japan, so we had in Europe our Middle Ages. Church and State both set as their ideal this binding of the minds of the people in swaddling clothes, teaching them what to do and not to think. But the soil was not well fitted for the plant, and as soon as wars and commerce became national these bands were broken. National wars—greediness—were perhaps more important at that period than commerce. It was very rare that the “powers that be” had foresight enough to agree on the suppression of every form of free thought as dangerous to absolutist institutions. A rebel might be of possible use, and an asylum could usually be found somewhere in Europe. From the nature of its people, its soil, and its situation, Switzerland was a particular thorn in the side of autocratic Europe, but they never could agree on its suppression. This ability to run away, gave to thinking minds a start, and the very hopelessness of the various attempts at suppression led in time to toleration of the widest range of thinking. The Encyclopædists of France lived under a Government claiming absolute possession and disposition of the lives and properties of its subjects. Suppression had been tried and failed. Voltaire could find a refuge in Germany and in England, his pen all the more envenomed against those in power. This value of the transmission of ideas, this exposure of incapacity, is well shown in the history of latter day Europe; and the autocratic Government of Louis XVI of France had to sit helpless and watch matters drift out of their control. Its real force was shown in the effort of reactionary Europe to suppress the French Revolution; and again in 1848. The movement getting strength not only from its intrinsic justice but from the effort at repression. We can understand of course the view taken by the professional soldier critic of Europe as to this new-old Japanese civilization. He finds a capacity for drill, a readiness to the word of command, that is found among few other people. Such material is ideal to his own uses. He of course cannot understand that from a scientific point of view he himself is an anachronism in the present industrial stage of the world's history; that he is not an element of its progress but just the contrary. He is such an anachronism that if the question of land hunger among the nations could reach a settlement, if the economic rivalries could be put on equitable bases, his occupation would be gone. This is the hopeful feature of the future. The political situation resembles one of those chemical mixtures in which by the addition of a little more solvent the whole cloudy mass passes at once into a crystal clear liquid. The world's suspicions and difficulties and armaments are not unlikely to reach some such sudden clarification. It may be long delayed; it may necessitate a painful process, but one not long in its operation.

Bread, shelter, bodily covering, and the propagation of the species are the primal needs of man to-day, as of primitive man. Luxury is the disturbing element in our economic system. Says Apuleius in his "Defence:"—"For my part I have learned that in this especially the gods surpass mankind, that they have to satisfy no necessities, hence it is that him among us who has the fewest possible necessities, I consider most strongly to resemble a god. I was very well pleased, therefore, when you said, intending it as a reproach, that my property consisted of a staff and wallet." In the past luxury has been the almost necessary accompaniment of courts, the marking off of the greatness of the monarch as compared with other men. Of necessity he must pose as the richest man in his kingdom, and must display his wealth, and hence power, to the dazzled eyes of the people. Pomp and glitter therefore have a practical political value, especially in times when national interests are the personal interests of the monarch, and display is his means of advertising his importance. This stage therefore in Europe lasted down to the period of the French Revolution when the personal interest of the monarch was sunk in that of the nation, and its sole remnants to-day lie in a display kept up in the various courts of Europe which is very much akin to a national exhibition of the pots and pans of the national paraphernalia. We take little account of how many sit down to dinner with the ruler; very little more than with any private gentleman in the land. Only in so far as he represents the national housekeeping we do not want him to range too far on the line of shabbiness and stinginess. Potentates in this ornamental capacity are not unlike the pets kept for amusement. Fido must be neat and well-groomed. In these modern days, alas! luxury must be laid to the account of women. Whoever heard of a luxurious man; that is, of anyone with the right to call himself by the masculine appellation. Take one of our more primitive and promising bachelor settlements, and the luxuries introduced will be found for the convenience and comfort of some feminine souls who have braved—or sought—the dangers of such environment. Drinking and gambling are the vices of a remote mining settlement where a man is far more likely to die with his boots on than with the gout. Society of the present day in more civilized communities is an appendage of politics, and our women find a useful sphere in Society for which we must pay the price of their affection for luxury. Indeed, outside of the four main necessities, the whole western world can be said to be piling up its labour and surplus for women. Emerging from her obscurity of the past woman is making us pay a high price in addition to her new privileges. The secret of her appearance lay in her usefulness, and man had to have an ally in the field of social life, in which his energies in gaining the particular—a livelihood—are too much taken up to also guide the general touch with which it is necessary to keep in contact with the social world. In this respect the Japanese are still in the Middle

Ages. They have never found this politico-social use for their women. Their luxury took more particularly the form of court ceremony and æsthetics. And here this extravagance, urged on by the politics of the Tokugawa Shōgunate reached a high point. Costly ceremonial, calling for costly equipment and a costly establishment, was pushed to the extreme. Japanese luxury therefore paralleled any similar display found in the West. Otherwise, however, the training of the individual Japanese of the upper classes was decidedly Spartan in its character. Woman worship had no place in his extensive pantheon. His down-sitting and his uprising were not influenced by any such element in his political economy. The surplus labour was directed not to individual uses but to this public display required for the etiquette of the small ruling class. These many journeys over the highways of Old Japan; these crossings of dangerous rivers; these nights at sometimes questionable and dangerous inns; these pack trains clambering over the steep trails and skirting the edges of mountain precipices; these battles, sieges, and bloodshed; never had any of these even a remote connection with some woman's whim for additional luxury. In Japan it never has been "ung caz de femme."

IV.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF A PEOPLE.

"May it not displease the great King Solomon, the ant is the stupidest of animals: instead of enjoying itself during the fine weather in the fields, and getting its share of that magnificent festival which heaven for the space of six months gives the earth, it wastes all its summer in piling one upon another little scraps of leaves; then, when its city is finished, a passing wind sweeps it away with its wing."—
"My Uncle Benjamin" (English translation by Benj. Tucker).

§ 1.

We have reached a point where it is worth while to stop and consider some of the influences which govern men's actions. Many volumes—heavy volumes—have been written on the freedom of man's Will, but we have come in these later days to know that the only freedom we possess is in the choice of the many motives which play on and across our nervous apparatus, weakening and strengthening, fading out or coming into strong light, according to frequency or original vividness. It is the physical surroundings of men, the object for subject, that furnishes all the material for our thinking lives. We can weave nothing but from what those materials afford us. Hence their importance in the present; and in the past, for men's history is of as great influence on them as their immediate present. It is the "Social heredity"* handed down from the past that marks off man's evolution from that of the brutes. The lowest savage possesses this inheritance from the past. In fact with his lower brain power, his smaller facility for complex combinations, the past is of such influence that it retards his progress; for his customs tend to become almost instincts. He makes no pretence to reason about them. And they fill so much of his narrow life and narrow mind that he finds but little room for anything except the maintenance of custom and the needs of this daily life. But in the higher grades of peoples this influence of the environment has a stimulating effect. The greater training the brain gets in weaving complexes from this wonderful world, the greater its facility of control over present and future. Once open this world of combination to the thinking man, and custom and convenience become synonymous terms; but custom loses its old tyrannical power, it becomes the

* "Social heredity," a technical term introduced by Professor J. Mark Baldwin: "The process by which the individuals of each generation acquire the matter of tradition and grow into the habits and usages of their kind."

servant not the master of man. And the further this is carried, the greater becomes the grasp of men over affairs. Everything is an instrument of conquest; and men themselves no less an important instrument than the lower forms of Nature. In fact as far as human life is concerned the control of man over man has been one of the most important gauges fought for in the battle of life; whether it be the life of nation or of individual, for it is to-day the great prize of both. Man lives on and by man. The actions of men therefore are not haphazard. They are carefully adjusted to the circumstances; and the more completely this is done the greater the success. Adjustment to all the surroundings is of course an ideal. The medium is too complex, and we have to deal not only with co-existences and co-extension but with succession. But success is measured by approach to the ideal. Hence everywhere there is met the keen sense of advantage even among savages. It is the clashing of mens' Wills that bring them together even in scattered huts; and in a primitive and unrestrained life this clashing soon shows and leads to a predominant communal advantage. A method of living must be found by which men can reach some compromise other than that of pursuing each other like any other beast of the field. Most animals respect their kind—except man. And he found it necessary to limit this field of mutual pursuit. All corporate bodies, however, move with extreme slowness, and the primitive commune was no exception to the rule. In these early times restraint on the individual was far more necessary and far more drastic than with civilized man. It was necessary in as much as his actions involved the commune. And the necessity of the commune to the individual enforced its action on the ablest. The commune on the contrary could only change its rules from direst necessity. Of such necessity it was the very epitome of conservatism. Hence in a community where its life is very full but within very narrow limits custom becomes more and more binding with every generation, until in itself it becomes a cult to which every new element entering into the community, physical or social, must bend. The relation between the community and the individual is one of the greatest problems of modern times; for it is in the individual that lies the progress of the race, it is to individuality that is owing the increase of range in human thought and in human life. This old communal life, however, could not and did not consider the individual. To them he was the original enemy. To his suppression was due the possibility of a life of peace within their comparatively narrow circle. The condition of the world was a condition of war, whether individual or tribal. Discipline in primitive times was military discipline. The individual was to be suppressed. And they suppressed him.

"Dust thou art and to dust shalt thou return" says the old Hebrew tome, and man's connection with the soil, not only in death but in life, is very close. The struggle for subsistence, the necessity of a large district to nourish a comparatively small

community, enforced a notorious jealousy of any encroachment by outsiders on the hunting grounds of the primitive tribe. The idea of primitive man wandering freely through the forest is a very false one. Not only did the hostility of his fellowmen prevent any such frolicsomeness but it would have been useless to him. Even to primitive man the "forest primeval" was almost impenetrable. His chance of success in his hunting pursuits was there a small one. He rarely resorted to it except when his game was man himself. His favourite method then, as it is to-day, was to find out the places to which animals came to supply their own needs, or spots which were the centre of a given food supply. Near such places he established his little communities. It is probable that a tribe remained sometimes for generations within the narrow range of a little bay, hemmed in by the impenetrable forest and the sea, and unable to follow the shore line for more than a few miles without fighting its way. If we can judge by great shell heaps which must have taken many years to accumulate, and which go back to those dim ages which stagger us with the time since elapsed, we must conclude that man for many ages has lived a savage life in some respects as narrow as that of a New Guinea savage of to-day. The knowledge of their neighbours in such communities has a very narrow range. The man who has passed beyond the tribe is as great a traveller in their eyes as Marco Polo to his time. All information obtained from savages as to peoples beyond their immediate ken is extremely vague and purely hearsay. And as it is the unknown and requires explanation, so he seeks an explanation and weaves fanciful tales of such people beyond his ken. One necessity early springs up in man's brain. In fact it is a primitive function on which progress depends. It is the question "why?" Man must seek to know, not "what" a thing is but "why" it is. In all times his range is very small, but to the savage his range is practically as far as he can see; and yet within his experiences he must seek the material to answer this question—"why?" Having no scientific knowledge of anything he attributed life to everything in the metamorphoses of Nature that he feels within himself and sees going on everywhere around him. His battle against Nature is a hard and a losing one. He finds animals stronger and more cunning than himself, and it is no wonder if he gives them a higher consideration in Nature's scale. When he triumphs, he triumphs over the stupidity or the carelessness of his animal foe. But always with respect and as a much better animal than himself. He early peoples his world with ghosts and spirits. He must so people it if he would account for phenomena familiar but totally inexplicable to him; such as fainting, dreams, apparitions, apoplexy, epilepsy, insanity, delirium, all forms of unconsciousness or nervous extravagance. A meaning he must find for these phenomena, so he finds it in the supernatural for he knows nothing of the real explanation. That therefore he should people his animal and vegetable and mineral world with such ghosts is

nothing extraordinary. As the spirit is intangible, not to be injured by him, so it is the more powerful. And so it can enter into anything. Shapes have a most striking effect on the mind through the most complex of all organs—the eye. And the fancy of savage man gives to stocks and stones food for his reflection and power over his actions. His whole life is one of fear. Fear of these gods and fear of his enemies. And this fear keeps him very much occupied mentally. All the minutiae of a landscape passes through his brain. Every breath of wind, every creaking of a lough carries pregnant meaning of man or spirit to his brain. This brain, it can well be imagined, finds little time for anything but its own fears and the best means of avoiding unpleasant consequences. With his own gods he *must* reach some terms of composition; he must make them allies against strange gods on the terms of his own service to them. When they are unsuccessful therefore he turns on them with scorn, and berates and beats them; for of course he can give his enemies but little credit with the divinities. To do so would be to imply the superiority of such enemies, whose gods are strictly co-ordinate with the race. The savage is willing to admit the influence of bad luck, but not of bad management. *He* is never at fault.

The physical environment of Nature as a factor in civilization has found powerful application in the development of man both in the past and to-day. A mountainous country like New Guinea, in which the tribes inhabit their valleys and hardly move from or know anything beyond this limited habitat, can maintain this condition of affairs almost indefinitely unless some outside influence comes to break down the barriers so raised. Within historic times in a great people we have had a splendid instance of the influence of a mountainous country on development. In Greece it was a race of kindred tribes that inhabited the countless valleys, and developed a number of independent small communities intensely hostile among themselves but intensely racial in their feeling of hostility to outsiders. Fortunately the world was differently situated in those days, and the greatest and most civilized nations had very inferior arms. They could not stand off at a distance of several miles and sow a hillside with a leaden rain. The Persians could not treat the Greeks as we treat savage or barbarous tribes of to-day. And a much shorter distance was effective; as Professor Fiske points out in the unsuccessful attempt of the Norsemen to effect a settlement in New England in the eleventh century, as compared with the better armed Englishmen in the sixteenth century. But these great nations and civilized peoples were a constant temptation to the hardy and adventurous mountaineers. Nations differ of course in mental power; and the Greeks had first to go to school to Egypt and to Western Asia. But given the schooling they could further attend to the development, and they did so with wondrous results. Their early training, their independence, their intense raciality, their inter tribal rivalry, led to great competition and perhaps a greater development of individuality than has ever existed

except at the present time. It was a period of war, and the old military discipline prevailed in the communes. As a citizen, the Greek was held strictly in leash. As a Greek he had a wide range as individual. His virility he owed to his nurture as a mountaineer. His development and world empire he owed to the temptations that drew him from his mountain fastnesses. And much does any such race owe to its mountain life. Among the hills the well ordered commerce and highways of the plain are an impossibility. The narrowness of its range, the local nature of its development, and the small preference possible, lead men to the shortest distance between two points. Only the inaccessible and unscaleable are barred to this small traffic. The consequence is that every mountaineer knows his own valley as he knows his house. He knows it under all conditions of season and weather, and can find his way about as a man finds his way about his house in the dark. Here has rested the great difficulty of any invasion of a mountain people. The invader can spoil and waste, and then is forced to retreat before the impossibility of supplying his host in such difficult and limited districts. Every valley requires its separate garrison. This has been the history of mountain peoples from the days of Philip of Macedon to those of Edward I of England. There is of course at times a reverse to the shield. Where intertribal hostility is so great that the tribe is hemmed in without retreat over the mountains it is likely to be annihilated. But usually there is at least a dim enough sense of race to obviate this, and a fellow-feeling against the lowland invader supplies a refuge for a time to the fugitives. Tradition of common descent, existence of the same totems in other tribes, all give rise to a sense of kinship in facing a common danger. The savage has not enough to be selfish when his own may be threatened next. And war to him is the normal state. He seeks it rather than avoids it. But against the superior race it is to be noted that it is the physical difficulties that baffle, not man.

The nomads of the plain are differently situated. Their range is much wider than the narrow mountain valleys. A tribe has its limits within which it claims the sole right of pasture, but in the plain these boundaries are not well defined and some arrangement is necessary by which men can live at peace and distinguish their property. For here property takes a meaning that it is very slow in developing among the mountain peoples. Some nomad peoples—the Bedawin of the Arabian desert for instance—are hardly to be distinguished from mountaineers. But here the distinction is difficult to draw; for where mountains in the one case mark boundaries, in the other case they are drawn by the desert, and as a limiting barrier perhaps the latter is the more serious of the two. The mere question of elevation does not enter; only the question of barrier. The real plain dwellers, however, soon collect in the favoured spots for their grazing. This soon leads to settlement, and settlement leads to agriculture. On the

whole these plain people are peaceful. They have property to lose and hence must guard it; and environment of the peaceful development aids a kindred development. And when in time they are ripe for the plucking; when luxury and ease have sapped all the vigour of the original pastoral race; mountain or desert peoples, tempted by this luxury and its helplessness, descend upon it to make it and its owners their prey. Such we have reason to believe has been the history of Egypt. We know it to have been the history of Babylonia and Assyria, of the Elamite Cyrus and the Persian Darius. Where the opportunity offers—and that is but seldom, but once in the world's history—there is a population much akin to this. Island peoples are like mountain peoples. At first they appear as mere pirates, and pressure at home and temptation abroad may convert them into a great conquering people. There has been one such people—the Northmen, in that wider sense of the men living on the shores of the Baltic and the North Sea—and pouring forth from river mouth and fiord. And later in history making England their base; for it is to these Northmen and their old viking spirit that England owes her greatness. She is their direct descendant.

Perhaps we can now understand better how of necessity the Japanese must develop in their island home. Here we have a number of small tribes of the same race gradually unified by the predominance of one of their number. By emigration and conquest this dominant tribe seats itself at what was then, and is now, the *umbilicus* of the country—the Kyōto plain at the head of the Inland Sea, blocking the way north and south, and readily commanding access through this inland sea to every nook and corner of its empire. This was very important in the earlier times, for the North was then in the hands of the Aini and imperial Japan barely extended beyond the Biwa Lake. As in a spider's web the Government lay at the centre readily watchful and accessible to all; and yet the little communes themselves were very much isolated, cut off from each other in their mountain valleys, for the great mass of Japan is a tangle of mountains with these isolated little valleys only accessible through gorges or over rough mountain passes. And the Government did not encourage even such fusion as was possible. As a distinguished Japanese statesman has put it—"in these days men were as plants." By man and by nature the communes were kept apart. They were therefore in the first instance villagers, pure and simple. At the widest their ideas hardly ranged beyond provincial; with this thread of central government running through the whole, with its agents plainly men of their own race to keep alive the racial feeling. Needless to say their feuds were constant. Any contest over the control of this Central Government made itself felt all through what we can call this nervous system. Any weakening threw the local control on the ganglion controlling that part. Government is the great prize all through man's history and this struggle for government is shown all through Japanese history. At that period such a struggle was

by means of war, and the Japanese always saw and heard much of war. The Central Government, even though at first strong, was always more or less troubled with rebellion. As it weakened it fell into a feudal system, and the struggle between the fiefs was fiercer than ever. The development of the North made control from the Centre much less efficient. The North was a separate entity, easily defended from southern attack. It is the North which finally prevails, and descending from its mountain fastnesses conquers the South. The maintenance of two capitals—at Kamakura and at Kyōto—was not only a political but a military necessity. And in the final supremacy of one feudal lord over the others and the establishment of the Tokugawa this physical difficulty is recognized. There is no attempt to disturb the feudal system. The object is to effect the unquestioned supremacy and control of the ruling family by seizing the commanding military positions, and by so splitting up and isolating possible malcontents as to make rebellion difficult. This was all that could be done, for the physical nature of the country allowed nothing more. Mediæval methods never could and never did centralize Japan. It is only by modern highways driven through the heart of the mountain districts, by railways and the development of an extensive steamship service, that every part of the country has been brought into close contact with the Central Government and with each other, and the insularity of the communes has been broken down. Yes—there was one other method. Their feuds and struggle for independence or control gave them an intense sense of race. All quarrels fell before foreign strife, and whether it is in the thirteenth century or in the twentieth century we find the whole country rising *en masse* to repel the foreign invader. But they were very jealous of each other. The stress of invasion removed, they soon fall apart to renew their old struggles to main the *status quo* in their little fiefs, or to add a few villages to one or the other of them; or perhaps the larger ambitions struggle to add the shadowy influence of central power to their own real physical power as wielded by themselves or their allies. The dream of reuniting the shattered country, of recalling the old Japan of the ninth century was never lost to sight. And was never successful. The strongest of the feudal barons—Tokugawa—merely succeeded in maintaining a supremacy over what Sir Ernest Satow describes as in 1867 to be a mere congeries of clans and not a nation.

There is a difference within the clans themselves. Tradition has and had its effect, and while the northern clans are partly diverting their energies to the settlement of those problems arising in the development of new country, the cult of the pure military spirit was kept alive in the South. There is no doubt that an adventurous life influences to no small extent the intelligence. And the new material it brings in vivifies and enlivens the whole community. This was particularly the case in the England of the sixteenth century, when the whole country was on the *qui vive* and men's minds were engaged constantly in

speculation over the new wonders daily brought to their attention. It is shown on a small scale in the differences between village life and that of one of the neighbouring whaling towns sixty years ago in New England. Times have changed, and now the village stands on more even terms with its sea board neighbour. But before the telegraph and the railroad the seaport for days had almost a monopoly of everything that was news to the world. These men of the South in Japan were the adventurers. They were notable pirates. They were brought into intimate if unpleasant contact with their continental neighbours, and knew far more of the outside world than any other part of Japan. It has always had an effect on the local wit. The Satsuma man in Japanese history has always been the man of quick intelligence, of ambition, of curiosity. Intensely national he has always been intensely anti-foreign. He wishes the best of everything, but to use it to repel the foreigner. He was under all the influences of his race; mountain habitat, isolation, local feeling. But he was envious; and his warlike spirit, nurtured on his feuds, had a high contempt for all enemies, and an equally high appreciation for all weapons in which he was quick to recognize any value or superiority, and willingness and wish and preference to take by force rather than by negotiation. And his temptation was small. Rich prizes as his continental neighbours were they were not to his taste. His feuds were difficult to compose in order to bring about any serious plan of invasions, and he nourished and gloated over these feuds as a child over comfits. It is to be doubted if he anticipated any fighting worth the name to be found over seas, which he thoroughly harried in piratical raids. He was sure of it at home. His mind and time were taken up with maintaining the balance in his own little island. And the necessary backing of the Central Government, with its own difficulties in the North and its love of ease, would have been hard to obtain for foreign ventures. Fortunately for the continent; for any attack on them would have been led by these men of Satsuma; just as they led the attack on Europeans in the fifties and sixties.

Living in these mountain valleys, isolated from each other, occupied with their feuds, but connected by a thread of Central Government impressing by its injunctions their solidarity as Japanese, we should find a race endowed with great obstinacy, narrowness of view, intense prejudices and local feeling, great conservatism, an overwhelming predominance of the community in this half military life, and bravery constantly exercised by their vendettas. There is nothing to bring these men together, except the necessity of paying tribute to the Central Government which overshadows all and keeps all apart; or the presence of the stranger on the sacred soil of Japan. No great conqueror arises among them, for it is difficult for him to maintain his conquests, and to divert his efforts over sea is to threaten his interests at home. Thus the spirit of localism, the spirit of a narrow conservatism only desiring to maintain the *status quo*, is the spirit which is to guide the future.

§ 2.

One feature of interest is the relation *inter se* of these people in their small communities. As stated, the physical structure of the country splits its inhabitants into a number of small isolated units, communication between which in days when roads were mere pack trails, was difficult. The natural outlet for most of these units to-day is straight down their valleys to the point where the intersection of the weblike structure has given rise to a distributing centre. There were far less of these in the olden days when commerce barely existed. The journeys of the peasant in the days during which he was being formed socially and politically (and mentally) were mainly to carry the tax rice, and the local centre had little to teach him beyond the outward and visible sign of authority in the storehouses and the *Daikuan's* (Government or lord's overseer) residence. To say that these communities were isolated is equivalent to saying that they were self centred. Their connecting link was a central organ. Their relations to their neighbours were rather those of hostility than friendship. They were related to each other through the taxation of the Central Government. Their glances at each other were to see that no undue burden of the neighbouring district was shifted on their own shoulders. They had nothing to supply to each other and they wanted nothing. They visited each other much as two New Guinea tribes visit each other to-day. The prosperity of one above the rest was no object of congratulation. It merely set a severer standard for the rest. Hence the object was to maintain the existing condition of affairs; in agricultural methods as in everything else. But to understand this we must go more into the village itself.

To all intents and purposes the village was a family, and it had all the intensity of local feeling found in that unit. This was the more pronounced as the village unit was merely an enlarged family unit. The village was responsible for the acts of its members. One and all they stood and fell together. Under such a system needless to say everyone had to be under the eye of everyone else. A standard of conduct had to be set to which all members must conform, and any variation from that standard was to be frowned upon as involving some possible injury to the community at large. At all events its tendency might be wrong, and the uncertainty of the issue made the customary procedure the safer. The administration of this standard was in the hands of the Elders. Exacting responsibility, the Government gave great power to these Elders. Selected in the first instance for their own reputation and responsibility—for the commune could not afford to make use of untried men—they were interested in the maintenance of that position. They kept therefore a sharp eye on any variation from custom, and, where Government interference was invoked by disturbance of conditions and was certain to be drastic, the existing conditions were the safest and maintenance of custom the object of both

villager and village officer. Having the standard set in the narrowness of village life, we can understand the power of this "respectability." They and theirs are interested in maintaining their position. Others dread every change as attracting attention to them from the outside. Any rising pushing man seeking to rouse up this sleepy community by means of innovation would at once attract attention. What could he offer them? Would they inquire as to benefit of any such innovation? Certainly not. These people wanted to live. They had no other object. They were living under a communistic, under a socialistic system and a surplus would simply go to the Central Government; and furthermore would set a higher standard for them in the future. There would not only be no medium to support such an innovator, but there would be vigorous suppression. He would be a positive enemy to them. Fortunately perhaps for him and them he had little chance of development, even if Nature chanced to call him into existence. Conservatism—or stagnation it may be called—was further emphasized by another factor, the Family unit. This has not differed much the world over, until in our modern western world we have begun to see the necessity of loosening its bonds when man reaches adult age. Everywhere is found subordination to the Elders in the family. Always somewhat tempered by the individualism of outside life in the West it was absolutely unrestrained in Japan. The Elder was the single voice to be heard in the family. Before him all were silent and submissive. It is hardly necessary to point out how at this point family and commune work together to repress individuality. Abnormalities bring rebuke on the family, and from the earliest age everything is directed towards moulding youthful life to the standard. Anywhere this would soon spread into a custom, and as such it is deep rooted in the Japanese, and appears fully developed as they first emerge into history. The great majority frown on any deviation from the norm. The innovator is an excrescence to be cut down and cast into outer darkness. His doom is certain, and any temptation of genius must be avoided as one would avoid the Unpardonable Sin of Scripture.

Where the object was the maintenance of the *status quo*, the avoidance of everything tending to disturb the existing system, ambition is eliminated and the future easily provided for. The rule was what Professor Dill calls "the curse of hereditary calling and position." That a father should find it cheaper and more advantageous to train his son for his future calling rather than pay another for doing so goes without saying. It is almost a necessity for the large mass of men. But it is not the best method which should leave open a career to competition. The old Japanese state as socialistic was utterly unable to do this. Not only necessity and individual choice but custom as voiced by public opinion supported this oppression and suppression of the young. There was then but little envy, and but little ambition. The individual efforts were too diluted in the mass of the family to make any surplus of energy count for much. And these

individual efforts when spent on the community were lost altogether. It is the fact that the single household here aided much in simplifying the problem of how to get a living. These were not communities in which marriage meant a new centre of production organic and inorganic, and a development of the community. On the contrary, marriage as such was a decidedly informal affair among the lower classes. A man was responsible for and fathered his children. That was all. It was not overly formal among the upper classes in which, however, questions of family honour rendered it dangerous to divorce or repudiate a wife and send her back to her own family again. Such a course without cause was likely to give rise to complications and to one of those vendettas common enough in Japanese life. Sons therefore on marriage did not establish themselves in a separate house and as head of a household in their own right as adult men. Usually only the eldest married, the rest kept concubines which were regarded, however, in a looser sense as wives. Apart from paternity, after all children were the children of the house and the head of the house was responsible for all its inmates. In fact whether father or elder brother he was the *pater*. He wielded authority as such, and the other relations in the family were of minor importance. Certainly so to the community at large who only recognized the unit "family" and its representative.

However under such conditions of stagnation there was a recognized limit of subdivision. The whole question of population in Old Japan is an interesting one, and there has not been overmuch light thrown on it accessible to the foreign grubber after facts. In the earlier period there was room and opportunity for expansion. There was a wide territory in the North awaiting development, and there were ambitious men who saw in such development a means of wealth and power; land held in grant by men of rank and officials was or had come to be exempt from taxation, and it was not a difficult task to get men on such land in preference to taxed land. As stated the relations between Government and commune were those requiring the latter to supply certain taxes in kind and labour. The surplus population reduced the share of all. No obstacle would be placed by the commune in the way of emigration. The peasant was not as yet fastened to the soil in a condition of serfdom. He was fastened to his commune. With feudal times the peasant becomes a serf to all purposes. Movement is already becoming difficult. However, war, pestilence, and famine, all chronic evils, obviate any danger of undue expansion in the population. There is no reason to believe that the notorious prolificness of the race was not displayed also during this period, but the surplus population was thus provided for and removed from competition. Tokugawa times hardly changed the conditions of practical serfdom. Movement was very restricted and class was kept to class. Available land had been taken up as far as existing facilities for development admitted. Schemes of reclamation of forest or of swamp land were always encouraged, in the form of exemption from

taxation for a short period—three, five, or ten years. But the incentive to such labour was not great. The populace did begin to press on its means of subsistence. Pestilence and famine continued their work at frequent intervals; and abortion and infanticide, especially of female infants, played their part. The law of Malthus found rigid exemplification in Japan. But it could be kept at bay for a long time. There is much aid to be found in the family unit, in the guild, and in the village. There is throughout a recognition of the responsibility of wealth within certain limits. The Japanese did not carry this to the extreme advocated by modern socialism. They punished the thrifty in the family, but the relief from the guild was largely voluntary, and when the village interfered the matter became one of discipline or to avoid possible inconvenience to the community. The failure of one of the local units, through misfortune or illness, was a serious affair. His lands would have to be redistributed. Sometimes this was done under the supervision of the *Daikwan* or Government overseer for the district. The community paid tax in kind. The standard was high and carefully maintained, and efficiency of its members was of high importance. At other times, the community itself simply turned in and did the work of sowing, tending, and harvesting. This was especially the case where one of their units through weakness was threatened with extinction. From a religious point of view this was of great importance to the Japanese, and the wide range they gave to adoption was in order to prevent the extinction of a family. Government also preferred the *status quo*. Official consent was necessary for the transfer of any allotment of arable land. They were not disposed to allow the overgrowth of any one element in the village. The land revenue, it can be added, might be mortgaged up to the limit but its actual transfer was difficult. However, at times a sale became unavoidable, and in this case a stranger might step into the community. This was another inducement to the village to do all its power to prevent matters coming to extremes. The tendency of course was to the thrifty—in indirect ways, and less easily by direct acquisition.

But to the outside the village was all malice and uncharitableness. As we have seen there was no appeal to it. Their business relations were insignificant, and their suspicion and rivalry in the matters of avoiding unfair taxation was also a discordant element. This indifference and hostility to the stranger found such practical application that the Government interfered. The body of a stranger dying in the village would be withheld from the relatives, and a heavy fine exacted from them for the possible inconvenience that might result to the village from official investigation. Men who kindled a fire by the roadside to cook a little rice were seized by the village authorities and fined for the use of the highway. This was found to be a very convenient source of revenue, as often such men could not pay. They were then imprisoned for a more or less lengthy period and

forced to work out the fine on village improvements. These petty trespasses were soon a source of profit and constant quarrelling and litigation between neighbouring villages. The Government did very little to check anything but the grosser forms of it, those which prevented to the most legitimate use of the highways. On the contrary they encouraged this localism which rendered union more difficult; and in this were assisted by the selfishness and jealousy of the communes, which displayed in glaring colours these very individualistic traits without any of the checks usually present in an individualistic system. Further, the village temple encouraged this localism. This was more than the concern of its parishioners. It had also its official side. Even the holidays and festivals were directed by authority which formally, as such, took part in them. And all throughout we find no sign of a higher interest in anything. Everything is conducted by formula; everything is laid down according to programme. As in a play each has his settled part. There is no individual initiative. Public opinion acts spontaneously, automatically, and crushingly, on any effort at variation. And nothing can be hidden in this community where the very walls have eyes. As every one is watched, so everyone has the right to watch and demand an account from his neighbour. Where, on a small scale, we experience the annoyance of some prying inquisitive individual, of which there are always specimens to be found in every community, whispering his suspicions and comments adorned with the imagination inspired by his vivid fancy and very defective information and reasoning powers, we can see how terribly but simply drastic this espionage could become in the Japanese village. It did and could mould a public sentiment quick to act and far reaching against every abnormality. There was here no appeal to individual thought for there was literally no individual thought. People thought according to rule, or rather according to custom which was stamped on memory as effectually as the lines of Homer were stamped on the minds of the professional bards trained for that purpose. Progress here must halt and come to a stand still. The individual is a criminal and believes himself to be such. He timidly turns to the limited range afforded him by the rules of his art or his handicraft. Even here the great majority are bound down by the limitations of their brain, and follow the usual routine. Even the genius is bound down by the crushing and cramping to which he has been subjected, and wastes himself on minutiae and detail, delighting in variation within certain very narrow limits. This takes two curiously antithetical positions. There is the artist who expresses a whole range of ideas in a single stroke of the brush. His range is limited and he does not attempt to go outside of it but within this limited sphere he is the greatest "impressionist" the world has seen. At the other extreme there is the artist with the same limited range, but within its narrow limits he works out detail to its last lines. Always seeking balance, for the Japanese is inherently artistic; he is never extravagant.

Perhaps it would have been better if he were so for extravagance might have broken the mould; but with him the mould is the first limitation and the work is to be done inside of it.

Unity of ideas in the past, in the present, in the future. This is the keynote of these small Japanese communes. The village is simply one huge family. Often it actually is a family from the point of blood relationship. And this family is without check. We hardly realize at the present day in the West how important a step was this breaking away of the individual from our old family communities. Fortunately for us the mixture of nations, the clashing of divers interests, international commerce, and above all competition not only widened the field for individualism but placed it at a premium. Unconsciously the West acted on what we now know to be a natural law—that progress depends on the individual. There was none of this in Old Japan, the spirit of which still largely rules New Japan; We can understand then the importance of these officials to the villagers. That there was room for jobbery and tyranny there is no doubt. The Yedo Court of Appeal was constantly harassed with these cases, the seriousness of which can be imagined when the unwillingness to make such appeal is recognized. The individual under such circumstances had no chance whatever. He had to bow his head and submit. It was in the relation to the commune that these officials had real responsibility. They were its sole mouthpiece. Their touch with it had to be close and constant. Hence the community gave them wide latitude in dealing with individuals, but exacted a wide familiarity in dealing with the communal problems which might necessitate dealing with the outside world. A wrong course might lead to far greater evil consequences than any single act of injustice to an individual. They tried to provide for this by making custom far-reaching as to minutiae, and thus making the whole community as far as possible ready and accurate judges of the judges. What slipped through this network could not be helped. *Shikata ga nai*. But this merely required officials to keep within the letter of the laws as *they* understood them; and how far the personal factor or equation can bias judgment and commit no legal wrong is far too commonly instanced in the affairs of men. These officials, therefore, were representatives in every sense of the word. They represented the commune in its corporate capacity. They represented its units in their private capacity. They were the necessary intermediary. Any citizen appearing in a suit in court was accompanied by his town official as a sort of bail for him. They were present as his advocates to signify the endorsement of his complaint by his commune. Otherwise he had no standing. With such responsibility it was important to give them a real control. And they deserved it. When the crisis came in this cruel old Japanese State these men—and brave men they were—looked each other in the face and then took up their burden and carried it to the end, to stripes and imprisonment, and sometimes to death as in the case of Sakura Sôgorô

who sacrificed himself and his innocent family by thrusting a petition from his suffering village into the litter of the Shōgun. Brave men these were and hardly to be blamed when we find stagnation—timidity of any change—guiding their communities.

§ 3.

The relation of this people, therefore, is largely to the past. We have spoken of the ruling power being seniority. The fixity of age in its own ideas, its unwillingness to take up new ideas; its effort to bend everything to meet the form of past experience, its questioning the utility of anything that will not so bend; its failure to see the necessity of a new line of experiment—all these are marked as its qualities. The reasons for this are complex. One of them is an acute realization of the complexity of existing interests, and of the delicate balance existing between them. Anything that disturbs this balance is likely to cause injury and disturbance spreading far beyond any predictable bounds. A younger man does not see this. And if he does see it his vigour and energy lead him to depreciate the possible effects. He does not realize that a community is a sluggish and unwieldy body that cannot get on its feet again quickly like an individual; that being of organic growth its parts must again be slowly reconstructed in the course of extended time, not put together as parts of a machine; that if broken its parts are likely to remain scattered and to take new forms entirely different from those sought. But the older man acts on his experience; acts on his own disillusion. These have taught him the real unimportance of most things met in life. In rare cases he really appreciates this. In the large majority of cases, appreciating its truth for the experiences of life, he postpones the realization of his day dreams to another world. In this world the object sought is not an ideal but a *modus vivendi*. Hence there is an unwillingness to give a fair hearing to anything new; to sincerely examine into its nature. The affair comes before him strictly in the sense of prejudged. The objections rise spontaneously to the lips; and in answer to all the advantages urged are again repeated the objections. There is no effort, no desire to balance the two and then strike the account. This question had, not long ago, no little vogue in the discussion aroused by the dictum of an eminent physician—Dr. Osler—who attributed it to physical decay. And physical decay is not entirely a matter of years. Physically a man may be an old man at forty years; or at twenty; or for that matter we know of senile infancy. But also a man may still be in vigorous middle age at sixty or beyond. And such a man is one of our most valuable elements in the State. For vigour of body is tempered by long experience. We instinctively recognize this in our turning to vigorous age

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for guidance in dangerous places. We realize that age cannot stand the roughness of actual contest, and hence younger and stronger men are put forward to do the work and the actual conduct of affairs is left to them, but the experience of the aged counsellor is an invaluable guide. And this latter rarely wishes the executive work. He has reaped the reward of experience in his acquired influence. It is rare to find the combination of vigour, age, and experience; with all the energy of youth tempered by disillusion and hence turning itself to the immediately practical and attainable. When it is found its possessor has played a great part in the world's history. Its rarity makes it stand out in men's eyes, for the usual accompaniment of age is indifference or a senile decay totally incompatible with the advancing affairs of life.

The control of age, however, found strenuous support from the Government in Old Japan. It was a means of ensuring the maintenance of the *status quo* to which everything had adjusted itself. The object of Government was to strengthen itself and this was best sought in centralization. And the original Japanese State was highly centralized. But it was the centralization of the spider's web, and the cross strands were comparatively few. Therein lay its weakness. The idea of course was that this conservatism would be tempered by the wider outlook of the Central Government. But it is very difficult—even impossible—to alter the running of a machine without pulling it to pieces. This stagnation in the parts naturally extended to the centre, for after all the web was made of the same woof. Men devoted to the maintenance of the *status quo* in the various little units placed under their control naturally came to the national council chamber with a bias in their minds against change. Any change would involve a tremendous agitation through the mass. And it was rarely attempted. We have an inkling of such attempts made in the seventh century. The dates given are 604 A.D. and 645 A.D. and involved the Chinazation of the imperial and civil service. This can be described as the Legend of Shōtoku Taishi, for the persistent dominance of old Umayko no Yemishi through the whole period leads one to believe that the real inspiration lay in this "kingmaker" of ancient Japan. This reform is treated as very sober history by many Japanese writers, much as we would discuss the historical development of the agitation over the corn laws in England or the Missouri Compromise in the United States. It is hardly necessary to point out that this took place at a time of which we have no contemporary record. That such events did take place is told us in the Nihongi, published in 720 A.D.* and we can rely on the bare outlines of what is there given; but there is little use in piling up fanciful descriptions of

* It and its contemporary the Kojiki are distinctly devoted to the traditions and the glorification of the imperial house. Any deed or person not conforming to this purpose is treated in much the same charitable spirit as Mr. Pickwick treated the legal efforts of Messrs. Dodson and Fogg. "Precious scoundrels, Sir. Precious scoundrels."

what men thought when every contemporary document has been lost—if it ever existed. We have the results and must be satisfied with these bare outlines. One thing we know; that this curse of Japan, stagnation through all its governing centres, was early fixed in Japan; and from what we know of savage and barbaric peoples in general, and those of eastern Asia in particular, we can assume that not a glimmer of individualism ever reached Japan previous to its contact with European nations. Hence we find the importance allowed to local government is strictly in connection with the Central Government and under its immediate control. Extreme conservatism at the centre became fixation as the circumference—the more divided constituents—were approached. In these outer limits what was sought was automatic action not reflection. As a Japanese statesman of to-day has lucidly put it, the Central Government was to be the brain guiding and controlling the limbs and the rest of the body. Reasoning by analogy is not very safe, and this analogy leaves out of account that it is the same blood that nourishes the brain and the great ganglia which control automatic action; that as one centre, no matter which, becomes impoverished all are affected; that the welfare of the whole body is to be carefully maintained, for the paralysis of these ganglia leaves the body nerveless and forceless; just as the paralysis of part of the brain, if it does not affect control of the vital organs, leaves the physical functions of the body in vigour. It is the just balance between the two that insures the safety of the individual, and if one changes the other must change. There is no necessity to ask here why the law is such, but it is a fact that in an organic system in Nature the progress is from “complete homogeneity to complete heterogeneity” and the social system is of organic growth. The old Japanese State could take no account of this principle. Indeed as a formulated law this provision of Nature is very new to us. But blindly this truth was realized more and more in the West and slowly put in practice even when not understood. The astonishing thing is that the East postulated the reverse—the antinomy—without ever dreaming that the real truth might lie in the opposite direction. Not even as a matter of speculative theory, of dialectical gymnastics, did they think of examining the Negative of their Positive.

Old institutions were therefore perpetuated. We have spoken of the *be* which appear later as the guilds, whether of mediæval times or under this special application in Tokugawa times. As with the *be*, so are the guilds highly centralized bodies copied from existing institutions. The same subordination and the same subjection runs through them. The individual, the soul of true democracy never even casts his shadow in their organization. Down to recent times—even to-day—their centralization in a given district followed this old centralization of the *be*. And so we find streets of old iron dealers, of kimono makers, of cloth merchants, of china merchants, of lumber merchants, of funeral directors, and so on through a number of trades. They did not seek their

customers but their customers sought them. The system was that of the bazaar, and perhaps is a development of this primitive form of commerce in turn developed from the open air fair or market. But immobility went further. It led to clan and family immobility. Or perhaps this clan immobility led to fixity in the trades for the two are inextricably woven. This gained such control that it maintained its ground even when individualism became a matter of convenience. This continually keeping tab on a man, maintaining his responsibilities to elements other than those in his environment, introduced complexities that became positively injurious in the later Tokugawa times, when commerce had begun to develop and more or less of a floating population was necessary for its maintenance. A man's real relations were then with the community in which he lived. The expense and annoyance of maintaining his relations with his original source of origin extended also to the machinery which attempted to enforce these relations. Any but officialdom wedded to red tape would have cut through this knot, or at least gradually unravelled it so as to throw the responsibility on the man, not on interdependent relations between the man and some remote family or village. This relation was a very real one. There were runaways of course without number. The seriousness of the offence is seen in the formality and the care taken before the final expulsion from the family or community is put on record and the man officially made an outcast. It was a serious thing in Japan for a man to have no community to which to refer. His individual status was not recognized. He was literally "a man without a country," unless he could manage to edge his way into some other of the units; no easy matter for him even with references. Probably a formal repudiation relieved his fellow citizens of any consequences for his offences. For there was a sort of *wergeld* in punishment of a whole village for individual offences; that is, where the family of the offender could not expiate the offence. In connection with this expulsion or repudiation of the individual we can touch on another matter, though not in direct relation with it; slavery in relation to the caste system. Slavery was not regularly abolished. It died out. It became an inconvenience, or rather hardly a distinction existed where Government absorbed the surplus and left a means of living to the producer according to the standard. The peasantry became attached to the soil. Doubtless the real phenomenon exhibited was that the slave rose and the peasant sank. It was easy to maintain serfdom and difficult to maintain slavery in a feudal system. The same experience was reached in Europe where slavery was practically extinct in the fifteenth century; and then it was confined to foreigners and only existed in countries in immediate commercial contact with the Levant. But in Old Japan, under the caste system, where the slave did not rise there was no place for him. He became an outcast, and just what did become of him individually is a matter of controversy. Slavery—as instanced by the slave market—

early disappears.* The price of a man is quoted in the ninth century and indirectly the Shintō rituals of that date refer to man under such terms as to imply unlimited power over him. But at all events by the ninth and tenth centuries such subjection was rare. Meanwhile another factor looms out of the mists of time—the *eta*. These outcast people and their settlements are very ancient, and are attributed with some show of reason to settlements of former slaves. They performed offices about the dead and about animals that the rest of the community could not undertake without ceremonial defilement. The stress of circumstances which therefore drove a man into that class must have been very great. There was here no ordinary separation from the rest of the community. The *eta* were more than degraded. They were ceremonially unclean. Of moral leprosy the old Japanese religious code did not take account. Only of ceremonial leprosy. Side by side they existed with the people down to the proclamation of 1871. Their villages were co-terminous but apart from the caste population. They are not forgotten to-day, and the history of their settlement close to the Yokohama Bluff is well known to every local Japanese. They had their own laws and their own regulations among themselves, for the law as such did not recognize their existence. They were recruited by, or accompanied by, the *hinin* or outlawed class, men driven out of society by debt or crime or both. The two classes, however, seemed to be separate although it was possible for the outlaw to enter the *eta* class, a permanent mark of his degradation. These men—*eta* and *hinin*—had no rights whatever. A dog had infinitely more protection; especially under the reign of the notorious Shōgun Tsunayoshi, who showed this tender regard to the precepts of Buddhism in reference to animal life, so much so that the life of a man was of small account in comparison, and who drowned the cries of these victims with the cries of the victims of his "Island of Capri."

A caste system can find no place for extraneous elements. Its limits are marked off, and what movement there is into and from or within it must be governed by its boundaries. Whatever elasticity there is in this Old Japan is found in the lower strata; and this disappears with time so that in the sixteenth century the very little movement, the slight chance of escape from the iron circle, practically disappears altogether. And this is not due so much to suppression by a ruling class as to communal suppression. Japan had its Inca but its Inca class disappeared in the higher organization of all the tribes. The conquest of the ruling tribe, in the end, was governed by agreement with the conquered. But the communal suppression was actual and well directed. And all through the centuries not a word is ever heard from what in the West we call the People. And why?

* Sale of male and female servants in feudal times was really transfer of contracts. It was peonage, not slavery in the sense of the man becoming a chattel. The offspring were not slaves.

Because men were trained in the belief that they were not men but the community. These laws were set by the community. A man held his place by virtue of the community. As the community put him in his place, so it placed another over him. Of course as a matter of fact there was no thought over the matter at all. The system allowed no thought in such directions, and such thought could only find a basis in individualism which did not exist. There could be no better illustration of the formality of the code than this immobility of the great mass of the Japanese people. And this immobility carries with it interesting and sometimes amusing features. There is a mine of archaeological wealth to be worked in the customs of this civilized people. In many curious marriage customs we retain in the west a trace of savagery or at least barbarism; and in the idea of impurity implied in the churching of women we have in our religions a distinct reminiscence of it. And so in Japan. The relations between man and woman were often tacitly ignored by the community. A man visited his mistress by stealth at night, the secrecy involved being the openest kind of farce; but there was supposed to be a decent opposition on the part of the parents to allow this intrusion into the family. The consequences of such union of course caused a public acknowledgment of the relation. This practice perhaps goes back to those cases of necessity described by Mr. J. J. Atkinson in his "Primal Law," when the young male had no access to the female watched and guarded by the bull of the human herd, who by his right of the strongest maintained his marital rights over his females. It is a well known practice among savage peoples to-day whose living customs are based on this jealousy and have made a superstition and religion of marital rights of certain males over certain females. The very complicated marriage laws of the Australian tribes are attributed to this necessity of finding a *modus vivendi* by which men are enabled to live together at all. Generations of usage have enormously developed and formalized them, for savage man by no means is primitive man, but the root basis is there. In Japan the necessity of offspring, especially of male offspring, would incline society to keep alive a custom by which a woman's fruitfulness was put to the test. It is the case to-day, in which formal marriage sometimes does not take place until after the birth of a child and of a male child. Exogamy does not appear as a feature in Japanese customs although it is at least premature to say that it will not be traced out. As a matter of record the evidence is rather the reverse. Too close relations are condemned by the community. Marriage allowed between brother and sister by different mothers implies a condemnation of marriage between uterine issue. And this seems to have been the sin of Prince Karu and his sister. It is dangerous to draw conclusions from the practice as carried out by the rulers of the land. However, there is no indication of the wish to maintain the purity of the royal line; as is shown in that of the Incas of Peru where the

only legitimate sovereign was the fruit of the love of uterine brother and sister. All that can be said of the early days of the Japanese imperial line is that marriage within the house—with half sisters and cousins—was the rule; with numerous exceptions. Taking into consideration the intense localization of the Japanese; that the clans were strictly limited to their districts; and that sometimes a family constituted the whole population of a village, living, and working, and marrying within it; the relations in Japan seem looser and more akin to those of Annam. Incest was severely condemned by Old Japanese thought, just as much so as it is to-day; but with the open structure of the household and the living in which youth of both sexes are not strictly segregated; the practice of acknowledgement of maternal relation by any female competent by age to be child-bearing covers sins which in the absence of existence of stricter marriage relations could not escape discovery.

And in ancestor worship we have the apotheosis of the past. It is the very substratum of Shintō. Whether it be the *mitama-shiro* or the *ihai*—for the *ihai* or Buddhist ancestral tablets are merely another form of the same Japanese thought—the *kami* are always present to their descendants. And these *kami* are personal in a sense unknown to the *hotoke*. If the Japanese ever reaches a shadow of personality it is when he becomes a *kami*. Not a very satisfactory *début*, it would seem to most people. The *hotoke* (Buddhist ghost) ought in all decency, even if he does not, fade into Nirvana. However in practice he does not do so; and the vigorous beating of a drum all the night following a decease marks the survival of an old savage custom in the desire to get rid of the presence of the ghost, to whom this practice seems to be annoying. As the position of the elder before death has been one of command, so after death the same influence remains only tempered by the exigencies of existing circumstances, and where conservatism is made the ruling ideal we can see how he thus emphasizes the past. Once more we find this isolation of the Japanese community appearing as a factor. It takes its ideas from the past, guides the present according to them, and extends them into the indefinite future. Their influence accumulates more and more as time goes on. Custom becomes more and more strengthened until at last custom decides every disputed point. Under such a system there is no outlet for new ideas. Everything tends to stagnation.

§ 4.

It has been necessary in the course of the argument to speak more or less of the relations existing between the people—whether in the communes or as the communes—and the Central Government. We need only touch more specifically on a few of

the points already hinted. The main object of the Government was control. There is not the shadow of any idea of progress as the outcome of the functions of the various units. To the minds of the rulers the idea of a harmonious development was utterly foreign. Development of one element could only be at the cost of another. Balance to them meant the maintenance of the existing conditions. This theory of the organism was akin to that of certain (theoretical) rhizopods—if a rhizopod could have a theory. It was accretion not evolution. And as there is a limit to accretion, a limit set by gravitation, these Japanese Statesmen were not tempted to overweight their machine. This is the only rational explanation of the persistent insularity of the Japanese people, the fear of its leaders to introduce disturbing elements into their statecraft; and perhaps overweight it. Hence they display no wish to impose their gods, or the living representative of those gods, on foreign peoples. Government alone therefore was to do the thinking. But we have seen how the paralysis of this thinking power thorough the community must react on the Government, itself made up of elements taken from that community. Deeper and deeper this grows with the centuries until we reach that extraordinary stage witnessed in the history of no other people and instanced by the exclusion policy of Iyeyasu and his successors. Individualism here has no opportunity. It is crushed out by the automatism of the lower members; it is looked at askance by the conservatism of the higher members. Any scheme therefore comes handicapped. It has no opportunity of being tested on its merits. We have numerous instances in the emphasis laid on trivialities. In fact outside of the good hard downright blows exchanged in the strife for the plums of the local pie Japanese history is a mass of trivialities. There has been an effort, especially prominent at present, to mark these periods with the discussion of grave constitutional questions such as have arisen in our western world. When sifted down, however, it is readily seen that these "constitutional" movements are in no way related to an evolution but to a readjustment and to a stiffening of the existing formulae. Evolution requires the individual, and as far as the individual is concerned in old Japan his movement simply tends to mark him. Usually in an unfavourable sense. Like "Toad-in-the Hole," his most desirable phase is *non est inventus*. When he does appear something undesirable is usually brewing. Sometimes however circumstances do favour him, and in consequence in reference to some trivial matter. We have an instance in the reign of Suinin (29 B.C.—70 A.D.). It was the custom of the time to bury victims alive at the tomb of a dead prince. One bright mind, perhaps impelled by self preservation, suggested the burial of clay images instead of living men. It is not to be denied that the outlet was ingenious and the results perhaps individually important, but what trivialities are here involved! There is an element of bathos involved in this juggling with playthings instead of approaching the question as one of

common sense and expediency. The stress is laid on the ingenuity of the device proffered by the *individual*, the result sought is almost lost sight of altogether to the old chronicler except in a sort of after thought in adding that henceforward the slumbers of the king were not disturbed by the cries of the victims. This, by the way, was the main object sought. The whole episode is akin to those substitutions adopted among other peoples; the substitution of animals or other objects for the human victims of the sacrifice. So with the Hebrews before they had emerged from their savage condition. There is something deliciously comic about the whole affair in the old Japanese chronicle. It reminds one of the grave balance struck by the English landlady as to whether she could afford to give her lodger one egg and one slice of bacon, or two eggs and no bacon. Any common sense method was of course available; for the point at issue was whether the gods would be offended by the discontinuance of the human sacrifice. Unless of course we are to believe that the gods would be so easily deceived as to mistake a clay image for the real man. As the Japanese endowed their gods with great intelligence, and oftentimes benevolence, in other directions there is no reason to assume that they sought to deceive them. But we have other instances of this grave importance given to trivial forms. For instance in *harakiri*, practised and advocated even at this present day. The only defence offered for *harakiri* is and can be its effect as an emphatic individual protest. It is a striking method of directing attention to some action or to some event. It is one of the few expressions—in Old Japan one of the few means of expression—left to impress individual force on the community. There are noble instances of *harakiri*. Instances we can pity and almost at times admire. But when we come to examine into it as part of the existing code of etiquette, and see the utter trifles for which at times it was performed, we can only turn in disgust from a system in which formula had been driven to such great extremes. *Harakiri* takes on then its real and true form. Its kinship to Juggernaut, and to the fanaticism shown in the devotees of Juggernaut, appears very clearly and strip it of all sympathy. In the most noted, the classic instance of it, found in Old Japan—the case of the forty-seven ronin—we have abandonment of family, of wife and children, the adoption of a vicious life, the throwing to the winds of every moral precept, all carried out to accomplish a vendetta. The one residual element—loyalty to a petty chief—is made to swallow all the rest of the decalogue. The methods adopted are akin to those of a Red Indian, and as such we can understand them. But we can have no sympathy for a system in which such methods and such morals become a necessity. But, as we have said, Bushidō in theory and in practice expanded this element of loyalty into a monstrosity. To it were sacrificed both methods and morals, as instanced in the case of Genzo, the vassal of Michizane, who sacrificed his own child to save the son of his lord.

The completion of an inelastic system is marked by fear of any change. Government then becomes isolation, and individualism is finally crushed or is not allowed to develop. It only represents encroachment on authority which strikes at it blindly and at once. Hence we have the accentuation of the abstract community. Special cases drop out of the account. They must take their course under the general rules laid down, and are classified according to their main traits. In the case of the clash of two principles, as of loyalty to one's lord and obedience to one's superior, an exit must be found—*harakiri*—in the form of judicial suicide. But only some such striking anomaly in existing custom is powerful enough to command attention. The individual disappears altogether. Hence great authority can be granted, and responsibility exacted, for the limitations are so narrow that any deviation is quickly detected and checked. And for this purpose the closest watch is maintained throughout the community. In the upper classes this is maintained by a most exasperating etiquette filling every moment and movement and action of a man's life. Between the classes the same exacting etiquette maintains the relations of subordination. Within the lower classes this is driven into still closer relations making every man responsible for and a compulsory spy upon his neighbours. This is well instanced in the regulations for the *kumichō*. Let us turn to some of these as given by Dr. Simmons at the close of his paper on "Land Tenure and Local Institutions in Old Japan."*

"2. Filial piety and faithful service to a master should be a matter of course, but when there is anyone who is especially faithful and diligent in those things, we promise to report him to the *daikwan* for recommendation to the Government."

"3. If any member of a *kumi*,† whether farmer, merchant, or artisan, is lazy and does not attend properly to his business, the *ban-gashira*‡ will advise him, warn him, and lead him into better ways. If the person does not listen to this advice, and becomes angry and obstinate, he is to be reported to the *toshiyori*.‡ As fathers, sons, members of families, relatives, and fellow-villagers, we will endeavour to live in peaceful and kindly relations; as members of a *kumi*,† we will cultivate friendly feeling even more than with our relatives, and will promote each other's happiness as well as share each other's griefs. If there is an unprincipled and lawless person in a *kumi*,† we will share the responsibility for him."

"14. Whatever our business or occupation, we will not neglect it, nor waste time in amusements of any kind, nor engage in unlawful practices, nor urge people to engage in lawsuits. If there are any of our number who are unkind to parents or neglectful or disobedient, we will not conceal or condone it, but report it."

* Edited by J. H. Wigmore—Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. XIX.

† The five house unit or its officer.

‡ Village officers. The *nanushi* was a kind of mayor.

"15. When men who are quarrelsome and who like to indulge in late hours away from home will not listen to admonition, we will report them. If any other *kumi** neglects to do this, it will be a part of our duty to do it for them."

"16. In case of over-taxation or the need of food or seed in times of scarcity, where a demand for redress or an appeal of any kind is made by combining and by using force against the Government officials,—such means of redress we declare improper and dangerous and not to be employed."

"23. If any one goes away to a neighbouring *mura*† to remain over three days, *kumi*,‡ *nanushi*,‡ and *toshiyori*‡ will be informed; the same notice will be given on leaving for a distant place to take service, on business, or for pleasure."

"24. No person not having a *nimbetsu-chō*§ is to be allowed to remain even one night in the *mura*,† etc.

"Kobayashi *mura* Minami-kuwata-gun, Kaneoka Han (near Kyōtō) 1. As it is considered necessary to reform our *go-nin-gumi* system, established in obedience to your order, we hereby, in accordance with your wish, form all the inhabitants into *go-nin-gumi*, including tenants, servants, wives, and children, as well as house owners. But, in forming the *kumi*, we shall take care not to form them exclusively of near relations or intimate friends; we shall put together all classes of people; and those who refuse to enter a *kumi* shall be punished. Whoever abandons his *kumi* shall be reported by the *nanushi*, the *toshiyori*, and the *hyakushō-dai*,** and upon investigation shall be punished. 5. Each *kumi* shall carefully watch over the conduct of its members so as to prevent wrong-doing. Whenever any person is found to have misbehaved, and his *kumi* have negligently failed to discover it, the *kumi* shall be considered culpable as well as the *nanushi* and the *toshiyori*."

"40. Every person leaving his home on business must inform the *nanushi* and *kumi-gashira*†† before starting. Those who go to Yedo to take service with a master must first obtain permission from you. If anyone leaves the *mura* without doing so, and afterwards is guilty of any offence, he as well as the *nanushi* and *kumi-gashira* shall be deemed culpable."

"51. A complainant when proceeding to court shall be accompanied by the *nanushi*. If he appears in any other way, he shall be punished, no matter how good his claim."

Under such conditions the power of this Central Government is very great. The units are constantly under its eye. Nominally self directing they are really centrally directed. Furthermore they have no relations with anything but this central mass, the weight of which overpowers any force of attrac-

* The five house unit or its officer.

† Village, or better "district."

‡ Village officers. The *nanushi* was a kind of mayor.

§ Passport.

** *Hyakushō* is a farmer. Probably a more rural officer.

†† *Ban-gashira* was the head of a *kumi*: the *kumi-gashira* was chosen by the *ban-gashira*.

tion found in the diminutive commune. There can be no "clash of authority, no appeal to the sense of fairness in public opinion, against despotism at the centre. The lines of communication run only to this centre. As stated this is to some extent due to the physical nature of the country. And to a larger extent it was due to the careful nourishment of this system of isolation in which the regulations and prohibitions, all directed toward preventing that community of interests between different parts of the body politic so important in our times, were piled up to excess; so much so as to reach to the most trivial journeys of men, and to cover the land with "barriers" at which passports must be produced. The weak little commune therefore had small chance to resist any commands from the centre. With its neighbours it had little in common but taxation, and to see that no undue burden should be shifted on to its own shoulders. We know enough to-day about taxation of classes to realize what spirit of jealousy this would arouse between the communes. There was but one limitation on the power of the Central Government. The spirit of self-preservation in its victims. A man must have the means to live. Drive him beyond this and he will fight. This has always been realized by the most despotic Government, and was thoroughly understood by the Government of Old Japan. A margin of living, safe in ordinary years, was laid down. But it was a high margin of safety, and the peasant profited but little on the good years and suffered severely during the bad years in which no allowance was made for defect in the harvest, provided he had something elsewhere to realize on. The usual tax was four-tenths of the produce (Tokugawa fiefs). Sometimes it rose to eight-tenths in some of the outside fiefs. The land was rated at so many *koku* of rice (a little minus five bushels) and this scale sometimes remained stationary for generations. Such formal taxation moreover was supplemented by forced loans, and loans had a long and tedious life and a precarious enforcement in Old Japan. But the people were not often driven to the wall. Their surplus was stripped from them in one way or another, but the Government did not drive them to rebellion. Furthermore it severely punished any such extreme of misgovernment. The *daimyō* who had driven his people into rebellion, or even into open protest, received very prompt and summary treatment. As did also the people for resorting to such extremes. The certainty of degradation and confiscation in the one case; and of imprisonment, of hangings, and of crucifixions, in the other case; this cold certainty modified the zeal of both parties, and usually an outlet was found to any little local differences as to taxation.* Also as to how much further burden that patient ass, the people, would bear. As far as possible the local needs were met locally. This was the more

* Arai Hakuseki reports a little civil war as in progress for some months within a hundred miles of Yedo, and unknown to the Yedo officials. This was during the "Peace of the Tokugawa."

necessary inasmuch as the difficulties of transportation were great, and practically the only means of relief was for the Central Government to lighten or even suspend taxation. This it never hesitated to do in the urgent cases. Some more prosperous district paid for it. It was truly socialistic. In one way or another it took all the surplus anyone was fool enough to make. But such could only reach to a certain point. Lightening or suspending taxation could not fill the empty rice heads, and there were frightful and periodical famines. Socialism does not tend to thrift, and the thriftlessness of the Japanese is notorious. It is the result of centuries of training under conditions in which individual effort met with no encouragement, and where the fruits of such effort were met by confiscation. There was no remedy for this under their system. The Japanese met their crises with a bravery and patience that commands admiration to-day. There was no hope or expectation of relief and they sat down and starved together, simply drawing in the *obi* (or sash) tighter at the waist to diminish the pangs of hunger only aggravated by the little cakes made of chopped straw and a pinch of millet. To this day the powers and responsibility of relief found in the Central Government, the readiness of the whole world to respond to the suffering caused by famine, comes as a surprise to the peasant in the East. He often still suffers dumbly as his forefathers did before him, without one thought of the necessity or even the use of making his condition known to the outside world.

With such control it was safe to give great power to the Japanese communes within their limits. And responsibility was exacted from them in turn. They were careful to live very much to themselves. Disputes were settled locally, and the danger of invoking the Central Government with its punishments severe and certain was impressed on all their members. So dependent on the commune the individual could not press recognition of his claims too far without arousing the anger of his fellows for invoking outside interference.* And the position taken by the Central Government was that they were not to be disturbed by such low affairs admitting of local settlement. As little did they recognize any rights of the individual against the commune. For appeal there must be a breach of sacred custom, for this might touch on the working of the governing apparatus. Otherwise the *daikwan's* (government overseer) court was the limit. Appeal to the Yedo court, or even to the Privy Council, was admitted but was punished. Appeal to the Shōgun was death. The nature and the result of these appeals show how utterly irresponsible officialdom was; for the burden of proof always lay on the people to prove to a Government, itself an interested party in the dispute, that taxation had been driven, not beyond just limits but beyond the means to live. Cases of

* Consider the local resentment aroused in our own communities—in the South for instance—against the individual invoking the protection of the Federal Courts.

personal oppression, petty tyranny directed against individuals; it was almost impossible to reach. No wonder men in Old Japan kept their disputes out of official hands when in our modern western world we strive to do the same. Precedent therefore was doubly valuable in governing all disputes. They kept away from authority as far as possible. This strengthened very much the control of the public over private affairs, and in turn made the maintenance of the system all the easier. If a matter reached litigation, it was not justice but the letter of the law that ruled. Equity does not figure in Old Japan. It is not to-day a feature of Japanese judicial machinery. Custom alone ruled Old Japan. Once more we find the individual eliminated as a possible factor. For a man can ask for justice, the broader application of the law to the special case. A community asks for the interpretation of a statute.

With its army of administrators, its division of the produce between State (Church) and People, its elaborate organization, its minute marshalling of the people, its application of military principles to civil life, this old Japanese State recalls Professor Fiske's description of the South American Empire—Peru. "On the whole it was the most complete illustration of Government Socialism that the historian can discover looking backward." This well describes the earliest empire in Old Japan, and one might add full of valuable suggestion to us of to-day. The parallel might have been driven further had not power slipped from the ruling clan to the military class. It is again partially resuscitated under the Tokugawa, but differentiation—division of labour—had by that time gone too far to retain anything but the spirit of the old socialistic despotism.

§ 5.

The importance of the temple in Japanese life has been referred to. We have now to touch on this more in detail. This is not the place for the discussion of Japanese religion. But the temple and religion can be taken apart, as these two phases of the same thing are more easily disjoined than in our modern western world.* There is a distinction existing not unlike that found in

* We have not yet learned that the cry of separation between Church and State is not a mark of two entities but a proof of evolution. This discussion is confined to the public and official relations of the temple. There was also the congregational relation. Japanese temples were in this sense in the hands and management of their congregations. These supported them and used them and the system was highly developed, and the sects were numerous and their rivalry in the religious propaganda was great. But the Government never loses sight of the public and official side. The erection of new temples was steadily discouraged from the eighteenth century on. The temples, it should be added, were the schools of the country, and hence, as can be imagined, a sharp eye was kept on the teaching.

our American political life. Spurred on by the heat and enthusiasm and other spirit rousing elements we Americans fill great mass meetings, and display much zeal, and sweat tremendously under the collar. And this watery and spirituous phase is usually the typical product of the whole business. A week later we all go and vote into office the political opponent of the man so bepraised and beflattered a week before. And why? Because we are party men throughout, and we carry party down from our great national interests into the minutest cranny of our municipal or even personal lives. The issue at stake may be the practical control of the citizen's life by great corporations, having for sale a necessity of living or getting to the place where he makes his living, and seeking a monopoly in supplying these public needs. The citizen has absolutely the whip hand in the matter. He controls the situation and can make what terms he pleases. He abdicates this control, and perhaps continues the veriest set of rascals in immediate office over him for fear that some scrap of influence may thereby accrue to the opponent in the distant national issues. Protection and Free Trade have been our more visible national party cries of recent years—always excepting the deep and radical gulf of "interpretation"—that separates the two great American political parties. And the Augean stables of many an American municipality have remained uncleared simply for fear of a mistake in making the cross on the ballot. It is safer to vote the party ticket and stick to the big type at the head of the column. This is the great value of the *referendum* proposed in regard to the disposition of all these valuable public franchises. To bring the specific matter home to the individual voter. It would seem worth while to go to the expense of separating our elections for federal and for state offices from elections for purely municipal offices. The more elections the merrier, for the more politics are forced on the citizen the better for the State at large. But it remains a fact that in our American political life we draw a sharp distinction between action and our final determination. To get back from this little digression, and without much apology for it, we will connect the two thoughts by saying that the mass meeting, the excitement, and the discussion have no more to do with the final action of the citizen than Japanese religious life had to do with Japanese ritual as performed for the service of the State. The praiseworthy metaphysical discussions and speculations of the Buddhist had and have little to do with the ceremonial rites carried out by the State. For, it is to be remembered, in Japan the State is religion. No matter how much zeal therefore we find displayed it is to have but little real influence on any issue in which the subject displays his activities. It is all mere metaphysico-religious fireworks,

There is then a purely official side to Japanese religion. Without theology or dogma this side is purely ceremonial. Religion on this side is a part of the State. This is the old standard of Shintō which throughout has always remained the

basis of the Japanese political structure, and in active and visible operation at the great shrines of Ise and Izumo, no matter how neglected elsewhere. But Shintō did more. It carried this spirit into Buddhism, Buddhism invaded its many local temples and took practical possession of them; not turning its gods out, but turning them into Buddhist incarnations. And in so doing it placed itself in Governmental control. The old Shintō theory remained applicable to the Buddhist priest. We can understand then that, although the temples had practically control of what schools and teaching that were to be enforced, this source of influence availed them little. The public religion and the private relation were two separate factors of Japanese life. They were part of the system, and as such carefully kept apart and controlled by the Government. There is one apparent exception here—the great Buddhist monasteries which gave so much trouble in the history of the country. But a monastical establishment is a corporation which has other relations to the body politic than those immediately attached to its charter. As we know well in these modern days. It was the monasteries in political life that gave trouble to Old Japan. And this political side had nothing to do with the religious side. They fought for power and privilege and fortunately they lost. Otherwise Buddhism presented no dangers to the Japanese State. There is no great central hierarchy in the Buddhist Church. The system is congregational and presents no real union.

There being no state theology, therefore, state religion was naturally conservative toward ceremonial. Ritual observances alone are found in it. And this is of importance for theology implies discussion, and hence at least life. But this constant attention to ritual tends to intellectual religious dullness. The time and the mind is taken up with a round of ceremonies in which most elaborate care is exercised as to precedent and formulae. That there were many bright and active minds among the Japanese priesthood needs no proof for they have left evidence of their activity, just as they display it to-day. But their general reputation as a body was not and is not high among the people. The *bozu* is looked on as reactionary, as sensual, as a parasite on the body politic; and they rather hoot at his morals. And this standpoint seems to some extent justified when their stagnation, immersion in tithes and revenues, and general indifference to advancing modern life is taken into account. An old priest and his wife and family,* who have not only occupied the temple for their lengthy lives but have inherited it (in some cases) from their forebears of long ages past, are most charming hosts, but can hardly be thought of as keeping actively abreast of the times in the sense of modern religious life. In fact the constant round of ritual dulls the mental activities of thousands of these men. They become pure formalists. What theology they evolve becomes scholastic, for

* All the Japanese Buddhist sects do not practice celibacy in the priesthood. Shintō priests are allowed to marry.

"the leopard cannot change his spots" and a cast of mind rigid in one sense cannot be elastic in another sense, especially when that other is part and parcel of the material to be subjected to formulae. Unfortunately Buddhist theology tends strongly to metaphysics and hence to scholasticism. There is no source of development. This is a tendency displeasing to active minds, and the best and most active of them sought refuge in Confucianism with its precepts calling for application to the practical affairs of life. This left the lower classes entirely to themselves. It is only within recent times that there has been any softening of the hard lines between caste and caste in Japan. The relations of each were rigidly determined. Within these relations much kindly feeling and much devoted service will be found between the humble man and his master. But any idea of providing for the spiritual or mental welfare of the former was never the subject even of a dream. He was very well in his exact place, and any shifting of his qualities might disturb the exactness of his position.

Now Buddhism has a very excellent but very dangerous precept.* It can be summed up—"to each according to his capacity," and avoid filling him so full that he will run over. In inculcating religion this capacity of mind is to be taken into account and the presentation is made to it in its lower forms under some readily understood symbolism. But in ignorant or unscrupulous hands this can be a terrible weapon. And granting the desirability—or the principle of the desirability—of the *status quo*, the possibility of developing the mass of the Japanese people by the efforts of the priesthood were small indeed. They fell mainly into the hands of the lower priests, and judging from popular representation the materialism of these was of the grossest. At best these men had "other fish to fry." They had wide duties in connection with all the offices of the temple; they had public duties to perform for they kept the local archives; and they had their duties as parish priests. And they gave the residue of their time to this latter. Material representation was the easiest and quickest means of maintaining control over the rough minds of their peasantry; where indeed it did not react on themselves, for constant teaching of a thing leads to belief in it. Hence the grossest superstition in the masses. The greater this was, the greater the control; and hence all the many resorts to the priest for charms and spells found due encouragement. As it does to-day, for it is easy enough in Yokohama to buy, from a man who knows very well the imposture, a charm to catch a thief or for a woman to catch a lover. But it is hard to rise above one's vested interests, and priests are no exception to this rule. Certainly not this old Japanese priesthood who believed, on the narrowest lines of Dr. Pangloss' philosophy, that whatever is is good in this best of all possible worlds. Their "good" was the existing world and they

* Cf. Pope Gregory's letter to the English abbot Mellitus. See Bede's "Ecclesiastical History" Bohn's trans, p. 56.

strive to maintain it. Can we point the finger of scorn at them when we find prelates of a great church organization, men brought up under the influence of the "most enlightened" of western nations, rejoicing over the vivid faith of the masses in Lourdes and St. Anne de Beaupre and the liquefaction of the blood of San Gennaro?

It is not hard to see what reception a reformer would meet in such society. His history is familiar enough to us through hundreds of instances in our own West. But in the West political ambitions and political greed for the plunder afforded by the temporal possessions of the Church combined with him. In Old Japan all conspires against him. If the object is to raise the People, here the one object of every class, the People included, is to maintain the *status quo*. Government, Village, and Priest, are all interested in maintaining ignorance. There is not the slightest interest or pity for the plebs displayed anywhere; even among themselves. Their wretched condition is a part of Nature's operations, just as she moves sun and wind and rain and brings plenty or famine. Their permanent betterment, the raising of the standard, does not rise into a question of practical discussion. Abstract pity for the concomitants of a distressed condition—yes; but the relief of that condition was no more a field for reform than the landslides, and earthquakes, which were such a feature of their native land. And this was emphasized by Confucianism. Its study by the upper class never led them to see anything beyond what was in it—duty. To see coldly to the right of these lower people to material existence. If ignorance or misfortune led to disaster and misery so much the worse for the victims. They were to blame in so far as thereby their efficiency in fulfillment of "duty" was impaired. In fact in Bushidō we find Confucianism in all its formalism, except that loyalty to the chief is developed into a monstrosity; one element overbalancing all the others that are found in the far better balanced system of Confucius. Little aid therefore is to be transferred from one class to the other, and indeed little aid could be given except in the form of abstract principle. There was none of that rich illustration of existing example as afforded by the outside world. This was an unfamiliar world only known and exaggerated by hearsay stories. And we in the West have been credulous enough in our time with tales of men whose heads grew beneath their shoulders, of dog-faced nations, and of the court of Prester John. We have said that there was no science in Old Japan, no possibility of science in so far as science was sure to disturb the balance of existing conditions. And yet there has always existed man's need of explanation of his surrounding world. What he cannot explain he attributes to the supernatural. There is no chance in Old Japan to upset an explanation once so given and adopted. It becomes established with custom and grows with time. Hence in their ignorance the love of folklore and of the marvellous among the Japanese. Their fireside tales are the

only occupation of their idle moments, and they weave into and unconsciously give life and vitality to them by the numberless little observations which are part of their practical experience in life. Who can disbelieve a tale when so much of it is palpably true? Indeed the supernatural is so often the exaggeration or the misconception of the natural that it is not surprising to find natural occurrences later on often taking on the appearance of the supernatural and giving it further support. Sir Roger de Coverley was not at all convinced that Old Moll White was not responsible for the burning of his barn; and does not Sir Thomas Browne openly express his belief in witches? And so foxes, and badgers, and cats, and numerous other animals, all played their part in the life of the Japanese peasant. And thus he rose higher to the very personal and active agency of the local divinity, whose origin is hidden in the mists of time, but whose local persistency and very limited range it is to be suspected marks the bailiwick of the chief of ancient days, apotheosized by his descendants. He is more than a mere nature god. He is distinctly a clan or family god to his surrounding worshippers and villagers. Locally he is known as the *uji-no-kami*.

To the temple of this god the Japanese bore a peculiar relation. Every Japanese boy, a short time after his birth, is taken to some temple and placed under the protection of its god. He becomes the *ujiko* (the child of the *miya* or what represents the temple in Shintō) and the god becomes his protecting divinity. Opportunities of worship are numerous and widespread, whether to the luck-bringing Bentensama—the Japanese Minerva, Venus, or Juno, as one chooses to regard her—or to the gentle Jizosama the god who listens to the petitions of little children, palliates their woes, and rights their wrongs. But to his temple, as *ujiko*, the Japanese has a peculiar personal relation apart from ordinary worship; and this temple becomes in a sense the centre of his life. Japan in one way is still in the Middle Ages; those Middle Ages in which man's life was centred in the Church and through it found an outlet for his amusements in the Mysteries and Miracle Plays. The *matsuri* or temple festivals bear much the same relation to the Japanese. Sometimes they are simply Fairs. As much so and as varied, and one might add as lively, as any Bartholomew's Fair. At other times they are half Fair and half theatre, some ceremonial observance of almost dramatic character being attached to them. At other times they are the observance of some ceremony of periodical importance, and we have such scenes as at the Nikko Matsuri and the Gion Matsuri at Kyōto, comparable in some ways to the great processions of Holy Week in Europe. Of the same nature but less elaborate are the fire walking and sword climbing which take place at stated intervals in various parts of the country. If we except the wrestling and the theatre, which are of a secular character, the more formal or public amusements of the Japanese can be summed up in these *matsuri*. The temple therefore becomes a centre of social life and religion is woven into

the Japanese life. Perhaps this is the reason why he gets the reputation of being irreligious. The point seems to be overlooked of the intense personal and racial character of the Japanese gods. They are not the universal gods found among other nations. The Japanese therefore takes them very much as a matter of fact. He displays but little more concern about them than he, or we, do over the immediate movements of the family about him or us. They are very familiar to him. There is a sense of relationship. They are known to him in life so to speak. But let the occasion arise and it is quickly seen how close is his connection with them, as he turns naturally and fiercely to them as gods of the race and to be found shoulder to shoulder with him in repelling any invasion of the sacred soil of Japan; It is at such periods that the close and living connection of the *kami* and their descendents appears in a glow of such intensity as to shed a ray of romance over these old Japanese gods, akin to those Norse divinities hovering over the field of battle and ready to assist in it and to carry the souls of the slaughtered heroes to Walhalla. And yet there is an immense amount of common sense displayed. As they are thus living to him so the Japanese translates their actions and their feelings into himself. They are necessarily very anthropomorphic. Sometimes inconveniently so. As perhaps is felt in a very personal sense by some farmer or peasant who has a grandson to support, fruit of the god's loins. For these gods were much given to wandering on the hillside, and any unsuspecting maiden was fair game to them and likely to fall a victim to them. In these days such tales would be looked on with a very bilious eye, but the belief as holding good in the past is firmly grounded and gives a reality to Japanese folklore that has almost died out in the West. The stories of Momotaro and Kintaro in the mind of the peasant fade into the real tales of the olden time, *mukashi ō mukashi ne* as the little Japanese mother croons to her child, until it is almost impossible to distinguish them. At times this intense superstition will give rise to ecstatic outbreaks; and in the supporters of the god's ear, carrying it in procession, shouting and singing, there is an abandon and gesticulation and rolling of the eyes, that we see paralleled in a Maori *haka* or war dance. There is a necessity for some social outlet, and much has always been made of these temple *matsuri*. As official and authoritative there is not even the slightest spice of protest in them against anything or anybody, not the slightest assertion of individuality even of any minor unit in a larger community. We miss this feeling in Japan, for we rather like that feeling of exclusiveness, instanced perhaps by the harmless if somewhat ridiculous pass words and hand clasps and secrecy maintained in our Fraternities. But the temple had its good points. It preached duty to parents and to country as part of a reciprocal system, even if it preached that the ideal of that system was found in the existing condition. The idealization also of a person dead has its real value in the influence on the character of the living. *De mortuis nil nisi*

bonum. We have to-day this tendency to whitewash some unmitigated scoundrel. Nobody but a cleric or an enemy in his heart ever damned any body—and these two act on principle. But the more evil that is thrown overboard the better, and if we preserve in memory only the good traits of a man we are unconsciously forming a general ideal to which in time it will be easier for men to conform. The preservation of evil also at least leads to its remembrance, and in its association with good qualities may lead to imitation. As in the absurd apotheosis of weak and wicked kings or in the gilding of the vulgar criminalities of thieves in the lives of “flash” highwaymen. It is easy of course to be generous with another person’s property, and for that reason perhaps a mean thief is the meanest of mankind.

In total ignorance and disregard of the physical limitations which science even in its cruder days has taught the West marks the boundaries of man’s real knowledge, the East has pushed its metaphysic of religion within the bounds of dreamy abstraction, forgetting or never realizing that the abstract has no foundation except in the concrete, or mistaking for inspiration and introspection the disordinate action of the physical frame brought about as readily by the intemperance of abstinence as by the intemperance of gluttony; the result being that belly philosophy so tersely described by Gibbon. Every word, as Mr. Spencer says, has its real meaning, but these philosophers must ignore the intrinsic and often extrinsic sense of words. To lose oneself however, in this subtle play of words, to refine on meanings until all original meaning (and vigour) is lost, and then to dispute even over the very special sense in which these dreamers use their terms, at least fills the human mind and even gives a sense of superiority in the general unintelligibility. Such logomachy does not touch the general practice of life, but it makes the weight of the race conservatism as found in eastern Asia less oppressive. Thus in the speculative theology of the Brahman the mind has the fullest range that perhaps it has ever reached anywhere, whereas in the exoteric practice of religion the brutal force of caste finds full expression. This latter is supposed to have been originally adopted by the conquering race to still further enforce its supremacy over the conquered. Esoteric Brahmanism is not supposed to represent the original religious ideas of the invading peoples in India. Indeed we know that these earlier superstitions are represented by the grossly sensual side of the Indian cult. Esoteric Brahmanism was the later development, as on any theory of evolution it had to be. And so in China. Its moral philosophy is purely materialistic. It confines itself to the five relations—sovereign and subject, husband and wife, parents and children, elder and younger brother, teacher and disciple or friend. Around these points it weaves its dogmas. This is “The Way” of eastern philosophy summed up tersely in filial duty. It has at least the merit of detecting the real relation existing between subject and object, although it abandoned all attempt to obtain a reasonable definition of the limits of either.

Buddhism made its way by accepting the theories of both Brahminism and Confucianism. Shintō is nothing but a crude superstition which before historical times had passed beyond its grosser forms. Its cosmogyny and cosmography are of the vaguest; its theogyny has not reached beyond the period of folklore; and its only real value is in the ceremonial it has developed and hence its existence as a political force. It has developed the priest-king. It is more therefore than a part of the Government. It is the Government itself. Needless to say there is no trace of mind stirring here. Priest and king are co-workers for stagnation.

§ 6.

With the mind thus turned in on itself let us turn for a moment to the relations to art and to literature, those two means of expression of society, as an Italian writer, Mr. Nencioni, has tersely expressed it.* The limits here are strictly marked, the necessary result being a scholasticism more or less marked according to the nature of the subject. The hampering effect of restraint is well illustrated by a classic example. In the political competition between its many units the Greek mind was left practically as free as it is to-day amongst ourselves. The Greek tyrant frankly maintained himself by force of arms and suppression of all hostile expression within his reach; but his reach was small and he was fair game for the abusive tongue of every philosopher outside of his influence. This sometimes worked disastrously for the philosopher; although like the prophet in Israel, he had a popular influence behind him everywhere that made him dreaded by the evildoer. There was as yet in the ancient Greek world enough heterogeneity to make the Macedonian kingdom of Philip seem but an exaggeration of the control exercised in previous times by other Greek States. And a wise tyrant saw the value in this free expression of opinion in the adversary in anticipating discontent in the masses to which the real appeal lay. Hence Aristotle worked under one of the greatest of tyrants and under the freest of conditions. And how great a range could be given to such a great mind is seen in his anticipation of land to the west of Europe, to be reached by circumnavigating a *round* globe. This question of restraint and non-restraint has had at this point a curious influence on Euro-

* Referring to the Renaissance—"La forza trionfante, l'indifferenza nella scelta dei mezzi pur di riuscire, la bellezza sensuale e voluttuosa, il godimento raffinato e egoistico, divennero un nuovo Vangelo—tanto che la letteratura e l'arte, queste due confessioni della Società, ne furono finalmente viziate, infette nell'intimo, "organismo, e monstruosamente pervertite." And all ran to form.

pean history. The destruction of the Greek philosophical school and the substitution of the narrow dogmatism of Christian theology led direct to scholasticism in which thought was limited to certain limits and certain forms within those limits. Hence we find scholasticism wavering between a round earth as laid down by astronomy and a flat earth as laid down by the ancient geography, and timid as to carrying either to the test on theological grounds as the peoples necessarily so isolated from the preaching of the true word must be necessarily damned to all eternity without a hearing.* Thus the discovery of America was postponed for at least a thousand years. The actual problem of damnation seems to have been quickly settled in the Catholic brain, for of course proof of the existence of such people necessarily carried with it proof of their damnation, and thereby necessarily proved them to be fair game for Europeans. No syllogism could have been more logically exact, and Calvin in practice was anticipated by the Spaniards by at least a generation. And the reason of all this was the paralysis of science. Aristotle could predict the use of the Inductive Logic. But Scholasticism stepped in with preconception. The Deductive Logic in which the terms based on the theological metaphysics of the day naturally were in agreement was left in supreme control. It is only since the days of Leonardo da Vinci and Lord Bacon and the application of the Inductive Logic to Science that philosophy has been freed from its bonds; and deduction forced to work on a far broader basis with constant reference to inductive processes. The old straining after an explanation within certain limits was abandoned and facts were left to take care of themselves. And it was the grouping of facts by a master hand that has led to the greatest application of generalization as a principle of human knowledge—evolution. Professor Baldwin couples the two names of Aristotle and Darwin as the two intellects of mightiest range in the history of philosophy.

The fact that there was no relief visible or available in Japan, the fact that the bonds were self imposed, are something of a puzzle. We can only attribute it to a race conservatism shown throughout in the history of the people, or to lack of originality inherent in the race. Turning to the speculative side of the human mind, we might remark that religion though necessarily dogmatic carries with it, often in spite of itself, an ethical element. But in this Old Japan it lacked material. The practice of life was limited in expression and strictly defined. Religious controversy therefore drifted to verbal mysticism. And as it it lacked connection with the practical life there were no burnings and torturings in the name of religion. These pastimes were avowedly conducted on political grounds. Heresy in the Church, and hypocrisy in handing its criminals over to the secular arm were unknown. As to religion, its kingdom was

* See Professor Fiske's "Discovery of America" Vol. I. pp. 309, 368.

not of this world in the eyes of the authorities. We can understand then the attraction of the Buddhist philosophy to such a people. Think they must, and its wide range of abstract philosophy gave thought a field for exercise. In the same sense as literary and learned men in Europe in the Middle Ages found relief in thrashing over the old straw of scholastic debates, wherein it became a matter of grave speculation as to how many angels could stand on the point of a needle.

Turning to those outlets of the mind that deal with the non-speculative, we are here in contact with the material, that stuff by which the *praxis* of life is determined. Necessarily therefore its limits are still more rigidly defined to avoid encroachment on the lines laid down by custom, and by which the relations of men are to be governed. General principles are here soon determined for art and literature. There is no range for width. The small therefore attracts and the mind turns to detail. Broad ideas would soon lead to forbidden ground. Hence the actual experience of natural phenomena, the intense attraction of Nature in detail, absorbs the energies. And vast is its field. But the training of the Japanese had made him essentially deductive in all his ways of thinking. His bias has led him to seek an explanation on settled lines. To-day this habit of thought seems almost incomprehensible, but for long it reigned in Europe. Quantitative methods and the revival of the Inductive method by Leonárdo da Vinci* and later by Bacon were the only things that freed European thought from scholasticism, from the authority of the schools. A terrible word is "authority." We have had so little of it in recent times that we have forgotten its real meaning, and men are even heard vaunting its advantages; the value of a "strong" Government. It has played a terrible part in Old Japan. With the minute knowledge displayed in so many branches of natural science one would think that the Japanese would have stumbled on the inductive method. But to do so it was necessary to think. And this was strictly forbidden for other reasons connected with government of the body politic. It is no easy matter to upset a supposed law of Nature that has received the sanction of our learned scientific bodies. And very properly should it be so. But the open freedom of debate exists. The Japanese, however, was hampered by his habits of thought. A fact was to be brought under a rule, facts were not to be grouped together, to find a rule. When the fact did not exactly fit into the rule there was more or less ingenious explanation—a sort of dialectical gymnastic—to get it finally into such shape that it could slip in somehow. And this was possible where the balance—quantitative reasoning—was not in use. Exactness of definition showed the necessity of a broad basis, and soon began to show the intimate connection between the sciences. This

* *Pensieri Sulla Scienza*. No's.—44, 47, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 68, 69.

could not have gone very far in Old Japan. We reason necessarily by analogy, and although it rises from the coarser and inexact form to the higher logical formulae this groundwork of like and unlike is never lost sight of—the ultimate datum of the Synthetic Philosophy. But broad generalization must touch on the material. Men deal with things, and we cannot deal with things without dealing with men. Here the Japanese was stopped forcibly, at a recognized barrier. His men were ruled by the five relations, and his things also must be ruled by the five relations. There was danger even in the syllogism—"all men are mortal; A,B,C, are men; therefore A,B,C, are mortal." Such interpretation could never find place in the dogma of Old Japan. Hence the limitation of his horizon. Hence the absence of any true science.

But attention must be riveted somewhere. And as it turned to detail it found expression in putting that detail into mechanical form. And this wonderful manual skill gained power with the succeeding generations. As said, the very artisans were artists. There was but small range for the skilled workman, the man who turns out with exactness and despatch a large product. Commerce or construction had but little opportunity in our sense of the word. Even in later times old customs hung on, and Arai Hakuseki speaks of his mother as one who believed that women should not only be able to make the garments but to weave the cloth out of which the household was to be clad. And to any man, unless he was of the upper class, there was but little object in wealth. The caste system established his scale of living, and beyond a certain limit made him simply a mark for taxation at best or punishment at worst. What was essential was a connection. To obtain a protector, a powerful patron in this feudalistic society, was of the highest importance. Hence in production time was no object, and with this exquisite manual skill we have perfection of workmanship. All minds were centred (and narrowed) on the object of their immediate attention. And as the sources of art were to be found in nature, so they were familiar to all. Even the peasant is an artist. There is no parallel to it in Europe outside of Italy and Greece. There also we find that same innate appreciation of art, perhaps due to the centuries of restraint the church and state threw over the people. The human mind must fill its void. Hence it turns to polish and to form, and in the former the Japanese have played a great part in the history of the world's art. And so in literature. Its philosophy we have referred to under religion. Its secular literature was of course limited in its expression. It was limited to description and to form, and both these were strictly governed by a convention long subjected to censorship. Its form, if limited, has received appreciative treatment from good judges. Ingenuity, beauty of expression, to a feeble degree imagination, are all freely granted to it. Fancy—that just and subtle distinction which Coleridge drew between the imagination of

Milton and the fancy of Cowper—is denied it. What it does lack is the individual. It does not enter on that dangerous field of human interests in which the passions and prejudices and ambitions of men have full sway. Its representatives here are of the peculiar warped communal type. We want nothing of blood and thunder heroes, spouting commonplaces as to the five relations. Shakespeare was an impossibility in Japan. That delicate psychology of the human soul would be incomprehensible to a Japanese. Lear would be immoral. The doubts of Hamlet would not be understood in a country where all introspection is conducted according to rule. The delicate fancy, the imagination, the blaze of passion, found in Romeo and Juliet to them would be nothing but mawkish individualism. The world of lovers even is fixed by convention. Rosalind, Portia, Beatrice, Imogen, would be nothing but forward jades who in trying to bend circumstances to their will do not know their place as women created only for child bearing (of males). Perdita might possibly find some favour, on the ground of the "five relations," but the plot of "A Winter's Tale" certainly would not. There is no greater distinction to be made than between Shakespeare's dignified appeal to rebellious youth, the appeal to the duty of the heart, and the appeal that only could be made to a breach of these five relations, the violation of the precept of the Sage. The difficulty lies in the fact that Japanese introspection is not individualistic. It turns on the family or on the commune as its pivot. In other words on an abstraction. Custom is taken more than seriously. It is taken religiously. An individual is not to reform it. There is only the community to harden it or to restore its prestige if violated. There is nothing ridiculous or anachronistic in custom. Hence no Cervantes is possible. In fact the basis of Japanese life is pure formalism, narrowing the range of everything which comes under its influence—and everything does so—and apotheosizing the minutiae of observance. Mens' minds are so occupied that there is a lack of the broad feeling of their humanity, men become wooden. They are mere pawns, ignorant of humanity. For a great literature we must fall back on the universal sweep of human passion, even if only to laugh at it. Hence Rabelais was an impossibility.

The effects of such suppression of the individual are far reaching. As our physical frame forces the knowledge of the *ego* upon us, so this artificial limitation of its forces on the field of action more clearly defines its limitations in a wider field. It throws into relief its insignificance as an entity. Hence we find among the Japanese a deep grounded pessimism. The individual is made to feel his uselessness in this depreciation, and this feeling extends to the uselessness of human effort, *shikata ga nai*. With this constant vista of the past, and with little or none of the future, the realization of the shortness of life is more than ever forced on him. His one chance as individual lies in post-humous fame; and a high place is given to heroism, and candidates are never wanting for the honour. There is a

real level, a socialistic evenness, in Japanese Society. For ages learning was mere book learning, and within the grasp of any patient mind. A distinction has grown up here in the modern world. The gap to-day between the scientist and the general public is far greater than it has ever been. Science is now based on exact or real knowledge, and has become more and more the field of the specialist worker. This real knowledge involves many fields, and to truly comprehend the results of modern science takes an exceptional brain. A general grasp of it is given to but very few—the giants of our world of modern knowledge. The field of pseudo-science, newspaper science or science stripped of its qualifying terms, accentuates the difference all the more, to the thinker. This spread of pseudo-science has its recognized dangers and its advantages. It makes men more patient under difficulties whose complications are better understood and therefore tolerated; but the patent possibilities of error and a mistaken course of conduct are also very great. This is all the greater in a community trained for ages on a single line of thought. Such communities are accustomed to the positive stand offered them by the ancient dogma, and the often negative position taken by modern science baffles them. It seems to offer an uncertainty for a certainty; for how can an uncertainty call in question anything when uncertain of its own groundwork? Hence there remain many prejudices in Japanese thinking. And the greatest of these is the prejudice against the individual and still found among the mass of the Japanese. They can appreciate the material progress of Europe, without seeing that at the root of it lies Europe's individualism and that their own history is stamped by the lack of it. No one seriously is going to attribute defect in originality to a defect in the Japanese mental material on the evidence as yet existing. It has never been given an opportunity to develop and only the future can show its possibilities. What can be said is that the development cannot be on the old lines. For ages originality was given no opportunity to develop in Europe, and Europe is much older in its civilization than Japan or even than China. No matter where we look, however, we find the Japanese field hedged in by this old affection for formulae. It has governed them in the past, and haunts them in the present, and threatens the future. In this field of art and literature, once more the goal is stagnation, only less pronounced in so far as the possibilities of combination are greater. Like the "Old Man of the Sea," this nightmare of the Past hampers and throttles the existing spirit of progress.*

* Incidentally we might ask, why in recent times the Japanese have not taken the step of inserting the letter *l* in their kana syllabary, a course which would much simplify the use of necessary foreign words and names, and perhaps in the end enrich their own language with a new sound element.

§ 7.

To every people there is a goal toward which they are aiming, and the nature of that goal and their progress toward it is very much dependent on what lumber they have picked up on the way and their success in getting rid of any superfluity of their burden. The Age of Europe's idealism has passed. The close of the Middle Ages was followed by that glorious adolescence of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries in which like the child, unconscious of sin and crime, it grasped at everything within its reach, and with no thought but the desire and the will to possess. This was the spirit which impelled those glorious sea-rangers, whether Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, English, or Dutch. It was what made possible a Sir John Hawkins, one of the world's greatest sea captains, explorers, naval heroes,—and slave traders. Such an age of course could not last, and as the responsible element of the machinery of government stepped into control of these new lands in Eldorado the romance all died into the sordid struggle of Europe itself for power and to maintain the balance of power. Its last glimmer of light was with the great French captains in the New World, and its sun set on the Plains of Abraham. This non-moral period in the world's history has gone forever. Whether for greed or for jealousy every act of nations is now closely questioned. The group of active observers checks all spontaneity. The explorer in Africa may find his every action brought before a commission of gentlemen sitting under all the comforts of electric fans and the *habeas corpus* and in no danger of being perforated by a poisonous arrow from the bush. And hence looking at matters from a very different point of view. To-day Cortes and Pizarro would find themselves lodged in the police court, without bail, to plead to the scragging of a few niggers, or to explain why they had administered the "water cure" to some recalcitrant chief. Not that we are any better than the men of these olden days. We are simply hypocrites. Cortes and Pizarro were punished for robbing the Crown; and the Crown appropriated their plunder much on the principle that swine are used to hunt out truffles. To-day the explorer is punished if he robs and maltreats the native, but the lands of the nigger and the labour of the nigger is appropriated just the same by the modern Government. To be sure he is given all the blessings of civilized government. Native customs must not be disturbed and he is left under the tyranny of his old chiefs, who are only restricted in the sense of not making things unpleasant to the sight and sense of the resident European. He has the added benefit of taxation which makes his country safe and accessible—to the white man. This is better collected through the medium of old native customs and the chiefs. And he has the inestimable privilege of seeing the white settler gradually occupy all his best land

and restrict the use of the remainder.* There is no practical or theoretical objection to any of this procedure. These inferior races must go; but why not call a spade a spade, instead of snuffling through our noses about the "blessings of a civilization" which is meat and drink to the white man but is deadly poison to even the best of natives—such as the New Zealand Maori? And so the missionaries in Samoa have sought to bring the native nearer to heaven, and have succeeded in sending a good many of him hitherward, clothing him in heavenly raiment by first clothing him in earthly raiment. If it were not for national jealousy this sentimentalism would never be heard of. As it is we adopt as convenient the phraseology of the little band of real humanitarians and claim the credit of it. However that projection of our own feelings into our conception of the personality of another—the relation between the ego and the alter-ego—has perhaps thereby taken a wider range as a matter of discussion, no matter how much we may question its sincerity. And perhaps we give it greater credit as greater knowledge brings greater pessimism. There is no longer the spontaneity in grasping indiscriminately. These prizes bring grave responsibilities with them and sometimes turn out *incubi*. Hence we confine ourselves more and more to the prosaic limits within which we can safely apply present knowledge. The commercial spirit of modern Europe is not the adventurous spirit of the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Enterprise to-day is measured by the yard-stick. The only resemblance lies in the fact that contracts are still backed by cannon, and the minor (the *savage*) is held as responsible, or more so, as one who has reached the full age of political and mental discretion. The one advantage is the display it gives of our national characteristics as enabling us to judge the weaknesses of each other. We have the Frenchman, nervous, careful, frugal, timidly conservative, restrained by his military habits of obedience, turning to the community in all his difficulties, constructing a little Paris wherever he plants himself, but only a temporary Paris for his aim is to restore himself as soon as possible to the original. We have the German, callous, greedy, brusque, brutal, satisfied that every other race is inferior to his own, and these natives hence to be ruled by blows and kicks, with no respect for anyone not armed with a gun, or any rights not protected by a gun, and hence building up an admirably ordered and admirably governed little military community in which the morals of a military government prevail; and in which whoever he is, he is officer over the native community. And little more need be said as to its nature, except as to the commercial dry rot inherent in these military communities. We have the American, nervous, calculating, selfish, self-reliant, constructing for profit and moving to new fields as soon as this profit is gathered. In foreign lands he is as unstable as

* Rocks, rattlesnakes, and a Reservation for the Red Man, are so to speak concomitant conditions in the western United States. And elsewhere.

quicksilver, for all said and done he is a home dweller. His eyes are always turned to the great Republic which is his goal as soon as he has made his "pile." It is only the indefiniteness of the term "pile" which sometimes trips him up and buries him for good and all in a foreign land. All three, French, German, and American, are poor colonists. The Britisher alone rectifies most of these faults, which he also liberally possesses, by being a home builder. He goes to a place and stays there. He takes a personal pride in the possession of his own work, freezes out any other element, and makes it enough of a Little Britain to be a good substitute for the original.

It is into this calculating and selfish world that Japan has stepped. Not into a healthy period of ebullition. The question is, what element will she furnish? The Japanese are not handicapped in any way, except in so far as they have been anticipated in land grabbing. There are no vacant lots left to take up without fighting. But then it is well understood that the present arrangement is a mere pre-emption on the part of nations, not a freehold title. The strongest in the end will get the choice bits. As for the question of adaptation there is no difficulty for it is a recognized quality of the race. That they have stood still while the world contest has been going on means nothing. All the qualities of mind of a highly civilized State have been in constant exercise. It is only the assimilation of the new material that is needed, and this of course requires the penetration of the spirit that has inspired its creation. Here there is possibility of positive defect for the new may clash with the old, and this bias of distrust toward new principles does display itself in Japanese adaptation, and perhaps accounts for the clumsiness of much of it. The effort is made to conserve past methods or to put the spirit of past methods into the new, as we see in the strained attempts to reconcile the theory of an ancient despotism of the seventh century with the highly developed and complex modern State, this latter being the result of centuries of grave discussion and experiment. It is hard to keep one's face as we read the attempted apotheosis of "Shōtoku Taishi"—the earliest existing records postdate his death by two generations—or to see ascribed to the Chinazation of 604 and 645 A.D. the Bismarckation of 1889. This is very patriotic to be sure; but to come nearer to the truth, it can be suspected that the materials of New Japan are rather to be found in the archives of Prussia, Oldenburg, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, and other petty German principalities. This attempt, however, at the rejuvenation of an old Japanese fossil is not without commendatory features in as much as an old idea rarely gets original credit from a new discovery. The influence of the old on society is not acknowledged and it gives credit to the pilferer. Much European knowledge is thus becoming absorbed in Japan and ingeniously fathered on native sources, but it does seem too bad to deprive these little German States of their due credit. The great German Federation could have stood the loss with equanimity, but then

Japan did not turn to the German federal organization. It turned to the units of which it consists. It deliberately chose the type of a petty principality as suitable for modern Japan. However the movement to naturalize all adapted principles is undoubtedly partly sincere and partly to perpetuate present conditions. For the dominant element in the old type was subordination, and this it is sought to uphold at the present day. For this reason the restraint of individualism found in the old system is encouraged. The dangers of individualism found in western life are strenuously preached from every official pulpit. The object is to teach what to think. And there is no more valuable method than maintaining the family unit. Japanese progress depends on the driving a wedge into this clogging and restraining element of the body politic. Japanese law deliberately goes out of its way to maintain it and to perpetuate it. And here the ruling class recognize their strength, for naturally they are supported by the unthinking masses. A few brilliant men break away and we can see their great value in their sharp distinction of outline of character, as distinguished from the great dull mass beneath them made up of drilled and drill-masters. Everywhere is raised a pean of praise to "drill." Parrot-like is repeated the phrase of the leader—well satisfied with his position. Everywhere there is a depreciation of the individual. Minds are filled with "patriotism" as expounded by and necessitating "drill"—and with communism. The community is never given time to think! Its leaders have taken that comfortable task to themselves. All efforts are to be in the direction of filling the appointed place in the community; with the fatal disregard to the inexorable psychological law on which all natural progress depends—the development of the individual unit.

This spirit of communism, of course turns to rules and regulations; whereas it is principles not rules that should govern. The abstraction, the community, can lay down a scheme of life and enforce it; but it cannot understand Nature. It is only enlightened self interest that can push inquiry with small reference to personal results. The individual can take risks the community cannot take. The community cannot even risk its prestige! The necessity therefore of this training of the individual as the progressive factor of the race is becoming more and more evident as we understand better the operation and development of mind. Darwin tells us that it was the study of the law of Malthus that led him to his own great conception of the explanation of the evolutionary process—natural selection through survival of the fittest. But both Malthus and Darwin were rendered possible by the fact that they had all the vast field of modern science at their command, and that they had no preconceptions within which that vast field must be arranged. And herein lies the distinction between East and West in the Past and Present: Darwin was not possible without this elasticity, this possibility of development and modification of general principles as extended to wider and wider fields. But such extension can only be made

through the individual, for Nature is not lavish in giving these exceptional intellects, and to successfully bring them to maturity a ground must be prepared propitious to their growth; a ground only prepared at some cost and sacrifice. Self interest leads to an effort throughout the community that cannot be evoked by any dead level of socialism, which on the contrary goes out of its way to crush any tendency of the individual to assert itself. But it is only through a process of natural selection, where individual effort has been spurred on by constant and severe competition for the high prizes of life, that the possible conditions of the genius can be realized. Darwin was as much a matter of the "natural selection" of his time as was Aristotle, nearly two thousand years before, of *his* time. The Japanese had constantly the same problem under his eyes, but the solution never did and never could occur to him. To Darwin it was the general principle that was at issue. To the Japanese that general principle had already been applied and was no longer a question for discussion. To the Japanese any further development was mechanical. It lay in the *soroban*, so to speak. And so to-day he has a tendency to regard principles as established, and to think that it is the *soroban* that is behind European materialism. The results of the world's labour, its acquisitions in the wide interval from Aristotle to Darwin, are given to the Japanese. Its principles are wide open to his intelligent mind, and he has only to apply these principles. But the material alone will not answer his purposes. That would indeed be putting "new wine into old bottles."

§ 8.

There only remains to consider the means chosen to effect national progress. As with men so with nations, and the old rule-of-thumb methods of the past must give way before more exactly determined processes. But this by no means eliminates the importance of the individual. Leadership to-day requires a far wider mental grasp than it ever did. Perhaps that is a reason why we are endowed with so many honourable mediocrities, for the inherent tendency of laziness in man leads him to mistake the rule of order for the rule of red tape. However, when circumstances do bring the genius again to the front he will find forces at his command that no other has ever had the opportunity to wield. And perhaps it is just as well we are so occupied with our commercialism that this vast application of modern science will gradually wear a rut and gain a definite position in men's minds from which it will be difficult to dislodge it. For a new weapon whose use is as yet ill-defined may be put to terrible use by some experimenter. However, there is one thing that science teaches us to-day, and that is the importance of the individual, that he is the basis of all pro-

gress in Nature; and history teaches us the same thing. It is the secret of our hero worship, and it makes the history of a democracy as well as of a monarchy only the history of its leading men. And indeed this intimate connection between a people and its leaders seems the only natural one. Judging by history the only possible government lies in despotism or democracy. Bureaucracy has invariably gone down before them. It was the degeneracy of the ancient world into bureaucracy that sealed its fate; whether in Egypt, in Assyria, or in Rome. And in modern times we have before our eyes the fate of the old French monarchy, and the approaching fate of the comparatively short lived Russian bureaucracy. As long as the individual maintains his supremacy, whether at the head of the nation or in the national council, a nation maintains virility. There is paralysis as soon as affairs are entrusted to a caste, whose selfish object must be to specialize and to surround every movement so completely with formulæ that they alone are competent to unravel the knot. If red tape can be fastened on a nation—and bureaucracy thrives on red tape, it is its very life—then nothing can be done without the intervention of an official class. And an official class tends to perpetuate itself. Democracy avoids this, at some cost to be sure, by the constant contact of the people with the machinery of their business; and woe to the democracy that grumbles over this labour and becomes more and more willing to leave the initiative to official action. On the whole, however, history shows that it is less likely than despotism to sink into bureaucracy; for in its turn despotism almost of necessity must create a bureaucracy. The force of the individual is rarely continued into the next generation. A well balanced democracy, however, has the whole people from which to select. Bureaucracy is differently situated. It calls in to-day the aid of science, and science is greatly fostered under bureaucratic Governments. But there is little real sympathy between them. Only in so far as science becomes pessimistic does it affiliate with bureaucracy. The natural limitations and stupidity of by far the great mass of mankind are of course brought into stronger light by investigation; and at times it seems as if the task of raising them was beyond accomplishment; as if the task of developing to a high point of efficiency a chosen class was the easier and better method. But it is not difficult to see that the very limitation of the material limits the possibilities of improvement, and in permanently widening the gap between one class and the community further limits the possibility of gaining new material. Hence the only salvation is the progress of the race as a whole; and perhaps in the appreciation of this is found the radical tendencies of science. Democracy is rooted at the very base of its teachings.

The necessary limitations of bureaucracy of course in turn react in the limitation of science. "Bureaucracy is based on the automatic running of a machine. The individual must not interfere with it. A change in system may unbalance the whole

machine. But this limitation is fatal to science. And the force of this is shown in strongly bureaucratic countries in driving so many men of science into the ranks of advanced radicalism—of nihilism, of anarchy, and even of socialism; for in this latter, having experienced the heavy tyranny of the few in a caste, it seems to them that the distribution of the tyranny of the many might weigh less heavily. There is inevitably ahead a struggle between science and bureaucracy. The struggle of science is against the renewed scholasticism seen to-day in Government control over universities. For bureaucracy thoroughly realizes the importance of controlling the teaching machinery of the State. It is as important to sow ideas as it is to sow wheat. We are or should be free from this in our Anglo-Saxon world; but we are not. In exchange we put on other fetters, theological fetters instead of political fetters. There is an absurdity, illustrating the limited outlook of the average man, in these bequests to colleges for the teaching of ideas necessarily limited in their vitality. Almost as much so as the man who fondly hopes thereby to perpetuate them. The idea of universities based on the dogma of some creed carries with it a contradiction of terms; but only by the exercise of some little casuistry have many of our American universities and colleges carried their scope far beyond, or even reversed, the narrow intentions of their founders. Hence, where we do not find the positive teaching of an anachronism to the exclusion of at least a fair presentation of the other side, we have a distinct tint given to all instruction. And indeed oftentimes it is a delicate question how to avoid the truth. The doctrine of evolution with all its implications is handled very gingerly in our colleges on religious foundations, and the professor in his chair and the professor in print are often two very different men. Indeed to get the privilege of teaching—and to many it is a real “call” to teach—a man must have more or less of a hinge in his back. And as in Europe they ask whether a man is politically correct; so in America the question is as to whether he is theologically correct. And, if the former question very seriously limits present advance in many directions, the latter gives a distortion that almost necessarily involves the teaching of error; especially in such fields as history, anthropology, and archæology. And this question is the more important now-a-days, inasmuch as science must be carried out on such a large scale and requires such an expensive plant that the individual must obtain public assistance to do effective work. If the range from which data must be gathered is so great that only a Government Bureau can grapple with it, and a Government University is necessary to carry out work efficiently in laboratories and in subsidiary institutions, it is all the more necessary to absolutely free the teaching of such an institution from all Government connection; to leave its government in its own hands and to absolutely exclude Government from all voice in its affairs, except the privilege of inspecting and paying the bills.

Science should be as independent as the Judiciary. What is wanted is the truth; and the open criticism of scientific methods can apply the correction to error. But what is realized to-day is the importance of the teacher's place. After all the future of society depends on him. Bureaucracy thoroughly realizes this, and wherever it is in control keeps careful guard over the utterances of the teacher. Where positive methods are not practicable, the freezing out process of sectarianism is adopted. Thus we pass from prohibition to the persecution proposed by the socialistic State, in which the censorship of all thought expressed in hostility to the existing regime is absolute; a censorship which if carried to its legitimate conclusions would involve the destruction of the great mass of existing literature, and leave us the dreary treatises of a one-sided political economy or the still drearier speculations of the socialist novel.* Again we find the issue even of this new-old proposition to be science against scholasticism.

This question is well understood by the Japanese Bureaucracy. It is at the basis of much of the preaching of the Nation against the World as the vital issue; and the necessity of subordination in training to meet it, the benefits of uniformity and of all swinging together to get the maximum effect of the brute force of the nation. Of course to them the efficiency lies in the Government not in the individual, and they rely on the limitation—and perpetuation—of direction in the hands of a few, without seeing the necessary limitation of material within this class. It is the boast of the Japanese Bureaucracy that "at the present time, "appointment to a civil or military post or to any other public "function, is not regulated by consideration of family. This "must be regarded as one of the splendid results of the Restoration. In former times, men were classified according to birth, "and each office belonged to a particular house; and each public "employment was hereditary in a particular family. Consequently "men of inferior birth, however talented they may have been, "were absolutely excluded from high positions in public offices"—as they are to-day unless they form part of the fold of the Japanese Bureaucracy. Some exception might be taken here as to the very narrow view that Marquis Itō takes of "hereditary calling" in Old Japan. For the hereditary nature of the carpenter's or the gardener's task was equally pronounced, and they were not likely to encroach on any other occupation. However, as to the ruling class, nowhere in the world is there instanced better the power and unity of purpose of a small well-knit body of men banded together by not only a class but a clan feeling. The only opposition to them tied hand and foot like Gulliver and "doped" with the sweet bolus of the privilege to exist. Not even in Russia can there be found such tenacity and such virility of purpose to dominate. In Russia the chiefs of

* Always excepting one of the most delightful of books—Sir Thomas More's "Utopia."

bureaucracy must take account of their whole class. In Japan it is the clan against the class tied by an unchangeable Constitution; unchangeable inasmuch as motive to change does not exist for the nominal head of Government, and outside and apart from party contests he can far more safely leave the struggle to take place between the two interests, one of which is fatally handicapped. It is hardly necessary to say that this leads to great conservatism of method—except in control of the physical force of the nation, of the army and navy which has been found such a tower of strength to modern bureaucracy everywhere. Voices are constantly raised in complaint against the cut and dried methods. But what can they do when the machinery of action is lacking, and when a Bill impeaching the Government is met at the close of the reading by the dissolution of the National Assembly? The real question at issue is the Nation against Evolution. It is a fact that in introducing the half method of modern instruction as exemplified by the schools and universities, it is necessary to imply the other half. Ignorance, or even one-sidedness, is no longer possible to many minds. The importance of principle is being seen. A feature well illustrated by the influence of the French philosophy of the eighteenth century, the ultimate effect of which was never suspected until it broke into fire and flame in the French Revolution. This French philosophy is particularly abominated by the Japanese bureaucrats, who, when unable to suppress the fact of its historical existence, carefully teach the "error" of its methods as proved to the world at large; whereas, as a matter of fact, we are to-day living on it. The French philosophy of the Encyclopædists, of Voltaire, and of Rousseau, was not free from error. No human thought is free from error. But where it erred was in trusting too much to the goodness of humanity as based on an incorrect historical hypothesis as to primitive man. Its principles based on liberty, equality, and fraternity, are admitted to-day as sound to the core, and as the only guide for the future.

There can be no such question as the Nation *versus* Evolution. Such a contest would be fatal. The very least admissible is stagnation. The real ideal is to have every part develop harmoniously. And for that purpose present methods of formalism in Japan must go. In place of Government universities, the competition of free universities is needed; not High Schools. The separation ought to be sharp; and so marked as to make the expressions of a professor as individual carry no more special implication, apart from his professorial duties, than those of any other citizen. If the professor's chair closes a man's mouth and makes him an automaton to deliver himself on certain narrow lines, very few thinking men will be found willing to fill such positions. If the Public attaches a special weight to the professor's opinion it should be on the ground of his individual learning not on the badge of his professorship. And a frank abandonment is needed of the old communistic

principle; setting as far as possible the ideal lines which prevent encroachment of one man on another's rights, to give free scope to all resources. And then gather in the good results. Individualism is making some progress in Japan. Enough so as to alarm the bureaucracy and to lead to some recent steps to its suppression. Commerce to some extent is breaking into the family organization. The interests involved are so dependent on individual judgment, so much is involved in modern undertakings, as to make it advisable to let the individual stand and rise or fall by himself. There is the old communistic cry to squeeze thrift, which cry readily makes itself felt with the old spirit of Tokugawa days in its outward expression. One of the most extraordinary instances has been seen in a discussion over army conscription. This is conducted of course so as to train as large a body of men as possible and to have them available for military service. This is both the theory and practice. But some bright minds have turned to this scheme as a source of revenue for taxation! A surplus of any kind is rare to the large majority in Japan. And a far greater number of young men are available and pass the physical examination than are needed. These are our premises. The surplus are exempted by drawing lucky numbers in the conscription, or being in exempt classes. It is proposed to tax these youths roundly for their luck, on the ground that one man pays by his service and the other escapes because he is not wanted. It could be pointed out that with a taxation which reaches into every cranny of the national life the exempt youth does pay his share of the army support and training of his unlucky comrade. He has to support himself also, whereas the conscript is fed and clothed by the Government (or the taxpayer). If it is proposed frankly to lay a tax on every male as soon as he reaches a conscript age, why not say so, and allow many who could and would pay a competent substitute who in his turn would find the payment of the tax a very great hardship? "Oh!" the Japanese patriot cries, "we Japanese do not wish to escape service; we glory in serving our country." Most men do in other countries also. They make great sacrifices entirely apart from any conscription. But it hardly seems just to tax a man because he is not allowed to perform his service. These "patriotic" communists carry the brutal matter of revenue still further. One can almost detect the glee with which this proposition is advocated as a sure source of revenue from the maimed, the halt, and the blind, who are to be taxed because of their misfortune especially if they have any money this communistic Government can squeeze out of them.*

* "Then there are those who fail to pass the medical examination. They may be and generally are well able to engage in money making professions or to carry on some other business, but a weak physique procures for them release from conscription. Is it right that these should be entirely exempted from the service of the State"? Digest in "The Japan Mail" from the Japanese newspapers. These exemptions of course pay in many forms of taxation. The additional tax would be on their infirmity.

Defining the Problem and the Solution

The first step in the design process is to define the problem and the solution. This involves identifying the user's needs and the constraints of the design. The problem is defined by the user's requirements, which are often expressed in terms of functional goals. The solution is defined by the designer's understanding of the problem and the constraints. The designer must then develop a concept that addresses the user's needs and the constraints. This concept is then refined into a detailed design. The design process is iterative, and the designer must be prepared to revise the design as needed. The final design is then implemented and evaluated against the user's requirements.

V.

PEOPLE AND RELIGION.

"'Go to, go to,' cried Gripe-Men-All; 'when did you ever hear that for these three hundred years last past, anybody ever got out of this weal without leaving something of his behind him? No, no, got out of the trap if you can without losing leather, life, or at least some hair, and you will have done more than ever was done yet.'—Rabelais.—(Urquhart and Motteux. Trans.)

§ 1.

It is still a matter of legitimate debate in philosophy as to whether the fact of being born, of becoming a factor in and a witness of the wonderful panorama of life, is to be held to be a privilege or the reverse. It is even asserted as one of the saddest ironies of man's position that what he should be most willing to lose he most willingly clings to. This animal whose directive power is almost entirely centred in voluntary action of the brain, who is able to weigh the plus and minus factor resulting from his different actions, rarely applies this power to any such balancing of his different states. At the first shock he abdicates from this appeal to reason, depends on his reflexes and seeks refuge in the operation of that instinct which he shares with animals, self preservation—thereby showing how recent an acquirement this thinking faculty is to him. The large majority of men if asked to give a definition of pleasure and pain would probably give to both a very positive form. The large majority of men if questioned as to any neutral condition would at once admit the existence of such condition, which in their minds would probably be associated with that half sleepy somnolence occasioned by repletion, and popularly known as "stuffed"; something in fact short of an actual indigestion; that vague condition where sleep and uneasiness balance each other with the rapidity of a magnetic needle hovering around its pole, and leaving the mind in a similar state of uncertainty and unable to come to a conclusion. This is by no means unsatisfactory from one point of view. The conclusion could not be a satisfactory one. Pain and pleasure have no such contradictory relations. Only one of them can take the positive form, and it would be a bold man who would say it is the latter. If pleasure were a positive factor we would find man's life an effort towards a well recognized condition of being, whereas on the contrary it is a continual flux. It is the uneasiness, the pain aroused by desire, that drives us on under the lash of some stimulus. The removal of that uneasiness

or pain, effected by nervous discharge in our physical body, we call pleasure, and if too intense or prolonged such pleasure can pass into the most exquisite physical agony. So close together is the relief from ennui and pain that the very means of such relief is a "point" in time, always becoming and never being.

No matter what his condition, whether civilized or savage, man has always felt this instability, usually without understanding anything as to its reason. Hence he has sought a remedy more or less energetically, more or less effectually according to the light his understanding has thrown on the question. Seeking relief from pain his first recognition has been of the universal suffering and that its cause lies beyond his control. Finding no remedy in this world he has turned to a next world, his efforts ranging from propitiation to resignation according to his cruder or more refined ideal of the guiding force behind all phenomena. Here it is to be recognized that a river cannot rise higher than its source. In seeking relief from the oppression of the universe man must forge his weapons from the material around him and familiar to his hand. The African indulges in uncouth and obscene gesticulations, and in bloody sacrifices before the idol which he has erected to represent his god. These gesticulations and sacrifices are the result of the ethical ideal to which his limited understanding has been able to reach, the merest recognition of the unaccountable and uncontrollable. Esoteric Christianity or Buddhism on the contrary, recognizing the universality and necessity of suffering in this world, seek their ideal in a future world without suffering (or without feeling). They preach resignation. It is therefore from a pain that intimately touches the lives of all that man has evolved religion.

"Instead of considering the religious sanction as the leading motive to human progress, and that despite the lack of support from the 'rational sanction' so called, we should say that the religious is the outgrowth and constant index of the ethical sanction, that its social value is mainly on the side of its conservative influence, and that the ethical is the most important as well as the most 'rational' of all the springs of human action, whether public or private." Professor Baldwin, who lays stress throughout on the fact that man's mental development is largely a matter of his "social heredity" obtained through his social environment, thus sums up a position which can be widely accepted both by Theist and by Agnostic; the source of this "social heredity" being conveniently attributed by the one or the other to supernatural or to natural causes, according to the mental range and the inquisitiveness or inertia of the thinker. It is unfortunate that any form of religious discussion implies a controversial or at least an explanatory tone. This is largely due to the attitude always taken by the theologian who regards this as much a matter of professional treatment as the physician has in his sphere. It is said by the carping that the doctor of medicine buries his mistakes in the ground. The doctor of divinity should therefore feel complimented that men pay more

attention to their souls than their bodies and demand to know the rationale of his treatment. However, the priest of ancient days made much of his mysteries, only to be participated in by adepts; and so the priest of to-day claims the same privilege, the same monopoly of discussion, and regards any intrusion into his field with the same wrath as his ancient prototype. To-day, however, his power of punishing intrusion has been reduced to moral suasion over his flock. He can no longer torture and burn, he can only abuse and ostracize. This claim for professional treatment of theological matters might have aroused some sympathy if grounded on data and methods subject to the usual critical methods applied to all branches of philosophical knowledge. But when his methods and much of his data are found to be at variance with ascertained facts in the exact sciences and the data of these sciences are forced to bend to the dogma of theology, not the reverse, or even to be rejected altogether, the positive minds of men refuse him any such privilege of exclusive treatment, and take the ground that as he will not put his house in order himself they will do it for him. It is on such ground that science enters into the field of theology; not to reform dogma, for constructive religion is none of its business, but to point out the palpable divergence from the truth in which alone it has any interest. There is always one unfortunate feature in such discussion. The subject being largely historical the examples taken have to be historical. Religion can be seen to-day at all the various stages of development. We can pass from the crudest fetichism to the most scientific agnosticism. Even within the sphere of a single religion we can see almost as wide a range. We see the peasant worshipping a dressed up image, with the fervent conviction that within the doll lies the power to relieve him of his ills; and we can see the polished clerical agnostic interpreting the anthropomorphic god of the peasant as a universal *afflatus* little to be distinguished from the "universal force or energy" of the scientific agnostic. Indeed these last two usually meet before the "altar to the unknown God," for mental growth like any other growth fills the mould and then breaks it.

Religions can be traced down through their career. What study of comparative religion there was existing in the past followed this method. Interpreted in the light of modern scientific investigation of existing phases of religion this method has given valuable results. But these have only been obtained by a constant discounting of the records handed down. These records have been in the hands of priests whose sacred duty was not investigation but support of the cult. Wherever in the records of the past there have been passages obvious enough to attract attention as injurious to the prevailing cult, these have been mercilessly excised, or edited, or passages have even been inserted by the priestly copyist and commentator. This has largely been done in a spirit which we of to-day find it difficult

to understand. These old clerics know nothing of our modern idea of the truth. To them the cult was the truth and everything inconsistent with it was necessarily wrong. Hence its suppression or "correction" involved nothing wrong. Fortunately for us their ideas were in accordance with this standard. A triumphant religion has no interest in concealing the defects of the religion over which it triumphs. Rather does it exaggerate them; and its own defects are not a matter of suspicion or concern until the opposition, which in turn is concerned in holding up such defects, begins to gather strength. Hence we have worked into the religions of to-day all the crimes and cruelties committed in their past and in their battle for supremacy. This record illustrates the triumph of the cult; its deeds have been inspired by its god and represent his vengeance on the wicked and the unbelievers in whom it is necessary to strike terror. Moreover just as hostile religions have suffered from this revision by the triumphant cult, so within the cult itself the battle between various sects has given currency to the interpretation of some one prevailing sect, and there has been as little scruple to blacken the character of the defeated. These internal records are badly warped by partisanship. If this small regard for the truth had been confined to the field of theological controversy it would perhaps have been of but small moment, but religion is and always has been closely connected with politics. In ancient times they were practically one. The ethical element was originally very small with all peoples. This widened and extended as they approached the culmination of their civilization, but the first battle which any new creed had to fight was to secure its triumph in the political world. Religion therefore soon became—soon becomes—a question of political supremacy, and to maintain its ground must remain a political question. Such a position may seem unfamiliar to modern eyes where we think we have so nicely separated church and state. But our separation of church and state has been a victory of ethics over religion, not of politics over religion. These two latter always have stood side by side. They are natural allies and make use of each other. To ethics dogma is fatal. Ethics and Evolution is a perfectly natural battle cry, for our ideals must change with advancing knowledge mental and moral. Religion, however, claiming to get its principles at first hand from God is wedded to dogma. Dogma being inspired is necessarily unchangeable. A dogmatic ethics, however, is unthinkable. Religion and ethics are two widely separated factors of the world's life.

Disclaiming therefore any purpose to enter into any questions of theological dogma let us turn to these relations of Church and State as illustrated by the history of the world's religions. The two most ancient empires of western Asia present similar forms. The early traditional period in Egypt shows the country split up into a number of small divisions ruled over by a priest-king. When we pass into written records and the full light of history these petty kingdoms have been consolidated

under one great monarch. This monarch throughout the whole ancient period can be defined as a priest-king, himself of divine descent. The hierarchy is fully developed through all its ranks and nominally the ecclesiastical and secular services are separated; but as a matter of fact the Egyptian Pharaoh never loses his connection with the hierarchy. He is always its divine head, conducts the sacrifice in person, and the priestly caste rule the country through him. An identical condition is found in the Sumerian-Accadian kingdom. Here too the monarchy is preceded by a number of priest-kings ruling simultaneously over the Delta. Father "Abram" or "Orcham" is supposed by some to have been one of these old traditional Accadian kings. By the time of Sargon the Old, however, (3800 B.C.) the country has been consolidated under a government which never changes its character through all its changes of dynasties and ruling nations. Down to the Greek conquest we have the priest-king of divine descent, making the sacrifices to the gods in person. He too has a great hierarchy behind him on whom falls the real responsibility of maintaining the national worship, for the monarch's time is mainly occupied in secular affairs. But he never loses this priestly character. Nabonidus, the last of the Babylonian rulers (600 B.C.) was as much priest-king as Sargon the Old. Two other nations of the West interest us. The Greeks have represented so to speak the essence of the Aryan mind. In them it has shown its highest and most catholic characteristics. Inheriting from their savage condition a polytheism of the grossest character their political condition, due to the nature of their country, was always heterogeneous. They had priest-kings, but never potentates. This splitting up of the country into a number of small principalities in which there was feeling of kinship or race led to a feeling of kinship of gods; but it is only in time that one of these establishes himself as the head of a rather disorderly family circle, not unlike their worshippers on the Earth. The very local nature of his divinity would be early impressed on the Greek, at the same time that his nimble mind grasped those great universal ideas which were floating behind the gross polytheism of Egypt and Assyria. Unlike the Egyptian and Assyrian he could and did keep the two elements, esoteric and exoteric, widely apart, and he early developed apart from his polytheism a true philosophy of the universe. This unity of the Greek thought is displayed throughout their civilization, and as far as it can be materialized their true god could be said to be Beauty—as displayed through the whole universe and typified by man. It is this essential unity of thought that makes the ancient Greek mind so sympathetic to us, and brings them in mental contact with another great people from whom also we inherit our present system of thought.

That polytheism was as gross among the early Hebrews as among any of their neighbours is patent all through the Old Testament. Vengeful, unjust, savage, these gods show the greatest care for the most unjust of men provided they are

propitiated with sacrifice. They condone the greatest crimes provided these men worship them. And they require from them blood and at times human sacrifice. But this Hebrew people were essentially monotheistic. It has been pointed out by Renan that the *elohim*, those gods of wind and flame, so numerous as to be as the sands of the sea, were never given individual names.* Separate entities, they were only vaguely anthropomorphic. There was an element of rough justice at the bottom of their partiality and their punishment fell on the wicked man. This moral element at the base of the patriarchal worship of the *Elohim* only retired from view before the adoption at Sinai of the bloody and unjust national deity *Jahweh*, to reappear triumphant in the grand moral creed of a universal just God of the universe as preached by the prophets. "I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he goats. Bring no more vain oblations; incense is an abomination unto me. Your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth," says the God of Isaiah so different from the God of the priestly legislator who stained the floor of the temple with useless blood. The prophets developed their pure monotheism from the elevation of *Jahweh* to the moral sphere of the *Elohim* and the concentration of these latter in the unity of *Jahweh* to whom was given neither name nor definition—simply The Lord. The Hebrews too had their priest-king who worshipped for the people, but this priest-king was not of divine descent. He was the "Lord's Anointed," the servant of *Jahweh*; and in that sense we inherited the term in Europe. He sacrificed at The Temple in Jerusalem and in the holy places of Samaria; but the heads of the Hebrew families continued their sacrifice to *Jahweh* at their own hearths. It was this widespread theocratic democracy that gave the prophets their strength and prevented the development of the priest-king. Ultimately indeed they suppressed him and substituted therefor the rule of a hierarchy then centred at Jerusalem which with the fall of Samaria had become the centre of Israel. In this way theocratic democracy in its turn disappeared before the Church and from the Jewish State, only to reappear as the dominant factor of the events that caused the siege and capture of Jerusalem, the destruction of their Temple and State, and the final scattering of their people.

It was this battle of Church and State that was carried into our modern world. Accident one might say—the victory of Saint Paul over Saint James—transformed the creed of a little Hebrew sect into a great world religion. The politics of the time furthered its growth. There were grand philosophies in this old

* Henotheism, as used by Max Muller (*Physical Religion* p. 80) is the better term. Renan's formula, taken from its context, gives an impression of Semitic religious solidarity which is contrary to the facts. Their gods, when vague, were still local. Evolution, it can be added, has a teleological phase in so far as the hit and miss is governed in its results by past development and present environment.

Roman world but they were for the few. The many were sunk in the grossest superstition. The religious man had nowhere to turn. Deep as was the devotion aroused by the purer worship of Mithra brought from the East it could only go down before the far better system of morals found in the teaching of the Hebrew prophets, and brought to a head by the last and greatest of them. We know very little of the actual teaching of Christ, but there was a well established oral tradition of it which was put into written form a little more than a generation after his death. We know that these early Christians were earnest men, true converts to the faith and very different from the material supplied by conversion in blocks, and under the orders of a prince whose own conversion was more a matter of expediency than of conviction—as of Clovis. They only held their ground a short time. Circumstances brought the Christian church into politics, and a great ecclesiastical machine had the old problem before it which it too tried to settle on the lines of the old Hebrew state. Hence the great contest of our mediæval world was the contest between Church and State. A contest still going on in our modern world and far from being settled; for while both sides are willing to admit a sphere in which its rival has operation neither is willing to admit where its lines are to be drawn. Both sides make their spheres concentric, and both claim to be the greater and therefore including the less.

Between East and West there is no differentiation between the lines on which its ecclesiastical battles have been fought. Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Confucianism have stood as ecclesiastical establishments of their respective cults apart from and often in opposition to the secular power. Japan offers us peculiar advantages in such study, for whereas elsewhere the strata overlies each other so that we have to dig down to determine their relation, in Japan they have been tilted so to speak and lie in full view at the present day. That there were rivals in the land, that the old patriarchal system was not dead, we get a hint in the Kojiki. The divine grandson is met on his descent from heaven by one of the gods of the country who comes to offer him homage and assistance. Hints of these other gods, previous settlers in the "Central Land of Reed Plains" are found in other parts of the Kojiki. These are the only hints of a worship foreign to the invading tribe to be found in the old writings of Japan. And these are not necessarily foreign in a racial sense. The conquered and the conquerors of the land of Yamato settle down under the government of Jimmu without the slightest reference to any hostile divinities being expelled. They plainly worshipped the same gods in the same way, and in the long course of time changes in this old worship are made by formal edict, as shown by the reference to the backsliders who still maintained animal and even human sacrifice. From the earliest recorded time—the first century A.D. as reported in Chinese annals—there is a priest-king of divine descent, worshipping his ancestors. His position in reference to the gods is identical with

that of the Egyptian and Assyrian king. And he would have shared the same fate were it not for the accident of situation. Egypt and Assyria were great world powers, engaged in world politics, and the centre and object of attack of the seething mass of nations grouped around them, from the Persian Gulf and the Iranian plateau on the east to the Greeks and the Tartar tribes of the Caspian, Black Sea, and eastern Mediterranean district. It was merely a question of time when accidental weakness and the rise of one of those ephemeral barbarian powers—conglomerations that were only brought together with difficulty and only held together with greater difficulty—should combine to make their invasion and destruction possible. Thus Assyria fell under the Medes, and Egypt under the Persians, and later both under Alexander and the Greeks. No such question of outside politics disturbed the priest-king of Yamato or brought a strange religion among the Japanese people. The Japanese, an eastern people imbued with eastern thought and crystallized in eastern institutions, occupied the only geographical position which allowed their isolated development, unless they themselves chose to take up the rôle of an invading and conquering people and at a period of the world's history in which naval power cuts but a small figure in such invasions; a development not abnormal but normal and purely eastern, and hence more sharply defined than other eastern development. But if outside politics or strange religions were not forced on the Japanese, in these early and unsettled days the personal status of the monarch was often questioned. The Japanese monarch had to fight to secure his throne, and had afterwards to fight to hold it. His exemption from this condition of instability was brought about in a curious manner. One of the institutions of Japanese life, codified with its Chinazation and only doubtfully original, is action by deputy. In the smallest affairs of life, if it is admissible, two principals conduct their business by deputy. The functions of the Mikado being gradually thus transferred to other hands, custom soon made impossible his action in any other manner. It was against the national habit for him to act directly in the affairs concerning himself and his people. The Japanese therefore at this early period adopted the principle now carried out in the limited constitutional monarchies of the West; a responsible minister and an irresponsible monarch. Needless to say, however, the "responsible minister" of early Japan was responsible only to himself and his party. It was here the battle raged all through Japanese history; such "responsibility" being antidoted with assassination. The priest-king therefore retained all his functions but these were only exercised by the party in power who held him in their hands. His divine character remained unimpaired but his functions on this point were purely ceremonial. It is to be emphasized that all his executive functions were deputized. There was little object under such conditions in setting up an opposition emperor. At times this was done to give the strength of the emperor's name to an opposing faction; but the real question

was to be fought by rival factions eager for power; both acted in the emperor's name and both claimed to be his only true and lawful representative. Usually of course he had a preference which was clear enough to the eyes of all men to give real power to one side or the other. This retirement, not elimination, of the royal house is unique in history, and has maintained one dynasty on the throne of the Mikado since the earliest annals of the nation. Their lives and their exalted position were preserved to them, even if all real power was stripped from them.

Let us turn for a moment to the religion of which this priest-king is the head. Something has already been said of it and therefore we can pass over these points rapidly. It has changed very little in its essentials from earliest recorded time. The Emperor, as a god, to-day worships his divine ancestors in the same manner as we find recorded in the Shintō rituals of the fifth century or perhaps earlier. This is a point of some importance. On its surface Shintō is a nature worship spread over most of the phenomena of that interesting lady. This is so much the case that eminent authorities deny that ancestor worship has anything to do with Shintō; not the reverse. Now it does seem as if this ancient worship of these divine ancestors, as carried out by the Emperor even to this day, should answer this question. In the Kojiki the gods are a family. There is not a suspicion of myth about them. They act as a family council. Now it is hardly to be thought that in worshipping the sun goddess his ancestress, the greatest of the Japanese pantheon, the Emperor makes a distinction when offering is made to Ōkuni-nushi the god of Izumo and worships in this latter case a purely nature god. He certainly does not place this nature god above the head of the pantheon; and to degrade a purely nature god would be a reversal of mental process not yet shown in religious history, and certainly not shown in Japan where the deification of ancestors within the historical period has taken place. But these recent ancestors hold a distinctly lower place in the pantheon as compared with those gods whose exact origin is lost in the mists of time. We have said that it is not likely that the Japanese people were ahead of their ruler in their form of worship. If therefore the king worshipped his ancestors, the people presumably worshipped theirs, and at a greater distance they worshipped the king's. This is shown in the genealogies of the Kojiki, which for the nobles are carried back to divine ancestors and the Japanese people in general terms are referred to as a divine race. The feeling certainly exists at the present day that the various *uji-no-kami* or local divinities are deified local chiefs; and the care taken of their cult in particular families in the earliest times, and the care taken to maintain these local family shrines when in later times families were scattered into widely separated parts of the country, certainly seems to support this view. The main point is that this distinctly anthropomorphic pantheon of the Japanese appears in the earliest traditions as the progenitors (not the

creators) of the race. It is with this view that their worship has been maintained from the earliest times; and this is the ground to-day for Governmental support of the *miya* or Shintō shrines. It may be claimed that these ancestral gods developed out of nature gods, but this is conjectural. The fact remains that on their earliest appearance in record they are ancestral.

The intense anthropomorphism of these Japanese gods is a striking feature. They are not only men but they are Japanese men, so much so that it can be suspected that some of them in their mundane lives were very close to human record oral or written. This is not the case where a full nature worship has developed. Osiris, Asshur, Zeus, Jahweh, are all local gods in their partialities, but they are raised high above the racial limitations of their worshippers. Asshur selected the Assyrian as his favoured nation; Jahweh selected the Hebrews as his favoured nation. Both are all powerful and their competitors go down as stubble before the flame of their wrath; but neither is Asshur an Assyrian, nor is Jahweh a Hebrew. In fact they both have that germ in them which can develop the universal God. This is not the case with the Shintō deities. They are emphatically not only local but Japanese, and like all primitive deities they are very human in their actions and in their history which is made up of these actions. They are always mentioned in connection with these their descendants—the Japanese people. A nature god pure and simple apart from the race is not to be found. There is not the slightest trace of a system of ethics to be found in the whole Shintō rituals, and nature worship implies a budding ethics. The sins against the Shintō Decalogue consist in violation of ceremonial; “flaying a horse with a backward flaying,” breaking down the divisions of the rice fields. Sins for the police court not the pulpit to deal with.* It is this lack of any ethical teaching beyond the injunctions of the policeman that is the fatal defect of Shintō. It makes these myths dull and lifeless as compared with the Greek myths. We have the same coarse element in the myths of Homer, much more so in Hesiod; but along with this anthropomorphism we see cropping up the nature myth. Apollo playing the pander for Zeus to deceive the wife of Amphitryon is coarse enough even when told in the beautiful Greek verse; but Apollo the sun-god entrusting his chariot to the rash Phaeton, and his mourning over the untimely end of the luckless youth, conveys a true ethical lesson. It does not seem hard to see which version preceded the other in mental development. And so on to the more serious attempts of Neo-Platonism to erect a true nature worship on a philosophical basis.

It is indeed possible to suspect that the introduction of Buddhism assisted the development of nature worship in Japan.

* The sin of Oedipus aroused the moral wrath of the gods and its expiation could only involve the tragic. In Shintō it merely involved ceremonial uncleanness, expiated by a formula of purification. The inevitableness of the tragic in both Oedipus and Orestes is what commands the attention in any estimation of the moral in Greek myth.

It did not originate it, for nature worship is distinctly a possibility of Shintō. These human like divinities have all their supernatural powers, control over the elements. Otherwise there would no distinction from their living descendants. But Buddhism separated them from their local habitats. It made them Buddhas. It gave them a universal character which renders the original simple lines indistinct. The Shintō gods of the Kojiki, and the same Shintō gods worshipped in the numerous *miya* to-day have changed their character somewhat. But perhaps this is inevitable. Athene the companion and divine helper and comforter of the "man of many woes" is not the dread goddess that dwelt in the Acropolis of Athens. The great gods were too unsatisfactory for the higher minds of Greece. And so also in Japan. The Neo-Platonism of Greece we can compare in its *modus* to the Neo-Shintōism of Japan. This purely literary movement took its rise in the middle of the eighteenth century, and here we have a deliberate attempt to connect Shintō with the great natural phenomena. Shintō, however, is far too primitive to respond to these efforts. It never has concentrated its pantheon. Jahweh of the Hebrews; Chemosh of the Moabites, Rimmon of the Ammonites, Salne of the Arab tribes, Baal and Milik, all found their place of worship in Solomon's Temple; but all the others had to give way to the worship of the one God of Israel—Jahweh, and as Jahweh in turn had to identify himself with the Universal Spirit found in the Elohim. Shintō however does to-day represent a Universal. It represents the Japanese people. It is fashionable to speak of Shintō as a dead and gone religion only remaining in an official formula. On the contrary, Shintō lies at the basis of the Japanese character. The Japanese are Buddhists or Confucianists; and they are all Shintōists. It is only as Shintō has worked itself into these two cults that they have gained success. And Emperor and People as they turn their faces toward Ise bow before the immortal spirit of the Japanese people there enshrined.

§ 2.

Leaving this more general point of view of the religious question let us turn to its political side. Religions may vary greatly in their ultimate aims but the question of their relations between Church and State is a universal one. It is found among the most savage peoples, where the medicine man or *shaman* is often—or always—an open or secret rival of the chiefs. Man loves power over his fellow-man, and wherever exceptional advantages lie they will be used, or it will be suspected that they will be used, to the detriment of existing power. The question therefore of Church and State exists even among the more miserable remnants of the aborigines in America and Australia, and

risks to a very positive one among the despotic tribes of Africa where the plunder to be obtained is so much greater. Among the great civilized peoples of the world it has been, and is to-day, the great world question, and it must be understood in its main phases for it has given rise to political ideas having tremendous influence on the relations between different nations. This has been especially the case in the contact between East and West where the struggle has been on somewhat differing lines, and where the factors emerging into prominence have widely differed in its latest stages. In Japan the relations between East and West were involved in the political relations of the Roman Church. In trying to ascertain therefore on what lines the West has carried out this battle let us take this example as the one most familiar to us and indeed involving the whole of our modern history, root and branch.

It is not too much to say that the triumph of Saint Paul in the matter of circumcision converted the Christian-Jewish sect into a world-wide religion. The whole Gentile world lay open to its career of proselytism, a career practically closed to the narrow nationalistic Hebraism which clung to this degrading badge of servitude so hateful and despicable to western eyes. But what it did retain of its Hebrew origin at this period—and of much importance to our argument—was the teaching of the relation between Church and State. Early Christianity could, and did, teach in its humility the “render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God the things which are God’s,” a teaching the full comprehension of which is not understood even at the present day. Much less could the ancient world understand it, and these people who held aloof and prated of their king and his kingdom, and carried this doctrine into practical effect by their refusal to conform to the outward ceremony shown by all other existing creeds—a ceremony understood to be formal and official as the bitter jest of Vespasian shows*—thoroughly aroused the suspicion of a Government the cardinal principle of which was to enforce obedience in those outward signs of conformation to its formulae. The Roman Government made little account of religion as such. But it was based from the earliest times on ceremonial, and failure to observe all the due forms was the signal of rebellion. Just as in later times this principle was carried into the feudal system, and the failure to observe the formal duties of a vassal was regarded as rebellion. The Roman Government therefore was little likely to understand such a distinction as that the “kingdom” referred to was “not of this world.” And the actions of the great mass of Christian converts as little conformed with this sense. Openly preaching disloyalty to the Government, and later in the times of barbarian pressure openly rejoicing over its defeats and approaching downfall, they were regarded by the Government very properly as enemies seeking to supplant it with this new fangled kingdom so much

* “*Ut puto, deus fio.*”

talked about; and in their open alliance as Roman citizens with the enemies of Rome they regarded them as traitors. As far as the Roman Empire was concerned the charge was just.

Based originally on a thorough Quakerism the Christian church was early forced into a political organization for defensive purposes and soon entered the field of politics—with the usual results. They had to do it or be annihilated. Their creed forbade any concession to formula. Religion with them at that date was a matter of conscience not of ceremonial. The Roman Empire could make no concessions to an obscure sect in its political forms of obedience. It did what it could, and as far as possible ignored them through the action of humane officials acting under the private instruction of the emperor himself. But its persecutions were based purely on political grounds, and can usually be traced to a reciprocal fanaticism aroused between the lower class Romans and the Christians themselves, or to some open defiance of the laws and customs of the land that could not be ignored. The wise and moderate counsels of Saint Peter and Saint Paul lost entirely what force they had with their disappearance from the strife. It was the harsher and rougher spirit of the author of the Apocalypse that began to sway the infant church. The persecutions under Nero can be set down as political; those of Marcus Aurelius as judicial; and it can be added that the extent of both is now admitted to have been grossly exaggerated by ecclesiastical writers, who, confined to their monkly cell gave their minds to the full sway of what we will call, according to the distinction of Coleridge, "fancy." Increasing numbers, and ability to actively resist, gradually retired Quakerism from the councils of the Christian church. The earliest symptoms were Christian and anti-Christian riots, severely repressed by the Government. But in these riots Christian political power was making itself felt. Any unbiased study of the career of that old reprobate Constantine, who painted his face and dressed like a doll, hardened his heart and put his own son to death, will give him little credit for any sentiment in his adoption of the new religion. But he recognized the strength of its organization. Here it radically differed from the pagan religions. Inheritance from the concentrated theocratic government of the Temple at Jerusalem, and the political condition of the times, had given the Christians a firm knit organization independent of the Government and unaffected by its existing difficulties. The pagan religions, however, were local in character, were State institutions to all practical purposes, and their prosperity depended on the prosperity of the State. The Roman principle was to unify the system of government, not of the governed whose local feelings and jealousies were encouraged and whose union was discouraged or forbidden. The apotheosis of Constantine, the glossing of his crimes and the misrepresentation of his character by ecclesiastical writers of his time, was simply the result of a very usual political short-sightedness. Never was the Christian church as

an independent entity in such danger. The removal of the capital to the Bosphorus and the invasion of the German tribes saved the western church from the fate of the Greek Church, which has also suffered from that hairsplitting tendency of the eastern mind toward metaphysics.

Constantine and his immediate successors thoroughly realized the value of this organization of the Christian church, but they had no intention in the least of diminishing by one jot their power as heads of the Empire. They played a trick common enough in these days of our own enlightened politics. They captured the machinery of the enemy. The Church always realized this and struggled against it but like a skilful driver the emperors at Constantinople gave the ecclesiastics full rein in matters of ecclesiastical controversy, taking advantage of their disputes to maintain their own nominal headship of the Church in matters spiritual, and hence all the more fastening their grip on things temporal. But emperors are mortal, and empires have moments of weakness. The Church is immortal and always ready to take advantage of the favourable opportunity. This opportunity came but slowly and then only partially in the East. The Greek Church has always been subject to the State and its secular head is its head. But in the West the Church fared differently. The invasion of the northern peoples, the disorganization of the western empire, left practically nothing standing in the way of authority but the Church. At the close of the fifth century in Italy civil society could be said to be represented by the Exarch and a few Greek officials in southern Italy. The only other organized machinery for carrying on government lay in the bishops, and it is to be confessed that these rose grandly to the occasion. In some cases—not many—this temporal authority can be said to have been most unwelcome to them. The early church wanted to be let alone in its own affairs. The dream of absorption of the civil power had not yet arisen. The fear of absorption by the civil power was a very lively one. Entrance on active politics was a matter of circumstances not of choice. The only power in Rome—and a power assumed most apologetically—from the fall of the western empire in 476 A.D. to the entrance of King Pepin and his Franks in 750 A.D. was the bishop of Rome. His primacy in the Church was far from being admitted when its political necessity became felt. The church was quick to feel the dangerous position in which it stood in relation to the emperor; and the advantage of an umpire more removed from his influence with all the prestige of the ancient city, "mother of the world," often led to a grudging recognition of this primacy of the bishop of Rome even by the eastern churches. This primacy was more easily secured in the West where Rome soon became the holy city, the place of pilgrimage. And the Frankish kings established this position and career of the Roman church. Pepin in turning over Ravenna to the Roman bishop had laid the foundation of the temporal power. He, however, stopped there. He turned out the Lombard and re-

fused to turn in the emperor. But he left the Roman bishop and the emperor to come to some *modus vivendi* as to their respective rights. As Professor Freeman tells us, Pepin plainly felt that he had been fooled both by bishop and emperor. Charlemagne put the matter on a very different basis. He excised the emperor altogether. His grants of lands to the Church were held on feudal tenure and brought it into connection with the existing political system as part and parcel of the system. But Charlemagne held the Church in strict bonds. He himself was now the western emperor and the Church in Rome was strictly subordinated to the State in its feudal capacity. Charlemagne, however, was mortal. He died and under his weak successors the great empire was split into fragments, The Church regained its freedom and retained its temporality.

This is the true point of the origin of the western battle between Church and State of modern times. A feudal lord to whom homage was due and whose fiefs were held by his vassals on their due observance of duty to their lord, it was easy to extend this idea to the whole body politic. Hence the announcement by Gregory VII that kings and princes only held their crowns as gifts from God, and that as his vassals they were subject to the Pope as his representative on earth, was perfectly logical and readily understood on all sides, no matter whether they were willing to admit the right or not. The Pope therefore claimed the right to distribute the political power in all nations with sole reference to the rights and interests of the church. It was a grand idea of the universal republic, at least centuries ahead of its time and it is to be hoped merely a utopia at any time. Man only profits by centralization to a sharply defined limit. Beyond that it is repressive. Gregory's idea fortunately left out national feeling. Instead of strengthening the church the assumption of temporal power in the form of a political exclusivism radically weakened it. The spiritual powers and terrors of the church used for political purposes and to further objects which were a cause of strife among nations made the nature and range of interdict and excommunication a matter of controversy. The clergy themselves, voluntarily or under compulsion, disregarded these thunders from the Lateran Palace or Castel St. Angelo. And in Italy itself the German factions of Guelph and Ghibelline brought home its real weakness to the papacy. The contest was a long one. Indeed it cannot be said to be over yet. The old question of Guelph and Ghibelline still troubles France, Italy, Germany, Spain; even democratic England has its local quarrel. As long as it was a question of dynasties the advantage lay with the Church. They could play one candidate off against another. They had as strong a hold on the people as had the State. Their wealth was enormous. In England at the period of the reign of Edward I they are said to have held one third of the land of the kingdom. And land at that period was the only form of wealth and correspondingly valuable. It was with the rise of the people into power in the State that the

battle began to go against the Church. The people would not fight for a dynasty, no matter if backed by clerical interests, until they were shown that their own interests were involved. Once this became clear they took their side by prince or noble, using the contestants as their own stepping stones to power and with only a side reference to ecclesiastical interests. The dominance of the political results over the ecclesiastical basis on which the great Reformation was fought displays this clearly. Be it said they never lost their balance—except from the clerical point of view. As has been said, the Church never dies and never forgets. One factor has been eliminated but to-day it is the Church and State still in opposition, the people representing the State. The Church still retains its spiritual hold on the people. If it could gain control of the thought of the people it would regain its old position of temporal power. The battle is now between free thought and the Church, with the advantage on the side of the latter as free thought is not in favour with numerous political sects who only see hope for the success of their own creeds by the ultimate adoption of repressive measures. Socialism openly advocates the control of thought, and one cannot help being struck by its resemblance in machinery to mediæval ecclesiasticism.

The effect of a military despotism is anything but to be admired. However it confines itself strictly to the affairs of this world. It has penalties many and severe against many forms of individual expression not allowed by its code. It enslaves the body, but it cannot prevent thought. Clericalism, however, enslaves mind and body. Under all the penalties and terrors, not of this world but of a world to come, it teaches men not how to think but what to think. This absolute supremacy of the church over the individual conscience is as much dogma to-day as in the past. Between the different sects it is only a difference of range; and Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist, are all agreed on everything but where the chalked line is to be drawn. In the one case a pope, in the other case a majority, is to determine the limits for human thought in the physical and intellectual world. The dogma enunciated all must obey. The force of this discipline of human thought which should be as free as air is something terrible. Anyone who has had the acquaintance of some friend, gifted with the wider knowledge of highly educated men of to-day but an earnest and believing member of the Roman Church, can appreciate the sharpness of this line and the care taken to maintain it, beyond which the individual conscience must seek counsel of the Church. Public opinion in small Protestant communities enforces the same restriction of free thought; by ostracism in higher circles or by actual maltreatment by the rougher element in such community. This is particularly the case in western America where the first question is what church the newcomer attends. Such community regards itself as a closed circle. Admission to it is practically on the same terms as in the old Japanese district. Legally of course it cannot be restricted

as was the case in Japan, but practically such admission can be regulated. The non church-goer might arouse suspicion, but any more positive opinions would arouse ostracism. So much for freedom of thought as translated into some western townlets.

Now the first demand of clericalism is for control of the schools, and the importance of the public school cannot be overestimated. We want to teach children to think, not what to think. In thinking lies the whole progress of the race and it is not to be confined within arbitrary limits. Doctrine belongs to doctrinal schools and it is no more necessary to teach doctrine in the public schools than in learning a trade. One can feel sympathy with the rigid sectarian who is unwilling to pay a double tax in educating his children under the special system that is the only right one in his eyes. The difficulty lies in the confusion of his ideas. The priest is to teach religion. The schoolmaster is to teach mental exercise. The two fields are wide apart. To bring the priest into the school is to teach facts under the light of a special tint and on which no two sects can agree. The State is only interested in teaching the facts in the colourless white light of truth. If the priest chooses to step in and give colour to those facts, and if people choose to listen to him, that is another matter. A more rigid application of this principle to our secular teaching would lead to more fact and less theory in our schools, and this would work no particular injury. There is plenty of theory met with later in life.

In this question of politics Protestantism can hardly point the finger of scorn at Catholics. Their organization is less firmly knit and the individual gets fuller value in its ranks. But religion permeates politics even in those countries in which the individual is supposed to be entirely free from its trammels. Thus a judge of its highest court declares that the United States is a Christian country and its laws are to be so interpreted. Catholicism has been far more dangerous through its strong discipline throughout the rank and file. On minor questions it allows wide range to its numerous sects, but the final appeal is settled by the hierarchy and its head in Rome, and that enunciated they all swing together in one firm mass. But it is impossible to enter politics without the means to make those politics effective. Hence Church and State opposed on one line are united on another. Conservative in questions affecting dogma, the material interests of the Church make it conservative on questions affecting property and public interests; and it is hard to tell in the present state of a world struggle going on whether it is of more aid as a conservative element to prevent hasty experiment in the economic system, or is a grave drawback in view of the suspicion with which it is viewed by every liberal mind. Perhaps it is the former, for it still retains its spiritual power over the great mass of the people, and this is especially of value in Protestant countries where the people have a very actual direction in their churches. They might willingly and legally

rob each other but not themselves. It is hardly necessary to point out the utter unsuitableness of this positive religion to the old Japanese state which had just emerged victorious from a struggle with its own dominant religion. Persecution of Christianity in the Japan of 1600 A.D. was purely political. The Japanese Government was thoroughly Ghibelline, so to speak, without being in any way hampered by any ties personal or political with any religion. The ethical teaching of Buddhism is so akin to that of Christianity that the latter was soon forgotten. Except for its political exclusion at the barriers the memory of it would have been stamped out from the great mass of the people. There was a curious local survival of it, however; a survival which shows the great value of persecution; for it was in the very hottest centre of the old burnings and slicings—in Kyūshū—that in 1870 some remnants of the proscribed religion were found to be still secretly practiced.

We have here a new interpretation of the term "State." Ordinarily the clerical body should, and in practice does, form part of the more limited civil conception of the term. But in theory they have a temporal allegiance beyond the bounds of this civil State, and at times in opposition to it. Even Rome recognized the limits of her civil power—the Barbarian world and the Persian empire. There have been dreams of a universal republic—Fourier's, for instance, with its capital at Constantinople and its omniarch a benevolent despot chosen by the suffrages of the world and not by conquest. But these are recognized as impracticable Utopias. The Church, however, attempted to put this idea of universal dominion into practice, and the struggle was a gigantic and a costly one in blood and money on both sides. The idea never has been abandoned. What might be desirable with beings in a state of moral perfection is to-day the avowed object of religion as applied to beings of very imperfect moral perception. Everywhere is sought uniformity in religious belief. Clericalism as a ruling power still acts indirectly and powerfully on the civil rulers, and in some cases to all practical purposes governs directly—as in Spain. In the East the same battle for supremacy has been fought by clericalism, but the object sought and the result obtained show somewhat different lines. The Brahmanism of India to all intents and purposes governs the country through the caste system which as conquerors it fastened upon it. But like all eastern religions the philosophy of Brahmanism does not lead to action, and it lacks the central organization to make its political action effective. It is in some respects analogous to the Protestant bodies of Christianity as contrasted with the centralized Roman church. Brahmanism therefore was never able to bring together into one well knit mass, the heterogeneous peoples of India. And this eastern Aryan is distinguished by his inertia as compared with his western brother. Great empires have been formed in India but it has been by conquering tribes from the great plains to the north of India. There has been no great ambitious movement

from India itself to conquer their eastern world and to spread their religion and civilization. In Japan these questions of Church and State have arisen in connection with an Indian religion. Buddhism has its central organization—its pope; but how widely does the Thibetan Lama differ from his prototype in Rome! Buddhism if more philosophical is far less practical than Christianity. It deals with thought not action. Looking at it apart from the ambitions of men one would as soon expect an effort of temporal aggrandizement on the part of the Association for the Advancement of Science and its allied Scientific bodies as on the part of Buddhism. And the idea of our respectable and often revered professors, leaving their dens for the concoction of smells and dissection of bugs and other creeping things, and marching as to war, would only arouse gleeful anticipation in the minds of the profane and worldly butcher, baker, and candlestick maker. Let us hope these latter would smite the professor gently and with their clubs stuffed with some lethal but not deadly material. It would be the only proper weapon for such unsophisticated assailants.*

Buddhism preaches resignation and reflection, not a militant propagandism. The difference here between the positive militant God of Judaism, of Christianity, of Islamism, and the dreamy abstraction of Buddhism is going to mark the contest between Church and State as carried out in East and West. "I am the Lord thy God. Thou *shalt* have no other god but Me." This has the strong ring of personality about it, even when that God is the Wind and Flame of the old Elohim consuming as with fire whatever it touches. A man can follow such a God as he follows his leader into battle. Such a God calls for that spirit of universal empire found at the base of Christianity and preached by the Hebrew prophets of olden time. What hold can Nirvana give to its seekers after the one true God? None to the man of action; peace and rest to these peoples of the East whose civilizations had sunk into lines so deep that a man had dumbly to bear his lot in this world without hope of change. The spirit of pessimism is at the very root of Buddhism. Its battle with the State has been fought on very simple lines and apart from religious issues. It was a battle of ambitions, the stake at issue being plainly visible to those engaged in the struggle; temporal power—the good things of this world—not veiled by any pretence of its religious element which kept aloof from such struggle. It has been a struggle, pure and simple, for the flesh pots. In Japan it began with its introduction into the country. There was no struggle for supremacy between Shintō and the State. Shintō was the State; but at that almost patriarchal stage of Japanese life no distinction could be drawn between the civil and religious functions of the Government.

* A lethal weapon, but not in the sense of a recent decision of a Japanese Court which seemed to be somewhat fogged as to whether a leaden bar was a lethal or deadly weapon, or both. As I remember, it finally decided it to be none of the three!

No better evidence of the close relationship between the gods and the people could be asked than this primitive Shintō in which priests and people were hardly to be distinguished. Whether the hierarchy in Shintō could have developed into a power separate from the State is a mere speculation. It is probable that Shintō had within it the germ of hieratical rule, but circumstances nipped any such career in the bud. Buddhism, the stronger religion, absorbed Shintō, not the reverse. The civil element in the State, as distinguished from the hieratical, then took up its normal development.

Buddhism did not make its entrance into Japan with a roar and a rush. It apparently made no pretension to substitute itself for the native religion. It offered all the beauties of its philosophical system to the thoughtful men of the day. Its worship was to take place side by side with the native pantheon. As stated the Japan of 551 A.D. was possessed of a priesthood headed by a priest-king. Primitive as this was in form and worship this priesthood was well developed and possessed of an elaborate ritual. It takes a priest to catch a priest—or did in those days—and this innocent proposition of the Buddhists met with polite but instant opposition. "The Emperor has already many gods to worship and these gods will be angry if foreign gods are introduced among them." But what chance did this primitive religion consisting of mere ceremonial, possessing no ethical code and with no capacity of development, have in a contest with a great philosophical system offering all its immense content to the men of intellect in Japan. It went to the wall, not without a struggle, for the attraction of Buddhism to such men was overwhelming, and these men governed Japan. The emperor and the hierarchy had little to say against a cult that practically placed them in the background. They early adopted it themselves—from the individual point of view! In other words the rulers were converted, which in those days and in the East meant the conversion of the people. It had, however, to cling largely to its original terms. It had to adopt the Shintō pantheon, converting this pantheon into Buddhas. Such a step with a religion whose worship was strictly an ancestor worship was easy enough. Shintō had neither to change its outer nor inner form to the educated Japanese. It had always been ceremonial in its treatment of religion. To this it simply added all the immense treasure from the store house of Buddhist philosophy. The result was foregone. In time Shintō ceremonial sank into neglect. Buddhism gradually replaced it for all practical religious purposes. It took possession of its temples and even conducted its ceremonies. The great official Shrines, however, always maintained the cult and kept the memory of its original practice green. And it had its revenge in the common people to whom esoteric Buddhism was a sealed book, and who simply translated the new religion into terms of the old and clung to their old gods under their new names. This double worship merely corrupted both religions. For thirteen

hundred years Shintō had no opportunity of showing its real strength.

Buddhism is peculiarly the religion of reflection and resignation, and its favourite form of expression has been the monastic life. This did not take the extravagant ascetic form in Japan that is found in India and in some forms of Christian monasticism especially that of the fourth and fifth centuries. Their monasticism was more akin to that of Europe from the sixth to ninth centuries, when the learning of the time sought refuge from outside disorder within the peace and sacred walls of the monastery. Early in the ninth century and under the most favourable circumstances the great monasteries were established on the slopes of Hieisan and at Koyasan. Their rule does not seem to have been severe. They could be said to be centres of thought in this time of peace and luxury among a people who had little other outlet for the mental life than what they could find in their immediate surroundings. These monasteries therefore became from the start objects of patronage to the great and wealthy of the time. Their own object could be said to be purely intellectual. There were no great questions offered for settlement in the Japan of the time of Kōbōdaishi and Denkyōtaishi. Not that they did not exist but that society did not trouble itself about them. The position and condition of the classes were determined and were not a subject of discussion or amelioration. Again, the Buddhist regarding this world as illusion—Karma deals with the phenomenal—did not lay the stress on personal morality with the severity which is such a feature of Christianity*. Not that they disregarded or even minimized its importance but a breach of it did not involve the irremediable ruin involved in the Christian code, a ruin extended even to sin in ignorance and in both cases only expiated by instant repentance, a rather impossible condition under the latter circumstances. In other terms Christianity punished sin and damned the sinner. Buddhism punished the sinner, but no matter how incorrigible only postponed his chances to acquire a state of grace. Buddhism gave far more time to the discussion of what we might call metaphysical doctrine rather than to the more practical details of the cult. Philosophical discussion was therefore encouraged in the Buddhist monasteries; which is just the reverse of the

* Karma can be defined as heredity from the past and propagation in the future of the effect of any thought or action. It is only with the appreciation that thought and action are both phenomenal—deal with the form not the real nature of substance—that Karma loses its power. Karma and the Veil of Maya become hardly distinguishable (Cf. "Questions of King Milinda" vol. I, 72, 102; vol. II, 137, 200, 212, 216, 316. trans. by Rhys Davids.). Maya properly speaking is a force—magic force—enabling a being to veil his own personality in bodiless phantoms. Absolute being—Brahman, in the Indian philosophy—therefore takes on *quality* by this moulding into a not-self over against the true self. It is thought in terms of ignorance. Maya is therefore illusion. Note the distinction between the phenomenal and the fictitious. (Cf. M. Müller "Six Systems of Indian Philosophy" pp. 162, 185, 280-1.)

Christian monasteries whose attention was mainly given to details of practice. Philosophic discussion belonged to the schools. We can see therefore the great attraction these monasteries had to the intellectual men of the time. Men retired to them not for religious purposes but to discuss philosophy. The more comfortable the surroundings the more comfortably can philosophy be discussed. Plato himself was a notable high liver. In these Japanese monasteries thousands of monks of the lower grade—to all practical purposes retainers—found room and support from their great and wealthy establishments. The same took place in Europe, but the spirit was different. No such powerful arm rose in Buddhist Japan as the mendicant orders and the Jesuits—orders devoted to the church militant. But the feudal times were marked by orders analogous to the Knights Templar, to the Knights of Saint John, and the Knights of Jerusalem. These latter were instituted for a specific purpose it is true, but that purpose gained or lost they were left stranded without any religious mission in the Church. They were possessed of great wealth and power and threatened the organization of that very Church which had engendered them. In the militant religious system of Christianity such organizations without a mission had no place. They had to go.

In Europe the battle was to be fought against these orders by the Church and the State. In Japan it was to be fought by the State, for these orders had overwhelmed any Church that could be said to exist. By the twelfth century they were at the height of their power. There was very little government of any kind in the Japan of that period; except what could be secured by the strong arm. The monasteries had great wealth, armies of stout-hearted monkish men-at-arms, and they proposed to retain their wealth and to absorb more if possible. They warred with the nobles, warred with the emperor—usually on his side when the right one could be distinguished, recognizing kinship in their interests against the turbulent aristocracy—and warred with each other. One centre of attack was Miidera, the temple establishment overlooking Biwa Lake at Otsu. So peaceful and beautiful to-day its groves and wooded recesses in the Middle Ages were the constant theatre of battle and ambush. Taira Kiyomori burnt it down in 1180 A. D. for its meddling in politics, and then marched to attack the Minamoto who had raised their head in the Kwantō against the Taira then in control of the Government. But this was once of many times. Every half century it could be said that Miidera suffered a like fate at the hands of the monks of Heisan and it is fair to presume they retaliated in the intervals. When therefore Nobunaga attacked them in 1571 the monks could be said to be a third power in the State. Their whole battle was summed up in a question of property and hence of power. There is not the suspicion of a religious question involved in the contest. If they seek to gain and maintain a preponderant interest in the State it is for purely material pur-

posers. They did not even to seek to rule, or else they would have made an effort to use their religious power. On the contrary they practically left the field to Confucianism. They were simply a party of wealth, armed to the teeth, holding the balance of power and using it for their own material advancement. Nobunaga thoroughly understood the dangerous and disturbing influence of such a factor and did not strike until he could destroy. After the battle on Hieisan in 1571 A.D. the source of their power—their wealth—was destroyed; which is plain enough evidence that no real religious bond held them together. From that date they have been kept close in the eye of the State, and indeed up to very recent times were a State institution.

Reduced to this harmless condition, their position in the State well defined, the religious establishment was fostered by Iyeyasu. That there was no lack of religious interest in the country is shown by the wide range of its discussion, and the freedom of thought allowed in this harmless field is shown by the large number of sects. Buddhism seems to have always maintained this congregationalism as its governing form. It is one of its most attractive features. A man can always find shelter under its broad wings even if he has to stand by himself and preach to a wilderness. The term heretic is practically unknown. Hence there has been no such thing as persecution directed by the keen far-seeing eyes and far-reaching arm of a strong centralized hierarchy. When it has appeared in Japanese history in this light it has been in its political character. It protested against the introduction of Christianity on this ground, that the new doctrine was dangerous to the political interests of the country. Its real rivalry was of course religious, but it did not dare to take this ground which would have had no standing in Japanese eyes. The State made use of its organization in the persecution and subsequent scenting out of Christianity on the same political grounds, with the keen sense of acumen and humour of setting a priest to catch a priest. No matter how cheerfully the Buddhist priest burnt and sliced his rival from a religious point of view, the punishment and the recantation sought had no religious ground. It was due treatment for a spy who had entered the land or for a traitor who sought to betray it. To such a church, so well trained to obey and so thoroughly overlooked, it was safe to leave education; and any popular education of the period, such as it was, lay in the hands of the Buddhist priests and up to the time the Government itself took it in hand with the Meiji period of 1867. The value of such education, conducted by priests whose whole thought was taken up with a dreary scholasticism revolving around a visionary metaphysic, is not hard to estimate. Wherever the human mind turned it found formula. The priest learned his lesson by formula and he found it easy to teach the formulæ of social status proposed by the Government. In neither source was originality to be found or encouraged.

Having this power over the mind, and almost necessarily a certain *esprit de corps*, it could be asked—why could they not

have become a dangerous power in the State? Something of the answer can be found in their original history which shows no such *esprit de corps* on the religious side, no conception of mind as a source of their power; but simply a conception of their vulgar material interests. It is to be suspected that the monks of 895 A.D. were very different from the monks of 1571 A.D. It is perhaps a little harsh to say it, but Buddhism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries seems to have become practically a religion for women, children, and the people—all of whom stood on very much the same basis. The *samurai* for centuries had turned himself to Confucianism, and the *samurai* ruled the land. As long as he did so there was little danger of a return to power of ecclesiasticism. Everything confirmed him in the choice of an ethical code in preference to a religious code. The localization of feudalism brought the "five duties" of Confucius home in a very practical sense. But here a complication arose and its practical application found expression in the middle of the eighteenth century. The Japanese undergoes waves of patriotism which find easy outward demonstration in this highly socialized people and during which nothing but what is supposed to be of native origin will satisfy. Chinazation had been pushed to a great extreme. To such an extreme that the divine and ruling house at Kyōto was lost to sight, or regarded as an excrescence to be pruned away. Reaction from this extreme devotion to a foreign philosophy led some great minds to an investigation of the original sources of the native authority. This could not be done without exposing the real truth as to the position the imperial house held in these earlier times. The irony of the situation is that the reaction was assisted, if not promoted, by the very interests vitally concerned in keeping concealed from the Japanese people all information as to this early period. When the danger was discovered it was too late. The revivalists of pure Shintō had to undergo a mild sort of persecution. Hirata, one of its greatest advocates and ablest exponents, was deprived of his government position and exiled to a distant province. But the mischief was done and discussion had been aroused. Discontent had been given a head, and Confucianism through Shintō overthrew the Tokugawa Shōgunate by the very means sought to secure its perpetuity—the *Samurai*. Shintō regained its old position in the State, never anything but official, and it showed its real power over the hearts of the people by the readiness with which they understood the real position of their emperor in the state. Buddhism had only laid a gloss over their old gods. This latter religion perhaps can be said to have lost but little by the change. The cry of danger is always raised in cases of disestablishment. But it is a question whether Buddhism did not actually suffer from its connection with the Tokugawa state. It seemed to stand still. Without competition it had no incentive to action or to maintain its interest in the heart of the people. Even with this disestablishment it would have had but little to rouse it; for, as

said, Shintō has no ethical code to supply the needs of its worshippers. The re-entrance of a powerful rival in the form of Christianity, however, has supplied this incentive. The mediæval sleep of Buddhism has been broken; just as the sleep of mediæval Rome was broken by the reformers of the twelfth and sixteenth centuries. Christianity has reappeared in Japan under very different conditions to find a very different Japan. One thing, however, is never to be lost sight of in this question of religion and politics. Although the split in the ranks of believers and the contest between creeds has made the dream of a universal theocratic republic more of a dream than ever, and although men's minds are so occupied with the political questions of the day that the theological question has lost interest to peoples and Governments, it is never to be forgotten that as a local issue the Church is immortal in one form or another, always to be reckoned with and always to be controlled. Unpleasant evidence of this is to be found in existing conditions in Germany, France, and Spain.

§ 3.

Having looked at this question from the purely political point of view, especially as to the importance of educational control, let us view it from the point of dogma. East and West the representative Church and State have both had their dogma, and where their power lay mercilessly enforced it on those subject to their control. This has given rise to very different results in these two antipodes; whether due to race, or to the dogma, or to both, is a complex question to which we can only try to seek an answer. The striking point is this difference of result when the same object was in view. Learning in the West in ancient times—and in Rome in particular—could be said to be secular. In fact the priesthood were so much a political body that the special learning applicable to their craft hardly gave rise to a theologian. As a priest he was occupied with ceremonial; when he descends into the field of religious controversy he finds it occupied by the layman, and Plutarch the priest to the later Roman world hardly occupied a different position from Apuleius, or Porphyry, or Plotinus, or Julian. The real field of controversy lay between the different schools of philosophy. The methods employed were keen, dialectical, and unscrupulous. We know the reputation grafted on Epicurus by the Stoics. Perhaps this was justified by the conduct of his followers in the Rome of the first century (A.D. or B.C.), but it was little justified as to Epicurus himself or his teaching as can be seen by an extract from a letter supposed to have been written to Menaecus:—"When, therefore, we say that pleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the debauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant, and who do not

"entertain our opinions, or else interpret them perversely; but
 "we mean the freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul
 "from confusion. For it is not continued drinking and revels,
 "or the enjoyment of female society, or feasts of fish and other
 "such things, as a costly table supplies, that make life pleasant,
 "but sober contemplation which examines into the reasons for all
 "choice and avoidance, and which puts to flight the vain opinions
 "from which the greater part of the confusion arises which
 "troubles the soul."*

Into such a field of controversy entered the Christian church. And to adopt its methods. The Fathers of the early church, especially those of the fourth and fifth century when conversions were made rapidly among the educated class, were many of them learned men. Jerome, Augustine, Chrysostom, Martin of Tours, Eusebius, Gregory of Nazianzen, a long list entered the field equipped with all the learning of their time. Saint Jerome was the fashionable young preacher of his day. Attractive in person and manner, of an aristocratic family, his influence over the women was particularly great; and he exercised it as a means of conversion of the husbands, with a relentlessness and unscrupulousness not unknown to modern times, and which in Protestant countries makes the name of priest and confession an added object of dislike and intolerance. Christianity at that time was in practical control of society, the doctrine of Saint Peter and Saint Paul in reference to women had dropped from sight and their influence in the Church was very great, so that although Jerome did not escape the tongue of slander it could not hamper his methods. This growing control of Christianity over men's lives was not yet strong enough to forcibly suppress paganism. As far as it was concerned it was strong enough to put Christian learning in the hands of the priest and drive secular learning into the pagan ranks, a learning so brilliantly exemplified by Symmachus, Macrobius, Ausonius, and probably by the much disputed Boethius whose literary corpse has been the cause of a Homeric combat between Christian and Pagan even to the present day. Men of learning in these times had a value and gained a control and mastership that rapidly widened the distance between the presbyter and the rest of the brotherhood. The political relations of the Church made these services still more valuable. The Church took on the organization and discipline of an army. It was no longer a republic. The hierarchy was thoroughly developed by the second century and from that time there was a continuous development and differentiation on the lines laid down thus early. It only needed a pope, and the conditions of the time were to supply that need. The controversy that was carried on with paganism was carried on with all the weapons of the old dialectic and with as little scruple. But here a distinction is made. To-day the popular and learned preacher is ready in

* Diogenes Laertius—translation of Dr. C. D. Yonge. Bohn's Ed. p. 471.

the pulpit to make appeals to passion and prejudice, to speak *ex cathedra* to the mob who are without question to accept his words much as the physician's bolus is crammed down the patient. Here assertion takes the place of argument, and very rough handling do the great lights of science and philosophy receive from these modest and over-confident gentlemen, or even from youths barely escaped from the virgin simplicity of the seminary and with as yet full faith in the mythical tale of "David and Goliath" or of "Jonas in the belly of the whale." But when the learned preacher descends into the field of the modern magazine, where his readers are men of many minds, and where he must meet a scholarship equal to his own and analytical powers unhampered by dogma of any kind, he must take a different course. No learned man wants to make himself ridiculous before his peers. His object may not be to gain converts among his opponents. That he can hardly expect when he starts with premises which they are unable to accept. But there may be readers in that cooler field of controversy who can accept his premises and hence the argument he bases on them. This was the exact distinction made in the early days of the Church. To the mob the preaching was ferocious and intolerant. As they gained power every sense of that justice which is supposed to lie at the heart of every man seemed to be extinguished. One of the grievances against the Emperor Julian was that he restored to the pagans the property which had been illegally torn away from them, the original injustice of the confiscation being entirely overlooked by the enthusiastic and heated Gregory. It was strictly forbidden under the early days of Theodosius to disturb the pagans in their temple worship, but Saint Ambrose obstinately refused to restore or to make reparation for the loss occasioned by one of his Christian mobs egged on by him. Saint Jerome entered a field still more dangerous to the public peace. The later Roman Empire had given to women a freedom and a power over property which has never been equalled since. She not only had full control of her own property for her own uses, but it practically nullified all contracts disadvantageous to her. Her dower right could not be touched. And she had full control over it by will. This was Jerome's stamping ground and his game was worth the stalking. Families were ruthlessly torn apart even when members of the flock. The women went into the convent and their property went into the Church. Be it said that all was for the glory and advancement of this latter. There is not a trace of self-seeking and there is the greatest of self-abnegation in this courtly ascetic whose privileged position did not save him from the tongue of scandal. These drastic methods, however, did not apply everywhere. The learned men of the Church were just as tender not to expose themselves to the pointed shafts of a party to which they had once belonged and to whom perhaps they felt they had to give good ground for their change of front. The lamp of reason was still flickering and was kept alight in a refined if pagan society.

To their old companions these early Fathers address argument and persuasion. Their effort is to show the philosophical advantages and reasonableness of the new creed, the attractions and not the terrors. This is particularly conspicuous with Saint Augustine, who perhaps felt that he needed a little charitable consideration himself as he had passed through the various stages of Paganism, Manichaeism and Arianism before he finally found light in Catholicism.

This condition of the West during the early stage of its religious battle has been gone into in this detail for perhaps an obvious reason. We find in Japan the same struggle between two religions both entrenched within the ruling class, but supremacy in the latter case left none of the bitterness behind it that is found in the struggle between Christianity and Paganism. The victory was as complete in the one case as in the other but the victor did not so viciously stamp out even the semblance of life in the defeated. And there is a difference of spirit here shown throughout between East and West. The Roman Empire was as absolute throughout its vast extent as the little eastern kingdom lying off the Chinese coast. The Roman Republic was as absolute as the Empire. The man was for the State, not the reverse. But this little leaven of individual responsibility found in the teaching of the Hebrew prophets struck an echoing chord at the bottom of the Aryan and Semitic heart. They threw off their chains; and although the political conditions of the times riveted them on again the remembrance of the early church—the people of the church against the civil power—is never forgotten. It reappears sporadically and periodically through the entire history of the church up to its partial victory in the Reformation. It is seen in the monks of the fourth and fifth centuries. There is little worthy to be seen in these fanatical and extremely filthy clerics, except in so far as they were an expression of individualism; for in their *origin* they were bands gathered around some exceptionally holy and dirty man, independently engaged in rapturous admiration and imitation. Later they formed communities whose rule was rigid enough within the brotherhood but who fiercely contested any outside supremacy. It was a hard battle, and at times a bloody one, for the Church to bring them under authority, and at first she dared to make but little use of anything but their fanaticism. And fanaticism ran riot. Charity, the pastorate of souls, did not in any sense imply the use of persuasion in place of force. The greatest offence—a crime against the world's knowledge—lay in the systematic destruction by the Church of all the learning of the past handed down in its literature. But little security could these learned bishops have felt in the spiritual strength of their flock as they urged on the burning of the magnificent libraries at Alexandria* and elsewhere; and the great collection of the classics at Milan the

*The Caliph Omar has long been exonerated from this crime. Cf Professor's Fiske—"Unseen World and other Essays" p. 171 seq.

(destruction of which can be said to be the personal work of Saint Ambrose himself. Nor did they confine themselves to the printed pages. We hear much of Saint Cyril and his force in the Christian propaganda and his martyrdom which he finally had the manhood to face after showing less courage than hundreds of weak women. But we have to go to the pages of "hostile" writers to learn that this bishop and saint was the instigator of a lynching party directed against a woman and an opponent he could not silence in any other way. Not only to the pages of "hostile" writers, for the deed roused the protests and censure of his own party, who, however, diminish their credit by the suspicion of a wish to clip the political wings of the bishop. Once safely out of the way and lost in the mists of time they dub him "Saint." As to the classics, however, success was absolute. They fell into complete disgrace, at least in the West; and with them all secular learning. It was a time of dreary discussion on points of casuistry in theology. Eutychianism and Nestorianism, Arianism, Pelagianism, Monophysism and Monotheism, Homoousion and Homoiousion, the nosing down of different forms of Gnosticism; and of Ebionism, for this reminiscence of the old Church of Jerusalem with its flavour of the Essenes had by this time become highly unpopular as it savoured too strongly of a return to the early simplicity of the church and the apotheosis of poverty.

Fortunately the complete prostration of any militant form of paganism, and these internal squabbles of the Church which were a favourite pastime of the East, prevented the complete destruction of all classical knowledge. Greek philosophy especially was of great value to the eastern mind in its hair-splitting disputes. The East had grafted this Greek philosophy, especially Platonism in the form of Neo-Platonism, on to the Hebrew stock, and Christianity found therein all its metaphysics. What was left of ancient learning therefore found refuge in Constantinople, and the fortunate and early conquest of the East by the rising Arab power preserved the remains of what was left. The West, however, completely stamped it out, and the Greek and Roman writers made way for dreary copies and commentaries on the Fathers of the Church, a regular Chinazation of literature. The rage for actual destruction came to an end only because the material was too valuable to wantonly destroy. Erasure was therefore resorted to, in many cases so clumsily that by proper treatment the trash of the monkish writer can be removed and something recovered of the old classics from these palimpsests. Much is made of the "peace of Rome" which made life and property safe from one end of the empire to the other. It was a peace of law and a peace of prosperity and thereby had its justification. There is in Europe in ecclesiastical circles from the sixth to the twelfth centuries a "peace of the Church," only broken by the intrusion of a few scattered sects from the East—Paulists, Marcionists, Catarists, Lombardists; but it is a peace of the desert. Learning was confined to the

priests and "in two centuries of crusades no cleric studied languages."

With the rise of the modern nations, the emergence of civil power from the hurlyburly of constant war, came the necessity of law. The circumstances of two nations, conquerors and conquered, living side by side, the latter town dwellers and more civilized than the conquerors whose laws and customs could only be applied with difficulty to the subject people, doubtless led to the preservation of the Roman law in Italy. Civil power was by no means inclined to abdicate to the canon law. The first appearance of the laymen in the schools is in the early part of the twelfth century at the Law School of Bologna. They had from the start the support of the civil power which felt how essential they were to their independence of ecclesiasticism. A Bolognese professor was as safe amid his bands of students as the emperor amid his cohorts. It was neutral ground and he was not always so safe elsewhere. However they stuck pretty well to their last, and without allowing the interference of ecclesiasticism in their sphere meddled in their turn very little with theology; although never lowering their colours before the Church their sphere touched but little on that of the canon law. They were invaluable not only to the municipalities but to the Empire of which they were consistent supporters. They were necessarily Ghibelline. Other faculties were added to the law school. Other universities sprang up by imitation elsewhere all over Europe. Theology was the dominant school. Theology determined the mould and the material content of each of the "subordinate" sciences. There was no such thing as free inquiry. It said just what should be taught. The greatest importance lay therefore in the form, in the method by which this matter could be grouped. This was the case in this twelfth century when true science had begun to raise its head, and one of the greatest leaders of thought of any time could still say of logic "*disciplina disciplinarum, dux universae scientiae, sola dicenda scientia.*" Abelard changed his battle cry before his stormy life came to a close but for long he recognized the duty of the intellect to submit to authority in ecclesiastical form. Indeed this Scholasticism is very bold considering the risk its professors ran. The fact is the Church was not thoroughly roused to its dangers. The discussions were confined mainly to learned men and their scholars. They were not entirely beyond the comprehension of the flock, for religious questions were almost the only questions of interest, but the flock was well in control and could be used to rend these wolves if they became too bold. The Church did turn a few over to the secular arm for incineration, but its real persecution was as yet turned away from the Schools which dealt with metaphysics, and was almost exclusively directed toward certain heretical sects that taught practice. But if anyone—from the clerical point of view—deserved burning it was Duns Scotus. He taught pantheism pure and simple. His neither creating nor created as Universal Spirit, his creating not created as Holy Spirit or Logos,

his creating as the vital spirit found in the material world, and his created not creating or matter itself, can be translated to the sphere of Brahmanism and pretty much nowhere else; and yet he fathered it on Christianity! His doctrine was condemned as heretical after grave discussion by the Church as to just what he meant or whether he knew himself what he meant—which was nothing wonderful. He jauntily withdrew it as was the habit in those days, and with a pre-Galilean wink for it was very well understood that the withdrawal was purely formal. His exegetics and casuistical gymnastics were of too great interest to the learned Doctors themselves to purify him with fire and flame. His influence remained until supplanted by another shadowy struggle over Nominalism and Realism; but both show that Scholasticism was a real philosophy, not merely the chopping of logic to which the Church sought to limit it.

Scholasticism reached its highest point in the greatest mind of the middle Ages and one of the great minds in the world's history.* Abelard's position as the representative of the Science of his time was a thoroughly conservative one. At first he made no effort to go outside of the lines laid down for such discussion by the Church. His principle was enunciated in the simplest terms. Wherever reason could be made a handmaid of religion it was perfectly legitimate, even a duty, to support religion by its aid. This meant that in its enunciation of dogma religion must seek the support of reason. He thoroughly admitted that whatever lay beyond the limits of reason was proper ground for pronouncement by the Church alone. Speculation even here was forbidden. It is not hard to see, however, that no matter how good Abelard's intentions were it would not be easy to fix this limit where speculation must end. Abelard claimed to discuss purely theological questions on rational grounds. His doctrines on the nature of the Trinity were made the basis for two widely separated Councils, that of Soissons in 1121 A.D. and of Sens in 1140 A.D. In both cases he was condemned. Science was strong enough to save him from any consequences except that of defeat. Twice he rose from it more formidable than ever, but the last time found him an old and broken man. It seems an irony of fate that his conqueror should have been the monk of Clairvaux—Saint Bernard. Not that Saint Bernard lacked the power, for he was perhaps the greatest political influence in Europe at that time. But he was a wire puller, pure and simple. His statesmanship consisted not in argument but in using every influence at his command to ensure an opponent's defeat. He went into the Council of Sens prepared not for argument on Abelard's positions but to ask for a pre-arranged judgment on extracts from his published works. They were to

* Abelard made a greater mark on his time than later did either Marsilius (1270-1349) or William of Occam (Doctor invincibilis d. 1349). Although Marsilius is almost a modern in his political thought, Abelard is classed as a "conceptualist," hence he is very modern.

be judged not argued. We cannot help winking our eyes a little at this monk of the childhood of our modern civilization and who was so thoroughly a master of all the tricks of our political machinery. And his political methods were as good as theological arguments. The power of the Church lay in its organization. Anything that implied a doubt of its judgment, a limiting of its range, was to be condemned as attacking that organization in which lay its whole power for good. Discussion of any matter relating to the Church was not to be permitted to laymen. When reform was needed in the hierarchy—and he thoroughly admitted the necessity of such reform at the time—it was to come from above. Abelard's destruction was sought by Saint Bernard, not so much for detestation of his doctrine—although this too he condemned as thoroughly heretical—but as a dangerous leader, a fire brand of the Church and one who sought to extend the sphere of the layman. The man who could say—“Science is the gift of God, light of the Spirit, grace from the Divinity. Logic is indispensable to faith for intelligence and for its own defence. If the clergy decry science that is a suggestion of the devil, and therein it happens that they teach to sing words not to understand them; to make their flocks bleat, not to feed them,” was in Saint Bernard's view doubly worthy of condemnation not only as a heretic but as a wolf in the fold disguised as one of the flock. Saints sometimes handle the dead gently, but willingly burn their contemporaries. Saint Bernard could be all gentleness to the mistakes of the past. He could Christianize Virgil and rehabilitate the masterpieces of a past age, but on contemporary error he had no mercy. His own character has been sketched with a few master strokes by Gibbon. “A philosophic age has abolished with too liberal and indiscriminate disdain, the honours of these spiritual heroes. The meanest among them are distinguished by some energies of mind; they were at least superior to their votaries and disciples; and in the race of superstition they attained the prize for which such numbers contended . . . Bernard stood high above his rivals and contemporaries; his compositions are not devoid of wit and eloquence; and he seems to have preserved as much reason and humanity as may be reconciled with the character of a Saint.” When we stop in these modern days to consider the localism and narrow-mindedness displayed once in seven days in so many pulpits; when we see this particularly rampant among evangelical creeds whose boast is that they have succeeded in shaking off the numbing and confining influence of a hierarchy; can we point the finger of scorn at the antiquated figure of Saint Bernard preaching the same system of authority and repression so often advocated to-day?

By any exercise of the imagination could we transfer this scene of the struggle between Abelard and Saint Bernard to Japanese soil? Is there that mental sympathy that could render it comprehensible? I think not. In the West we have a great controversy going on involving the control of a religious organi-

zation. Nominally it is entirely within this organization, which however claims its jurisdiction apart from and untrammelled by the State and claiming exemption from all civil control. It renders unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, but its empire is over the human soul which to Christian dogma takes on a type of accentuated personality very different from the dreamy absorption into the Universal of the religions of the East. It is difficult to disconnect soul and body—in this mundane existence anyhow—and the control of the former is likely to imply the latter. In Japanese thought this interblending of spiritual and material, subject to two separate controls in the sphere of politics, never took form. There was no political stake at issue in their ecclesiastical controversies, which on points of doctrine were limited to that cacophonetical if somewhat facetious term familiar in modern politics as "spell-binding." But there was plenty of dogma in the old Japanese state. It was founded on dogma. Where there are two contending powers some freedom of thought is possible. They have at least to present their claims to their adherents. Where there is but one suppression is absolute—as in the Spain of Philip II, in Old Japan, in the proposed Socialist State. Government in Japan took the place of Church. Its dogma was plain and severe, and as far-reaching into the lives of its subjects as was ever sought by the western Church. It never loosened control in any direction. That the control of such a machine should be an object of ambition is plain enough. Control of the State was the great stake at issue and strenuously they fought for it. All eyes were concentrated on this contest. There was no rival to take advantage of this absorption. The Japanese State therefore ruled supreme. It marked out the limits in which the superfluous mental energy of the people should exhaust itself. Politics were forbidden to such mental energy. In other spheres it soon exhausted the material on hand, which limited to a certain number of combinations was driven to extremes in the matter of detail. This has been a characteristic of Japanese art and literature; very beautiful, highly finished, extremely limited, and very material.

Religion could give but little assistance to the material life. Speculative religion apart from dogma is always connected with philosophy. Indeed its field is part of philosophy. In Japan, as in the Europe of the Middle Ages, its source of supply—in this case Chinese philosophy—soon dried up and it drifted into a dreary Scholasticism or into outrageous superstitions akin to the revived Gnosticism of the ninth and tenth centuries in the West. There is an interesting question here. We can well ask if it was not our battle between Church and State that saved us in the West. It sent men adrift. From the point of refinement there was no comparison between the elegant Japanese courtier of the tenth century and the coarse gowned palmer or even the troubadour of King Rene's court. There was as little between the luxurious court of the Shōgunate and the rough seamen and adventurers—English, Spanish, Portuguese—that were

pushing their way over all the world in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In the West of the tenth century there were no silk clad courtiers and in King Rene's day armour was still far more familiar than silk, but men were getting a very practical view of a wider world and different nations through the buffets of very hard knocks. And in the sixteenth century when silk instead of armour was becoming more the rule and less the exception the important point to us is that they were pushing and progressing everywhere; that there was enough of the old spirit left to make the sympathy between the silk clad courtier and the adventurer very complete—and the terms were often synonymous. There was life, possibility of progress, in the West, and every such contact with a strange world gave men new and often valuable ideas. Europe received its spur to progress from the East. Its philosophers' stones—the literature of the past and the science of the present—lay hidden at Constantinople and among the Arabs.

Japanese scholasticism was partly voluntary. During the early ages the inclusion of the native rather than the exclusion of foreigners was maintained, but foreign ideas were eagerly sought from their great neighbour. The phase of the Japanese mind exhibited at this time is noteworthy. China had at one time a promising development of science. Unfortunately it drifted into that scholasticism which seems a feature of their civilization in all its departments. However, the ideas were new to the Japanese and would have been supposed to strike a chord somewhere in the nimble brain. Not so. They simply adopted wholesale the crude science of their big neighbour and proceeded to learn it without any process of digestion. The question always seems to have been not why a thing was but what it was. An appropriation was not the starting point of a new development. Indeed if we take Japanese civilization, from its origin up to the present Meiji era, it can well be asked—has the Japanese mind ever shown originaive power? It does not brutally copy its original. That is true. It assimilates it to the national taste, a method better adapted for aesthetics than for the mechanical arts and sciences, which bend as little to such national idiosyncrasies as the natural laws on which they are based. But assimilation is not origination. The doughty deeds of modern Japan have been executed by men trained in and trained on the schools of the West. The strength of the western civilization lies in the originaive power. If it should come to an end within a short period and there were only the Japanese of the East—the only eastern man who has shown an understanding of the western spirit—to carry it on, there is not a particle of evidence to show that the world progress would not come to a halt. They have never shown as a factor of their mental equipment that mental process which is behind all the material civilization of the West, and seems to have only been active in the brain of the western Aryan races. It may be there—some think with good ground that it is there—

but it is not to be developed on the old lines. An Abelard was not a possibility in Old Japan. Without science all their thought lacked definition and sharpness. It had exhausted all its possibilities. There was no avenue of escape left for further expansion. In the same way the Greek thought early reached a culminating point, the limiting point for deductive knowledge, but found an escape in the rise of experimental science and the inductive philosophy of modern Europe. Buddhistic philosophy in the East here gave no relief. Karma—dealing with the phenomenal world—is illusion. Buddhism turns away from it. Confucianism made an idol of the past and turned blindly to its worship. How absurd seems this cry now of “back to the philosophy of Old Japan.” A scholasticism trying to direct the modern world. But we have it also in the West in a far more threatening form.

In outward seeming there has been little change from the old position as far as Government is concerned. The old dogma is as much in force as ever. In everything is government interference on the lines of its old paternal rights. Before modern democracy and modern scientific and religious thought this official interpretation of all knowledge is bound to go down. The Bureaucracy can only make an effort to give direction to a system of thought absolutely opposed to the spirit of the past. They are undertaking the task with different purposes but on the same lines as European socialism. Militarism finds ready acceptance in the Japan of to-day because the nation has been trained so exactly to obedience in the past. But modern thought is absolutely opposed to militarism in any form, whether bureaucracy or socialism. Modern thought is based on natural science, and Nature makes use of the individual. Not in her care of him, for as to that she is utterly indifferent, but in her use of him. It is through the individual that she progresses. This is forced on the mind by all the processes of our modern world. Doctor Hadley has shown us that the economic processes of society are not only of slow growth but have been the unconscious choice of society to force out of its units the highest *efficiency* and thus to progress. What is not based on this growth lacks organic coherence and falls apart in practice. We rebel against the brutal law of Nature, even as we realize its necessity. To shut a man's eyes to individualism it is necessary to make his world artificial. He must be enclosed in a Utopia, but unfortunately man's wings are leaden and his Utopia is still on earth and subject to its natural laws. In every school in Japan they are trying to enforce belief in their interpretation of Utopia. This is the old idea of unlimited obedience to authority, which alone has the interpretation of what is right. Such obedience only finds expression in formula and this is pushed to an extreme. Every precaution is taken to emphasize it. At the time of the San Francisco earthquake it is gravely cabled that the emperor's picture had been saved from the consulate. Not a word as to the archives and less as to the office staff. As this interesting

item found due expression and congratulation in the foreign press its emphasis in the native press can be imagined. The more important news (in western eyes) as to the condition of the Japanese living in the stricken city came later. This worship or reverence—it is hard to distinguish between the two—is rigidly enforced as symbolic of due submission and recognition of the head of the modern Shintō, and hence of Authority. About the only thing of value that Shintō gives to this modern state is this link of connection between the old and the new, constantly holding up to the eyes of the nation its connection with the past.

We have to some extent the same thing in the West. There are but few who as parents teach a child to think. They teach it authority, although the two are not incompatible. To tell the truth we are either too stupid or too prejudiced to keep up with the best in the world. Besides, motion on our part requires effort and it is easier to cling to what we think we know than to try and understand the new. And so in many a household the boy is given a cuff on the head and told to do a thing in the old way. This is fairly comprehensible among the mass of humanity. In fact our whole social life is liveable because we think in common. "The purposeful actions of all humanity have become so artificialized as to make the natural physical man subservient to the new man, the *Homo Sapiens*." The instinctive thoughts of society save the individual much trouble. But the same is found in those institutions especially organized to train thought. Our colleges and universities teach all the old superstitions of the race, often to the exclusion of all and any influence considered as possibly hostile to the ideas or prejudices of some man or men of the limited knowledge and ideas of his or their opportunities and brains, or the limited ideas and knowledge of a previous generation. And they are right. Knowledge is a matter of individual research not of general information. How many of our American universities would dare to establish a course of lectures on the Higher Criticism of the old Hebrew books to be carried out side by side on neutral grounds with the old orthodox interpretation. The scholarship is at least as great on one side as another and the student would be supposed to choose the most reasonable; not so readily effected when the destructive critical teaching is entirely directed against one side postulating the right of existence of the other side. The university, however, attempting such a course would soon have to close its doors. The public has no objection—to some extent—to the private researches of the professor, but it states very positively what it wants taught from the professor's chair—even if it is not very reasonable or even if it is totally unreasonable. This illogical position of the public, this unwillingness to hear truth if it grates on its prejudices, may be unfortunate. It is a strongly expressed feature of our American life perhaps through the predominance of evangelical influence in our religious life. Under Roman Catholicism the

repression or one-sided presentation would be so much a matter of fact as not to find any expression at all. But after all the advance of ethics into the field of religion must necessarily be a slow one. It is marked by the influence of higher minds on the lower. Persuasion is a very poor means of making converts. It is on a par with force. As soon as the pressure is relieved the object pressed on flies back and perhaps beyond its old position. Appeal to the understanding is the only permanent means of effecting change, and this is only effective away from the influence of the mob, away from all taint of the "suggestiveness" of the common thought, into those regions where lies the true superiority of man—in his brain.

§ 4.

Wherever we turn we find this same problem of Church and State, the solution of which is sought in so many ways. Savage man and civilized man all find it a stumbling block and try and get rid of it in ways more or less efficient. The savage chiefs silently circle around the tepee of the *shaman* until he sticks his head out on a preliminary reconnaissance and then the nearest proves him to be the brainiest man in the camp by laying them open to inspection. The priest escorts his victim to the funeral pile with all the ceremonial of a Roman Triumph, dear to the circus and the small boy's heart. In these piping days of the peace of liberalism we prefer strangulation, rarely going to extremes, the question being one of finance, and in the terms of modern statesmanship making "the other fellow cough up" all the plunder he has gained by years or perhaps centuries of the same procedure. There is not a gleam of comfort for those who would like to think there has once been a better relation between Church and State. It has been "pull clerk pull devil;" sometimes Church and sometimes State changing roles as stranglor and stranglee. The chiefs are not satisfied with the brains of the *shaman*. They want his "medicine" too, and they plunder his tent thereby recovering a good part of their own property. In the old monarchies of Egypt and Assyria, priest and king made mutual use of each other. One Egyptian monarch thought differently. He was either a Liberal or a hog. At all events his descendants went barefooted and were beggars, and the priests rubbed their hands slyly over the experiment and the lesson. Neither was repeated in the long history of Egypt.* Mediæval Europe showed many instances of a similar character. Unfortunately these pictures of statecraft and priestcraft instead of degeneration from a better state show the reverse. The smoking altars of Jahweh at one time bore

* Amenophis IV or Khu-n-Aten.

human victims not the flesh of rams and of pigeons. The sacrifice of Iphigenia is not a mere myth. Assyria and Egypt and distant Mexico show the same; and as priest and parishioners sat down later and consumed the burnt offering; so known examples of later date lead us to draw the conclusion that these old peoples did the same with these human offerings.* Indeed of all the institutions of man there is none so strictly conditioned by the material as religion. These old religions had their ideals. Their gods were their heroes, and as their range of knowledge of the universe widened so did the control over that universe possessed by these divine beings elevate them above their more anthropomorphic presentment. But knowledge and material civilization both increase, and civilization and religion interact on each other. All the elements were woven into both in these olden times. With their settlements in the plains, with the evolution of the cities whose moral corruption has become a byword among nations, the old primitive worship of nomads took on a darker hue. Bloody and cruel before it added to itself not only a real philosophy gained from wider knowledge but a moral corruption gained from the herding together of men in cities. We see the same contrast to-day between the small and the large community. It is one of our great problems. Common sense, a better knowledge of the commercial value of a man, substituted animal sacrifice for human sacrifice on the Assyrian altars, but the reason of this substitution was material not moral. Israel and the worship of Jahweh had greatly changed but at the pinch of national distress Jephthah's daughter had to ascend the altar of sacrifice. A nomad life is far more favourable in some respects than civilized life to the development of a high ideal. At all events this ideal is simpler and the paraphernalia of worship must necessarily be easily transferred from place to place. Whenever they began to think, and whatever thoughts sprang up in the heads of such a people as to the nature of the universe, they were at least untainted with the more material surroundings of civilization. It was an idealized ideal of this old nomad life that was continually kept before the eyes of Israel by their prophets. What was never lost sight of was the responsibility of man to man—the element of contract, which becomes a necessity of their later civilization and must be accentuated if men are to live together; but these relations were

* Well meant efforts to trace cannibalism to religious intents—as eating an enemy's heart or drinking his blood as a specific to gain his courage—are unfortunately not borne out by the facts. Not only the specific parts are eaten but the whole victim, and the Maori wars were associated directly with periods of food scarcity. A famine made weaker tribes tremble. Cannibalism is extremely ancient, the bones of palaeolithic man are found scorched and cracked open to extract the marrow. Every people have been tainted with it. Legends, one of which is perpetuated by the anthropophagic statue of the Kindlifresser-Brunnen in Berne, are a reminiscence of it in our own race. And we have many such tales of flesh eating gods. Its religious intent is more likely to have been secondary than primary.

subject to the approval of God, and as society to exist must establish just treatment between its units so this God had to become a just God.

Its religions hold up before us therefore a mirror in which we see a reflection of the mind of Old Japan. Wherever there is controversy we get a one sided picture, but we can also see in the distorted vision of the victor at least an opinion of what was meant by the defeated. Japan is a better field than most nations. Its struggle was not purely religious. It was a struggle for the fleshpots, and this accomplished the victor made use of the vanquished. It did not and could not accomplish utter destruction. The old Shintō shows us a people of very primitive religious thought. What legal code, however, these people had was found entirely in the ritual. This throws a bright stream of light into their civilization. There was punishment in the old law of Shintō. But for what? For violation of ceremonial purity, not moral purity. This never enters in at all. They apparently possessed a law of vendetta which was sufficient for those offences which do not fall within that technical code of custom or law necessary for the preservation of orderly relations between man and man in any community, and which as customs have often nothing at all to do with morals. An instance is the injunction of Confucius—that a man shall not endure the presence of his father's slayer, a precept probably original also with the Japanese. Punishment to a considerable extent lay in private hands, and all through the Nihongi and Kojiki this element of personal enforcement of retribution is marked. But as far as Church and State—here the same—were concerned the punishment was purely and simply to avert from the people at large the wrath of the Gods brought on by the misdeeds of the offender. The gravest offences were directed against the ceremonial. As with the old Roman practice, the slightest variation in this ceremonial form vitiated the whole procedure. Other offences were directed against an agricultural people; breaking down the divisions of the rice fields, destroying the storage reservoirs so necessary for cultivation of rice, sowing seed in the midst of a growing crop and thereby stifling it with tares, removing their neighbours' land-marks; all these treated only in the sense of their offence against the Gods. Offences against the person were regarded in the same light. Assault, injury, especially the shedding of blood, caused personal impurity and necessitated personal purification. Practically the only other offences—the sexual relations—involved the same idea. Vicious practices of this character are most mistakenly connected with the highest civilizations. They are practised high and low, and the unnatural vices of classic Greece are habitual accompaniments of the degraded ceremonies and practices of initiation among the Australian tribes. Old Japan was no exception, and it is to the credit of its ancient deities that they required purification rather than practice in such cases.* It

* The cisibisism of certain orgies and *Saturnalia* connected with phallic worship finds an explanation in the desire to sink one's identity in the mass. See Mr. Crawley's "Mystic Rose" p. 279 Seq.

can be seen, however, that such purely dogmatic treatment of the religious code, and a dogma in which the ethical element is so small, would indicate or give rise to a peculiar mental stamp of the people that followed its practice. This was their practice of religion. It is claimed by many that it is their practice to-day. Buddhism was to give little aid on this point. It did not disturb in any sense the ideas of the Japanese people as to the practice of religion. It substituted its Buddhas for Shintō deities, carefully explaining that it was not a substitution but a baptism in which they received a new name rather than a new nature. In its metaphysic it gave the Japanese an outlet for thought; something sadly needed where politics were tabooed, and art and literature tended to become mechanical. Japanese art, especially its painting, is described as "impressionist." Very true; but "impressionism" does not imply thought, although the general opinion may be that it does. On the contrary it implies a wide spread use of formula, and it is this knowledge of the formula that enables the onlooker to fill in the details of the landscape or portrait sketched in a few strong lines. Buddhism could do little to alter the set of the Japanese mind. It lacked any strong accentuation of the positive and negative—the good and evil—principle in the universe. Its evil was Karma—illusion.

Buddhism and Brahmanism are the two dominant ethical religious systems of the East, the one losing itself in metaphysics and the other in ceremonial. The radical defect of Buddhism, excess on the metaphysical side, has made itself felt in all eastern civilization. The Chinese suspicious of its tendencies and hence only reversely influenced by it have become more and more wedded to their materialistic philosophy. This is purely practical but the reverse of scientific. The Chinaman is a hopeful subject from the scientific point of view. There will be no difficulty in opening his eyes as to the useful side of science. But for pure science, that form of it which is entirely devoted to the reason of things without any reference to their immediate practical application, he will show but little aptitude, unless connected with a Government job. Communism in China has developed the most intense form of individualism to be found anywhere; and only the worst side of it. This is inevitable where instead of the individuals neutralizing each other the whole mass is directed by an official Bureaucracy, and hence to the individual the main thing is to get the ear of that direction with all the attendant implication of favouritism, bribery, and graft. Immersed in a struggle in which individual acquisition counts for much and individual development counts for nothing, he is literally bound to the things of this earth as they apply to him personally and he has no thought or wish for anything else. He seems to have originally possessed, or he has developed, a coarseness of nerve fibre that leaves him unshaken and untouched by stimulants that would wreck any other people. He swallows alcohol like water and smokes a narcotic that would in a short

time make a nervous wreck of a more delicate organization. As a matter of fact the two drugs to some extent might neutralize each other but he does not try to neutralize them. He takes to one or the other indifferently and without apparent effect. It is true that opium does much harm in China; but the amount of harm it would do if indulged in to the same extent by the western man swells out of sight. On callous nerves of this class of civilization appeal to the abstract or the metaphysical is almost useless. He looks largely to the practical application of what is offered, and finding it not of such practical application casts it aside at once. His nearest prototype in the West is, or was, in our own America. The difference lies in the type of individualism which here has been a development and expansion of the mental power not a concentration into one narrow material range. Pure science has a stronger foothold in America than it used to have, but it is not to be disguised that almost the whole object of our scientific education is directed toward its practical use. Devotion to pure science is regarded with a feeling of kindly contempt, and its devotee as a harmless crank. Sums are given to our schools and colleges for the equipment of laboratories in which it is stipulated shall be taught practical chemistry, and physics, and engineering; but little is given to the laboratories devoted to pure science. The American takes this stand, however, for very different reasons than the Chinaman. To him everything is bound up in mental development and fruitful originality. Where that fruitful originality commands profit he naturally turns; and it is not contempt for pure science but it is the hunt for the "almighty dollar" that blunts his vision. Philosophy has nothing to do with it. Europe supplies the fount of his pure science and he puts it to practical application. If there was no one to furnish the supply pure science would be a source of the almighty dollar too, and would open a career to him. It does so in the case of a few of the better endowed professorships, and in a few men who with the means of living have chosen to defy public opinion by turning to such pursuits instead of piling up more. The public pities them and it is fair to say appreciates them; which appreciation they deserve, for small as is their number they have held up honourably the country's name on many a foreign "fenced field" of science. From Count Rumford and Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Henry and to Joseph Leidy and Joseph Le Conte, to which a long list can be added including many living names, the field of pure science has found many brilliant exponents in America.

The Japanese also is widely different from the Chinaman. His highly strung temperament is but little adapted to the materialistic philosophy that he adopted. Out of Chinese pessimism he developed Bushidō which is anything but pessimistic. Out of a negative creed he developed a positive creed. It was not a metamorphosis of material he effected. It was a new point of view never suspected by the Chinaman. He easily exhausted

his new material and stopped, thereby illustrating a law of development—that it is not possible to make something out of nothing. To effect recombination he had to reconstruct his mode of thinking, but that was not possible as there was no inkling from any system known to him to give him the hint in which direction he was to find the clue. The genius might have pointed the way but the genius was crushed down by the existing system. It could reach no development. It is somewhat unfortunate that the Japanese has waked up into an age of pessimism. He has had enough of that in his own past which is filled with the spirit of distrust. He should have entered the field of nations when man felt capable of anything. When there was a world to conquer and develop, not simply methods of commercial exploiting of other nations. That generous age is now almost a myth. We are at one of those stages of the world's history where science discovers new applications rather than new ideas. Radium and the corpuscular theory of the ether are wonderful discoveries on the lines of ideas already developed. But they have not altered by a jot the lines of modern thought. They are not like the discovery of the application of steam to manufactures; thereby changing and disarranging the whole economic supply of the world, multiplying the capacity of man a thousand fold and raising that very practical question of modern times—to whom shall go the profit and how shall it be distributed.

"The Semitic mind and intellect have appeared as hostile to experimental science and research into the mechanical causes of the world. In appearance nearer than Paganism to the rational conception of the universe, the theology of the nomad Semite, transported into scholastic minds, has been in reality more injurious to positive science than polytheism. Paganism persecuted science less bitterly than the monotheistic religions originating with the Semites. Islam was the destruction of positive philosophy, which attempted to struggle into being among some of the peoples which it had subjected. Christian theology, with its Bible, has, for the last three centuries, been the worst enemy of science." Only as far as the dogma of Government applied to the conduct of the individual can this dictum of Renan be applied to the Japanese State. From all such restrictions as are based on theology the Japanese have been substantially free. Indirectly, in restricting intercourse with the outside, this dogma frightfully hampered the Japanese mind, but had it been capable of developing modern science or philosophy from its available materials it was at full liberty to do so. Restriction applied only to politics, and it was exclusion and inclusion in this relation that injured Japanese development. Otherwise they were free as air to develop all the metaphysical and scientific systems they pleased, a feat quite possible without poaching on the field of politics although not without poaching on the field of religion. This honourable position has always been maintained by the Japanese Government.

Indeed it is almost an exception in this respect to-day, for most Governments restrict both religious and political discussions, especially on the continent of Europe where a State Church and the existing social condition is protected against the assaults of malcontents; not a very efficient or valuable means of protection as repression has usually the reverse effect of that intended. The freest discussion soon shows the holes in an unsound argument, and any other course shows weakness not strength. The most marked feature of our western religions is the assurance with which they regard themselves as right and everybody else as wrong. This could be called the Egotism of Religions, and as there have often been blind leaders of the blind it has led to disastrous results. Religions accept the dogma to the full that man is a gregarious animal. Straying from the flock or the herd is dangerous and the limits have been not always wisely defined and sometimes have been rashly and too sharply defined. Dogmas should never enter into the general. Like the Decalogue they should stick to a few simple axiomatic truths. The other field is too broad for them and they are sure to trip and fall on their nose. It is impossible to give a new interpretation to a specific fact, and efforts at reconciliation are simply a false step and cause of rejoicing to the ungodly. There is enough morality and philosophical truth in the old Hebrew books to carry them through without trying to make it support a whole mass of primitive history, primitive science, and primitive ethnology; all the work of men who were abnormally ignorant even for their time. The tenth chapter of Genesis has been very thoroughly thrashed out in these later days. What mainly appears in this interesting account of ancient ethnography is the ignorance, radical prejudice, malice, and inconsistencies of the writers—there were several—and of the compilers who dovetailed these accounts. The priestly writer, as he is usually called, in the opening chapter of Genesis has given us an old Accadian myth, but he has given it in a form which, as literature, will live for ever. The view point of God changes from place to place all through the Old Testament, but that does not prevent the acknowledgment that the final result is an ideal of a just and well wishing God not approached in any other sacred books. Christianity has developed it as a personal God with stronger anthropomorphic traits than are found in the Jewish Scriptures, but perhaps this is the more available and influential form in which to reach the great mass of men. The view of a just God, however, has had little real influence among men. It was not the God of the prophets that entered into western life. It was the Jahweh of the Temple of the Jerusalem hierarchy. Jahweh had abandoned his human sacrifices and burnt offerings but he remained as a political force; a point of view thoroughly familiar to the western mind and to which they were prepared to give a world wide development. Religion entering into politics had to adopt the methods of politics. Now to secular authority the

and justifies the means. There has always been a great outcry against Machiavelli because he openly stated what all statesmen before and since his time have practiced. Public ethics are *not* private ethics. There is of course always a call to reconcile the two. This reconciliation we owe—to the Church! Casuistry reached its highest development among the ecclesiastical writers of the seventeenth century, especially Spanish. Casuistry is simply the balancing of good and evil. Nearly all our actions are more or less mixed, and tainted with the questionable. The nice point with the Spanish casuists was to lay down how far the questionable methods could be justified by the unimpeachable desirable results, not only from a personal but from a moral point of view. A regular code was so drawn up; and such a code was very necessary for without it there is always danger of making the personal end very large but the moral end very small, and then claiming the benefit of clergy so to speak.* They found plenty of material to afford them exercise. State and Church politics had long practised it before it was put into a formula. The ends of the king as State and the king as person had become so confused that the terms royalty and prevarication were practically synonymous; a notable example being found on English soil. The king lost his head and his earthly crown but he gained a heavenly crown. If his legs had been longer, his tongue shorter, and his luck better, he might have avoided the scaffold and the saintship. For neither of which it is to be confessed he showed any marked preference in life. The fortunate removal of latter day monarchs from the more active field of politics, and the interposition of a responsible minister, has freed them from any necessary connection with the "casuistry" of modern statesmanship.

At a certain stage of man's progress this entrance of the Church into politics is not without value. The early history of every nation is that of brute force. Ecclesiasticism also by no means is averse to carnal weapons, but its powers not being of this world quickly lead it to appreciate this far more effective weapon which enables it to act on men through control over their minds as well as their bodies. This soon relegates brute force to the position of a mere instrument of mind. There is not a State that does not show this early control of the priest, and it is to him that is owing this introduction of priestcraft into State politics. In time the secular displaces the ecclesiastical power, but not before the empire of mind over matter has been established. Cunning and diplomacy become then the weapons of layman as well as of priest, and the rivalry between the two

* An ancient and harmless and still disputed question is the famous instance cited in Chap. XII, Book III of Cicero's "Offices"—in reference to the corn merchant and the Rhodians. Ecclesiastical casuistry did not always deal with similarly harmless subjects.

never allow these qualities to fall into neglect.* Brains directing the brute force of the State have opened a career to brains in the State. Combining the two the secular power has the supremacy. Brains are now the only source of power to the Church in most countries, and it is noticeable that they are more in evidence in countries where it is a political factor. Elsewhere the priesthood can be charged with being a little more book-learned than their parishioners. The parson or the minister is rarely a diplomat; the priest is often the real secular head, in fact if not in title, of his parish. Under these conditions of contest in the world there is an eager search everywhere for new ideas, which simply means men capable of evolving new ideas. This has put everywhere a premium on men of brains which wherever found have long had a market value. Science it should be said sometimes makes a discovery. Her real sphere, however, is explanation. What we hear so much of now as "suggestion"—the starting of a common thought in the minds of a mass of men, association with that thought of action in a certain direction, an automatism which dispenses the great mob from the trouble of thinking and brings them to the level therein of greater minds—this has long been appreciated and practiced since the beginning of history, perhaps of time as far as man is concerned. Power has always been to the man able to make successful use of this "suggestion" on the masses. There is not one in a hundred of us who does any real thinking. We take things at second hand. It is this "suggestive" man which great ruling organizations are seeking or trying to suppress, according to his attitude to them. It is admirably instanced in a phase of modern religion which is either hypocrisy or hysterics. It is hypocrisy where it seeks power; calling on men to abandon the things of this earth and taking those earthly things into its own broad bosom; claiming this as a right and as a means of propaganda, and showing not

* And some other qualities as the following story taken from Holinshed's chronicle of Richard Cœur de Lion shows:—"Hereof it came on a time, whiles the king sojourned in France about his warres, which he held against king Philip, there came unto him a French priest, whose name was Fulco, who required the king in anywise to put from him three abominable daughters which he had, and to bestow them in marriage least God punished him for them. 'Thou liest, hypocrite (said the king), to thy verie face; for all the world knoweth I have not one daughter.' 'I lie not (said the priest), for thou hast three daughters one of them is called Pride, the Second Covetousnesse, and the third Lecherie.' With that the king called to him his lords and barons, and said to them, 'This hypocrite heere hath required me to marry awaie my three daughters, which (as he saith) I cherish, nourish, foster, and mainteine; that is to say Pride, Covetousnesse, and Lecherie; and now I have found out necessarie and fit husbands for them, I will do it with effect, and seeke no more delaies. I therefore bequeth my pride to the high minded Templars and Hospitallers, which are proud as Lucifer himselfe; my covetousnesse I give unto the White Monks, otherwise called of the Cisteaux Order, for they covet the divell and all; my Lecherie I commit to the prelates of the church, who have most pleasure and felicitie therein.'" Bohn's ed.

example but the extension of the secular spirit among the very body sworn to its suppression. The mendicant orders were the protest against this hypocrisy and their own fall from grace simply showed how little they understood human nature. Religion is hysterics where it is unable to draw the line of the unknowable; where it rejects the common sense experience of its daily life to put in practice its crude ideas about the unknowable; with the usual result of a fearful tumble into reality as soon as the nervous crisis aroused by some fellow with a gift of gab and power of "suggestion"—a "magnetic speaker"—has burnt itself out and left the victim rather ashamed of his personal exhibition of himself. The first is exhibited by a great ecclesiastical organization, which at least is a matter of cooler thought. The second by the nigger camp meeting or the revival, or by Lourdes and Loretto, and which simply act through nervous discharge—and perform miracles!

The cool thoughtful practice of religion is extremely uncommon and truly valuable where it is found. There are such men, and they are mostly marked men if not men of mark. But we cannot give the credit of this cooler thoughtful religion to the man who writes an essay on "Free Will" on Wednesday and leads a "revival" of howling dervishes on Sunday. Religion is too largely emotional to be reasonable. Some features of pulpit misrepresentation could also well be omitted. "I am always very well pleased with a country Sunday; and think, if keeping holy the Seventh Day were only a human institution it would be the best Method that could have been thought of for the polishing and civilizing of Mankind." No one could take exception to this in the mouth of the Spectator. He wrote with the light of his time. But when we hear the old Acadian practice claimed and vaunted as the original institution and gift of Hebraism to Christianity and to the world—and this claim is made constantly from the pulpit and especially in the East—we can well question the sincerity of him who makes it. Among the Hebrews it is confessedly an institution of the Exodus. Originality it can be added is not likely, for the institution was widely established through western Asia centuries before the Exodus. The claim of original establishment in the tenth century B.C. of an institution long known and practised by highly civilized peoples, as made for a people just emerging at that time out of barbarism and who by their own legendary history of the patriarchs had been brought into intimate contact with the Mesopotamian peoples, is not only improbable but is inconsistent. The less heard of this claim the better. The seventh day has been a day of rest for more than six thousand years. The term "rest" is still a matter of dispute and is interpreted differently in Paris and in "Thrums."*

The great phenomena of nature are a secondary object of interest to the primitive man of to-day, and it is unlikely that

* Cf. Dr. Sayce—"History of the Early Hebrews," p. 193 on the Babylonian Sabbath.

they were an immediate object of worship to him in the past. His superstition seeks a much more practical object than anything so far out of reach as sun, moon, and stars. He seeks something more immediately within reach. And so the African or the Australian sets up his fetish of stocks and stones, and if it does not answer his prayers he chastises it as unmercifully as Mr. Quilp chastised the wooden counterfeit of the unfortunate Kit. But there is one event which imposes itself on him at first hand—death. The varying stages of unconsciousness, such as dreams or insanity, are mixed up and confused in his mind with this longer absence of all as Mr. Spencer interprets it. Religion necessarily revolves around death; the religion of the savage especially does so for to him there is no natural death and he continues this world into a next and hence develops his anthropomorphic gods. Science and higher religion of course interpret death differently, for the first is based on induction from fact whereas the second is based on deduction from theory. The first can get on the right road. The second can only get on the right road through a lucky guess and in so far as their theory happens to coincide with fact. Even in such case they are as likely to go off the track again as to keep on it. But it is noticeable that one of the reasonable and therefore enduring features of the eastern religions is in their approach to the interpretation of science; an approach on which they lay emphasis. The pantheism of Brahmanism and Buddhism, with their metempsychosis, is very close to some fundamental laws of science. What is the ultimate constitution of matter science does not pretend to say but the latest theory based on investigation of the ether, almost splitting up our more material atoms into that universal mysterious factor known as "force," has brought the corpuscular theory of matter and the theory of vortices into very close proximity. Science expects that at least the various forms of force—electricity, magnetism, chemism, gravitation—will be co-ordinated, and dreams that they may be shown to be manifestations of one and the same. The ultimate problem is of course insoluble because man is limited by his very nature, his only means of contact with the world "as Will and Idea" being through his sense perceptions. In spite of itself Christianity is feeling this influence more and more, and in its interpretation of divinity is drawing nearer and nearer to the great eastern religions. The intensely anthropomorphic God of the early church is disappearing in the minds of religious thinkers. The ancient Elohim, the gods of wind and flame, purified by modern thought, are again coming forward. There is one question raised in reference to Christianity that is not without interest. It has been said that with its dogma of eternal punishment of the wicked in another world it has made cowards of men, inasmuch as no man feels at ease in his mind as to his chances hereafter. Islamism seems to have handled the question much more boldly and positively in promising life eternal to the believer. But there is little real difference. As

much fanaticism has been displayed in Christian as in Moslem wars; and the spirit that actuated the monk, Jacques Clement, to drive a dagger into the heart of the French king was seeking not the same but a kindred reward to that which was the object of the Assassins. All religion must make patriotism a virtue and hence a reward. And Christianity preaches the national crusade with all the vigour it preached the church crusades of the Middle Ages. To this day Jahweh is a national God, just as he was a national God to the Hebrews of old; and men stream into or out of his temples, their banners and themselves blessed in the coming fray in which they are to tear each other in pieces. Christianity makes no cowards. It is the half believer, afraid of hell and afraid it may exist, with but little confidence in the assurances of his ghostly counsellors and the blessing his cause has received, that shrinks back on religious grounds. There are not many of them. The large majority in their hearts would never damn the believer who has wiped out by his state of beatitude and a soldier's death for country's sake any sins he may have committed. The country's cause is sacred and sanctifies everything it touches. Some sects damn the majority anyhow, and confine blessedness to the elect, in which case it makes but little difference to the majority; and it comes down to the plain ground which is the real influence at the bottom of all shrinking from death and which is equally distributed among all nations, East and West—self preservation.

The positive quality of Islam—the promise of future happiness to all believers who fall in cause of God and the Church—is therefore found, more or less diluted, in all nations; but it is the fatalism of the Arab that makes it formidable. When it is God's will the Arab will perish and not before, and therefore nothing he can do will hasten or avert the catastrophe. In the Far East religions do not preach this doctrine. They preach that man's lot is fixed in this world; that he has a duty to perform and that it cannot be avoided. He must take all the consequences of his position. In civil as well as in military life he is a soldier. This is the only form of fatalism in Japan and China. It is a fatalism due to government and not to religion. It is the hopelessness of escape, not any idea that their career is to be cut short at a certain time that leads to their impassive attitude at a crisis. Predestination is not a favourite doctrine of the East. Divinity is too impersonal for that. The Buddha knows all—past and present—but Nirvana is no stimulant to activity.

East and West we cling to our dead, in the present just as in the past, handing down old superstitions whose origin is lost in the mists of time but of which we have the prototypes under our eyes in the practice of savage peoples, or even have it preserved in the historical records of our own past. Offerings to the dead are common to all nations, and in East and West is still found the sense of sacrifice; modified it is true, but we feel in our hearts that our act in laying flowers on the grave at Easter is pleasing to the dead, otherwise it would have but little meaning or would

be a vain self-seeking to the eyes of onlookers. The East makes its sacrifices to the dead at its Easter or Feast of the Dead when the dead rise and again visit their descendants, not to partake but to enjoy the greenness of their memory and the essence of the offerings made to them. Of course we smile, even get angry, at these practices among other peoples than ourselves. We pity the lack of foresight of the Roman who made provision for the "eternal" care of tombs. And we are possessed of the same shortness of vision in our times in doing exactly the same thing. What difference does it make that history teaches us that such care is of uncertain perhaps very short duration; that man's memory can only be preserved for a length of time that is a vanishing point in the world's history? What real object is there in making any distinction between a hundred years and a thousand years? As history which touches our lives so intimately can teach us little, so science can be said to teach us nothing. The geological record shows us the vanity of the hopes even of the race, let alone the hopes of nations and peoples. It goes still further. It shows us a universe in which our little world is the merest vanishing point, and teaches us the folly of making that representative of nothing the culmination of everything. The difficulty lies in our own brains. The "idealism" of philosophy has a sound basis. We can only weave our own little world—a purely phenomenal world—within our own brain. We cannot step out of it. We must even think within the limitations of words. We must conceive God and the World within the terms which are comprehensible to us. Comprehensible and hence capable of expression in *our* terms. A new thought is simply a new combination. The connection between two old thoughts is grasped and gives rise to a new term. Every label attached to a fresh phenomenon carries with it this stamp of the old. It is another turn of the kaleidoscope. We cannot understand the Universe so we invent fairy tales to explain it. Man's brain is too limited to see beyond the end of his nose. Our fate is written large in Nature but we refuse to read it.

§ 5.

The real power of religion, to-day as in the past, lies in man's yearning for an extension of this personal existence of his. This is more accentuated as man's appetites are perhaps more sharply set to an enjoyment of which he gets so little in this world that he feels it must exist in another world. He rarely appreciates that this thought of pleasure is the *mirage* that Nature holds up before his eyes to keep up his efforts for life. Savage races, whose ideal range is much more limited to the practical affairs of life, possess less of the feeling. Their future lives are akin to their earthly lives. These being often not

overly pleasant they are willing in some cases to put a limitation on such period in the future. Something of this primitive idea is seen in the popular idea of the Greek Hades, where the ghosts have anything but a pleasant time of it. This is evidently an inheritance—perhaps somewhat developed—from their primitive condition, and with the higher philosophical thought of the Universe more cheerful elements were added to the classic hell. The Elysian fields were not a feature in the *Odyssey*. Men therefore felt they must have a future before them and beyond this life. If for nothing else than in some way to make up for its kicks and cuffs and palpable injustice. Theoretically speaking the eastern religions seek the annihilation of the personality in the Universal Element, but practically it is doubtful if the average Buddhist wishes for anything of the kind. It is safe to say that nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand have a sneaking hope and expectation (perhaps certainty) that they have sinned enough in their present life to have another chance again in the world of illusion.* The candidate for Buddhahood is indeed one of the elect. Now the great mass of mankind have not only no thought but no power of thought. But they have tremendous yearnings. The practical affairs of life, its politics, they can control with the operations of their hands. They can blunder and correct those blunders as best they can. But they have no such power over things purely of the brain, and hence they turn to those whom they think do possess that qualification. In this has lain the strength of the priesthood. Their position has changed with time. At first they had all the learning and the mob had none whatever. The gap between master and man was wide and impassable. Religion therefore consisted in dogma pure and simple. Indeed there was no reason to which to appeal. The spread of scientific and secular learning to the layman has brought a superficial knowledge of a wide range within reach of the masses. It does not go very deep, but through newspapers and magazines it is widely spread especially in modern times, and it has aroused the inquiring spirit. This new spirit must be met in a new way. Until recently this was not the case. The priesthood have been marked by their scholasticism. They were not only a conservative element; they sought to make use of repression, a favourite idea still with reactionary clericalism as shown by the programme laid down by one of its socialistic bishops, Bishop Ketteler of Mainz. This, however, is merely the programme of a reactionary party. The advance has been sounded even in clerical circles, the appeal is made to man's reasonable side, religion is becoming not only didactic but argumentative. The old dialectic of the schoolmen must be stretched to take in latter day facts, for dogma cannot forsake its old dialectic. In that respect the Church is tenaciously conservative, even unchangeable. Un-

* Popular Buddhism; the metaphysics of Buddhism deny the immortality of the individual soul.

consciously it does change, and the ethical element in sermons is becoming more and more prominent. The hope of the future lies in the extension of ethics. Science has no quarrel with religion properly speaking. Religion is out of that sphere which simply deals with the cold hard facts of the Universe, physical and mental, and seeks to explain them. In its sphere science is in search of truth, and in its sphere it must rule and dogma must go. In this sphere religion must become scientific. Any positive statements relating thereto must be well understood to be allegory, merely convenient means of teaching and of memorizing the extension of our knowledge of the world. It cannot dogmatize in the field of science. It is sure to be found out, and discovery is fatal where claim to infallibility is made and where such claim is soon upset by evidence palpable to the eyes of all but the stupidest. The political church is of course willing to rule through the stupidest, through any repressive force available to its hand, but there is a spiritual element that is not so willing. At least let us hope so.

The true spirit in which the question is to be approached has been indicated by Thoreau. "The language of excitement is at best picturesque merely. You must be calm before you can utter oracles. What was the excitement of the Delphic priestess compared with the calm wisdom of Socrates?—or whoever it was that was wise.—Enthusiasm is a supernatural serenity." But this is not the spirit in which it is approached even in these days of supposed scepticism and "sweet reasonableness." The only principle of action everywhere prevalent is prejudice. There is not the slightest wish to hear the argument on the other side. Meetings are called now-a-days to lay a certain position before the public. The whole programme is carefully arranged for the most effective presentation of such position and the necessary "firing of heart" of the hearers. No cold water is to be allowed in the presence of this graduated enthusiasm. Even a stockholders' meeting must be arranged. Any discordant element is carefully suppressed, or "bounced" if it makes itself heard. It is a gross offence to thus jar the logical development of the object sought to be obtained by public means. The old-fashioned debating society in politics or religion has gone out of fashion, and advantage is taken of the fact that we rarely read what does not please us but we often have to hear things that are anything but savoury. Reading is a matter of private choice, but hearing is often beyond our control. No religious body can point the finger of scorn at any other in this matter. The Roman Church takes the more positive ground and simply forbids certain fields of discussion to its lay members. In those fields they are allowed to hear but one side—their side. Many evangelical churches are no better. They keep quite as rigid a control over the thoughts and actions of their members. There is a system of espionage carried out that is most degrading in its effect; blunting the mind by confining it within the narrowest channels, and spreading habits of interference with

others that have a wide reaching effect in other fields far more important than "the chapel." A shining instance is found in the non-conformist religious bodies in Wales; and in many small towns in America, especially in the central West. It is impossible for the victim to escape from his environment. Not only all his religious but all his material interests are bound up in his church, for the church is the town. The same set of men who guide the church-meeting are found in the town council chamber, and they carry with them into the council the religious prejudices gained in the meeting. There is no tyranny worse than such a small community for there is no appeal from it. In the case of a great Church there is at least the far wider range of thought to be found within its limits. These prejudiced little centres of evangelical thought are, moreover, a positive danger to the community at large. No discussion is allowed in them for they are as dogmatic as Rome itself. Narrowly local, with the greater part of their time occupied with the daily affairs of their lives, they have but little time to devote to theories of government, church or other kinds. Hence they are far more ignorant than any hierarchy which at least has the leisure to devote to the questions before it. Supposedly congregational the real power lies in the hands of a few men surrounding the pastor, chosen to suit the tastes of the congregation in the religious field and radiating such a strong influence as to have at least the power to influence choice of their successors. The whole spirit is shown in the mixture of the social and religious life, whereas the latter when truly earnest requires a grave and separate consideration apart from any outside influences. There is no more real religion in many of these little church organization meetings than there is in a "corn husking party." Their real danger, however, lies in carrying their religion into politics. The world has learned that this connection is dangerous and has been at some trouble of war and bloodshed to separate the two fields. In this sense these reactionary tendencies of the evangelical sects is thoroughly bad and to be regretted. Religion has no place in the Town Hall.

There is a very nice question here involving perhaps a little exercise of casuistry on all sides. Is paganism dead yet? Most people as far as the West is concerned would answer "yes" at once; but the term is not here used in the narrower sense of being the worship of God in some other form than that practised by the questioner. To the West of course the East is pagan, and it loudly proclaims the fact. The East has exactly the same feeling as to the West and is too polite to proclaim it, or rather their indifference to propaganda in any form appealing to the emotions rather than to the intellect gives their religion a more passive tone. Religious propaganda in the East consists in converting the ruling power. The people must follow or take the consequences. Paganism is here taken to be that form of religion which worships divinity through visible objects whether of Nature's or man's manufacture, whether a mountain or a

mannikin. It is to be remembered that the early Christian church never denied the existence of the pagan gods. They attributed their manifestations to the fallen angels acting in these rôles and deceiving mankind. Their worship was therefore a devil worship and it took centuries for the old gods to be so forgotten as to reappear under new names, of which Saint Nicholas—Odin—is a familiar instance. This localizing of worship is absolutely essential for the narrower minds of the mass of humanity. It was too strong for the Christian church. It early forced on it the worship of saints which in many cases simply appropriated the ceremonies attached to the worship of the old heathen local god. It early forced on the actual worship of images. The excuse is often made that it is not a worship of the image, which is supposed to be merely a representation to enable the idea to be more readily grasped by the ignorant. The possible individuality of each of these images is glossed over by the unfashionable omnipresence which is an attribute of a divinity whose powers are not to be limited by human understanding. This idea of representation can be granted for the upper classes (not always) and the educated, but is not the case with the lower classes. The virtue of the Bambina at Rome, or of the Virgins of Lourdes and Loretto, lies strictly in the image. Where the image goes there lies the virtue which is the source of appeal and nowhere else. When the Mother and Child leave their accustomed niche in the church the virtue has gone out of it only to be restored on their return. Indeed in the West we cannot point the finger of scorn at the East, for the same symbolism, understood by the initiated, underlies the frowning countenance of Emma-ô, god of hell, and the gentle face of Jizôzama, the god of children. Perhaps the Japanese peasant has rather the best of the argument, for if his gods haunt certain places it is rather in the wider expanse of the open air than in the confined limits of a wooden image. He regards the latter as being capable of becoming animated at times by the descent of the god within it, and by its becoming his temporary resting place. The phenomenon of "possession" (hypnotism) described by Mr. Lowell is based on this belief. There is not that feeling of reverential awe of the image itself as a living being which makes the nun handle the infant Jesus or put on the gala robes of Mary with such tender care; nor is it that feeling of respectful terror of the peasant toward the wooden image apart from any appeal to it for protection or aid. This possibility of descent, however, and the fact that the image becomes the earthly and favourite means of representation of the god brings him within measureable distance of such feeling. Particularly if the image is a big one, for size is always impressive. The gods in this way play many a prank on poor mortals. More than one Japanese hero thus traces his ancestry to divine descent. The great Benkei, according to one legend, traced his paternity to a Nyô who had taken advantage of his mother rendered unconscious by heavy sleep. There are a number of superstitious rife among our Protestant

bodies. It has been but a short time since the Church of England ceased to exorcise devils; that the law itself, so expert in the sifting of evidence, used to condemn any ugly old woman to the ducking stool, provided she was poor enough and unhappy enough to try and make some pitiable advantage of her supposed supernatural powers. The Protestant churches still believe that a just God will derange the operation of natural laws in response to personal appeal. They are not mainly associations for the spreading of wider knowledge of a moral order in the Universe, and to teach men to accept and to endure the inevitable chastisement of the breach of these laws. At every drought, at every pestilence, there is frantic appeal to avert the disaster, the mitigation of which lies strictly in man's hands. Indeed in some forms superstition is more gross in Protestantism than in countries under the Roman church. In this latter at least church discipline cracks the lash over the head of the mob. In the other they run wild, maddened by old superstitions inherent in their blood, and totally unable to balance evidence or determine its value they eagerly accept any promises to pay drawn on the Bank of Heaven, often paying for it in the hard cash of worldly goods. Such movements gave rise to Mormonism and Zionism and a dozen other isms, some of them frankly pagan in the modern Christian use of the term.

We cannot say that belief in miracles has ceased at the present day when they receive daily the stamp of approval of the hierarchy of the greatest church in Christendom. The belief among the educated classes has been badly shaken by the extension of science into many fields, but the prevailing tendency is wherever there is no present explanation of a phenomenon to attribute it to the supernatural. The sphere of the latter is becoming more limited but it still finds plenty of room for action, indeed must so find room owing to its new combinations and consequent extension of its field. The agnostic position is a rare one. Men like to take a positive stand no matter on how slight evidence. The truth is that men cling to the idea of a supernatural agent not only capable but willing to relieve them of their woes, and combatting for them those inexorable laws of which from time to time they get a glimpse and the sight of which like a spectre makes them very unhappy. Thus while they may not admit miraculous action to-day they unhesitatingly accept it as good in some past time. There is not a man who would transfer his hard cash for a title deed with the slightest flaw in it; there is not a man who would hang another if the evidence was not a complete chain in his mind; and there is not a historical miracle that can stand the searching requirements of modern historical methods, and these are less exacting than those required by the conveyancer or the jurymen. As for modern miracles they belong to the field of nervous pathology or of the *prestidigitateur*, and in both they have been successfully dealt with. As Gibbon has pointed out men are ready to accept the miracles attested by their fore-

fathers, although they are very captious as to the capacity as witnesses of these same forefathers in every other direction which clashes with their later knowledge or prejudices. All history is the action of strong minds on the weaker. Why should it not be the case to-day? The weak minded have troubles and perplexities which they are unable to solve and unwilling to leave unsolved. They do not want the truth, they want the agreeable. And this is often served out to them in very questionable forms. This necessity of laying down a remedy gives a professional tint to religion. There would be no confidence in it if it should show distrust in its own dogmas. What it pronounces on positively it must stick to, and this makes it all the more necessary to be careful in selection of dogmas. There is an unfortunate dilemma here. It must draw its materials from its social environment and try and reconcile its present and its past. This gives rise to some curious results. Take the average idea of a middle class God as is found in that respectable body which fills our churches at the present day. Unimpeachably dressed in grey trousers and frock coat he carefully puts down his silk hat as he reaches the altar, or rather the President's chair as he is merely a presiding elder and nothing else. Michael Angelo has drawn for us his picture. To be sure there is here a change due to climate, and such scanty raiment and of such colours would never be allowed in any Anglo-Saxon conventicle. But the general lines, the bluff, hearty, trustworthy, keen, shrewd face is all there—in the imagination. This averaging up, however, is not without value to men's minds, and professional guidance within limits has always found favour with them. This was the stand of Coleridge who not only supported the idea of a church but the idea of an established church. As he also wished freedom of conscience and discussion the clerics fell foul of him on all his other points. Perhaps it was a cleric who obtained for him his scanty subscriptions to "The Friend" with the comment that "fifty-two shillings a year was a large sum to be bestowed on one individual, where there were so many objects of charity with strong claims to the assistance of the benevolent." This individual however shines in comparison with an Earl of C—who rebuked him for sending them at all but received (and retained) the numbers "probably for the culinary or post-culinary conveniences of his servants."

Human nature changes very little. Our present condition is simply due to the enormous development of individualism to which in many ways we owe our salvation from the past. Liberalism is the subject of scorn and hatred to modern communal thinking which seeks the suppression of liberal thought, especially the socialist who points out its short comings without consideration that the faults may lie with the method and not with the system. "Many men many minds," and repressive measures are not adopted in every direction, to-day as of old, simply because we are able to agree on very little. Given uniformity the social penalty for

revolt would be now as it was in former days, a cutting off from the community; and if not the actual physical punishment of past time it would be the slower one of death to a recalcitrant individual in a world where a man must seek his kind to live. Socialism has real and sinister meaning when it turns a kindly face to the Middle Ages. Meanwhile society still clings to its idols, and society to-day is middle class. Its modern god is interpreted in terms which it can understand. It is interpreted in the language familiar to the ninety and nine just persons, and hence is an anthropomorphic god with good commercial principles. And better such a god, be it said, than the hideous demon of the past evolved by superstition; or the equally hideous anarchy evolved by an ignorant agnosticism which has thrown aside its old idols without the reasonable substitution therefor of an advancing ethics, but replaces superstition with license. Such agnosticism is *not* scientific agnosticism and is as dangerous in its way to society as fanaticism.

It is inconceivable that men should deliberately raise a structure in these days without a belief in its usefulness and hence in a principle of truth lying at the bottom. Therefore an official Shintō reconstructed in this nineteenth century means a belief in it. The lower classes frankly believe in it, and always have believed in it in its grossest forms. The ghost to them is an undisputed fact, and the three days of the *Bon*, a translated Buddhist festival to the Japanese mind when they formally revisit their descendants, is a solemn fact. The matter is somewhat different with the educated classes. Their conduct is guided by a moral code—Confucianism—and the claim is entered for them that generally speaking, in matters outside its purely practical application, they are agnostic in the scientific sense. This may be true for a few, just as it is true in the West, but not for the majority. The energy which forms the living personal unit passes on death into the Universal again, but in keeping up the living memory in the observance of Shintō by its descendants a tendency arises to confuse the energy known in its living representation with the energy found in Nature, which is unknown and unknowable to us. That energy therefore melts into the Universal, but still maintaining in the minds of the esoteric Shintōist a hazy individuality. Any such ideas, be it understood, are entirely foreign to Shintō. They are simply the application of Buddhism to Shintō, and are put forward to explain what has long been felt, for previous to contact with western science no such thing as agnosticism or a scientific position toward the metaphysic of Nature was possible. To the educated man in Japan, therefore, the Shintō rites have a meaning beyond keeping up an antiquated but venerable and national institution, and beyond a simple memorial service. It is of course not to be believed that they look at it in the light of the official proclamations. These are to be regarded in a sense as official buncombe for the ears of "the many-headed;" but these official proclamations also are capable of a more refined

interpretation, for just as in the West our universal god becomes on occasions an intensely national god, so to the mind of the esoteric Shintōist the Universal Force can become a very national Force. Indeed in this active form the influence of Christian ideas are to be suspected for Buddhism would never give it such expression. It is contrary to its whole philosophy which is not active. Buddhism has been recently stirred up by two factors; disestablishment and Christianity. Christianity has some advantages in this contest, given it by its aggressive tone, and especially by its more positive position to the social questions of the day and to the position of women in the community. These are the great objects of discussion in these days, and it is impossible and dangerous for any religion to neglect them. Christianity stands in a different position than at its first appearance. Its relation to the State is better understood; not entirely understood for there is still in influential circles a suspicion of its tendencies. It is disliked for its avowed democracy. But its real separation from international politics is now understood, and it is tolerated if not encouraged. Of course reference is here made to its practice by the native. Protestant influence has made itself felt here advantageously. They have been most careful to avoid any connection with the internal political affairs of the country except as they bear on such social questions as suppression of prostitution, public care of the poor and sick, and such manifestations of philanthropy. The Roman propaganda has not followed the wiser course in the East; or rather perhaps their greater political acumen dictates a different course in China from that in Japan; a matter in which it is well not to draw hasty conclusions in reference to a Church of such great experience and ability in statecraft.

But what is needed in Japan is a native church, a cry which is being most strenuously sounded. The difficulty seems to lie in the disposition of funds advanced for the propaganda. There is a certain mercurial element in the Japanese temperament that leads to the fear that Christianity might take on a form worse than heretical in the eyes of the donors of these funds. Perhaps their long training under a dogmatic Government and the firm-knit organization introduced by the foreign churches might hold together the Japanese on religious questions; but it has not been the case in their previous history. Mental speculation has been very diffuse and has never sharply differentiated its material. It is feared, therefore, that Christianity, as with Buddhism, if left to Japanese hands would be split into scores of small and ineffective bodies; and with their use of metaphysics, so nurtured by centuries of Buddhism, there would arise a number of heresies only rivalled by and probably a repetition of those so famous in the history of the Church of the fourth and fifth centuries. It is quite usual to deny the metaphysical turn of the Japanese mind. But in such case it is necessary to deny any metaphysic to Buddhism, which

hardly seems reasonable. The Japanese are certain to modify Christianity. In the best hands they are likely to make its ethics wider, and to diminish its excessive aggressiveness. Indeed the Japanese, from their independent standpoint as to old controversies, may give us a type of a truly ethical religion. They are not likely to give us a philosophy. It is the mathematical tendency that gives the sharp outline needed for a scientific philosophy, and in which Buddhism is so fatally defective. This is a western endowment. It is shown in the supremacy of dialectic in the Greek philosophy, and in the advance of mathematics and the application of its methods to the sharply balanced reasoning of modern western philosophy. As to the ultimate issue of the contest between Buddhism and Christianity it is at least doubtful. There is so little difference in the ethics of the two creeds, and the hold of the former is so strong on the mass of the Japanese people, that it is doubtful if any effective results can be obtained by Christianity. If Buddhism changes its attitude and takes a more positive stand to the social questions of the day they seem to have the game in their hands. And there is a movement in this direction and toward a stronger combined movement among their churches which as at present constituted can be described as strictly congregational in their Government. Their drawback is their wealth and real power, which makes them indifferent or sceptical as to results of the attack upon them and the necessity to meet it by a change of front.

It can well be asked as to Christianity, why its ethical element is not made more prominent? Where there is belief there is a deliberate closing of the eyes or a very lame "interpretation" of certain legendary portions of the Bible which give grave offence to our more advanced morals. To take some of the milder instances: the story of Elishah and the children who were torn in pieces by the bears for mocking at him, or of Jacob's exceedingly shady financial methods. It would seem better to treat these tales in the light of glosses of a purer text and the legends and traditions of an undeveloped people. Certainly no effort to make them part of the ethical code or to explain them in any other manner could to-day find favour with an intelligent people. At all events not in Japan. Again, much stress could be laid on that cardinal principle of Christianity—"Honour thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee." On the contrary there is a tendency to give it another emphasis in depreciating it in reference to one's duty to God. It is not hard to see that they are not opposing principles. But perhaps where it is necessary to take a convert out of the bosom of the family it is felt necessary to finesse a little on this point. Casuistical treatment is, however, not always readily grasped by the ignorant, and an impression certainly exists among the lower class Japanese that Christianity is opposed to filial obligations.

§ 6.

The question can well be asked, what have Japanese gathered of a permanent and valuable nature from these religions of theirs—especially this old and primitive Shintō? The answer is—their character; and one might almost add—their civilization; for the religious, the ethical, and the secular so react on each other as to make the three almost inseparable in man's actions and in his institutions. The purely ceremonial character of Shintō, the great stress it laid on the importance of detail, the care taken to cover every possible gesture or position of its officiating priests, leaving nothing even mechanical to the individual volition, was the basis in Japanese development of an etiquette carried to an elaboration of detail unequalled even in Chinese life. Their outer forms indeed the Japanese borrowed from China but their application was strictly national. China seems here to present a different phase of the same thought. Its system of ceremony also had its origin in military necessity but in time it took a different position in the eyes of the nation, a reasonable position based on its national philosophy. A Chinaman would explain some trilling detail of ceremony on such grounds. Not so in Japan. Its ceremonial even when borrowed from China maintained its old arbitrary military basis. For fourteen hundred years there was not the slightest effort made to give any reasonable explanation of Shintō ceremonial beyond the fact of its necessity or its antiquity. Ceremonial borrowed from China was frankly accepted as a borrowed institution. It passed into the military system perpetuated by the old Shintō. This was also the fate of the Chinese moral system. Confucianism was made the basis of the military ethical code, and the product of the Japanese military mind was *bushidō*, a fine ethical code necessarily limited in its range. Confucian morality was capable of a wider extension than the Japanese *bushi* (or knight) could give to it. Over the sphere of their law Shintō has held the same grasp. It has been stated that the legal code found in the rituals is essentially non-moral. It relates to ceremonial only, and purification is obtained by ceremonial only and not by any moral regeneration. This does not mean of course that the Japanese of olden time were an immoral people. No people could so exist and prosper, for our moral laws are nothing but a translation of certain natural laws into a category fitting the human understanding to easily grasp their meaning and extent. But they were a non-moral people. The moral law as they grasped it was at once transferred to forms of ceremonial. It never was allowed to become ethical. This condition was much modified as time passed; but entirely by outside influence. Japan imported its morals from China and its metaphysics from India, but Shintō moulds them both.

Everywhere there has been seen the struggle between the spirit of justice and the letter of the law. Rome evolved its praetor's court, and the modern world its equity court, to meet

the necessity of reconciling the clash between jurisprudence and ethics. Japan has never reached this solution of the difficulty; and to-day, as in the past, equitable procedure is not one of the mitigating features of the Japanese legal code. Equity did find expression in the practice of the old Japanese courts—more so than it does to-day under the imported western codes—but this was owing to the personal equation of the magistrate who took license directly against the law. It was a species of casuistry rather than equity that interpreted old customs in these courts. Some of the cases reported by Mr. Wigmore in his notes on "The Law of Old Japan"* are most ingenious exhibitions of such casuistry, as shown by the effort made by men educated in the higher ethics of Confucianism and Buddhism and to whom this old levitical code was intolerable, based as it was on the unbending lines of the native temperament nurtured by its ancient but unforgotten religion. Emphasizing custom as it does it goes without saying that the limitation placed on thought in more material directions of development is severe and watchful. Where every innovation must make its way, not only against opposition, but can only obtain a foothold by adaptability in some form to the existing code, it can readily be seen that such adaptation would be slow and the range would be limited. Much would be rejected. There are but two instances in Japanese history. The adoption of the Chinese system in government was readily adapted as it was simply a form of the existing Japanese system, only it had been brought to a high finish by a civilized people. It made no radical change in the existing Government. It sought converts only in the ruling class, and after having been a subject of investigation for at least a hundred years took another fifty years before it became comfortably adjusted as the law of the land. Buddhism took a far longer time. The radical extension which it involved in the native way of *thinking* made its popularization difficult. The Japanese had to learn to handle metaphysics from the ground up, and this is no easy task. They are not as a race fond of metaphysics. Their turn of mind is essentially practical, hence Confucianism is so strong among them. This is due to the influence of this undercurrent of formalism—crystallized custom running all through the national character. But there are fields of discussion outside of the daily affairs of life and the relations it calls for, and the Japanese are the reverse of mathematical; hence as they must use metaphysic they turn from the more sharply defined mathematical treatment given to it in the West to the more vague and diffuse methods of Eastern philosophy. They present a curious anomaly in this respect. It is an active mind absorbing all the material offered to it. It does not rest satisfied with formula as is the case with the Chinese. In a sense of exactness the Chinese mind also is very different from the Indian. But the Chinaman is not intellectually

* Vol. XX Supplements. Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan.

restless. He has been satisfied with his results and wishes to examine no substitute for these results. With the present day Chinaman "the best" and "good enough" are synonymous. The Japanese has this same limitation as to the efficacy of his formula, but he is ready to examine everything new. This very thirst for the new makes the ill defined methods of eastern philosophy congenial to him. The sharp exactness of the western mind seems to him to limit the subject, for his formulæ have never tried to deal with anything but those simple relations between men in their everyday life. To the dreamy metaphysics of Indian philosophy the unknowable is a much smaller quantity than to the western mind, which with its far greater scientific knowledge of the physiological man can place limits to the knowable and can define many of the phenomena of eastern religion in terms of neuro-pathology. The Japanese is far more akin to the West than to the East in this respect as far as his mental equipment is involved but centuries of training have been in the reverse direction. It merely involves a correction of method.* This strong undercurrent of native conservatism preserved in Shintō of course makes itself felt in Japanese aesthetics. And if Japanese art owes its steady balance, its avoidance of all extremes, and its simplicity, to this old Shintō which shows all these qualities in its rituals, its architecture, and its ceremonial, it owes a very heavy debt. And it is to be suspected that it does owe this debt, for this simplicity united to perfect taste and finish is a characteristic of the Japanese in every department of life, of which their ancient religion can be said to be the general expression. Much of Japanese detail is implied in the perfect finish given to expression whether in a Japanese picture or a poem. There is not a trace of that undefined spirit so common to Buddhism. This has added to the common stock its many beautiful conceptions both in art and literature, but it is the old practical spirit inherent in their native Shintō that has guided the Japanese in their treatment; except as to religious subjects where they have often followed conventional lines. But where the old spirit comes out strongest is in their exclusiveness. Their gods are national gods. There is not the slightest wish to make them anything else, or to

* This attitude of the mind of Japan toward science is perhaps illustrated by an extract from the *Okina Mondō* of Kyusō. The translation is taken from the lucid paper by Doctor George W. Knox. (Trans. Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. XX.) The writer has taken the liberty of bracketing some necessary explanations in the absence of Doctor Knox's exegesis. "True learning is disregard of self, "obedience to the 'Way' [filial obedience] and the observance of the "five relations. Its eye ball is humility. Wide learning applies all "this to the heart. False learning [corresponding to our modern "science] desires the honour of wide learning, envies those who "excel, wishes only for fame, and makes pride its eye ball. It has "nothing to do with obedience and the more one has the worse he is. "Let us beware lest we tread the evil way leading down to the brutes "and the dominion of the devils. False learning fosters this pride "and never thinks of casting it away."

impose them on other peoples. Perhaps this has been just as well for the neighbouring peoples of Asia. If the Japanese had been pressed for room in the ancient days they would probably have in their turn become a conquering people. But if their gods had been gods calling for a national propaganda of the faith this hardy and warrior race might anyhow have entered on this career. As it was, those gods and the soil of Japan were sacred, and the religious spirit was roused against any aggression from the outside even if it did not lead to aggression on outsiders. Shintō and the Japanese have therefore reacted in the sense of an intense racialism. To Chinese morals and Indian metaphysics is only to be added the aesthetics and peculiar cast given to philosophy by Buddhism. These elements widen but do not change the basis of Japanese character and civilization. It is not often that nations so develop their earlier superstitions. As a rule some higher form is imported or is imposed on a people: This has been the history of the nations of Europe and western Asia. The Japanese, however, have consistently developed their earlier religious code which to-day lies at the basis of their national life. Any social religious ideal is the epitome of its best. The social religious ideal of Shintō represents an intense racialism, a fondness for detail and ceremony, a highly developed symbolism; therefore an indirectness which is carried out in most of the relations of Japanese life where plain 'yes' and 'no' form no part even of the language. It is true that owing to its having no ethical side, and to its gross supernaturalism on the exoteric side, we can give Shintō but little standing as a religion; but it has added a strength and a sturdiness to the stock not found elsewhere in the East. In this sense the Japanese owe it a great debt contracted in the past, and it is a great part of their capital in the future. To Shintō is due Japanese virility.

When primitive man for the first time rounded some stick or stone, instead of using it just as he picked it up from the ground, he was on the way to the idea of a creative power. He could not possibly have had it before for man's mind works on the material presented to it. A proved creator, however, the question was bound to arise;—"Who made these other things around me, and who made me?" This question he has tried to answer in many ways in the world's history. All his answers have been more or less unsatisfactory, if one is to judge by the discord created. There is no such thing as a primitive man left on the face of the earth. Existing savage races are the reverse of primitive, for their customs, especially their marriage customs which practically govern their communities directly or indirectly, have a complexity that is confusing even to the western mind. With the lowest of them their gods are usually traceable to a distinct hero worship or to an aetiological myth. One striking feature is their kinship to the animal world. And this is not a kinship of superiority, for the average savage regards the brute as more cunning and able than himself. Totemism which emphasizes this importance of the animal kingdom—probably at

first the names were given from peculiarities of the fauna or flora among which a tribe dwelt, even were malicious nicknames, and later were connected with the problem of maintaining the food supply—this totemism never was a religion, but it has the possibilities of developing a religion as can be traced among the Australian tribes.* But if man has been almost necessitated to develop a supernatural it is still more astonishing to find even among such a low grade of savages as the Haida and Thlinket of western America and the Arunta of Australia a doctrine of the conservation of the soul or world matter, curiously akin to the spiritual metempsychosis of highly developed religions, which in its turn is not unrelated to a thoroughly scientific explanation of the Universe by a primal force or energy. The Arunta is by no means the most primitive of the Australian tribes, and, as Mr. Andrew Lang points out, he has developed a true philosophy. He believes in differing totem souls dwelling in different localities. He has not grasped the somewhat cardinal fact that children are the result of copulation between man and woman, but thinks that one of these soul totems enters the woman's womb much at its own will. He has just gotten beyond the stage of our younger children who are led to believe that the newcomer was found in a cabbage head or some equally extraordinary place. The Arunta can appreciate the visible signs of pregnancy and delivery, however, and to him the locality in which conception took place fixes the totem of the child to be born, a practice which has utterly disrupted the usual exogamous practice common in the other Australian tribes and which forbids marriage between man and woman of the same totem within or

* Totemism does not involve the reasonable definition of Mr. Benjamin Kidd (Social Evolution) that the ultimate element of religion is the ultra-rational. Whatever element of the supernatural is found in savage religions is simply an enlargement of the powers known to the savage in his environment. This he cannot get beyond. Totemism, however, often makes no such enlargement at all. What the savage cannot understand is death. To kill or injure the totem means to make an enemy and an enemy he dreads and misunderstands. Any religious element in connection with totemism seems rather to be a later development as man rises to seek an explanation. The whole subject is confessedly confused and obscure. A thorough discussion is found in Mr. Lang's—"Social Origins." Connection between the totem and ancestor observance (*not worship* although its passage into such is plainly natural) is indicated in the results of Messrs. Spencer and Gillen (Cf. "Northern Tribes of Central Australia" pp. 145, 174-176, Chapters on "Ceremonies of the Wollunquna Totem" and "Beings with Supernatural Powers." A list of animal ancestors treated as totems is given p. 327). The religion of these Central Australian tribes—if it can be called such—can be defined as ancestor observance. The Arunta ideas of different souls, or stages of a soul—the Ulthana, Arumburinga, and Iruntarina—are very crude but recall the Egyptian ideas on the subject. (Cf. Native Tribes of Central Australia pp. 124, 125, 265, 514, 515). They find no evidence of a Supreme Being among the Arunta. (Northern Tribes p. 497) the nearest approach to such being Atnuta among the Kaitish (p. 498-509). Baibai and Daromulun are not known to the central tribes.

impose them on other peoples. Perhaps this is well for the neighbouring peoples of Asia. If they have been pressed for room in the ancient days they have in their turn become a conquering power. The gods had been gods calling for a nation; this faith this hardy and warrior race might have made this career. As it was, those gods were sacred, and the religious spirit was not to be changed from the outside even if it did not. Shintō and the Japanese have an intense racialism. To Christianity is only to be added the philosophy of Buddha. The change the basis of Japanese religion is not often that nation has a rule some high. This has been the case in Asia. The Japanese religion is an earlier religion. It is the most reasonable choice, the most reasonable choice, the most reasonable choice. It comes to the top again. In the present world religion, apart from ethics, seems an absolutely necessary factor. It is the vehicle, the formula, through which ethics finds much of its present application. Strip ethics of the sanction of religion and the common mind would soon turn to licence. It is too near the savage to understand any restraint short of the physical force exercised by its superstition. Whether it will ever be in any more hopeful position is at the present outlook too distant and too uncertain to take into serious consideration. Such a savage is not able to see the slow, inevitable, and inexorable action of moral law in the Universe. He is unable to see the penalty of its violation. It must be symbolically impressed on him by fear of possible immediate consequences; or rape, murder, robbery, and all kinds of violence would reign supreme. This does not necessitate any violation of Truth. Landon in his "Imaginary Conversations" has put into the mouth of the philosopher Lucian this striking sentence:—"Surely we ought to remove an error the instant we detect it, although it may be out of our competence to state and establish what is right. A lie should be exposed as soon as born; we are not to wait until a healthier child is begotten." But the mass of humanity are unable to understand that naked "Truth" the English philosopher has so beautifully described.* It must be presented to them with more or less clothes on. The essential point is to see that the symbolism involves and does not disguise the truth; for in this latter case it would lead in the wrong direction, to the lie. There is nothing to fear in tearing down. The inherent demand for the short-hand representation of the grain of truth behind the mass of symbolism quickly supplies a

* This famous allegory is in the dialogue between Marcus Tullius and Quintus Cicero. "Imaginary Conversations" Vol. I, p. 411—American Ed. (Roberts Brothers, Boston.) of Landon's Works.

substitute, and where inquiry has been freer this substitute is found on more advanced ground; this too to go in its turn before advancing knowledge. With the religion of the future it is necessary for it to be understood that its symbols are mere symbols of the existing state of knowledge. If the masses know that there is an esoteric religion behind this symbolism, curiosity will lead an increasing number to make an effort to understand what is this esoteric religion. The wide extension of modern science is distinctly due to this inquiring spirit aroused in the masses and leading many to more detailed inquiry into its various branches. The new religion can then widen its ethical grounds, and the advance will be more general all along the line. It is hardly necessary to say that the social religious ideal will be raised higher by this extension of ethics into its field. Just as it is hardly necessary to say that dogma having nothing to gain, being unable by its very nature to make a step in advance, has consistently opposed and raised the masses against any such invasion of its field. But with advancing means of learning the truth, it does seem necessary to graft religion on to philosophy, or else palpable falsehood will strip it of its influence and the mass of mankind, half savage as they are, without any guide will fall into license. Philosophy is a strong tree and can stand the graft; which, however, must always be so evident that it can be cut off if it threatens the vitality of the parent stock. The community can then be left to pluck fruit pleasing to its palate.

There is a genuine battle of life which cannot be met simply by material means. As St. Simon tells us, man needs an inner guide. And he has found this in different ways. We have at least two shining examples applicable to our modern world and which takes them much to heart. To the Emperor Marcus Aurelius it was man's mission to face the burdens of this life without shrinking and without hope of reward, and with full control over self. "To carry on the work without noise or display, and in this tempestuous ocean to keep ever near the shore." To the Roman Stoic Fortune's gifts were but loans, and when they were taken away thanks were due for the use had of them. Complaint over their loss simply showed ignorance of their nature. This stern old philosophy did not find the world a playground, and this is the secret of its strength and consolation. It is because we of the modern world have an entirely false conception of it that we find our lot so hard and hence make our complaint so loud. We are not to seek to make the world a happy place. This is simply illusion. We can make it more tolerable. Saint Thomas Aquinas sought this by a method different from the Roman Emperor. They were men of kindred experience, if not of kindred thought. Aquinas was essentially a mystic. He had full comprehension and sympathy with all the pain and trouble in the world. He descended into the arena of public life where he figures as politician and controversialist in combatting its evils. But the remedy he finds is seclusion, flight from this strife of the world. His own appearances from

the retirement of his monk's cell were to combat the worldly spirit, to advocate and extend this outward and visible sign of contempt for its struggles. But this is hardly the way in which to meet world questions. The world is to be lived in and fought for; as much to-day as in Saint Thomas' time. If all the intellects that appreciate its illusions and its shortcomings are to withdraw from it this is simply to withdraw so much available force from the elements that are combatting evil. The world is not to be left to ballot box stuffers, plunderers and robbers of the widow and orphan, "grafters" and manipulators of "influence"; all in search of but one thing—boodle and the power it brings. The strenuous life has been widely preached of late, and it has its justification in these times of universal selfishness. And to meet this selfishness we must turn to the example of the Emperor, not to that of the Saint.

VI.

PEOPLE AT WORK.

"You present to me a complicated picture of artificial life and require me to admire it. Seas covered with vessels: every one of which contains two or three tyrants, and from fifty to a thousand slaves, ignorant, gross, perverted, and active only in mischief. Ports resounding with life: in other words, with noise and drunkenness, the mingled din of avarice, intemperance, and prostitution. Profound researches, scientific inventions: to what end? To multiply factitious desires, to stimulate depraved appetites, to invent unnatural wants, to heap up incense on the shrine of luxury, and to accumulate expedients of selfish and ruinous profusion."—*Headlong Hall.*

§ 1.

Up to within comparatively recent times the value of paper constitutions and ideal schemes of every kind had been pretty well discounted by modern publicists. It was generally recognized that human society was a growth much like any other growth in nature, every stage in which implied genetic connection with the preceding stage. Side by side with this thoroughly scientific view of society there existed an idealistic economic philosophy as old as Plato's "Republic." This idealism by no means despised the aid that modern science brought to its ideas. It took advantage of all the spirit of pessimism therein contained, just as it turned away its face from the light that science threw on its own inconsistencies. But every stable and valuable institution of society can be shown to be a plant of slow growth. It is the gradually widening circle of society's experiments that has put its foundations on such strong bases. What will not stand this wider extension is soon cut off and rejected. There are ten thousand unsuccessful to one successful experiment. It is this permanency that makes the study of any society so valuable. Rarely does its course run smoothly. At times there is a shock to the whole body politic and then the machine rolls on again, perhaps changed a little in the plane of its orbit but maintaining all the essentials of method that its experience of ages has shown to be good. The dreamer, even the scientific dreamer, has never played any positive and permanent role in the world's history. There is not the least reason to believe he ever will; for society does not often stop to think, it moves. Its inertia can only be affected by the mass of the opposing body, and this is necessarily but a small fraction of the whole. But the dreamer is not

without value. He can give just that tint to the social thought that puts old ideas in a new light. Unlike the genius he brings nothing new to the social inheritance. He represents readjustment not gain. If strong enough or noisy enough society wakes up, rubs its eyes, and adjusts its spectacles to ascertain what all the hub-bub is about. Sometimes the dreamer is partially right. He is never wholly so. His sphere is narrower than society's, but he is not so busy. It is only the genius who towers so above that he can view the wider range. But it is the apotheosis of the future not the past that he seeks. As soon as a man begins to prattle on the perfection of the primitive condition of man he abdicates all claim to the title of genius. He is harping back to the past, making his end and aim the putting of new wine into old bottles. That is an old occupation of Society. She has lost a good many dozen by breakage, prefers to drink the old wine herself, and let the new wine slowly ripen for some time under her own eyes.

Every society presents this picture of the slow evolution of its economic institutions. Japan is no exception to the rule and perhaps her past in some features can be shown to throw light as to results on some of the problems now troubling the modern world. What we are seeking are not paper constitutions, not the pen and ink sketches of dreamers who outline their schemes and trust to God or luck that the filling in may correspond to their hopes. Society is little tempted to make such experiments now-a-days. We are not at this date seeking even a rational basis for our institutions. As at the genesis of a new invention our question to a new proposition is always—"Is it practicable? If so give us the proof in the separate working of its parts. Show us its operation." Any political principle therefore must at least show its genesis from some form of practice; and as the world is wide and is old; as it has contained many men and many minds; so somewhere and somehow it is not impossible to detect this practical operation of principles in past history. The resemblance is close enough to enable us to venture on prediction, and sometimes it is so close as to alarm us. Let us turn then to the old Japanese State to read the lesson which it holds up to-day to our political world. The excursion into its past will not be an unprofitable one.

At the top we find the ruling class—the officer class. To our present argument it makes little difference how they reached that position. Whether by election under universal suffrage, or by services rendering them peculiarly valuable to the State in that position, or by force of their good right arms, a ruling class is simply the executive of a nation, its officers. They set themselves aside, or are set aside by the nation, for this purpose, and are necessary in the sense that courts and lawyers are necessary. Men are not honest enough or generous enough to treat each other fairly, so there must be some one to umpire in all their transactions. It is not fair to say that they are non-producers in every sense of the word. Their product is purely

and simply a brain product but it enables all other production to go on. This natural superiority of brain power is recognized now in practically all socialistic schemes and these provide for an elaborately officered State. The smaller the class the better.

What at once impresses us in reference to the ruling class of Old Japan is the lack of any balance to their power. We are not dealing in any sense with a democracy made up of a system of checks and balances, even if such checks and balances be only the individual units of a very small State not the wide interests of a great State. We are dealing with a bureaucracy, with a military system carried into civil life. We find at once two of the cardinal principles of modern socialism standing out prominently like those volcanic dykes, the ribs of some great soft amorphous mountain mass of rubbishy cinder. These two principles are centralization and subordination of the individual to this central power. This subordination is most complete. The organization is on the basis of an army. Even in the upper class of which we are speaking each unit has his place and his definite sphere. The Head himself of the State has his definite limitations. He moves not within a wide circle, but within a very narrow circle of ceremony, the distinction being that his movement carries within it all the rest. The simple inertia of the dead weight of this attached system, the impossibility of finding individuality of thought to supply the necessary instrument for any initiative in the higher centres, soon crushes any aspirations to change. For in the great mass to be moved there is positive reason against change. They have a very comfortable position, and that position is secured by the fact that in the control of this compact caste lies all the physical force of the nation. There is no balance whatever to this central force. They are only limited by the selfish desire not to diminish the efficiency by means of which their comfortable position is secured. Of course we cannot blame the ruling caste of Old Japan for taking this stand. The ultra-altruism noted by Mr. Benjamin Kidd* as the prevailing tone of to-day is strictly due to our exaggerated individualism. It is a development of it. These Japanese however found themselves in possession. They were not troubled with a religion that aroused altruistic scruples. On the contrary the tone of their ethical creed—such as it was—like that of modern socialism was decidedly materialistic. They had control of the physical force to secure the position of their caste, and they used it remorselessly to secure the subordination of those below them and of those within their own circle. Granted human nature the position was an inevitable and an inexorable one. "Whatever is right in this best of possible worlds;" and there was no counterbalancing influence of any power to say that anything was wrong.

We see in several ways the effect of this feeling of the existing condition being entirely normal. These can be said to be the

* "Social Evolution" p. 199.

necessary conditions attached to a State in which there was such a lack of balance. The accentuation of formula is enormous. Every little personal action has its set way of performance. There is not a phase or a feature of human life that is not thus provided for in the code. As early as the codes found in the Nihongi the ranks are divided and subdivided to give to each unit a definite formula according to which he must regulate even the doffing of the gay cap which marks the insignia of his rank. And this rank is also of the gravest importance and attention, for this society is a military society. This is never lost sight of, and grave must be the occasion to allow any neglect of the respect due to rank or the methods by which it is approached. The interesting feature here is the growth of this ceremonial with the growth of the bureaucracy. In the early accounts of the Nihongi and Kojiki we get a glimpse of a very different condition. The semi-independent noble is living on his land surrounded by his retainers. To these retainers he has a very personal relation, and he does not hesitate to start a brawl with his neighbours, or to start a brawl with his monarch if the occasion is favourable. Moreover his retainers in both cases do not hesitate to join in brawling with him. To come down very late in the record (642 A.D.), such are the cases of Soga and Iruka no Yemishi. These proud turbulent nobles had little to do with cap ranks except to bestow them when and where they pleased. Their power lay in their fiefs not in centralization, and they did not hesitate to buttress that power with their bands of barbarians or Ainu. A later and final instance was that of Tenmu Tennō himself. Before he came to the throne through his successful rebellion he figured as a great lord, and in his own fief was safe against any central power. But all this we find changed in the course of a generation. And the method of the change was simple. A powerful monarch on the throne changed the system of fiefs into a centralized bureaucracy. The lord of the soil was removed from immediate contact with the people he ruled. He was transferred at the will of the central power from place to place. And the importance of this cannot be overrated for it removed the one check on the central power. The units of the ruling class now fell into their proper figure, to be trained and groomed to fill a certain sphere. Individual aspirations became hopeless except as the central power was disposed to favour them. To think as thought the Centre became the end and aim of all political life.

That this grading of the bureaucracy added immensely to its efficiency there is no denying. There was all the difference between the virile disorderly age of the French baronage and the tame poodle condition of the time of Louis XIV. The passing of the period in which might made right could not be regretted, but the supremacy of bureaucratic government also made itself felt in an evil influence on the constituents which went to make up that bureaucracy. This of course displays itself in action toward those below; and the vices of bureaucracy

make themselves felt in the ease of oppressing the classified masses. The sins against Government now are not rebellion but peculation. The complaints of the people against the oppression and greed of the bureaucratic officials make themselves heard even in such an early record as the Nihongi (720 A.D.) At the very beginning of the reign of a strong centralizing monarch such as Kōtoku memorials are presented (646 A.D.) concerning "subjects who come to the capital in connection with the discharge of their duty to the Government of the Country, and are detained by the various public functionaries and put to forced labour of various kinds." Such complaints had a long life. They made themselves heard under the revived bureaucracy of the Tokugawa Shōgunate as late as 1867. And the tone of the complaints does not change much. The Government takes action—when these grasping officials threaten the vails and perquisites of the Government itself; that is, when the efficiency of the fleece-bearing flock is threatened, and there is danger of its rebellion. Disarmament of the population had been complete and carefully carried out under Kōtoku and his immediate successors.* The unauthorized possession of weapons is made a grave offence. Revenue and rebellion were the only two cardinal springs of action to the irresponsible government of centralization. Beyond that the Government could be said to wink at peculation. The complaints come from a people who are not simply oppressed but who have been driven to the wall. It is a cry from sheep who have not been shorn of the wool only but whose very mutton is being attacked. Thus in the reign of Kōtoku, already cited, there is a long list of punishments meted out against officials for mulcting of the people and peculation as to Government property, there being a decided taint of pettiness about the delinquents, who had not plundered on a large scale but had resorted to extortion on a small scale, and had endeavoured to keep part of their plunder by giving up the rest. This is distinctly a change for the bad. All efficiency of centralization was being lost in this unbalanced power of the bureaucracy. At the earliest period the Japanese people are classified in their ranks, paralysed physically by disarmament and mentally by custom, and the chances of their exit from this condition were small indeed.

When consideration is taken of the marked care shown in some of the earlier institutions—as those of Temmu—to guard the efficiency of the people, there appears in this decline something more than simple inefficiency or rascality of officials. In the code the effort is made to secure to each family head a means of living and of paying taxes. The land is carefully parcelled out among this agricultural people, its succession and alienation provided for and against, for the first was carefully determined and the second was as carefully prevented. The

* Except in the frontier provinces at constant war with the Yemishi or Ainu.

people are protected against each other. What these complaints really mean then is that there was not, and could not be in a centralized bureaucracy of this type, any efficient protection against the official class itself. And this official caste had developed itself most completely. In a little more than a hundred and fifty years the rough court which preceded the introduction of Buddhism and Chinazation had been marshalled into a complete system, in which all personality of the monarch had almost disappeared and all personality of the courtiers was fast disappearing. The rough and ready manners of such monarchs as Richiū (400 A.D.), Ankō (454 A.D.), and Yuriaku (457 A.D.) have disappeared entirely, and the same can be said of such types of ministers as old Umayko and his successors on both sides of the controversy, Soga and Iruka no Yemishi or the Nakatomi. There is no possibility of a prime minister having the questionable privilege of carrying off on his back his intoxicated sovereign. There is no time now for drinks between ceremonial. Every step in every transaction is governed by a formula which enters into all the minutiae of life. The importance of this in crushing personality and in imposing a military standard in civil life has been noted. This of necessity is carried farther. To maintain such a caste system a caste feeling is necessary in the bureaucratic sense. Elasticity cannot be a feature. There is indication of this in the squeezing out of people who have made their way to the front. The ruling class had felt this intrusion in early days and in rougher times had eliminated it by hot water cures and such miraculous tests. In Ingyo's reign (412 A.D.) a purification is said to have been made, based not only on half savage tests but on the genealogies preserved presumably, as is usual even among people of a much lower civilization than there is any necessity of attributing to the Japanese of the fifth century, by professional reciters or memorizers.* In Temmu's reign (676 A.D.), when we are in the full tide of contemporary written record, a similar revision is made. Many influences were at work to maintain this grip on the minds within the caste. There was education, prejudice, environment, a soldier's drill, luxury and comfort, and most important—bread and butter. A bureaucratic machine in its lack of personality possesses this influence, that its units are dependent on following exact custom and rule if they wish to draw their salaries. In the Old Japanese State there was every tendency toward eliminating any such factor.

There was however such a source of personal action even in Old Japan. That such a bureaucracy as was established in

* One of the objections to the early settlement of any large immigration from civilized China to uncivilized Japan, as in the supposed emigrations of 473 B.C. and 230 B.C., lies in the fact that the Japanese knew nothing of Chinese writing or thought previous to its introduction from Korea. That is the immigrants must have left their civilization behind them.

Temmu's time (653 A.D.) or in Tokugawa times (1625-1867 A.D.) could maintain itself was unnatural. What all this centralization did do was to make itself such a prize that it aroused the ambitions of greedy men. Its first signs of disintegration are seen almost with its birth, perhaps because a system not unlike feudalism prevailed before it. This preceding system cannot be called feudalism, unless we choose to call the political system of semi-savage races by a name which properly belongs to the intricate legal system of contract which governed the Middle Ages of Europe. There were no fiefs in the Japan of tradition and legend. But there were chiefs and their retainers, granting to the central power only what it could take by force, and the central power taking from them what it could but granting nothing originally. A reign of law and order under Chinazation did introduce the idea of contract, and the result in Japan was the same as that which followed the contact of the German tribes with Roman law—the gradual development of a feudal system which sprang from the awakened ambition of greedy men confronted with the spoils of a helpless Government. They took what and as much as they could get. The course of affairs seems from the inception inevitable. An unbalanced power is sure to develop into a despotism. This despotism for its own safety can only develop strong men to balance each other. This balance it is impossible to maintain. Remoteness from control, variations in responsibility and power, the necessity of delegating great local power to the few men on the spot, is certain to disintegrate the mass. It did this most effectually in Japan. So much so that by the fifteenth century there could not be said to be any real central power in the land. It was reduced to the merest shadow. But in the units and in this shadow of central force one influence of this old bureaucracy did remain—its clinging to formulae. Every little nucleolus maintained this imitation of the original nucleus. It set up for itself on the political and mental outlines of the mother nucleus. The scramble was merely for the political spoils. The military caste did not lose its solidarity as a caste. It recognized the value of the old system of subordination within the units. And it maintained this system rigidly in exercising its rule over those below it. These ranks below, closed in an iron ring of custom, could gain nothing by any change of masters.

And yet safety lay in the code and in feudalism. It lay in the code for it interposed between the soldier caste and those lying under their power at least some measure by which this despotism should be tempered. The military code gave a tint, an unbending mould within which limits the military mind should work. The system of feudalism added its influence in the same direction. Even granted an iron code a purely military despotism will break through it if subject to no other restraint in reference to its subjects. This was the case in imperial Rome, and to it we are indebted for the nightmare of its period of unrestrained power when, as Renan says, the human mind seems

to have been literally tainted with insanity caused by the horror of the situation; and men seeing the immoral and the unnatural in full control without remedy came to think it normal and to some extent a rule for conduct. Feudalism broke up this nightmare in Europe and prevented it in Japan. With the small units warring against each other there was a very definite limit to despotism. The mixture and rivalry of races and the rise of commerce effected great results in Europe and has given us our modern civilization. This it could not do in Japan because there was no mixture and rivalry of races. For centuries there was no commerce, and when an *internal* commerce did finally arise it was among a people who had for these centuries been moulded on the unvarying lines laid down by the bureaucracy. They could not go outside of their ideas for they knew of no others. How severely they had been restrained by their limitations, and how readily they changed their base, was shown when they finally were brought in contact with western civilization. But what the code could only effect indirectly feudalism could effect directly by the rivalries of the numerous chieftains. Any depression by some more despotic member of this band of robbers, beyond the normal surrounding conditions, would render the rule of his milder neighbours more tolerable. Some chiefs could and did carry things with a much higher hand than others, their position or the weakness of their neighbours or their strength making it undesirable to take advantage of discontent among their people. The position of the *plebs* under Satsuma was much less comfortable than in the Tokugawa domains. And "mild" and "severe" or "bad" were terms of legitimate use in describing the different *daimyō* or *hatamoto* even under the immediate eye of the Tokugawa. Before the consolidating peace of the Tokugawa this influence of discontent was much more powerful than it was in later times. But it was limited by a standard already set. The military class stood by the Code, and any attempt to encroach on their sphere was met with united front. The rise of the People as a political factor was impossible mentally and politically.

There was one source of differentiation within the ruling class itself which made itself felt after some generations. In any society these reactions are not immediate. At first sight we could be uncertain as to whether to class the military retainers of the ruling caste as part of this caste, or to regard them as plebeian. In part, as to origin, they undoubtedly were plebeian. This rank and file of the ruling caste were a sort of national police. As a standing army and a restraining force they were supposed to enable the other producers to continue work. It is hardly necessary to say that this was not their real rôle, which was simply to keep the mass of the population in subjection to the ruling class, and to aid in settling any little personal difficulties that might arise between these latter. The important fact to us is that in this unbalanced society they were finally the men with the physical force of

society in their hands. Whether plebeian or not to a considerable extent in their membership the fact remains that they did take control, and about the tenth century there are signs of the ousting of the officers of the ruling class by more vigorous members chosen from the ranks. That is, every officer who had forsaken the *real* work of his military position to assume civil rank as a member of the Emperor's court at Kyōto was stripped of all real power and left with the honour of an empty title and poverty. The process was completed at the close of the twelfth century by Minamoto Yoritomo. He placed military governors to act side by side with the civil governors sent by the court of Kyōto. The result was quick and certain. The civil governor disappeared.

There is therefore a radical distinction to be drawn between the old *kuge* or court nobles (the original military captains of the Old Monarchy) and the *daimyō* and *samurai* of the later military class and legitimately descended from the rank and file of earlier days. The evolution of this class is slow and in its units obscure. The untaxed lands of great officials offered advantages to settlers which the Government could not offer. The Central Government was attacked in two directions. It was attacked in its purse for its receipts were much diminished, so much so that by the twelfth century it was seriously embarrassed to provide funds for the support of the Kyōto court, let alone exercising any of the functions necessary to a Government which wished to maintain any influence over its units. It was too weak to show any front to the influences attacking it. The result was that nobles—and great nobles—began to separate themselves from the court clique. Thus as early as Shujaku's reign (931-946 A.D.) Taira no Masa and Fujiwara no Sumitomo are found in serious rebellion. For twelve years two great barons, Minamoto Yoriyoshi and Abe Sadatao, cheerfully fought each other for the supremacy of the northern province of Dewa. In the whole course of the struggle there was not the slightest idea or regard as to any rights the Kyōto Government might possess in the matter. And there were other influences at work under such conditions. Strong men everywhere, just as in Europe, began to command a premium, and men began to seek their protection. A small noble, even a farmer prominent in his limited district, found that men began to gather around him. There were many cases where men held their lands without any title involving the obligations of a fief. They paid taxes to the Government but not service, and their right to their lands in such cases was recognized by the Government. These men first known as *kuni miyatsuko* later appear as *gōshi*. They were farmers but they wore swords. They were not retainers of any chief, and their military service could only be called on to protect their province from invasion. The tendency of their development and their affiliations is clear enough. Most of them drifted into the noble class. There was always a relation between the two. By Tokugawa times many of these *gōshi* figured under a *daimyō*'s

robe or as *samurai*. A genuine *gōshi* of the ancient days had become as rare as a hen with teeth. In this peaceful later period it was quite possible for a man with the active responsibilities of political life to retire from this position, give up his rank as *datinyō* and take up the position of *gōshi*. He maintained much the position of the old *gōshi* with the rank of *samurai*. He paid taxes, was not liable to military service, and in general terms had abandoned politics and gone into farming. In this he differed from the highest grade of *samurai*—the *go-samurai*—who occupied himself with farming and lived on his farm, but was still the soldier under arms and in every other direction was subject to the call of his lord for the duties of war and politics.

Such isolated elements are of course without political influence. After the final test of supremacy in which Tokugawa won, these *gōshi* were no more a factor of Japan's real political life than is to-day a western philosopher in his sphere. In fact they had far less influence, for the western philosopher has many sources of knowledge, and can make his voice heard, if not his power felt, by the warring elements of political life. No matter how able a man of this *gōshi* class was he could have no real influence apart from actual political power, because his ideas were strictly limited to the ideas of his class. Until some new element was introduced he too could only wander around within the iron circle within which everything was enclosed and within which every idea was gradually petrifying. The real life, if any was to be found, was in the *samurai*. And the difficulty with the *samurai* was that he was the soldier. This did not preclude other interests, but it required that military duty should dominate and direct all other interests. Where the whole object of a code is to obtain prompt and ready obedience to the directing head it is not hard to see what direction the influence of that code would take. It was the value of this element in the training of the *samurai* that Iyeyasu was quick to recognize. His great first object was to ensure the headship of the Tokugawa. Discontent and ambition were to be bridled by this emphasis of a soldier's duty. The maintenance of such a military code in a long period of peace was ensured by keeping up a state of war within the ruling caste itself. For public war he substituted individual war. His soldiers were ruled by a code which called for their obedience to their chief; and which, by its appeal to military and personal honour, made every man keep his hand on his sword hilt with reference to his neighbour. There is a curious instance of this spirit. A nobleman on entering the house of another removed in the antechamber the long sword he always carried. His mission was that of peace. To do otherwise was a grave insult. Just as it was a grave insult to step over the sword of another laid on the floor. It was an insult to do so, and it also prevented the owner from making immediate use of it. One further remark can be made concerning the *gōshi*. The Japanese practice of *inkyō*, or retirement of a man from active life, has been referred to. After the establishment of the

Tokugawa, and with the final retirement of every independent political element from the field, one who assumed the position of *gōshi* performed political *inkyo*, and it was not an unknown performance for a *daimyō* to thus take on himself honourable retirement. He was following the illustrious example set centuries before by the *kuge* who by their connection with the court of Kyōto performed the same political *harakiri*.

§ 2.

Archaeological and ethnological evidence point to two mongoloid stocks as entering into the present Japanese race. In addition to these there is at least one aboriginal element—the Ainu. The importance of this to our argument lies in the relations these different constituents took to each other. The whole tone of the earlier legends found in the Kojiki and the Nihongi indicate that the fighting done by the invading tribe of Jimmu was against people of their own race. One thing is certain as to the relations between these kindred tribes; they did not recognize the authority of a chief alien to the tribe unless such recognition was forced on them by the arbitrament of war. And they then retain as much power as is possible. An instance of this is the brothers Akeshi. The elder perishes for his treachery to Jimmu but the younger maintains his position. Jimmu plainly does not find it wise to deal as he chooses with this political plum. And this independence of local chiefs is found more or less emphasized down through this early history. The chief of Izumo is at times entirely and again almost independent of the power at Yamato. War is conducted in and with Korea down to the close of the sixth century and often with small reference to Yamato. It is a great object of the Yamato Government to keep this "viceroy" of Tsukushi in some reasonable subjection to the central power. He is simply a type of what is going on all over the country, and the earlier Mikados are kept on the move in maintaining control over the unruly sub-chiefs. For sub-chiefs, it is to be remembered, they properly are. And the Chinese records of the second and third century A.D., describing this rough fishing and hunting population, enable us to understand the gradual development and aggrandizement of the chiefs under the shadow of the one great chief, their importance in relation to their retainers increasing with his importance to his retainers. Mr. Wigmore very properly emphasizes this rough condition of the early civilization, although it is not so easy to follow his argument that the Taihō code published under Mommu in 702 A.D. is an effort to maintain a system that was threatened with decay. The edicts as early as the reign of Kōtoku, especially of 646 A.D., cover much the same ground. The material of all these codes and edicts can

reasonably be taken to be long established and ancient customs perhaps subjected to a Chinazation in form undergone during the one hundred and fifty years following the introduction of Buddhism. But the whole movement from the fall of Soga and Iruka no Yemishi and during the seventh century was for the first time toward a process of centralization of the Government, not a weakening of it. This weakening did come later but not for more than two hundred and fifty years. The Taihō code was a mark of strength, not of weakness.

That the early hunters and fishers possessed slaves there is no reason to doubt. They were a fighting people. Their legends show this. And the one fate of a prisoner at such a period of history is to be eaten or to become a slave. That the immediate retainers of the chiefs were not slaves goes without saying. They did the fighting and hence must have represented a body of freemen much in the sense of the Germans gathered around their chiefs. Such men had their duties to their chiefs but they were in no sense chattels. With more settled times, in the early part of the Christian era, the number of freemen engaged in peaceful occupations would increase. Landholders owing no service and paying a tax only to the Government and to it alone are a constant indication of these people from the time of the earliest records. They will later be caught between the upper millstone of the great barons and the lower millstone of slave labour. A slave cannot own property except by the express permission of his master. But that both slaves and serfs existed we have direct evidence. Slaves, sold and treated as chattels, are quoted at market price. The amount of land allotted to the master for the support of a slave is carefully fixed. And the man with the most slaves profits at the expense of the poorer man in the periodical allotments. Instead of leaving the struggle for existence to the ablest, the Government steps in and deliberately throws the balance over to the side of wealth. For slavery being permitted the slave must of course be given means of subsistence. In their primitive condition these early socialists (for all below official rank) in their efforts at equalization found themselves plunged into this dilemma. For the sake of the efficiency of the State they were compelled to recognize ability in one way or another. In impaling themselves on the horn of slavery they of course made a mistake wholly belonging to their time; but in avoiding this they could not have avoided the other except at the sacrifice of efficiency—for the action of the State or, in this case, the pleasure of themselves. As to the distinction between slaves and serfs—the latter being attached to the soil and transferred with it, but not as chattels—it becomes in time a minor one. The edict of Kōtoku in 646 A.D., confiscating to the Government use private slaves, was probably not carried into effect. They are subsequently mentioned under an edict of Jitō in 691 A.D. and for long figure as the property of the temples. However, the serf was just as efficient as the slave, and the master had far less responsibility for him. The slave gradually

rose into serfdom; and the freeman gradually sank into it, for the disorders of the times were such as to render the support of strength necessary to the individual holder, and he sacrificed independence for protection, giving up his lands to the strong man and receiving them back with the burden of a rental. It was the old familiar European process of "commendation." As Mr. Wigmore points out, the temples largely profited and to become a temple serf was advantageous both to body and soul.

The freemen in any event were almost certainly limited to agriculturalists. And there seems to have been a reasonably large number of them. The difficulty of the Government early (7th century) is to restrain a movement to favoured districts, especially toward the *Go-kinai* or home provinces of the Central Government, and hence favoured by less taxation. A serf who is attached to the soil cannot move in this way, and a slave can only move with his master. There was one restraint on movement of the freeman. Whether serf or freeman a man in Japan was not a unit. He was a member of the community. This community had certain duties to the overlord, and every member of the community had to perform his part of those duties or the rest would have to do it for him. Freedom of movement was therefore jealously restricted by the communes, aided by a Government which had enough practical experience of rebellion to carefully guard against the drafting of its subjects into any undesirable centres. As early as 668 A.D.—perhaps earlier for the registration of families points to something of the kind—a passport system (*nimbetsu-chō*) had been adopted. A man to go anywhere, to live anywhere, or to have any legal standing and rights, had to possess this *nimbetsu-cho* or be entered on that of a master. In a sense this simplified matters. Actual movement could less and less be prevented as the Central Government grew weaker. Powerful men threw open to settlement tracts of new land—*shinden* and hence untaxed. These were offered in competition with the taxed Government lands, and the latter could not meet such competition. Colonies of slaves or serfs were settled on many *shinden*, and freemen who were paying crushing taxes to the Government rushed to the private lands. Taxed Government land also passed into these *shinden*. Their owners were from their official position exempt from taxation. Government land was therefore surrendered to these exempts and received back on a rental. And it became the only safe course of action where a feeble central authority had broken down before its creatures. With no balance wheel within the bureaucracy, with the lack of restraint over the executive, the man with power in his hands could do what he pleased. And he did it. The earlier distributions soon began to take one course. Favouritism and greed early turned the distribution in one direction. The best lands were all taken up by the powerful. And as a man's power and the number of his household—slaves and freemen—increased, so did his allotment. There could be no check to this in a centralized Government.

The measure of home rule allowed to Japanese local communities is often a matter of comment and admiration. The latter can have its limitations. Japanese communities managed their own affairs but they were given no freedom in that management. This was fixed by rigid lines. These limited the minutiae of political life. They were not laid down on the elastic lines of one of our western communities. Action within the Japanese communities was not spontaneous but was governed by the central bureaucracy. To be sure it makes but little difference to the Central Government who pays the taxes provided the sum fixed upon is returned to the coffers of the bureaucracy. It can afford to lay down broader lines as to the collection and leave the actual laying of the hand on the collar to the collector. It is sometimes better for the more removed authority to say how and when a tax shall be collected, but not to say definitely who shall pay it. It would make little difference to the Central Government whether A or B was the *nanushi* (mayor) of a village, provided A or B took care never to move out of the lines indicated for him to follow. And they saw to that. With what we call government these plebeians of course had nothing to do. As far as we can learn, within historical times they never had anything to do with it. It is only in the German races that we find traces of individuality. The Japanese is a true Tartar, and even when through the Chinese eyes of the second century A.D. we catch a glimpse of him under his tents there is no indication that the individual cut any figure in his world. But some form of local government is necessary as soon as he departs from his lord's tent and dwells apart. Not apart, for even in the country he does not do so to-day. Isolated farms can be seen at times, but it is the rule for a man to go to his work on the farm from his village. It is a very ancient practice to set aside a certain fraction of ground for house and court or working place on every farm. This selected land is bunched together into a village surrounded by a sea of rice fields, and is the standard feature of a Japanese landscape. And but little waste was allowed. About two per cent of the farm surface was so allotted. The Government was paid in taxes in kind. Everything being standardized in rice values. So much per cent of the crop and a minimum was fixed as to an average crop. With a large crop the tenant profited, with a small crop the tenant lost, and unless the diminution was so great as to threaten his efficiency he lost heavily. In addition, by custom, certain *corvées*, forced labour, service for the post, were likewise enforced. As to the Central Government it stopped its hand with these established forms of taxation. The local authority sometimes went further into actual extortion but it did so at its peril. The Government hand was always available, but woe to those who invoked it unnecessarily and without the interests of the Government being involved. They sweated for it unto the third and fourth generation. Their local government was purposely left to them, but in such form that the Government had it

constantly under real control and inspection through the local officials who were in the first case responsible to the Government and in the second case to their constituents. One remark can be made at once as to taxation under such a centralized bureaucracy, for it finds present application in the impersonal centralization of our own municipalities and particularly in those in which a tendency to socialistic legislation has displayed itself. The more a Government of this character can squeeze out of its source of supply, the more it will squeeze. Without control, with all the power in its hands, it will get all it can and spend all it gets. And it makes little difference whether it is the old Japanese Bureaucracy or the modern city of London, power without restraint is impossible.

The *go-nin* units have already been referred to under another connection. These five family clusters were selected under Government instructions directing that their interests should be as wide apart as possible, thus all the better making them spies on each other. They chose their own head but under the approval of the Government local representative (*daikwan*). Nominally he was supposed to be the oldest and wisest, but in practice wealth had the greatest weight, for as the whole group was responsible for the action of any of its members so the chief was responsible for the group. These *go-nin* were again grouped into small districts not unlike our modern city blocks, with the same mutual responsibility in the district and the same supervision over its choice of officials, the great object being that they should be men of sound doctrine and not likely to give the Government trouble. The Government had as much dislike of "the lean and hungry Cassius" as the great Julius himself, or some of our modern paternal Governments. These blocks were given a wide control over their members, and in very recent times the witnessing of a lease by neighbours was necessary for its validity. In other terms they controlled admission to the block, just as in rural districts the admission of any stranger to settle at all within the *mura* (township) required the consent of its officials. All this machinery was under the eye of the *daikwan* although he had but little to do with its actual operation except to see that it did not swerve from the rut in which it was supposed to run. He did this more particularly through the *namushi* or village mayor, who, with his officers, was the official having this double duty to Government and to his fellow villagers. Sometimes these *namushi* were appointed directly, as in ancient times in which the office seemed akin to that of bailiff* of a manor; the usual rule of the Middle Ages was that this appointment had become hereditary; the tendency in Tokugawa times was that they should be elected by the villagers. Always their assumption of office carried with it the stamp of official approval. As the head of the *go-nin* (*ban-gashira*)

* Mr. Wigmore's note to Dr. Simmons paper. Trans. Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. XX, p. 100.

represented the families, and the ward officers represented the district, so the village council and mayor represented the village, and they were the only means of connection with the outside world. All through the machinery of legal government the individual never appears. He cannot move without a passport. He is held responsible for every stranger that he shelters. So his officers are held responsible for him. When the individual has to appear at the local court he is produced by his officials. When he has a lawsuit at Yedo or at the local centre, again his officials appear as his bails, so to speak. Their charges are fixed charges, part of the costs of his suit. As a matter of fact matters rarely reached as far as Yedo. Criminal and civil procedure stopped with the *daikwan's* court, which official was supposed to consult Yedo in knotty cases. When the Government felt that its interests were involved all the witnesses were ordered up. And woe to the man or official who troubled them without cause, and particularly with cause. The punishment was real and severe. It was not confined to fines that brought a smile to the face of the defendant as he sat in court and as has happened in some recent cases of public interest in America. The nervousness of a Government, timid of all innovation, so often appears that these hearings in Yedo can hardly be attributed to anything but a desire to forestall any efforts at change. The abstract idea of justice, of an appeal court for the whole land, hardly seems to exist. The main object is the maintenance of the custom of the land, and with the wide system of espionage this was much simplified.

Passing from country to town there remains to be dealt with another group of producers before we reach the distributing class of the economic system. The earliest method of the classification of the artisans and kindred labour is found in the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi*. The *be* (or in later times guild) is the term by which they are always indicated, and groups of men were set aside in these *be* for specific purposes—to provide the supplies for the Emperor's table, to take care of the royal tombs, to weave cloth, to take care of forests, to maintain roads, and for every field of the then industrial life. The people forming these *be* were serfs and slaves. Many of them were prisoners of war, and were Chinese or Koreans perhaps also sent as tribute or presents. Their number was added to by the slaves brought over in the suite of a genuine immigration of men of wealth and position. These brought with them skilled workers in weaving, pottery, the fine arts, engineering trades, and other occupations. This Chinese and Korean element of the better classes is marked by the names in the higher ranks of the Japanese Society of the time. Their immigration was evidently welcomed as is shown not only by references in the *Nihongi* but by their reception into the ranks of the oligarchy. Whether so settled voluntarily in the land, or as in the earlier times of the fourth and fifth century forcibly by the arbitrament of war, these Chinese and Koreans were the most valuable of the artisan element. Many

public works were being undertaken, and as the Japanese were entirely untrained, on this side numbers would have had to make up for clumsiness. The services of the Chinese and Koreans in this field were distinguished by the reward of freedom and honourable position often granted to them. The artisan, however, never stood so high as the farmer. As an agricultural people the Japanese have always recognized the dignity of the soil and paid it the practical homage of placing the farmer in the first rank of the *plebs*, thereby simply following the standard set by the ritual of their Shintō. But the artisan stood next to the farmer and immeasurably above the merchant. Artisans had an opportunity to rise from a humble sphere. Artisan and artist were convertible terms before the introduction of machinery. Manual labour of course is only dignified by art and by genius in art. Perhaps the practical difference between artist and artisan was the more accentuated because in time the dilettante noble was attracted by art, practised it with his own noble hands and felt it the more necessary to mark the separation. Only genius could hope to find a foothold here. As to politics, however, the artisan cuts but little figure in Japan. The farmer in cases cuts a large one in earlier times. The actual operation of the crude *be* is displayed equally well in the more developed form of the merchant guilds which in system cover the economics of production and distribution.

§ 3.

There were wheels within wheels in this Japanese system; all, be it said, well within the control of the Central Government and only tolerated in so far as they were additional levers for its grasp. The usefulness of any institution is strictly written in its usefulness to the Government. There was no neutral ground in so far as the word "authority" applied. Government had no limitation in its application. It reached to the smallest item of the individual's life. The merchant class afford the best illustration of this inner system, although this classification also runs through all the other minor classes. If the artisan cuts a rare figure and the farmer some figure in Japanese politics, the merchant cuts none at all. At the very early period he probably could be said to be non-existent. At a much later period every noble establishment had its women trained in weaving and embroidery, and men trained in the rougher work of manufactures, in dyeing, etc. Still there were many things requiring a merchant class and they are well developed by the time the court settled at Kyōto. For a long time they could be said not to be worthy of notice at all. Properly speaking they were not taxed. They were fined—up hill and down dale—which perhaps in their eyes was an equivalent. It is hardly necessary to say

that there was no possibility here of a rise. Their only usefulness to the upper class was in their skill and practice as accountants, and as familiar with business transactions. Most of this detail work in receiving and checking and forwarding tax rice fell to them. Here their contact with the ruling class ceased. They dwelt under strict eye, without privilege and with contempt, and could not escape it.

Something has been said already of the wide extension commerce took in the seventeenth century and with the reign of the Peace of the Tokugawa. This commerce was based on credit and made use of all the forms customary to our times. To effect this it is hardly necessary to say that there must have been a standard of trust in this community which is rarely assigned to Japanese commercial circles. And from all the evidence such trust deservedly existed. The genesis of the mercantile system is an obscure one but it seems to develop legitimately out of the old *be*. Occupation in the *be* became confined to families. Son followed father, and establishment in a new business was difficult and only secured by being practically taken into the commercial house as a member of the family. Even the apprentice and employé formed during the time of indenture and employment part of the home circle. Lines of business were therefore confined to particular families; the force of public opinion, so strong in Japan, securing the trade from the intrusion of strangers. The old *be* connection apparently still existed between these families, making them to all intents and purposes a guild though perhaps without any more formal machinery for that purpose than was required for local purposes. To conduct a more than local commerce, however, this primitive structure, only fit for the early *be*, was not sufficient. Some sort of a general exchange was needed. And when the conditions were favourable it sprang into existence. Mercantile development in Japan, as elsewhere, was the child of its environment, and its growth began with peace. By the sixteenth century the traffic between the local centres was beginning to resort to great central marts, and Osaka was already marked for its future career when Iyeyasu finally established his power in the land. The government of a great central market is such a separate problem that we early find it accentuated in Japan. The primitive methods of the small towns could not here apply. The main business of such a market is distribution. There must then be a genuine system of taxation, not a head tax on merchants such as is found in Tosa. It is difficult to trace any burgher element in these great towns—Osaka, Yedo, Sendai. And the best evidence of its non-existence is the fact that it never exerted a trace of influence on the Japanese political system, whereas in Europe it was the entering wedge that was finally to split the feudal system into fragments. Japanese burgher rule in the towns was simply an enlargement of that of the village, in its turn an enlargement of that of the *be* and of the family. The lines and the minutiae were laid down for

them. The expense of town government they assessed among themselves. The present to the Government was to all intents and purposes a tax. It was not voluntary. Nor were the numberless assessments made for rights and privileges in every sphere of life connected with livelihood, nor were the various services required voluntary. Some of these were converted into money payments, the peasant or citizen faring very badly as he paid commutation for all services whether or not actually called for. Yedo, comparatively speaking, was badly off in this respect. Osaka was a highly favoured town.

Iyeyasu made Osaka practically a free city in the commercial sense. The old family system had long been outgrown, and to all intents and purposes merchant guilds were in existence in everything but the chartered name. Under the new conditions development was rapid. Business was done mainly on credit. There were banks and exchange offices, bills, drafts, acknowledgments, all kinds of commercial paper were in free circulation. Cash transactions were as infrequent as in our modern days. Integrity and reliability were the characteristics of the great Osaka houses. Credit was so solid that bills and notes passed freely from hand to hand and after a long circulation came back to the drawer or maker without the intervention of a bank.* To properly secure this an organization was necessary. The merchant guilds were first licensed by the Government toward the end of the seventeenth century, but this was simply recognizing a condition of affairs long pre-existing. There is a wide distinction here from the kindred charters issued by European Governments at the same period of their history. In this latter case a good deal of local government was vested in the citizen. But this local government touched on national and international affairs. The warring interests in the State or between States never came to an agreement to fight it out alone between them or within the ruling class. They buttressed their needs with every possible support and with small prevision as to the future of their caste. They called on the citizen for support in their quarrels, and his guild gave him a rallying point and contained within itself the germs of political power. Local government was only in the hands of the Japanese villager or citizen under limited conditions. There was no spontaneity in his action. Every case was provided for by law and custom, and every case arising must be brought under such law and custom. His only business lay in carrying out this routine. When in doubt the Government was the one to solve the difficulty. These guilds therefore had no political affiliations. They were simply means of maintaining a good understanding and ready settlement of business among the members, and in this

* J. H. Wigmore—"Private Law of Old Japan," Part I, p. 146, Vol. XX, Supplement—Trans. Asiatic Society of Japan. I am drawing largely on the data given in Mr. Wigmore's papers in which his own views, somewhat different from those given in the text above, are ably expounded.

respect the Government finally decided to encourage and support them. They were another lever of the Executive, and their actions were closely watched, but they relieved the Government of much petty business. The legal commercial code of Old Japan is found within these guilds. They were based on the different trades. Each trade had its guild, but these guilds had also a sort of clearing house or central body which adjusted the almost inevitable disputes arising in an extensive commerce in which there was much interlacing of different interests. In this respect they were much like our labour unions of to-day. But these *inter guild wars* were limited by this central authority, endowed with real power inasmuch as it could call on the Government to settle the dispute. This course, be it said, was rarely adopted. In licensing the guilds the Government had in mind its own relief from this minor business of petty disputes, and good reason had to be given for the necessity of bothering it with such affairs. Woe to the unreasonable man. The formula of approach to the seat of Justice was most degrading, the tone adopted was that of irritated authority chiding those who dared to invade its sacred repose with their trivial matters. It was neither Justice nor cold Officialism inviting men to submit their disputes to its decisions for the good of themselves and of the community. Beside, the guild had all the power of the boycott and used it unsparingly, and woe to the unlucky wight who defied its action. The Government might interfere in behalf of the guild, not for the individual. Their interference was in cases with a criminal or at least a political tint, and was of no particular use to anybody. Arai Hakuseki cites a case (1710 A.D.), the parties at issue being the Osaka guilds, a transportation company, and five hundred and three villages: The transportation company was charged with raising the tariff, refusing to make good damage to freight in transit, and stealing it when accident of any kind gave an excuse for loss. The support of a temple came in as a side issue depending on the decision. The upshot of this interesting lawsuit was that the Osaka guilds got nothing, the respectable number of five hundred and three villages got less than nothing for they were not even mentioned, the boatmen who admitted responsibility in so far as the freight was in *their* charge were relieved of *all* responsibility, and the incumbent of the temple being left without any support, financial or moral, by the death of his lord and patron, committed suicide. This last act re-opened the whole case, and the prime minister in Yedo put the transaction, temple and all, back on the original basis preceding the accidents or disputes; "by what means I do not know"—adds Arai suggestively.

One feature attached to this system of merchant guilds is the apprentice. These ranged from one to a score or several score, from the master's son to youths taken in on very much the same standing. And the relation is much the same. They are very positively subordinated to the master, and his control reached into every nook and cranny of their lives and covered

the whole twenty-four hours of the day and night. These young men received no pay; their food was coarse and their clothing coarse; their hours of labour were long and their apprenticeship was long. It could well be asked what attraction such a life would have to any youth. It was rare that any was open to him. Classes were fixed. Admission to the craft lay in the hands of the guild. Cheapness and the certainty of finding an outlet necessarily led fathers to favour their sons in choosing a career for them. Son followed in the footsteps of the father. Convenience was made a binding force. And Government enforced the custom through the threat of penance to itself. Any automatic provisions for advancement were discouraged. That hereditary calling has a hold on the mind is now-a-days hardly questioned. It is a fact and it generates the true artisan in distinction from the mere workman. But it is terribly narrowing to the mind. Only in our modern times have we broken away from it in the West, and then for only a small minority of the people. But this guild system, and its heredity, ran all through the lower classes of the Japanese people. We find it in the class just above the merchants—the artisan class. Its strength lay not only in the convenience but in the ultimate reward. When the young apprentice had finished his term—ten to twenty years—it was customary for his master to give him a start in business. This not only consisted in starting him out with stock and fixtures, but he was often established as a sort of branch house of the parent firm. He had a connection from the beginning. Under these terms there was no rivalry between the master and apprentice. They were really and truly loyal to the House. If the customary peace of Japanese commercial life had been broken, the sound of “clubs” in defence of the House would have had most enthusiastic answer from the Japanese apprentice. His goal was not that of the independent journeyman, but that of becoming a master or perhaps a trusted employé of the House with one of those rare and honoured positions with a competent salary attached, few in number and stepping stones at times to a subordinate partnership in the great House itself.

This ultimate goal, this graded definition throughout a given class, eliminated all jealousy and rivalry throughout these grades. There was none of the spirit of democracy, resulting from the sense of separation of interests between master and man, that made the English Commonwealth and its heir the American Republic possible. There was no “iron law of wages” to rouse feeling between employer and employed, and to demand freedom of contract and freedom of movement. There was an “iron law of custom” establishing the relations between them and ensuring to each a living within the class limited by his personal abilities and the control of the ruling power in the guild. A man's position was fixed within a corporation as close as any mediæval guild in Europe. But this is not democracy.

Democracy implies a share of all in the government of the community, small or great; the right of all to be heard and to have a share in the interpretation of the rules fixed for conduct. There is not a trace of this in the Japanese guild. The overawing power was not the sense of Right, it was the sense of the overhanging Government which would make itself felt as soon as oppression drove any section of the community to open rebellion. But how much oppression is first endured before it culminates in rebellion! The Japanese was patient under his affliction because he knew no better and could not help himself. With the classes fixed, and the position within these classes rigidly marked off, there was withal a cheerful spirit of optimism. But it reminds us of the optimism preached by Doctor Pangloss to Candide. It was an optimism based on limited horizon. The law of custom enforced by the law of the executive arm was an all sufficient reason. It was not an answer for there were no questioners. Each one was assured of his position on the given terms and the position was endurable. It was against custom to wish to change it, and any such tendencies toward originality—what we would call progress—were rigidly crushed out. There is a picture of beautiful subordination presented everywhere. If privileged official classes have privileges rigidly enforced, they also have duties not so rigidly enforced; for very obvious reasons. This has been called democracy, but the democracy had nothing and could have nothing to do with enforcement in a single centred bureaucracy. A limiting condition of Nature, however, steps in here. Caprice cannot rule without such limit. It is indicated by the right of a man to live. Infringe on this fundamental right and self preservation dictates rebellion. The ruling powers recognized this and justice was enforced from above. Whether it be guild or *daimyō*, if they oppressed their weaker subordinates beyond the straining point and drove them to rebellion, Government stepped in with terrible results. If anything, it punished the *daimyō* more severely than the guild, his powers of mischief being greater; that is, mischief to the Government peace. This had a curious result tending to the Government advantage. Resentment was not aroused against the Government but against the individual who had brought the Government into the field. It was clearly recognized by all parties that it was advisable to clean their own houses, to settle their disputes between themselves, to reach some compromise if necessary rather than to invoke the aid of this terrible and far-reaching power. The individual must dominate the community, which was not likely for Government naturally favours authority and would hardly put it altogether in the wrong—or he was ruined. But also the guild or the community was unlikely to drive matters to such extreme. Custom is its very life, and interpretation of custom cannot at one stroke reach very far from its base. The result of constant appeal to custom is a tendency to its crystallization into still harder and more unbending forms. The community with its close organization

had one terrible weapon, invalidating any appeal from its authority—social ostracism. It was a last resort, and the careful and the formal action of the heads, of guild or community, even in the case of a runaway apprentice or bankrupt shows that the result of such action was fully appreciated in this cold hard social life. Where there is no life or bread outside of the life of the community one can easily see how drastic and crushing a weapon this social ostracism can be. It brings the victim at once to the feet of the rulers, these rulers against whom in social life there is no appeal. For appeal to the corporate body, to the community, is too clumsy to be of any real use; and the community cannot rise from the general forms in which it has embodied its will. Its interpretation and application it has left to its appointed agents and these can make such application the most exquisite torture to the individual.* Of course the only refuge is to cling to the most general interpretation. This means the negation of all positivism as to personality, and this seems to be the keynote to the interpretation of much in the Japanese character.

One item of the derelict in the community is of interest in this connection. The position of the bankrupt in Japan was peculiar; but it was no more harsh than in our own western world previous to the first quarter of the nineteenth century. In both cases his treatment was cruel. We condemned him to hopeless imprisonment. The Japanese made him officially an outcast. His family were distributed among the relatives. If he himself was allowed to live among the villagers or townsmen it was as a disgraced dependent. He was allowed no voice in public affairs. His position was marked by the prohibition to wear the outside coat (*haori*) or a raincoat. In every public assembly he was a marked man. Often this limited existence was not permitted him, and he was driven to the outskirts of town or village and forced to live by himself in a hut erected for that purpose. Some of these bankrupt settlements formed small towns. This personal mistreatment was far more outrageous among the Japanese than in the West, where, the official forms satisfied, the general public rather pitied the poor debtor. The Japanese did not carry individualism to that extent. In a sense the bankrupt was excommunicated as far as the community was concerned, and the term "community" has far more meaning to eastern than to western ears. But they gave the bankrupt a better chance of rehabilitation. His labour was at a discount; and only to live he must take what he can get. Where the English debtor starved in jail, the Japanese debtor as often starved outside of it. The Japanese were not going to burden the community to the meagre extent of any provision at all. However, he had the opportunity to work, and his chance

* Imagine such a system in force in one of our American communities ruled by the "Boss" and "Organization." This comes more than once to the mind of anyone studying the operation and effect of these old Japanese institutions. How far does it apply to such American communities? In Corporation or Labour Trusts?

lay there if he could grasp it. And there were people perhaps—his family—interested in giving him that chance. Without this outside assistance he could barely expect to live, let alone recuperate, and the hopeless bankrupt was indeed in pitiable case.

Under such conditions we can understand the leniency of these old Japanese Courts toward breach of contract. The result of their decision was to be of tremendous import to the man in front of them. Bankruptcy was not only a commercial but a criminal offense. As in the large majority of cases there was no criminal intent to defraud, but the bankruptcy resulted from causes difficult to foresee, or even from positive misfortune, this extreme view was recognized. Excuses were given a wide range and any honest effort to meet a debt was good reason for postponement of the penalty. There was also another force at work. Public opinion, high and low, was much against the loaning of money on interest. It was a practice forbidden to the upper classes, and hence found no sympathy among the very men called on to judge the rights and wrongs of a case submitted to their judgment. In Old Japan they were unable to see that money has no value apart from labour; that it is stored up labour, and the loan of it is the loan of this stored up labour. This reasoning was singularly like that of modern socialism. To them money was simply a token. They had no conception of its real use. That the gold and silver or copper token had any right to a return in exchange for its labour, this they missed altogether. They could not see behind it.* A most

* As in the famous criticism of Henry George on Bastiat's still more famous illustration of the two men, one possessing and the other wishing to borrow a plane. George justifies "interest," but not on Bastiat's example which he considers intrinsically bad. He justifies it on the possible increase to the lender if he should refuse the loan of some object capable through use of natural increase, and which increase he could claim as his own. He substitutes therefore a calf which can grow into a cow before the end of the year. Where the care, food, shelter, etc. come in is not taken into consideration. Doctor Hadley ("Economics" p. 137), in puncturing this fallacy of George, remarks in reference to the increase of the calf into a cow, "without working: a curious conception of farm life." In other words the lender, for a small return, sacrifices the larger return if he took the risk himself. The true and scientific reason for interest is indicated by Doctor Hadley (*loc. cit.*) in the terms:—"We allow interest because it is for the advantage of the community to encourage a man to save capital which will support people in making more planes than he himself can use, or in bringing up more animals than he himself can watch." And further, p. 268:—"The system of interest was approved by jurists, because the accumulation and use of capital was advantageous to society as a whole, and increased the public wealth. With this end in view, society was willing to offer rewards to those who would abstain from destroying wealth and would use it productively." This is pretty much in the terms of Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations Part II, Chap. X) that, "every prodigal appears to be a public enemy, and every frugal man a public benefactor." This long citation can perhaps be justified from the importance of the subject in connection with one-sided systems of economics so unfortunately prevalent in these days.

unfortunate phase for it is to-day the cause of much of the Japanese spirit of unthrift. The Japanese are not an idle people but they never have been trained to thrift, to look beyond the end of their noses, to take advantage of present ability to provide for future disability, to store up work as the bee stores up honey. And in this these old court decisions did not encourage them. Repayment of the loan was usually enforced, although on most lenient terms. Interest was treated most cavalierly and only as it formed the letter of the bond for the specific period was it enforced at all. It became the practice, as far as possible, to incorporate it as part of the principal. Bonds were thus entirely rewritten, accumulated interest going into the principal and as interest not appearing at all; a familiar trick to western finance of equally shaky periods. Otherwise the chance of the collection of such overdue money was small indeed. Long extension of the time of repayment so often granted for years also involved the risk of another characteristic form of relief. This consisted in periodical "private settlement" orders, wiping out all debts previous to the issue of the order. Sometimes, however, these proclamations were limited to debts contracted within a given period. They formed a Japanese statute of limitations. Every judicial extension of the period of repayment would naturally send a shiver down the spine of any lender. Under such conditions usury flourished. Money could only be loaned at great risk of loss of principal, and almost certain scaling down, if not loss, of interest. Where the victim did fall in the usurer's hands and could not pay the principal he therefore sweated for it in the new bond. Bankruptcy was too terrible not to give any terms to avoid its consequences. Government recognized the fact grudgingly, that men could not be expected to give what belonged to them without exchange. It therefore was compelled to sanction interest to prevent men shutting themselves up in themselves; but in its attitude toward interest, in not treating it simply and openly as a matter of contract in reference to a material open to the law of supply and demand, it drove it into the worst hands accustomed to make use of the worst methods.

From village government to town government, and to the government of the artisan and merchant guilds, we can detect one even levelling principle. What grades and distinctions we find among them are grades and distinctions necessary to organized life, and it can be said in a large sense open to all. If the office of *nanushi* and *ban-gashira* become hereditary, the incumbent however must possess the qualities essential for those high offices (or his substitute, for this principle of substitution is recognized all through Japanese life.) If he is unfit for them a suitable incumbent will be found elsewhere. It speaks well for the system that for centuries the effort should in many cases be kept up to maintain in a family the standard fit for the position. But two important conditions are to be noted in the

system. The first is that this result is not obtained by any democratic principle. That is, unless the rank and file of an army be regarded as democracy. These people within the Japanese ranks are guided from above; their "self-government" is dictated from above; and they are compelled to closely follow the instructions. The desire displayed through all the members is not any display of democratic spirit but the fear of the punishment to all if one of them breaks ranks. It is the breach of custom which they feared with its unknown consequences. This resentment of the unusual is still plainly displayed in Japanese life. The relations between apprentice, journeyman, and master, are definitely fixed in the artisan guilds which yet retain much of the old flavour. What is resented is any breach of custom even down to an omission of any of the little courtesies governing their mutual relations. There is no movement toward democratic rule of the guilds, which still are in the hands of their elders—a kind of *toshiyori* selected to be sure by one of Nature's processes, success in the past, but autocratic interpreters of custom laid down by this close corporation. Any disturbance of the old guild customs is rather due to an intrusion of the democracy than to an assertion of it, and leads to a breaking up of the ranks within the guild and an opposition of interests. In other words the apprentice is not now looking to an even career, marked out by custom and granted to good behaviour, to establish his position in the ranks of the guild. Widening of interest is now making individual ability of more importance to the leaders, and this they look for and reward accordingly, but this is turning the Japanese artisan into a workman. He can no longer hope to perhaps become himself a master workman. The result is the same as happened in Europe more than a hundred years ago. Old custom is breaking down, and a claim for a voice in governing trade affairs is heard from the lower grades in the guild. But this is an entering wedge of western ideas. It is found in new industries, such as electric workers, railway employes, factory workers, and kuruma runners. These form "unions" on western lines. The guilds throughout Japanese life will certainly in time split into employers and labour trusts, especially in the extension of factory life to take the place of the present system in which as yet every home is also a workshop. Not that this is to be regretted, for experience in the West has shown that it is not the factory that has caused injury to social life, for it is the factory which brought to light and long suffered from the odium caused by the frightful conditions of that survival of the past—the sweat shop. One other feature of this pseudo-democracy is seen in the village life. Notices are sometimes posted agreeing that frugality shall be practised in the village for the ensuing year. These notices are the result of the consultation of the village elders, selected as before stated, not by any principle of suffrage where each unit has a voice in the public affairs, but by custom springing from an old military system.

Elders thus selected by a suffrage similarly sifted and governed by custom can hardly be grafted on democracy. In such case the government of "republican" Venice was a democracy.

The second important condition is that the principle governing this Japanese life in and subordinate to the ruling caste is socialistic. A man bows to no ability as the result of personal effort. The person holding rank represents the community, not his own ability. The whole original idea is a levelling one. Hence personality is to be crushed, not to be mutually balanced. Where ability is not to be given sway with the method of checks and balances the result is inevitable. Ability is sure in time to find its way to the top. There must be leaders or else there will be anarchy. The result is that this ability does come to the top and finds itself there without any restraint whatever upon it. And its position is the more secure inasmuch as it holds its place not as a personal entity but as the commune. In attacking it any individual attacks the commune. The same difficulty is found in western life. The problem often is to bring home directly to the *personality* of some scoundrel in political or corporate ("trust" or "union") life his misdeeds against the individual. This is always difficult and sometimes impossible. *Official* action is a cloak to many personal motives. But in our western life we have checks and balances and means of expression for a set of individuals whose personality by training is much accentuated. This was not the case in Japan. On the contrary official action for all was the only possible formula in thought. Action of any kind was necessarily accepted as official. The result was that these official positions were put to personal use, and every little Japanese commune was represented by an oligarchy. This was not inconvenient to the Central Government. A Central Government finds it difficult to deal with a democracy. The object from the centre outward is to see that no one of the units gets too strong, or threatens to displace it or to become a new centre. This feeling radiates outwards, for the object of each official in turn is to see that his underlings do not get too strong for *his* management. The Central Government determines this by laying down a formula and carefully watching that it be not encroached upon. And it is equally to the advantage of every official, for his own good, to watch the operation of this formula on all below himself. This the Japanese Government succeeded in doing. It maintained its grip on all below it, but the levelling principle became and only could become a formula. The land could not be alienated, but just the same it passed into the hands of a few simply because some men have foresight and thrift, and the majority are careless and idle unless forced by necessity to act otherwise. What could not be allowed for was human weakness, human greed, and ability. This can only be neutralized by checking one against the other. The incapable anyhow must sink to the bottom. To try to do otherwise is simply to put power in the

hands of ability without any check, and human nature is not so perfect as to allow such license. There is no worse failure or more hideous tyranny in history than the old Japanese State. Not even Peru.

Let it not be thought then that evenly graded, conservative, and automatic as this intrinsic communism or socialism of the Japanese State seems, that in its human application it found its expression as laid down in theory. Far from it. From above the oppression was merciless. It sought everything from below up to the limit of possible endurance. I do not speak here simply of the Ruling Power, but down through all grades of society; official to subject, master to man, parent to child, for even in this last relation the utmost of service and obedience was exacted; this latter relation, it can be added, typical of all. Indeed in this lower class of oppression it was the Ruling Power that was the saving grace. Despotism as it was it at times played the rôle of benevolent despot and saved the victims of such minor oppression. All below it were to it valuable cattle, its milch cows, and it visited its wrath on those who detracted from their efficiency and yield. Its regulations were all directed to the preservation and increase of the valuable stock of its farm. This it sought in the imposition of this custom law so carefully matured under its eye. But this, as said, is not democracy. There is no sense of any rights as existing against the Rulers who are only restrained by prudential fears against injuring their property. There never was a Government yet that would not take and spend up to the possible limit. There is no sense of personal rights against custom, for personality does not exist except as so much "arm power" (horsepower) belonging to the community. Hence there are no rights of a commune, no rights of a city against the Central Government. There is in fact nothing of these elements as found in European history. Let us recapitulate here for a moment these features of the old Japanese communal system, for we shall find all these features handed down and existing and governing both in economics and in politics the present Japanese State. We find the regulation of the individual by the community, a regulation pushed of necessity into the greatest minutiae laying down specific rules for his conduct and his thought. Words were given to conceal thought, we are told. The old Japanese State appreciated this thoroughly and interpreted a man's thought by his actions; therefore thought had to be carefully governed, and it is safest not to think. We find the absolute subjection of the individual to the community. There is no life outside of it. All occupation, from the Mikado on his throne to the lowest subject in the land, is organized. To its Executive there is no balance but its own interpretation of custom. All the powers of the State are of necessity in its hands. The individual is absolutely submerged in the State. He exists for the State which has rights but no duties; no duties, for the individual has no means of enforcing any rights against the State.

§ 4.

Let us turn for a moment to the history of Europe to see what is the spirit dominating it in the past and directing its development. Greece and Rome are alike in so far as the individual is regarded as existing for the benefit of the State, not *vice versa*. Turning more particularly to western Europe we find that at his first appearance the Roman is living under a patriarchal government. Society is made up of a congeries of clans supposed to be connected by kinship. It was a family system therefore in which the "father" of the separate units is the absolute representative in the tribal council. But one peculiarity is noted from the start. This family is to a considerable extent a legal fiction. Rome was a collection of men gathered together from various localities of Middle Italy. Its central situation gave the little tribe settled on the hills above the Tiber its advantages and attracted to it numerous outsiders. They were not far enough advanced politically to conceive the idea of a State apart from the family, and hence the constitution of the *gens* and a radical divergence of interests shown between the two sections of the populace in the division of *plebs* and *patricians* shows that the idea of kinship still retained in the *gens* was a very artificial one. However, the subordination of the individual in the family was carried into the Roman idea of the State. To the Roman as to the Japanese the individual did not exist at all except as a mere unit of force. It never recognizes his existence and individual responsibility any more than a man recognizes the individual responsibility of the axe with which he clears away the forest. The individual was purely and simply an instrument. This was transferring the idea of the individual as conceived by the family into the State. The individual had as little existence in the conception of his inner circle. For his misdeeds he was responsible to the family, but this was because through him the family became responsible to the community. Under such conditions it was impossible to consider him as a thinking unit. Only as a conforming unit, bound in by those unwritten laws and customs of the community in general and the family in particular, could he have any position whatever.

Such restriction of the individual will, the confining it within narrow and rigid rules of conduct, can be seen to be a necessity if these family units are to live together in the peace and contiguity of a community. This was the position of the Roman citizen in the primitive organization of Rome, which never was republican in our modern individualistic sense of the term. What element there was of this latter comes in later times, and strictly speaking even then is not individualism at all. With the conquest of the world and the substitution of foreigners for Italians in the army the State loses sight of the political duties of the Roman. He is forgotten. But with the exigencies of the later Empire the old theory comes again to the front and the Roman is held strictly for all the fulfillment of his duties.

As a soldier they did not want him for he was almost useless. But all the cost of the civil service he was again forced to shoulder. This had increased enormously whereas wealth had steadily diminished. Every public position carried these customary financial obligations attached to it. Public entertainments, the maintenance of public buildings and institutions, public improvements, all fell on the official class. In this class, narrowing in numbers and in wealth, office was compulsory and office meant ruin. The efforts to escape a seat in the *curia* and the once honoured name of Roman citizen were pitiable. These efforts were not dictated by selfishness but by necessity. Outside this charmed circle it was possible to prosper. Inside it there was certain poverty and degradation. There were no half-way measures, for the Roman citizen could only lose his citizenship by death or slavery.*

With its successful wars slavery had been introduced into the Roman State. With the provinces pouring their wealth into Rome, and with the labour performed by slaves, the Roman citizen had nothing to do but polish armour. Even this he abandoned later to mercenaries. *Panem et circenses*. The Government supplied food for his body and for his imagination. Practically all he had to supply was clothing and shelter. This was not such an impossibility in a State where personal following was so important to a public man. When the Roman was poor he became a client. When he was rich he became a centre for clients. At an early period the rich man or the stingy man found his position unsafe in the State. At a later period the Government required of him this public distribution of the surplus. It prevented his growing too great and it took all the credit for his generosity. The position of the Roman client was not a pleasant one. In his right to a patron there was not a particle of independence; there was only impudence. He had no strength to enforce his position. He depended on the Government, which in its turn depended not on him but on mercenaries. However he was the only resource and means of protection of the rich Roman, and these latter met all demands on them more than half way. This catering to the public demand for shows and idleness had the usual result. The "Roman people" of the Empire was perhaps the most worthless civic element the world had seen or has seen. Pampered by his Government, flattered and cajoled by fat kine who were afraid the Government would let him loose to tear them, his predatory instincts increased with his growing inefficiency. He acquired a mass of base desires with no ability inherent in himself to satisfy them. The Roman citizen developed into a chained beast which licks or tears the hand which feeds it, and is equally helpless before the anger and chastisement of those out of its reach. And it was this training which was to leave him more utterly

* The collection of the assessed taxes was the business of the *curiales*. Any deficiency they made up from their own property.

helpless than any other part of Italy or the Roman world before the storms and stresses of the Middle Ages. As for the free artisan in such a world, he weakened and could not sustain competition with slave labour. He was overwhelmed by its vast flood unlimited in numbers. He sank into a complete idler and lost all inclination and ability for work. Slave labour was of course inefficient. There was no personal reward at the end of it, only punishment on failure, and hence the object was to do just enough to avoid that unpleasant contingency. The favourable contrast sometimes made between slave labour of the past and what is sometimes spoken of by socialist writers as slave labour of the present leaves out of account this lack of incentive which works efficiently both from the economic and moral point of view in all but the hopeless class which, in modern times, is taken care of as soon as the pressure drives it below its subsistence. Incentive cannot be left out of account, for certainly the socialistic State is not to depend on the lash of the overseer but on the readiness of the worker to accomplish—what? His allotted minimum, a factor always different in amount and execution in the eyes of the one who sets the task and the one who performs it. But what is approved of in the slave system is its care of its human cattle, grounded on the desire for efficiency. There can be difference on this point according as society views its interference between men in their relation as owner and chattel, or as freemen dealing with each other on a basis of natural ability. There were undoubtedly slave owners in the old Roman world that took humane care of their slaves. The relation between master and man were often of the most intimate character. Freedman and faithfulness were often correlative terms implying in the later the continuance of previous relations. But when slave labour was very cheap and to be had in great abundance it is to be suspected that this is the exception and not the rule; and the almost universal condemnation of the system by ancient writers leads to the same belief. It was customary to expose sick slaves, and it was found necessary to forbid this practice or to check it by giving freedom to such slave if he recovered. It was found necessary to compel owners to maintain slaves who through age or injury had become useless. And it was equally found necessary to prevent their manumission *en bloc* by large slave owners who found this cattle not worth its feed; the reason for this being that the State only found place for the freeman and citizen, and had no place for the freedman who could not become a citizen. It was customary to chain the porter slave to the door like a watch dog. The horrors of the *ergastulum* are a common resource for the not over-tender writers of invective of the day. In these jails for slaves, men and women were crowded promiscuously together, in black and damp and unsanitary dungeons. They died like sheep, but as many souls were possibly made as were lost, and they did not regard the sufferings of the individual as of much importance. It was only necessary to keep up the proper proportion of females. As far as there is

any such disregard for the proper guarding of females in our present system it exists against the knowledge and in the face of both law and a strong public sentiment to enforce that law. The Roman, however, did not consider this as a moral question at all. He was dealing with chattels not with human beings.

The dominant spirit of our modern western civilization therefore is not to be found in this old Roman State in which we still find the initiative taken not by the individual but by the State. There is another element however—the German. It is not to be pretended that man ever was entirely independent of his fellowman. The idea of the freedom of primitive man in the forest is a very erroneous one. No one is more dependent on his fellow tribesmen for protection than the savage. But as far as individualism could be driven with safety it was so by the Germans of the time of Tacitus. Their political structure was extremely loose. Their bands waxed and waned according to the success of some leaders in war. The immediate pressure of war removed, or gorged with spoil, their hordes split up again into small wandering tribes within a loosely defined geographical range. A pastoral people, their wealth consisting in their scrawny cattle, permanent development of the soil was out of the question. A mere scratching of the ground, the harvesting of a crop and then removal to fresh soil, was the only agriculture possible under such conditions. The necessities of their situation made these units very small. Kinship was the basis of their clans, and its obligations were recognized although not so strictly drawn as among a more organized people. The father had power of life and death over his son. He could kill him or sell him as a slave; but as soon as the son reached man's estate and took the sword and spear in his hand he could take himself whither he chose, acting as independently in his relation as the tribe acted independently of the horde. There has been no such predominance of the single man, no such resentment of any kind of dictation or restraint, anywhere else in the world's history—except among the tribes of America. The patriarchal system of the East had in it all the germs of despotism. The patriarch was surrounded by his sons and his sons' sons, and the community gathering strength soon took on an artificial character from adoption of strangers into the family. The tendency of the German was rather to split the family apart, only maintaining such connection as ensured the individual safety in his community by the certainty of these existing avengers of any wrong done to him. In fact it was the dangers of the blood feud that kept the peace among these units. Time and contact with Rome changed the organization. The German described by Symmachus and Ausonius differs from the German of Tacitus' time. The wars with Rome to gain spoil, and the wars with each other to retain it, had not diminished this fierceness of the individual and his impatience of restraint; but it had necessitated a more permanent organization and had given a prominence and a power to the chiefs that originally they had not possessed. They were still

the choice of the tribesmen but the dice were loaded before casting. A chief now had a band of personal retainers, and these two elements form the nucleus of the future State.

This slowly developed into feudalism. Time and expense kept the great mass of the nation from attending the Witnagemote, and the fines soon became in reality a capitation tax. The form of Government at the centre became the convenient model for local Government and there was every likelihood of the old free spirit of individualism being crushed out altogether, at least in the rural districts whose forces were scattered and unable to resist the small but compact mass of feudal power. The spirit, however, was kept alive in the cities. These were remnants of the old Roman civilization. For generations the barbarian kept aloof from them; and for generations he one by one gradually drifted into them forming in time the backbone of these mercantile communities. From the first he recognized their value as milch cattle and the impossibility of applying his laws to the usages of the conquered. Hence two codes existed side by side strongly influencing each other. It is no strange result therefore that conqueror and conquered should change places. The more advanced civilization was certain to prevail, but could only prevail through adoption of those principles in the code of the conqueror which asserted the rights of all to have a voice in the settlement of the affairs of the community. It was the fact that the basic principles of both codes were not irreconcilable that enabled their fusion and prevented the final elimination of one of them. The settling down of the Germans into the cities hastened and strengthened this movement which was bound in time to cast its influence again over the rural districts rousing up in them the same old feeling of influence. And if the spirit was easier to keep alive in cities the position that the cities took in the Middle Ages strengthened and justified it. It is doubtful if civic life ever reached a period of suspension in the West. We know this to be a fact in four cases, Rome, the cities of southern Italy, Ravenna, and Venice. Venice was to be the model for that important feature of feudal times—the free city. The Veneti, the last to be conquered by Rome, were the first to raise their heads above the flood of barbarism, and through its contact with the eastern Empire keep the lamp of civilization alight in the West. The refugees, clustered together on the numerous islets at the mouth of the Brenta, showed the world that the real strength of a community lay in all its membership. These earliest Venetian Republics were representative governments that would seem almost impossible to such times; but they maintained their head against German invasion and were also practically free from any connection with the eastern Empire. Their alliance and their strength were so valuable to this latter that it made no effort to enforce its shadowy claim to allegiance.

The cities of northern Italy were differently situated. They were under the iron heel of the Lombard, but even then sheer necessity kept alive their civic institutions. They had to be

allowed to adjust the complicated affairs of civilized life by their own codes. This fact and the fact that the two peoples in Italy—German and Italian—did not mix made the supremacy of civic society almost a foregone conclusion. Given the breaking up of Charlemagne's unwieldy empire, and the disorganized feudal opposition without a leader was face to face with the organized community in their neighbourhood. The cities themselves fell in their turn. Italy had been broken into fragments apparently impossible of any further coherence; a coherence, in fact, not brought about until the last half of the nineteenth century. The very intensity of their civic life made them a prey to parties, and the re-appearance of the Empire into the Italian politics gave support again to feudalism and the rule of the local tyrant. However there was here a redeeming feature, for jealousy of the Empire and its ultimate intentions necessitated more or less of an agreement between the tyrant and his subjects. He had to rule under civic forms and keep them alive. This jealousy aroused by the overpowering shadow of the German Emperor curiously enough aroused no fellow feeling in Germany. It shows how intensely local were the thoughts of men. In their opposition Italian and German found no connecting link. The Ghibelline nobles in Germany found no inconsistency in marching on Italy. To them it was a just subjection of a fief of the Empire in its more abstract sense, and without material enhancement of the Emperor's power as far as Germany was concerned. And this spirit of discord existed all over Europe. The result was that both were to go down in their contest with the supreme power foreshadowing the modern State; the nobles completely, the people by making terms. In Germany the nobles could maintain a factious opposition, which, without furnishing any ground for a State, prevented the Emperor from accomplishing anything. The result was to make a great people the sport of European politics for nearly three hundred years, and Europe's battles were fought across the Rhine. In France, king and people crushed the nobles absolutely but left the physical force of the State in the hands of the king. What rights the people possessed they were soon forced to abdicate, and this result was an easier consequence as the wars of France were mainly foreign wars and placed a standing army on French soil always at the beck and call of the king. The Estates-General were no longer summoned, and the Parliaments were little more than mere bureaux of registration.* In England, the wars were civil wars mainly. Only during the Hundred Years War with France did the armies live in part on the country. In England itself the only resource was taxation. This meant the extortion from both contestants of privileges dear to the trader's heart, and as he at first aided the power of the king, so later he sided with the nobles to curb the power of the king, and in this delicate balancing of

* The French communes were eliminated as a political factor by Louis XI.

the two rose to the supreme power in the State. And yet its whole origin lay in these traders' privileges, the necessity to govern their local communities. In other matters the English merchant class were very reluctant to take a hand, until with widening vision they saw how essential to them was complete control. Then they took the whole. In England, local influence united people and nobles into a democracy. In France, kingly government became supreme and at the same time lost touch with the people. Hence revolution, not reformation. Through all this long battle between people and power it is essential to note the value to Europe of its commercialism, of its merchant class. The interacting necessity of the two forces to the first communities of modern Europe, of government through the civic institutions of the conquered combined with the personal rights *vis viva* of the German; the rise and extension of commerce, a valuable source of revenue to the powers of the land, and hence the wisdom of its encouragement and granting to it certain rights; all these factors implied internal government *plus* the spirit of individualism. There is in the old feudal government of Europe little to choose as compared with Japan. The merchant class were equally despised. But this merchant class contained within it the jewel of our modern life—the sense of equality through contract. Any form of contract implies justice, exact justice. There is here a radical change in the position of modern thought. We can now see that the modern spirit of justice at the base of commercialism is far higher than the romanticism of chivalry. Chivalry often sacrificed justice to sentiment, and truth and honour to a false ideal of loyalty.

Contrast this course of events and its ultimate results with Old Japan. Here we find the severest localism to rule under fixed conditions, as it must in a feudal state. District is fenced off from district, and communication between them is only allowed under strictest regulation. There are no devastating foreign wars, but the people have to pay for the support of a warrior class engaged in a continual civil war. To this civil war there is no immediate prospect of end. The country is without a ruler, for its nominal ruler has through custom delegated all his power, and the struggle is not over the throne but who shall gain control of the Imperial puppet and the vails and perquisites thereto attached. The remedy of a really strong ruler in his own right never appears. Tokugawa is only a partial exception. For over two hundred years they are really and actually kings of Japan but the radical weakness of their position made itself apparent in leaving a rival still existing even in shadow. It is fashionable to assert that Tokugawa could not have suppressed the Empire, but they not only thought of it but actually considered the best means of carrying it out. Meanwhile as far as the people were concerned they were of minor benefit. The whole system was based on selfishness. The peace of course gave an impetus to many industries, but the Government view of the lower classes was that of a valuable

milch cow to be carefully drained. Pressure on them, formerly due to civil war, became pressure due to the rage for luxury. The taxes ran up in many districts to seven-tenths of the produce of their farms. The severity and extravagance of this peaceful Government has been touched on elsewhere. Here it only need be said the Government selfishness kept things just from breaking. And they could shave very close to the desperation point. There was no public spirit to centralize opposition. There was no centre with effective machinery of opposition. There was no town, local government, or mercantile body, possessed of such machinery. When people had nothing to eat, they starved or eat each other. To be sure this is one form of mutual support.

One of the results of the extension of the Romans into a world power was an extension of their legal system. The original Roman law—the knights' code as exemplified in the Law of the XII Tables—was a purely formal code in which little idea of justice entered, and the validity of which required a most exact observance of ceremonial; any flaw in carrying out the formulæ invalidating the whole procedure. This law based on tribal customs it was found impossible to apply to the many peoples gradually brought under Roman sway. Hence among this essentially exact and legal people there was a search into those principles which govern the relations of men's conduct to each other. This natural law in its codified form was known as *jus gentium*—in later times developing into a *jus naturale* of still wider application. The secrets of the older law—the knights' code—were only known to a selected priesthood chosen and trained to carry out and hand down to their successors those mysteries and exact ceremonies so necessary to its execution and to avert the wrath of the gods. The *jus gentium*, however, was the study of legal ethics open to the examination of any mind. Its chosen officer was the *praetor*, and in the *praetor's* court originated the equity law and jurisdiction of our own times. Law passed from the sphere of ceremonial and formulæ to that of ethics. This equity jurisprudence has always had a tremendous influence especially on the legal minds of continental Europe. During the Middle Ages when law—apart from the Canon Law governing the relations of Church and State—was almost entirely an interpretation of customs and contracts, feudal contracts and not so very different from contracts in our modern sense of the term, the French lawyers never lose sight of this *jus gentium* as found in the later *jus naturale*. It is their ideal. This gave rise to an error perpetuated in the minds of many good people of the present day. The search for this ultimate ideal existing behind the obvious corruption of present day practices led to the idea that the primitive man must have been swayed by these ideas of justice that are found at the root of all their relations, and that in the primitive simplicity of these early times is to be found the cure for much of our present evil; that in a return to those times in which justice not greed governed the earth is to be

found a solution for the pressing problems of our intricate modern life. Fortunately or unfortunately no such ideal man ever existed. Evolution would lead us to suspect this outcome, and the actual searches of anthropologists and archaeologists have held up to us a very unflattering picture of these our ancestors. The more primitive man becomes the more brutal he becomes, with very doubtful ideas as to the source of his food supply and as to his marital relations. However, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were none of these prying scientists to hold up the lamp in these uncanny corners of the world's past; and it could as well be peopled with fairies as with spectres. This ideal man played a great part in the French philosophy of the Academicians, and governed the thoughts of the men who brought on and guided the first steps of the great Revolution. With the usual results. The savage element being put in control of the movement displayed its own savage nature. It had nothing else to display. But the unrestrained savage nature in this latter day forms but a small part of the general mass of society. Men quickly grasped what was going on. They were awakened from their dream of the universal good at the bottom of all men's hearts which was to appear as soon as it was released and an opportunity given to exercise itself for the public good without restraint. The reaction threw the pendulum as violently in the opposite direction, and France sank back into an imperialism as absolute and more powerful than the old monarchy. The extremes of communism had thrown down its own work.

The principles at the basis of the revolution were not lost. The interests of Europe and reaction among the French people put an end to imperialism. One thing had been learned; that the nation did not exist for the benefit of a class. The opposite principle was now to be carried into effect. The State was to interfere as little as possible with individual action, especially economic action. Foreign relations and police were its main duties. Any encroachment into the sphere of contract, beyond enforcement, would lead to again involving in confusion the delicate machinery of the modern economic system which was regulated by purely natural laws of supply and demand. Nature not man must rule this sphere. "*Laissez aller, laissez faire*" was the formula. It too was another extreme. It could not include a factor entirely unknown at that time and obscure even now, that man in his brain development has altered that course of evolution in its application to himself. The law of supply and demand regulates man's economic systems, but in turn is subject to artificial control. It is no longer automatic; and the principle of *laissez faire* simply left Labour and unrestrained Capital face to face. And under conditions radically disadvantageous to the former; for combination, which as an economic weapon was first used by Labour, quickly led to its more efficient use by Capital. It was, however, a condition that had been gradually evolving for centuries, gradually taking on a

new adjustment; and possibly, if it had not been for the forcible attempt to regulate and hasten this development by removal of all restraint, the modern system in which machinery plays such a part would have been tempered by a gradual adjustment to its conditions of the old system of State control. That is, individualism would have developed naturally, as did economic efficiency, instead of going to extremes at one leap, reaping the rewards of the old past system aggravated under the new, and giving rise to the cry of injustice in the distribution of these rewards.

Bad as the old system was the socialist writers find something to praise in it in the personal relations still maintained between employer and employed, and the sense of responsibility on the part of the former. Under this old system the master was himself a workman, surrounded by his apprentices and his journeymen. He worked and sold from his own shop to whoever came to buy*. If we except the wandering peddler, the middleman could be said to be unknown. One can see that under such a system good personal relations would be of advantage to the master at all events. A valuable workman would be an important factor in the very unrestricted competition with his fellows. It would be important that a rival should not get hold of him, and also that he should not set up for himself. But such an idyllic condition of affairs is hardly likely to get more than a bare glimpse of the world before it is sent hence to be seen no more. Strict competition on equality is impossible. Men differ in abilities, and unless a man is forbidden to use his talent he will use it and gather his reward. The guilds were at start a protection of the small master workman against the master workman capitalist. Industry plus ability was bound to conquer industry plus dullness, and the result of the battle was to reduce a large number of the master workman class to a condition they had long been necessarily approaching—that of equality with their own journeymen. This is probably what the socialists would consider as the first preliminary downward step in our present system, the degradation of the honest individual skilled workman to the rank of a salaried employé. To the evolutionist on the contrary it is merely, as far as effected by natural causes, the adjustment of the then system to a form of greater efficiency. It was an honest victory of brains over matter. All started even, and unless some artificial check is placed on development the natural inequality is bound to show itself in man. Honest brains thoroughly deserve their reward. Our own records of business failures to-day show how rare is the really able man and how deserving he is of his salary. The terms "check" and

* The greatest of the guilds—the merchant guilds—were really the transportation companies of the time. Their middleman's commission, if it can be called such, was a small item. The risks of transportation, involving the maintenance of fleets and armies, governed commissions on national and international trade. And does to-day, minus the fleets and armies, and hence at much less cost.

"development" here used are of course mutually antagonistic, although this is not recognized by the advocates of communism who refuse to see anything irreconcilable in the two terms. There were checks in this old system of the guilds, but they acted as they must necessarily act against one and in favour of another class. The greater merchants soon got control of the guilds. Entrance into them was made more and more contingent on wealth, and their privileges of monopoly were unscrupulously used to crush out rivals. Meanwhile the gulf between master and man gradually widened with differing functions. The master devoted himself entirely to the new and complex business of distribution, requiring great knowledge of affairs both in money and condition of the market, ability to wait until the favourable turn came, and no little skill in handling the different questions raised by politics where they trench on commerce, the field of politics being much wider in those days and ramifying all through the concerns of the people. The workman stuck to his tools. He continued the true manual labourer. He did not sink. He remained stationary; with a sordid hatred of the man gradually removing himself from the same sphere, and making efforts even in those days to check the course of affairs that was rendering brain power independent of manual labour in the same individual. He made one effort which might have been successful. The monopoly of the guilds was usually limited to a particular district. The London journeyman or small master by removing outside "the City" regained in part his independence, and every effort of the guilds to crush him by Government aid was frustrated. The question never became a pressing one for the rise of the modern factory system put an end to the usefulness both of guild and master workman. If it were not for the existence of artificial checks such as tariffs and bounties it could be said to-day that the barriers had been thrown down altogether by the internationalization of commerce, and that individual ability alone had full sway in directing the best utilization of the public wealth; that leadership had finally been secured to the ablest.

Originally the workshop of the workman, whether with apprentice and journeyman or by himself, was his own home. Distribution was effected by public markets, in turn a medium for a species of middleman, for one man would often undertake the sale of the produce of the countryside receiving a commission for his pains. Markets were, however, a feature of an old system of monopoly steadily losing ground before modern democracy. It soon became the custom for a man to ride out into the country and buy up all the product—cloth or grain—and undertake its sale in the towns. It was but a short step to undertaking the manufacture itself in the towns which had great advantages in obtaining readily and quickly all the materials for such manufacture. Direct distribution was now relegated to the past. It seems an inferior method under our present system of living which places high value on time

and requires that all the products offered for sale shall be brought within the compass of the narrow district of a bazaar—or what amounts to the same thing, one of our commercial districts. Of course it is simply a question of terms whether the factory sells to the middleman or starts a retail establishment of its own and employs a middleman to sell for it. Taking into consideration the double risks of wholesale and retail trade it seems to have been settled that sale through the independent middleman is more advantageous. This conclusion is the result of what has often been disastrous experiment to “eliminate the middleman.” There is nothing in our present system to prevent the adoption of the more direct method, except that it has not worked. One thing is essential—access to the “shopping district.”*

§ 5.

Meanwhile the separation of master and man had become complete. To speak frankly everything in our present system is a commodity; money included, a fact which is often forgotten. And must be, unless one part of the community agrees or is forced to support the other part of the community. Both capital and labour therefore must figure as commodities. Capital is a creation of man's brain, or of his hands, or of both; and comes into action through thrift. It is stored up labour of one kind or another, used for further production and not destroyed by consumption for idle gratification. It marks the passage from barbarism in which the fruits of man's labour is not secured to him to civilization in which it is so secured to him. It has no value apart from such value as stored up labour. Its conversion to the general term ‘wealth’ marks the loss of its specific character. It has or should have no other advantages than any other kind of labour. As a matter of fact capital is confused with the struggle over the control of capital. As far as capital itself is concerned its reward is exactly what it can obtain in the open market of the whole world, and it is notorious by the disastrous failures that every attempt to corner it has

* In tracing social development socialist writers are likely to start with their theory to the great damage of their history which must distort or ignore all facts inconsistent with the theory. However, as Mrs. J. R. Green says of the fifteenth century burgher, “for the believer testimony was superfluous; the very vagueness of his faith was not without advantages, since the fancied world of the past might be adequately furnished with types of all that was desired in the present.” Marx asserted (*Capital* p. 532) that “a merchant could buy every kind of commodity, but labour as a commodity he could not buy”; and that the relation between the mediæval guilds and the capitalist was a hostile one. Neither of which assertions are grounded on fact. Cf. the special study given in Mrs. Green's “*Town Life in the fifteenth century.*” As to Marx's theory II, p. 108, 113.)

only taken into account a few more conspicuous sources and left out of account the countless tiny rills continually flowing into the reservoir established by human thrift. Capital has its value in exchange as different products—as in the United States in 1893 it was attempted to corner gold, and in 1888 a French syndicate attempted to corner copper. And so raids have been made on lead, wheat, leather, and many other products, any measure of success being strictly conditioned by the artificial checks known as national tariffs.

Socialism of course does not take this position. To the radical socialist capital, the stored labour of the individual, is a crime. It represents in a sense over production. The course of the spendthrift, or the "capitalist" who lights cigars with twenty dollar bills, with them meets with highest approval. Now it may be a fact that on the theoretical island in some sunny sea of the South, well stored with cocoanuts, bread fruit, and *houris* of paradise, a limited number of men would find their daily bread supplied to them simply for the trouble of gathering it. But elsewhere, and in our modern civilization particularly, it is a *fact* that capital (stored labour) is a necessary advance made by some one (State or individual) to the worker enabling him to live during the completion of his task. It is an essential, although not the only element, in what are called intermediate forms of production. It makes little difference where the labourer gets it from. The State can only supply it to him as it can extort it from its units, and the whole theory of the State always has been to secure for all in the best possible manner this enlargement of the *public wealth*. Many schemes have been tried. Some of them perilously near the socialistic schemes advocated. Such actually was the internal management of the fiefs in the much admired feudalism (or in the old Japanese State). To be sure here the distribution is not to be admired, but the object was to get as much out of the individual units for the use of the State, in this case one individual; and it succeeded pretty well in one way, just as it failed in another way. The mercantile system revised feudalism by distributing the capital among a larger number of units. Our present system in democracy is the legitimate extension of the opportunity to all. For this public wealth is strictly due to the efforts of the individual, and it has been a long and painful course of evolution of man under social conditions to try and ascertain the exact point at which this effort of the individual can be made to yield the greatest fruit. Force has been tried, but the overseer's lash has proved a failure. No community to-day can afford this method. Reward has been tried with far better results, the only doubt remaining being as to how far the reward can be pushed without injury to the community. This is our present position, and we owe to it the strength and progress characteristic of these modern times. But we cannot claim as yet to have successfully solved this intricate problem. There are many thinkers—not socialists—who believe that men would

exert themselves just as much for less reward plus power than they now receive. Just where the limit shall be placed by society is the doubtful point, and as in all social evolution can only be determined by painful experiment. It is a historical fact that haste and revolution have invariably undone their own work. Just as it is a historical fact that atavism or reversion to the primitive type is a sign of degeneration not of evolution. What there is no question about is that with no reward men will not exert themselves. This is an *established* fact, and a society founded on a different standard of thought is in dream-land and no where else. So frail is the incentive even of bread and butter that it fills our highways with healthy and hu-ky tramps. This and the rivalry of modern communities, making a *sine qua non* of an efficiency of the highest type which is only that secured by the highest tension in the individual, puts all the levelling schemes of socialism out of court. They are fatal to any community unless it could maintain complete isolation, and it could only last as long as such isolation could be maintained.

The levelling principle of socialism naturally makes no distinction between the reward demanded by the time factor involved in capital (interest), which is strictly a question of the market, and the salary demanded by the manager, or capitalist manager as the case may be, in his position as manager; and they visit on the former the sometime sin of extortion by the latter, opportunities secured not by competition but against the principle of competition. This has always been the serious question recognized by economists in handling the interesting and probably valuable experiment of co-operation. Much of the wreckage in the efforts in this direction can be directly traced to the unwillingness of the workers to recognize and reward the services of able management. Inferior ability in this important position has of course resulted in bad or inferior results, something not to be tolerated in these days when profit, involving a skilled estimate of the future, is shaved so very close. Socialism pushes this to an extreme. Probably because only dealing with theory they are not troubled with the results of practice. To them labour alone is the commodity. And nobody denies it. As stated it is the universal brand mark of modern civilization. It is both brain labour and manual labour, although here again the socialist is inclined to give the palm to manual labour as involving the more toil.* But labour is only one factor of price. This is a matter of supply and demand, and is determined by what is called marginal utility. It does seem hard to swing a pick all day to the verge of exhaustion of the physical man. The average brain worker would soon reach the immediate limit of his strength. But the question here is: which is the more valuable

* At the meeting of the International Association of Workingmen 1866 it was long and fiercely debated whether the "intellectual proletariat" should be allowed any hand in the movement. The fact that their leaders came from that class carried the vote in their favour.

to society, and which labourer could the more easily and quickly work up to the standard of the other? Taking the average physical frame scattered through all classes of men, and the long training and high technique required as we advance in the scale of brain labour, the result cannot be doubtful. What if the physical brute was forced to perform the brain worker's task? It is fair to say that he would not worry much over his failure. The savage cannot think without a headache. He frankly confesses it. The same is true of our lower classes. Their range of thought is strictly limited. To force such a man, if conceivably possible, to such extravagant use of his brain power would mean brain exhaustion and a mad-house. It is to be suspected that the value given to brains in this world is some close measure of their due reward, and no abstract plea of equality would justify putting the clown in charge of our delicate modern machinery—a great railroad system, for instance—even for a week. He would wreck it with great indifference and a vacuous laugh over the work afforded to the proletariat in putting it together again. But he would gravely damage the common weal. If a man gets a large salary for being president of a great system, it is not because the stockholders are pleased to give him a surplus, but because he is worth it in conserving their property. The man that shovels dirt and grades the roadway they can find anywhere; the other man is decidedly uncommon. Few socialists give this brain labour its real reward. One of the most difficult tasks of any society is to establish the sliding scale of the rewards of its units. It has only been in any degree of fairness effected by open competition of men, and whenever this open competition has been interfered with, as in the favouritism and graft of ancient and modern societies (and as probably will be of future societies until man grows wings), the result has been disastrous to the service—public and private. To reward labour according to unpleasantness and not according to the ability required by the nature of the task, to elevate the savoury occupation of the garbage collectors and give the professors bread and butter wages, it is hardly necessary to say would not encourage efficiency in any State, and yet that practically is what is meant by many of the socialist schemes of to-day.* The hum of machinery to the socialist seems to run through our whole system, and it does so to a terrible extent—or at least has that effect from the terrible din it makes. These great noisy machines seem actuated by a brain power of their own. Not one thought is given of the human brain acting behind them. The credit on the contrary is attached to the automaton sitting in front of them, watching the fall of a bar and pulling a lever which restores it to its old level, repeating this thousands of times a day until it is ready to believe that it is

* "Socialism" by John Spargo, pp. 232-3—1906.

really the actuating brain of the machine. Modern machinery and the factory have had a terribly dulling effect on the already dull brains brought under their influence. Division of labour has been carried to such a point that one man spends his life in regulating the operation of a machine that makes one element of another series of machines, to be afterward assembled in their parts, put together according to the printed plan sent down from the office, and in their turn to continue the unending process of series dovetailed into series. A very high grade of manual dexterity is obtained, and as the material is valuable, the machinery delicate, and waste or damage to be avoided, this mechanical skill of the workman gets a rising value—just in so far as it covers these elements. But there is none of the manual skill combined with real thought that is required of the artisan. We have workmen—skilled workmen—in the West; not artisans.

Ricardo following Adam Smith drew the distinction between natural price—material plus work—and market price. The latter is regulated by supply and demand. If an article is in demand greater than the visible supply its price rises, there is a rush by capital to take advantage of this rise which naturally meets any such demand and swings beyond it; then in turn begins a decline. Market price therefore approaches, often is above, sometimes is below, the natural price.* In this connection John Stuart Mill pointed out the detrimental effects on the working class. Encouraged by good times there is an overproduction in the one direction there can be overproduction. The lower classes have little self-restraint or thrift. The thought of the future has little influence on the gratification of the sexual passion. The result is less cake to be divided and a general lowering of the standard, which, as Mill says, may become permanent. That is, they are forced to this lower standard, the younger generation are brought up under it, know nothing better, and acquiesce in it. There is no remedy for this lowest class except in their own self denial. Their standard can be temporarily raised by dragging down the classes above them. It can only be permanently affected by slackening of the effort to breed. The importance of this principle cannot be exaggerated in our present day when international intercourse is bringing the standards of different nations into close competition. A nation with a high standard of living cannot take too great care to maintain that standard. For the happiness of the people is not concerned with simply maintaining life in the body. It must be relieved of anxiety for the future. It must have room to fall and an ideal to which to make recovery. This law of wages of

* The limitations of "value in exchange" are pointed out by Mr. Bagehot (*Economic Studies—Postulates of Political Economy*, pp. 54—58 Silver Lib. Ed.) "Bagehot, that economist who united "such experience and sense with so much subtlety and humour." Morleys "Gladstone" p. 696, Vol. I, thin paper Ed.

Ricardo is an important factor in such standard. In its barest terms and as laid down in its ugly reality it was most effectively named by Lassalle, "the iron law of wages."[‡] This father of modern materialistic socialism applied it of course to the working class only as understood in Germany—the proletariat.[†] As a matter of fact it applies—in America at least—to the whole community. A man's work commands a price according to its nature. But the standard of the whole community should be so high as to allow a good margin of safety to the lowest. As bricks cannot be made without straw this can readily point to defects in our system for the claim will not be made that our American system of democracy is "without fault or flaw" and embodies a law perfect and all sufficient in its working. Such an optimism is only obtainable with Mr. Gilbert's "Lord Chancellor." But we do claim that the system is elastic and adjustable, and is constantly adjusting itself to meet its defects. The faults of modern civilization in the West have not escaped the keen eyes of critics. Karl Marx, following Rodbertus and the earlier English economists of the Owen communistic school, pointed out two plague spots in our economic system—over production and crises—and considered that he had found the fulcrum on which capital based its power. The first is much better withstood by capital than by labour; and it brings on the second which puts labour in the hands of capital, for it must work or starve. Capital can then force labour to take just enough to keep it from starving and enable it to propagate for the benefit of capital. Capital is enabled to buy not only the labour necessary to the community to live, but also the whole product of labour during a period not so long as to trench on

[‡] Thoroughly exploded, as the wage fund theory. High wages and limited capital are common enough. Wages depend more on efficiency of production than on anything else. "During the nineteenth century, artisans' money wages rose over 150 per cent. . . . The rise of real wages . . . was not so great, but was nearly 150 per cent. The rise in wages was due chiefly to the increased rate of work which is attained by the aid of machinery" (Essays on Economics p. 187, H. Stanley Jevons). In reference to those very dubious economic terms "price" and "value" perhaps it can be stated that in the case of great staples, and where monopoly and artificial or natural scarcity are not factors, cost of production directly fixes price in a wide market. Cost of production itself becomes the chief factor in regulating the balance between supply and demand. Value would seem to be confined to the purely personal factor, well illustrated by the current term "Value in use." It is as great a variable as utility itself, which is now here, now gone, and now returned. Supply and demand here rule unchecked without any reference to cost of production. A spring in the desert is of more value to a caravan dying of thirst than all the mines of Golconda; and a camel driver can there command a wage, whereas the quill driver in one of our modern offices could command no wage because he knows about as much of camel driving as milking a cow. And *vice versa* in the clerk's sphere of activity.

[†] An interesting word of which it is to be suspected modern definitions would "box the compass."

its physical efficiency. If labour gets its due share of the product necessary to live it never gets its due share of the surplus. This surplus, the joint product of labour and capital, (socialism claims that it is the product of labour alone, but this is due to one-sided views as to capital or stored labour, the omission of the time factor), goes mainly to capital, and every crisis puts it more completely in capital's hands. The defect here indicated as to overproduction lies in application of method and is equally inherent in a socialistic system as in the capitalistic system. Mill* devoted some space to refuting the idea of overproduction. Recent investigation associates both overproduction and crises with a tendency to diminish credit and hence production. Men contract all their enterprises. A strike in the engineering trades causes a contraction at the mines, in the transportation industries, in general expenditure, and makes itself felt through the whole community. Crises are entering a new phase through the mutual support conservative interests give to each other, thus confining the disturbance to the speculative interests. It is a part of the general public which is caught in the gambling craze; the professionals have better sense. A public healthy sentiment against the stock gambling to "get rich quick" would be as effective as in old days was public contempt against bankruptcy. To-day this latter is an episode in commercial life. There may be overproduction in single lines. There may be a difference of opinion between producer and consumer as to the value of the article produced, and there may be grievous mistakes on the part of the producer that he can force the consumer to buy at his price. But there can be nothing more. This minor form of overproduction is presumably what Marx has in mind. Where individuals with every incentive to make no mistake come to grief it is fair to presume that the State would do far worse in these speculative enterprises. State enterprises run at a profit are rare, the postal and telegraph services being shining examples of the defect of State management from this point of view. From the nature of their service society can afford to meet its loss in operation or productive power or both; but the extension of business conducted at a loss can only be carried to certain limits.† Most of the overproduction in minor lines can be guarded against by greater watchfulness and a stricter eye to statistics. It has been society's *experience* that this is best entrusted to the individual. Its business is to furnish the statistics. However, among other services Marx did a genuine good in accentuating this particular form of overproduction even if he did miss the mark in making a grain of truth do duty for a general application.

* "Principles of Political Economy" Book III Chapter IV on excess of supply.

† The very latest example is afforded by the debate in the Tokyo Municipal Chamber over taking the tramways. It being argued by one "municipalizer" that the city could afford to run them at a loss considering the gain to the citizens. The tax-payer was to be milked for the deficiency. For how long? See *Japan Mail*, 27 Dec., 1906.

We have spoken of the effects of modern methods on the mechanical operator. They are not such as to cause any healthy mental development. They call for concentration of attention, not thought. The mind must never wander from a given physical point. It must closely follow the mechanical action of eye or hand guarding and guiding a swiftly moving shuttle as it moves through its cycle of operations. The cause of the beautiful action of much of our machinery might well arouse the inquiring spirit in anyone who watches it, but this cannot be the operator. And with his long day's work finished it would be the last thing on earth to which he would turn with pleasure. But it teaches one quality, concentration; and this power of concentration on one idea in a dull and mistaken man, unable to grasp but the one-sided thought which pleases his long ears, and placed plausibly in front of him by men who have selected him as a possible instrument useful in their hands and who know his every weakness, may cause terrible mischief. He is not able to think and to reason. He does not see his own defects. In so far as he does sin he does it largely without knowledge. But he sees the defects of another; a careless ostentation of wealth, an unwise or an un pitying disdain of the less fortunate or the unfortunate; and he is told that the advantages of the fortunate man, the right reasons of which are not always apparent to the immediate apprehension, are directly connected with his own disadvantages. He wants to believe this. No man willingly accepts the wrong on his part, and the duller he is the more obstinate he is in the opinion that it is his antagonist that is wrong. He is utterly unable to see the long chain of self denial involved in the accumulation of wealth. He can only see the popinjay who gaily spends it, without any thought that there may be a very keen brain behind that gay surface; for in the world the problem is not only to get money but to keep it, and when money passes from generation to generation this prosperity is usually well deserved. It represents throughout care and thrift. This dull minded man sees nothing of this. Of the word "thrift" he hardly knows the meaning. Restraint in his pleasures does not exist for him. His predecessors exercised no restraint for him. Why should sobriety and education and night-school and restraint of sexual indulgence be preached to him? After he has worked hard all day to secure bread they want to take away from him his beer and his "old woman," the only pleasures the poor man has. When the crisis comes he has no reserve to meet it. Body and soul he is in the hands of unrestrained capital. Socialists claim, without going to much extent into the real claims of thrift and unthrift, that this system is now intolerable and must grow worse. That of man it is making a beast and of woman a prostitute. But the very result they have figured out shows, from existing practice, a deep seated fallacy in their argument. The tendency of society is not to permit anything of the kind, and with the increasing spirit of individualism the aim has constantly been to meet and check any such development

of anti-individualism. It has been sought to obtain such result by the use of the police power of the State displayed in much legislation mistakenly called socialistic but which on the contrary is purely regulative of the relations between individuals. Socialism does not seek regulation by the State. It is unalterably opposed to this as against all its principles. It seeks operation by the State and annihilation of the individual. The impression socialists seek to give is that society has failed in its regulative principle carried out in a slowly accumulating practice of centuries. The inculcation of this belief is of great importance. They therefore assume at the start that the great mass of society belongs to or is approaching what has technically been known as "the submerged tenth," and the untruth of this is shown in countries where there is in the hands of the people an instrument powerful to right any wrongs suffered by the majority—universal suffrage.* With our knowledge of the organizing power in countries under democratic government it verges on the absurd to say that there is a vast mass of ignorance unwilling to use this instrument. The socialists themselves, for a hundred years past, have been trying to organize it, and only in so far as they have weakened their socialism to adopt regulative principles have they cut any figure at all. It is to be suspected that if socialism, formally speaking, had never taken positive shape, the political attitude of the world in reference to the regulative principle would have been much what it is to-day. It equally verges on the unreasonable to say that the masses are sunk in superstition and are taught capitalist ideas of right and wrong by priests hired by and interested in maintaining a present oppression. There is plenty of superstition all through society from highest to lowest, but such restraint of religion acts on the highest not on the lowest. It is difficult to reconcile the cry of despair raised by both priest and socialist over the superstition of the lowest classes. In his loudly heralded discovery of the origin and cure for social ills the socialist seems rather to have squared the economic circle, discovered the economic fourth dimension of space, and at last solved for the proletariat the interesting problem of how the apples were got in the dumpling.

* Widely denounced by socialist and anarchist writers. One might ask what they propose to substitute for it?

As to the ethics of the socialist politician on this point we can turn to one of the leading apostles of latter day socialism. Mr. Belfort Bax tells us (*Ethics of Socialism*, p. 127). "The practical question finally presents itself, what is the duty of the convinced Socialist towards the present mechanical majority. . . . The answer is, make use of it wherever possible without loss of principle, but where this is not possible disregard it. The Socialist has a distinct aim in view. If he can carry the initial stages towards its realisation by means of the count-of-heads majority, by all means let him do so. If on the other hand he sees the possibility of carrying a salient portion of his programme by trampling on this majority, by all means let him do this also."

At least in America capital is pretty thoroughly sifted through the nine-tenths, and it must be our object for the peace of the land to keep it there. We are not all on a basis of equality in our capabilities, and if there is any truth in the idea that active competition exists not only in but between communities, if there is any truth in the fact that communistic settlements have been unable to face individualistic competition, we cannot afford for our present good to nullify individual effort. It is fashionable to point at a few rich men, as if the wealth of the country was concentrated in their hands. Their personal wealth though large for an individual is a vanishing figure compared to the total wealth. They figure heavily in the control of our large corporations, but they are really acting as representatives both of themselves and of many other interests. And it is in this single representativeness, in the power wielded by one individual, that lies their danger to the community. As to the figures in terms of wealth, they hold proxies from individuals, insurance companies, banks, mercantile industries. These latter corporate interests, in turn complexities in their corporate capacity, are a confused figure in the public mind to which they seem almost an entity, and, one would say, the property of their representative officials. A great railroad seems centred in its president and board of directors, who as a matter of fact are merely the representatives of thousands of small holders sprinkled all over the land. It is safe to say that to strike at the interests of our large corporations would be to strike at the interests of a great majority of the people of the United States. And there is but little inclination to do so. It is not hard to recognize the condition we meet with in daily life where the more robust individual shoulders the weaker out of the way and grasps any desired or unappropriated article with the claim "this is mine." It is in these unjust claims that the public justly takes an interest, and bases its interference with the actions of these agglomerations of individuals known as corporations; for no individual or body of individuals should be allowed to infringe on the just rights of others. To each one the fruit of his industry.

A system based on capitalist production has its grave abuses and dangers, as well as its advantages. Socialists have pointed out the abuses which they claim are inherent in the system and must continue, if let alone, until they reach a climax in the exploiting of the bulk of the people by a small clique in whose hands are concentrated all the wealth; a clique with all the advantages and none of the responsibilities of the Roman slave-holder. Their opponents claim that these abuses are not a part of the system; that they are simply grafted on it and capable of being easily removed; that they form no part of it, the true system being to every man the full reward of his labour without any encroachment on the rights of others. The socialists have one valuable advantage in this dispute. They are not troubled by any sense of individualism which must

necessarily balance the *pro* and *con* of any matter. They thoroughly know their own mind, for this is the abstract of their general mind settled into a dogma. In this they are thoroughly reactionary, just as they are thoroughly up to date in realizing the value of the brass band method, such a feature of these days of universal suffrage. But this thorough devotion to dogma is peculiarly valuable to cart-tail philosophy and the propaganda of the spell-binder. The object now-a-days is to be heard, and a small but noisy squad, trained on dogmatic lines, by constant reiteration can effect this far more readily than the individual, who sees many sides of a question and is often embarrassed in separating the good from the bad without the total destruction of the whole fabric. With this the socialists do not bother. They realize the logical completeness of one-sidedness from the side of propaganda. Their doctrine finds its highest value in destruction; and most of the sects recognizing this advocate destruction pure and simple. These present no scheme for reconstruction, on the ground that the necessities of the situation will give rise to a feasible scheme, the present object being merely destruction. However socialism is by no means a unit on this point, and the stand taken of a significant silence as to the future is broken by such schemes as have been presented and from which the drift of general sentiment in their ranks can be grasped. As socialism—outside the ranks of German professorial socialism—proposes a radical not an evolutionary change of society, all these schemes should necessarily reject past experiences and be based on purely theoretical lines. This would be the logical method of procedure. That they do not do so, but that in so far as they have any substantiality they are based on experience, leads to the suspicion that modern socialism is not the new creation or even development it claims to be, but that its roots are still hung up in air as high as ever was done in Plato's "Republic." Even the socialist has unconsciously been forced to recognize a natural law of psychology.* Two methods can be

* And illustrate another, for in rejecting experience the socialist simply emphasizes what is so predominant in all their discussions—the predominance of feeling, not intellect, as governing will. Just in so far as philanthropy and altruism intrude to interfere with natural laws, just in so far as intellect ceases to govern the association of ideas and permits itself to be overcome by waves of feeling, so do our ideas take on a different colour (cf. Professor Hoffding's *Psychology* Part VI F. 4). Professor Fiske, in another connection, in speaking of Comte's "Positive Philosophy," touches on a point which has direct application to the so called "Scientific Socialism" in *its* application. He is comparing Comte with Plato, and in referring to the change from the scientific to the pontifical state of mind assumed by Comte in his later days, he says:—"But at a later period we find Plato, like Comte, renouncing the scientific attitude, and setting himself up as "a founder of an ideal Community in which the pervading tendencies "which have shaped actual societies were to be ignored or overridden, "and in which existence was to be made intolerable to all persons "not built after the Platonic pattern" (Cosmic Philosophy Part I Chapter V.) Comte's fall from grace was due to his adoption of the

said to be proposed to meet any disadvantages and indigestion in the social system. They are diametrically opposed and hence mutually exclusive. The mongrel existing political systems of continental Europe can be put aside. Their destiny is to drift to one or the other pole of political attraction. At one pole the future social scheme is proposed as pure theory, and practice in the past is intentionally and skilfully ignored. Such is the proposed socialist State. At the other pole is democracy which finds its completest exposition in the American system of representative government. We can make use, in reference, of the American system; for England still retains class privilege in a hereditary legislative body; and France has always retained that visionary ideal of perfection in man which has never had a real existence, has but an indirect influence on the practical life, and in the attempt to apply it has given a very watery and unstable element to French political life. Evolution has never been popular in France.

§ 6.

Let us turn to what is offered us as the practical working of this socialist State. In so doing we are to have nothing to do with dreams and ideals. Giving due allowance to what might be possible, the question is, what is possible? Therefore there is always to be held up in the background of the discussion, plainly to view, what teaching the past affords as to conditions similar or akin to those proposed by the socialists. In the hurly-burly of the centuries of European politics, always marked by their steadily increasing individualism it is difficult to follow the disciplinary action of the community. All that can be noted is the steadily accentuated value of the man, and just in so far as this has been appreciated has civilization in general advanced, and just in so far as a particular State has appreciated it has there been supremacy of that particular State. The examples are familiar enough; Protestantism and Catholicism on the general scale, Catholic and Huguenot on the particular scale in France, the decline of French vigour with the victory of the former, and the defeat of the French in the long battle with England in which individualism was steadily winning its way to the front, until to-day in the two great Anglo-Saxon peoples standing at the head of the commercial peoples individualism

subjective method in place of the objective method; and scientific socialism stumbles over the same obstacle and falls into the same trap whenever it attempts a positive stand. Once more we seem to hear an echo of that ancient psychology which confounded reason and the emotions in the governing function of the soul; and against which, in showing the distinction and the superiority of reason, Plutarch so energetically protests (cf. Essay "On Moral Virtue.")

and progress have become synonymous terms. On the continent of Europe there is afforded an interesting example of the same kind. Just in so far as the community has laid its hand on the individual in its military control over him has progress been hampered or it has ceased. Just in so far as organization has been left to the individual to carry out on his own account have there arisen great enterprises eagerly employing every means that science can command to enhance the value of those enterprises, and never ceasing to try and find new channels for development and profit. The German and French shipyards and ironworks are equal in practice to any found among the Anglo-Saxon peoples. And they have all the energy of private enterprise behind them. The German system of State railways and the French system of State guaranteed railways notoriously cannot stand comparison with either England or America.* But we have a radical disadvantage in taking any European people as a standard of comparison, for all of them have long been influenced by individualism until to some extent it is a part of national character everywhere. To check up a system which specifically denounces and does away with the individual we must turn to those peoples among whom from time immemorial this has been the case. And we find this to be the case in the Far East. The Hindu, the Chinaman, the Japanese, have for centuries lived under just such abnegation of individualism. In these countries we have a purely socialistic influence at the basis of all government. Their socialism is far stronger and more stable than anything the West can offer even in theory. It is a family socialism which can hold and maintain its units in the strong circle of this natural bond. Modern western socialism, specifically rejecting the family for some theoretical brotherhood of man, just to this extent is the weaker. Of all these eastern civilizations that of the Japanese affords the best background for our purposes, and for that reason its description has been

* In comparing British and German railway management and net profit cost of construction is to be taken into consideration. For instance:

	Per Mile	Mileage	Net return
Great Britain... ..	45000 £	23000	4.10 %
Germany... ..	21118 „	33000	4.86 „

The question, of course, is not so simple as represented by these figures. Thus in estimating cost of replacement of right of way and terminals, increased values would be much less in proportion with the English railways which originally paid very high prices for their land. As a railway property is rarely one which has reached its full working value, the proposal to take over the railways for public use by compensation based on the mere replacement cost is obviously unjust. In reference to public and private operation of public utilities we have the opinion of an expert in what Doctor Hadley says on this subject—"Though half the railroads and nine-tenths of the telegraphs "of the world are in government hands, all the large improvements "of method in these lines have been made under private enterprise." (Economics p. 118. Cf. also pp. 399-401).

attempted in the preceding chapters. What elasticity, or variety, or change in the direction of progress or character, or political and social effects within its ranks, can exist as a *fact* under such a system, are better exemplified by the history of a great State extending through the centuries, than in some short-lived or limited experiment such as Mormonism, or the Shakerism of the Oneida Community. Unless, of course, it be preferred to take as an example that progressive and peaceful and exhilarating specimen of political culture and happiness—the Russian *mir*.

Keeping in mind this eastern prototype—the old Japanese State—let us turn to modern socialism. What is socialism? Certainly not the regulative schemes so prominently occupying society, some in a commendatory sense. The socialists themselves denounce these schemes of regulation, and such of them as do give them support do so only on the ground that they are means to the final end. There may be difference of opinion as to their wisdom on this point for every amelioration of existing inequalities drives a nail in the socialist coffin in lessening discontent. Their real aim is avowedly different. It is to level society. It cannot be better expressed than in the words of Mr. Benjamin Kidd*:—"True socialism has, however, one invariable characteristic by which it may be always recognized, whether it take the form advocated by the more prevalent German school, or by that anarchist section represented by Proudhon and Bakunin, whose ideal, despite their title and methods, is really a morally perfect state in which government, law, and police would be unnecessary. True socialism has always one definite object in view, up to which all its proposals directly or indirectly lead. This is the final suspension of that personal struggle for existence which has been waged, not only from the beginning of society, but, in one form or another, from the beginning of life." Every line of this could have been endorsed by the Socialist Convention held in Chicago in 1904.

With the economics of socialism we have little to do. They find no acceptance among scientific economists, and the socialist programme takes the ground that the scheme consists in putting in operation a certain balanced system of production and distribution and maintaining it steadily in the given form—as in Japan or in Peru. In other terms, their main object is political and communistic. A stand taken emphatically since the Gotha Congress of 1875, but figuring largely in the earlier Congresses of Bâle and Berne. Perhaps, however, some explanation as a sort of definition may not be out of place. Karl Marx, the apostle of socialism, substituted for capital production in the communal sense, which is a very different

* "Social Evolution" p. 220.

thing.† He confiscated all the existing capital as properly belonging to the whole community and continued its operation in behalf of the whole community. There is a difference of opinion here at the outset as to the fairness and honesty of this procedure and it is only fair to say he was thoroughly convinced of both. But what is not consistent is to do this and then to condemn capital as a factor in the State; that is, understanding of course that society is not going to crack the lash over the backs of its members. As stated, in our island of cocoanuts and *houris* a limited number of men might find provision for all their immediate wants. But in our modern society where the worker *must* be supported until his product is available this is not the case. If some individuals do not exercise thrift but consume their product at once this store for the intermediate stage of labour will not exist. Society in the new State must then set the task for each individual in such form (communal production) as to accumulate this surplus, and to secure its performance can only rely on two things—good-will or the lash. There are no alternatives to this dilemma. It is the old tale of the wise and foolish virgins and the disposition of the balance of oil that lies at the bottom of it. As to good will toward work in the great mass of men we have a great deal of evidence in the strongest possible incentive to thrift that is offered by present day society, and which in many case is not strong enough. If a society fails which makes everything but life itself depend on the effort of the individual exerted in his own behalf, what prospect of success is there for a society which removes this incentive. The indivi-

† Men's desires vary so that it would be necessary to draw the communal budget on lines like that of the national budget of to-day. That is with strict limitation of the existing effort to the absolutely necessary. Any other way would be a tyranny of the worst kind of the more energetic over the weaker or lazier—even if its direction was practicable in a political sense. This is a very different thing from capital, continually replacing and extending present production. The independent action of the individual beyond State sanction would give rise to competition, and this is exactly what socialism is organized to prevent.

There is no real distinction between so called "socialism" and anarchism. These both have a common economic doctrine—socialization of the means of production and elimination of competition—and the difference between the sects lies in the political method of putting this in force. The only logical end of both is communism. For this reason I have chosen to treat the political side only in the text. Every form of human society offers a field for destructive criticism, and to this heretofore socialists have confined themselves. As a political party, however, they are compelled to take up a constructive programme, in which neither the economic principle nor political method is to be feared. No people yet ever adopted a logical fallacy in either, although wise men—political economists included—have often mistakenly interpreted political and economic laws. Socialism itself is an example of these debtor *versus* creditor movements, as is the old Greenback movement in the United States, exceedingly dangerous even in its much smaller scale when left unopposed, but invariably relegated to obscurity by the common sense of the common people. Such questions never die—and never materialize.

dual is not going to save for the benefit of a theoretical society at large, to continue production. Such a system of socialism would simply amount to a vast pension scheme in which the idle or incapable were maintained by an insidious taxation at the expense of the industrious and capable. It would be a direct encouragement of what to-day society energetically discourages—indiscriminate almsgivings. There are tramps enough now, without making matters easier for them.

Some socialists seem to depend on altruism to maintain this good will. This is an idle dream and recognized as such by the Marx-Engel's socialism which depends on nothing but the strong arm of the State to enforce its dogma. Altruism as shown by the history of modern philanthropy will go a very great distance with a very few individuals, but it goes a comparatively short distance with the vast majority. Some expound desire as the motive force in the new society.* Others are candid enough to see the inconsistency of allowing classes in the socialist State. This is a spirit found widely in the true levelling socialism so strong in Europe. And they are right. There is little distinction between allowing a man to heap up great wealth in a socialist State and between existing conditions. The wealthy individual in the centralized socialist State would be infinitely more dangerous than he is to-day. A Caesar in the days of the early Republic of Rome would have been harmless. Caesar with a great organization behind him was fatal to the disintegrated conglomeration of the later Republic. Centralization is a *sine qua non* of socialism. It is its formula. Its whole and only object must be to paralyse competition between the units. It cannot admit checks and balances for this is to admit a voice to the units. It must lay down its scheme and stick to it hard and fast—if it can. There can be but one voice to give the word of command. And in every socialistic organization carried into effect on a large or national scale there has been but one voice. Such is the answer of history. Socialism is then the antithesis of any form of local organization, and in this lies its violent political opposition to Anarchy which in theory is a most intense form of local communism. The European proletariat therefore are thoroughly logical in their rejection of the theory of desire as the factor to maintain the efficiency of the State. To admit wealth, even without any right of inheritance, into a State in which there can be no balance to power—the socialist State must be comprehensive or loses all reason for being—can lead to but one end. The idea of a theoretical purity in politics can be rejected at once. Peru and Japan loom large enough in our eyes, and if these shining examples are not sufficient we can look a little nearer home and imagine our

* Mr. Henry George ("Progress and Poverty") regarded it as the mainspring of all production. Which it is. But compare the desires of the savage with the desires of civilized man; the security of means of accomplishment in the latter case, and the almost total lack of it in the former.

American Boss and "the boys" under the conditions of such halcyon times. If the community determined, and could maintain it, that its officials must all be poor men, then the saving man would simply be a mark either for official or communal extortion. The result would be that he would work for immediate enjoyment and nothing more. This is undoubtedly the object especially of Marxism which makes a fetish of "overproduction," and regards immediate consumption as highly desirable and to be enforced. Neither Marx nor his followers raise the question of the necessity of capital as a necessary factor of production. The substitution of "communal production" is simply an evasion of the term. Neither do they approach the question of the source of capital, except by demand for the confiscation of existing capital, and the vaguest reference in the most general terms to its maintenance. To secure this there must be an exploiting of the able by the idle and incapable. Good will and desire will not effect this. And perhaps socialism does not intend to apply the lash of the overseer. To return to our "wise virgins," it looks very much as if they must either be persuaded or ravished—of their oil.*

Interest of course hardly concerns us. It is involved in the elimination of capitalist production from the socialist State. Taxation in the form of added individual effort is substituted for it; although we can ask—what is the difference? As before stated its position in the modern State is that of an incentive to thrift in the individual. It is permitted because it has been found that men will not lend without some return for the postponement. Give a man the alternative of consuming or using his own surplus, and deprive him of any vicarious use from it, and he will consume of it what he cannot use himself for future production or will not produce beyond what he immediately needs if he is prohibited such future use. Every attempt to allow loans and to concurrently suppress interest has resulted and must result disastrously, as the history of usury shows in every country. In Europe this hostility to interest was once widespread. The failure to suppress brings cases of usury constantly before the Japanese courts. Such socialism as permits accumulation deals with this feature in a curious manner. The question of course arises as to how to protect the wasteful and improvident against "frugality, abstinence, and cunning." How is this done? By the State giving to the improvident man "credit upon the same" "securities as from a private creditor, without undue exploita-

* To choose between the two wings of the party—the State socialist demanding a strongly centralized State, and the more numerous socialist anarchist section advocating the smallest communal units—is not difficult. To maintain a capital for production only the first scheme is feasible even if it leads—as it does—direct to despotism. Communism is clearer in Marx than in his immediate successors, and it has again taken its inevitable place in the propaganda. In his whole development of exchange Marx sneers at the worker driving a bargain with his surplus. (Cf. Capital p. 56 seq.)

"tion."* It is just with the improvident man that no rational lender will have dealings. And the socialist State would be supposedly rational. It could no more prevent secret loans on usurious interest than could the old Japanese State. There would be just as much effort to pay these secret loans as was the case in the old Japanese State, and as there is to-day—for such usury is equally forbidden by existing law, and Government pawnshops, of doubtful benefit, (*mont de pitié*) are conducted in many countries to prevent these dubious transactions to which the very poor are subject. There would be the same public contempt for the repudiator, simply on the ground of his sharp dealing and unstable financial morality, unless indeed we are dealing with a theoretically perfect public in which there is "peace on earth, good will towards men" and repudiators.†

It is hardly necessary to inquire how rent is to figure under the new system. "Property is theft" quoth Prudhon of the Utopians. Marx in colder terms re-echoes the words and devotes a few terse remarks as to this particular branch of the subject—"The foundation of the capitalistic method of production is to be found in that theft which deprived the masses of their rights in the soil, in the earth, the common heritage of all."‡ Henry George devotes a number of fat volumes to the same idea. The remedy of this latter is simple. Confiscate the rent. Do not do so openly for there may be scruples in these communities living under a system of contract. Do it under the *form* of taxation, so that people will not suspect the fact but will confuse it with the form. Now it might be possible to follow the form of Mr. George's reasoning in the open. When he claims that property in land is an original theft and that the common law follows and returns to the rightful owner a piece of stolen property we can at least understand the gist of his reasoning. It might be pointed out that the common law is custom and nothing else—and that by custom and the common law the State has not only sanctioned but encouraged private ownership in land. It has made land as legitimate an investment as the manufacture of beer or of buttons or the operation of a railroad. If it is to lay hands on the thief it must lay its hands on its own collar, and common decency prevents it from demanding restitu-

* J. Spargo "Socialism" p. 237.

† The retired stocking or the cracked tea-pot as a bank is held in high esteem by many socialists. And, as an illustration of saving, this tendency of the ignorant is seriously brought forward as a substitute for the incentive to thrift and desire. There could be no better illustration of the fallacy in relation to capital, for such wealth would be much better devoted to production than to be withdrawn for an indefinite period from any usefulness. Better even would be its immediate and wasteful consumption as advocated by the socialist, unless there was not always the hope that these hoarded funds would finally come into more useful hands. (Cf. Mr. & Mrs. Webb "Problems of Modern Industry" p. 226.)

‡ From Professor Ely's "French and German Socialism." On the Land Question Cf. Mr. Spencer's "Principles of Ethics" Vol. II.

tion in the one case without making it in the other. This inexorable conclusion from the major premise was of course clear to such accurate minds as those of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, and probably it was only the obsession of a single idea that prevented its comprehension by Mr. George. That it is possible for the State to confiscate the land is true. The State has physical force on its side. But to act so is the definition of the State as understood in the effete and despotic East. This is the Law of the Cadi, which takes at will from one man and gives to another or keeps for its own benefit. It is not possible in a State governed by contract. No matter what was the original condition of the land it has a definite *status* now, and it is a fact that in the modern as well as in the ancient system the State has found it to its advantage to make a definite contract with the individual, giving him exclusive rights in the land. If he does not possess those rights he will not develop it to the best advantage, and every community from the age of primitive man to present day settlements illustrates the same principle. Arthur Young travelling in the wretched France of 1787 has to say of the farms *owned* by the peasant "the magic of property turns sand into gold."*

In the vast majority of cases the land to-day held in new countries—such as America, the British Colonies, other colonial Governments—represents a value which has been paid for in hard cash, the labour of the present owners. This is so much the case that Mr. George himself in his general illustration decently took refuge in England as an example of landed iniquity, and has loudly harped on the unearned increment, in which he had far more reason but which is nothing new for Mill argued the case far more reasonably and exactly. Ownership in land and the unearned increment due to increase in population are two widely different questions. Mr. George, either intentionally or possessed of one ideaism and hence unable to distinguish them, confused these two questions. Hence he grants the right to improvements, only enforcing the "single tax" on the land itself, and governing the whole question by the dictum—when in doubt confiscate anyhow. Now this whole question—as Mr. George himself admitted in the development of his argument—is swept at once into the field of ethics. If some

* If the community is to plead *right* in its title to land it is in a worse position than the individual. Land is no more the product of the community than of the individual. It is *res nullius* until taken up and used by someone. It has often been pointed out that in the savage condition there is no community ownership of the land in general. Land takes no *status* until brought into use. Any equity present communities have in land is limited to land in its wild and undrained condition. Not after the work of generations, perhaps centuries, has been expended on it. The public virgin land in the United States is open to settlement on payment of a small land entry fee. Apart from the doubtful ethics of the "single tax" theory as commonly advocated there are the baleful economic effects, Cf. Professor Fisher's "Nature of Capital and Income" p. 254.

theoretical rule of ethics is to govern then in a contract State, if instead of custom and law all contracts are to be for the immediate present and have no binding force on the future, it can well be asked what is the use of our present system based on contract? What is the use of saying that a man shall enjoy the fruit of his labour when there is no intention of allowing him to do so? To snatch these fruits away from him, arbitrarily and without compensation, is simply law as applied in an eastern despotism of the old stamp. There is a certain consistency necessary in men's thoughts and this can unconsciously be followed in the case of Mr. George himself. Thus, denying the rights of present ownership in land, he is found in his subsequent application of the general definition of wealth denying the rights to wealth in substantially identical form. He sharply separates men and material. This is carrying too far a definition only fit for the statistician. It can be granted that stocks and bonds are not in themselves wealth but they are in Mr. George's own terms evidences of wealth. The stock or bondholder *is* the owner of the railroad or manufacturing plant and the piece of paper is his *evidence* of that ownership. The two cannot be separated. Human society is a relationship between individuals. Materials are only tokens. The destruction of the piece of paper carries with it no destruction of the rights attached to wealth. "By enactment of the sovereign political power debts might be cancelled without the aggregate wealth being diminished by a 'pinch of snuff,' for what some would lose others would gain." This can indeed be done not only by the sovereign power but by the slippery operations of "frenzied finance." The real and the spurious are then brought to the same level. But his transfer of *wealth and its rights* is not in good odour in conservative circles. This is the method of the road agent who totally and impolitely disregards all evidence of witnesses or receipted bills as to the rights to the victim's watch. But whether in the victim's or the highwayman's pocket the right or title still clings to the watch. Wealth and title to wealth are inseparable, and title to wealth lies in someone. It cannot be destroyed. The *right* to the watch has some form of *evidence* attached to a person behind it. There can therefore be no destruction of rights to wealth as long as the wealth itself is not destroyed. There is no necessity of being worse than the savage for he recognized the meaning of the peace pipe and the belt of wampum. That the destruction of certificates of ownership carries with it destruction to the rights of wealth implies a misconception that is more convenient to Mr. George's land theory than to ethics. In fact his system can be carried directly down to private contracts of every kind. There is not an evidence of public or private indebtedness that under such a principle is worth the paper it is written on. The millions of labour invested in the national debts, in private enterprises of every character, can be wiped out by the simple dictation of any community strong enough physically and weak enough ethically to so treat its contracts. It is hardly

necessary to say that life in such a community would either be for the day or would be carried out under orders for each to accomplish his set task. The socialists are perfectly right in regarding Georgeism as milk and water socialism.*

Land in a State governed by contract is unlikely to be treated as the Georgeites desire. There are some questions in relation to it, however, that distinguish it although in this respect it does not stand alone. Land is a monopoly, has a monopoly value, and is distinguished from other monopolies inasmuch as its monopoly value is easily and exactly determined and hence can be very exactly taxed to just such point as not to discourage its best use and the development of the community. The sub-questions involved in it and mainly dealing with "unearned increment" have always attracted attention, mainly by their difficulties. It is within the experience of every one that there is an unearned decrement as well as increment. In any large city we have districts in which values have increased enormously at the expense of districts which have decreased enormously in value.† In the same way there are thousands of acres of farm land in the eastern United States which have an assessed value and pay taxes, and for which a purchaser could not be found at any price. And there are thousands of acres of abandoned farm land—particularly in the New England States. A demand has actually sprung up for some of this farm land—as summer residences! A demand serious enough to arouse attention, and, in Maine, to lead to a request for a legislative investigation as to the causes of original abandonment, for

* Mr. George's discussion is found in "Progress and Poverty" Book I Chap. 2, Book III Chap. 4; "Social Problems" Chap. XVI. As to Government bonds it can be said that behind them are the national assets and the good faith to so apply them. Repudiation or conquest may violently transfer the bondholder's rights; but so does the highwayman with his victim's watch. It could be added that a good Government is itself a valuable asset as an instrument for the production of wealth, and its destruction would palpably decrease the aggregate of wealth. In a recent accident to the Hamburg express near Cologne in Germany one million pounds sterling value of certificates were destroyed. Their destruction would cause great inconvenience due to the necessary delay in their re-issuance. In San Francisco many title deeds being destroyed the owners sued "the world" to establish their own better right to title. No rights were extinguished or destroyed. Only certain pieces of paper, *convenient forms* of evidence were destroyed. Since writing the above in the text (August 1906) an admirably concise definition is available from Professor Fisher's "Nature of Capital and Income" p. 22—"Wealth is the concrete thing owned; property is the abstract right of ownership. The two concepts mutually imply each other. There can be no wealth without property rights applying to it nor property rights without wealth to which they apply." Cf. also J. S. Mill's "Principles of Political Economy" Bk. V, Chap. VII, § 2.

† City Hall Square as contrasted with the district south-east of Independence Square in Philadelphia U. S. of A. is an example. As elsewhere in the same city. Any metropolitan dweller can point to kindred examples taken from his own habitat and experience.

naturally such unproductive use of the land is extremely undesirable. Much is heard of the confiscation of unearned increment but not a word of any compensation for unearned decrement. This of course is perfectly rational from the "single tax" advocates for they assume at the outset the "holier than thou" attitude, and because some primitive man in the Pleiocene or some Knight Templar of eight hundred years ago (not the present variety) robbed the peasant and passer-by, they visit these sins on the unfortunate holder to-day who trusting to the good faith of the State has put his savings into this legitimate form of enterprise.

There is one other feature in this connection that can be touched upon. There are cases where local influences have made unearned increment especially prominent. The peculiar geographical position occupied by the lower end of Manhattan Island in New York City is such a case. There is a wide difference here from other parts of the city and from cities lying in a plain. It is safe to say that in a plain city the great bulk of unearned increment in suburban land has long been consumed in taxes and loss of interest. What is taken into account is the difference between the first and last purchaser and not the long intermediate list between them, or the steady payment of taxes made for a term of years on unproductive property. If this be done the distinction between rent, interest, and wages disappears. Rent is a general term which covers all three. Farm property to-day within the limits of the city of Philadelphia, assessed at say one hundred thousand dollars, pays to the city seven hundred and fifty dollars a year and will not rent for two thirds of that sum, and every facility bringing the property closer to the market without actually bringing it into the market is met by rise in the assessment until there is no relation whatever between taxes and return from the investment. The city improvements, when made, are all paid for in advance by the land owner, and unless the owner of the land is fortunate enough to find brick clay on his land he brings his property into the market on terms in which he is at no advantage over other property and has been at a positive disadvantage for a term of years. Such a blasted and blighted district of unprofit surrounds every growing city. And after all we find in this the element so conspicuously noted by economists as akin to the risk taken in any mercantile enterprise or in stock transactions. Skill and experience reaps its reward. And experience is often dearly bought. This question of loss in land was probably confused by Mr. George's experience of life in the West where such losses have been so much associated with a most outrageous gambling in land, akin to gambling in stocks and for which there can be little sympathy.* Mr. George, following others, was right as

* As one such plunger, in a moment of genial expansion, told the writer:—On Monday he was worth forty thousand dollars and by Saturday night he was not worth forty cents. But this was a very mild specimen. Liabilities and the centuries (of dollars) sat lightly on men's shoulders.

to the monopoly value of land. And the question of wise treatment of any monopoly is a legitimate one for State interference. But the State based on contract does not grant a monopoly to subsequently extinguish it by confiscation. In such case not a franchise issued by the State would be worth paper and ink at any time. Land cannot be treated any differently from the franchise of a city surface railroad. In the United States, as elsewhere, the State is the land owner. A title is a perpetual lease. The State takes no risks in its management, and by its taxation assumes the position of the capitalist who prefers a smaller profit to taking the risks together with a larger profit or a possible loss. Taxation is usually pushed to the limit of prosperity, the State standing in the peculiar position of making and then interpreting its own contract. The inclination of cities has been found to be beyond this, and it has been found necessary to restrict their power of borrowing and hence necessity of raising money. Excessive taxation always makes itself felt by shrinkage in the community itself.

But what is of the main interest is not the idealism of the schemer, no matter how well-intentioned he may be, but what has been the experience of the past in these matters. These are questions of very practical politics, and the Old Japanese was just as practical as any American Boss or some politicians of effete Europe, to whom "public office is a private snap." The difference lay in the Japanese applying this maxim under greater advantages than have ever existed in either America or Europe; the peculiar sheep-like drill of their people not troubling them with any exhibitions of incongruous individualism. As to capital, their earliest idea was that it should all be held for the advantage of the State—the State of course being themselves, the rulers. To the time of Tenji (671 AD) this idea holds rigorously and is piously expressed and enforced in every edict. The righteous indignation against infringement is therein most piously phrased. It is a great shame that any of it should wander into the individualist camp and be exploited for personal uses instead of Government salaries, pensions, court frivolities, and general expenses. Every effort therefore is made to maintain its equal use and exploitation in the community. For this reason laws are made and edicts promulgated preventing its alienation and consequent accumulation in a few hands. This stand, it can be added, was of equal interest to these rulers themselves. They were not the producers; they had no interest in one producer as against another producer. They were the Government, the directors of the workers beneath them. To allow any one of the workers or group of them to accumulate the honey for their own benefit would be to build up a power against the rulers in the State. They possessed two incentives therefore—the maintenance of their position and the agreeable occupation of consuming the honey themselves. And they had no altruistic scruples about responding to these stimuli. At the earliest period their task

was simple, and confined to watching carefully those who occupied and worked the land. At a later period sumptuary laws were called in to discourage any extravagance but that of taxation. Any surplus run wild they took care of themselves. The rich plebeian was their mark.

But their treatment in this respect could not be consistent. Even in the small machine, in which from self-interest against the mass harmony could be expected, two factors in the working were left out of consideration. These two factors are a constant source of regret and reproof in the imperial edicts. They are human nature and human greed. And to these was added a deplorable inefficiency in their human kine. To satisfy their greed and to maintain the efficiency of the State it was necessary to allow the fat and capable cattle to wax great on the more fertile meadows. In other words unless capacity was given its due reward the efficiency of the State was radically affected. Ethics and idealism are not factors of a feudal State. It is reasonable to doubt whether they have any deep grounding in a mercantile State. The reaction from the nicely arranged socialism of the old Japanese monarchy took some generations, but it was radical in so far as it did introduce the only elasticity witnessed in its history. Granted a different environment the final result might have been different. Individualism might have been capable of development in the mass of the population. In war and a feudal age this was of course impossible, and Japanese isolation fastened their spirit of communism on the mass of the people. Never did education so thoroughly enthrall a people and prevent their natural development. With the Tokugawa the *samurai* were finally well settled in the saddle. Even then nature is almost too strong for man. As Warner tells us—root pusley out of one quarter of your physical garden and it will promptly appear in another quarter. One element the rulers of Japan always had missed, and because they despised it—the merchant class. This class might in time have become a question; but contact with the West, and the turn it gave to an impending squabble between the rulers over the division of the public spoils, prevented this ever becoming a question to Old Japan.

The question of capital incidentally, though not necessarily, carries with it that of interest. As we have said, Old Japan treated this as it was treated in mediaeval Europe. Its bare existence was only recognized grudgingly and because it was found that men would not lend without a return. If forbidden it was effected under the worst forms of usury. Against this Japanese laws were made fast and furious. But their difficulty lay in not frankly recognizing the proper use and treatment of interest, instead of paralysing it by "private settlement orders" issued on an indiscriminate basis of confiscation for the benefit of the debtor. They legitimized loans and prevented their fruition; with the usual results.

The question of rent they settled in the most summary manner. This was because they were early in the field, and no property at that time existed but in land and its attachments, and no revenue was obtained but from rent. This the State (themselves) confiscated and appropriated to running the Government. That is, it paid the pensions of the *samurai* and the extravagances of the *daimyō*. There were no difficulties about this point. They were the undisputed rulers of the State. Rulers of some kind must exist. And there has been no State—except possibly a democracy—that will not milk its units to the limit of endurance and efficiency. The limits of expenditure are quickly pushed up to the limits of income; as every modern State and municipality shows. The question of expenditure is simply a question of the power of the Government. In this crude centralized State as found in Old Japan all questions of efficiency, of maintenance, and of continuance were easily answered. The *samurai* held their swords in their hands, and they continued their organization for at least fifteen hundred years, only then breaking down before an entirely extraneous influence, the possibility of which they could neither foresee nor effectively meet without disruption of their ancient system.

Such was the old Japanese State, and history shows us the same in old Europe in which, however, the rising tide of individualism has been directing its attacks against a bureaucracy based on an ancient caste system. Such it would be under the rule of the American "boss" and "the boys" if allowed to ramify into the channels of private life. The reaction expressed by socialism is a curious anachronism. To fight the evils of organization by organization is an inconsistency not only in terms but in means. And yet it is necessary. This is the meaning of democracy. But what socialism proposes is to substitute in the final product organization for organization. This is the essential point, for it is fairly clear that many so-called socialists are simply fighting fire with fire. With them it is "our" organization against "your" organization. They have no idea of abdicating their individuality. This is the usual confusion of political equality with natural equality. They hope to make men naturally equal in the point of capability, and this can only be done by the levelling process which is the equivalent of abnegation of individuality. The equality mark of algebra cannot be adopted without taking the consequences. And to effect this they turn to all the brutishness found in humanity—the proletariat; for they frankly state that rule must come from the lowest, that those most interested must guide the steps of reform. That the submerged tenth are in a frightful condition can be admitted; that within this tenth there is a swarm of brutishness terrible to conceive is true; that their condition can be in part ameliorated is also a fact; that this condition is of interest to the State as well as to a noble philanthropy is also true; that their condition is largely to be attributed to their own fault or to inherited conditions—drunkenness, carelessness, lack

of thrift, idleness, obscenity, stupidity—is true although socialists of course would not admit it. But the remedy for this must come from above and its necessity be impressed on the ranks above. Ignorance cannot rule. It can only burn and break and destroy. It is pleased with its environment and demands that the rest of society shall come down to its level. But society has an equal right to demand that the tenth make good its own effort to rise by other than violence. It must abandon its numerous vices and take its place among the saving and thrifty members of the community. Socialism does not meet this question of equal response at all. It depends altogether on the effort coming from above or being forced on those above. This idea can only exist in the brain of an enthusiast. Man has had centuries on centuries of training in the family circle. His altruism has a strictly defined limit. He has had a practical experience of his fellowman for all these ages and very few angels have been detected. He has determined a scale by which a life in communities is possible. But the demand on the separate units must be met with frank response and effort to keep up with the rest. Otherwise altruism may display itself in charity but never in equality. Socialism is asserting that society is becoming the submerged nine-tenths, but in democratic countries the ballot box shows the contrary. Social questions are settled by the nine-tenths for their own good. These nine-tenths for ages have been adjusting and settling their differences. The submerged tenth have invariably been a dangerous and at times a fatal ally to any of the contestants. And yet it is to them that revolutionary socialism turns, and in them that is found the levelling down principle characteristic of socialism.

We can now turn to the main questions for discussion—the actual working of a socialistic system in the light of experience. This system must be tested as to efficiency, as to method of maintaining its integrity, and as to possible continuance. Cataclysms and experiments of utopias are not to figure. The *experience* of such has been costly and has invariably swung the pendulum far back in the reverse direction, the French Revolution being a classic example. And here we can make no distinction between “utopian socialism” and “scientific socialism,” unless to say that the first is frank enough to present a constructive programme, and the second leaves the future to God and luck.* “Scientific socialism” jeers at the “barrack system” of its predecessor, but it happens that this barrack system is a logical necessity. All politics are an extension of militarism into private life. Brass buttons and a uniform are not neces-

* Among the mountain of trash enunciated by Fourier, there are more grains of practical common sense and prediction of social evolution, and an only feasible scheme for a progressive socialism, than are to be found among the ninety and nine just expounders of “scientific socialism.”

sary. When a man marches to the polls to cast his vote he is submitting himself to rule and orders until the next opportunity—if it comes. He is abdicating his will just to the given extent. Socialism is politics extended into all private life. It must enforce its rule by the military method. It can leave no room for the individual. Every proposed form of it is therefore legitimate game for examination in this light. Marx and Engel are simply less candid than St. Simon and Fourier. As soon as men are selected and classified for State service they must be regimented, whether they are soldiers in the army or carriers in the postal service. But it is to be feared that the value of brass buttons would be enormously discounted if everybody wore them. There would remain then nothing but the fact that the great army would be swung in this or in that direction according to the will of the few men placed at its head. Internal friction would cease to exist. But with what result?

§ 7.

Socialism is a general name for the scheme or series of schemes for the socialization of capital and the means of production, present and future. The theme is not a new one. In fact its agitation is very ancient and to-day borrows with little modification from the time when Plato wrote. Essentially it can be said to rest on an effort to substitute for the more intimate relations and groups of men that more general relation of brotherhood among all men, and which is best expressed by the term fraternity in the sense meant in the well-known French motto. Socialist and anarchist writers therefore generally make a set attack on the family, individual thrift, and religion, all of which are rivals to this more diffused interest. In their advocacy of methods socialist writers tend to two extremes. At one end there are writers who advocate strong centralization, and this seems the only logical goal of their doctrine. At the other end they affiliate with the anarchists in an effort to separate the administrative and economic State. For either the autonomy of groups would bring about a series of crushing monopolies which the administrative State would have to step in and destroy for the benefit of the people, or the communal system of anarchy would lead to a reckless competition far more drastic and unregulated than that of to-day. In what follows we have less to do with economics, and mainly confine the discussion to the above in which the Law of Malthus in relation to society as it exists, not as

how it may exist ten thousand years from now, is necessarily a prominent feature.*

Two cardinal principles mark socialism. (1) The cessation of all internal friction, (2) brought about by sweeping away all right to exclusive use either of one's own production or to inheritance from another. This is the radical levelling programme of true socialism. In this light it hardly seems worth while to enter into that milder form of the doctrine which is based on labour according to capacity and reward according to merit. However, it receives possibly more discussion, and in spite of its greater inconsistencies, than the more radical form in which the basic principle is labour according to capacity and reward according to needs. This milder modified socialism is then to be tested as to efficiency, maintenance and continuance.

* Cf. for instance Herr Bebel's "Woman and Socialism." Professor F. S. Nitti in his attack on Malthus ("Population and the Social System," p. 65) tells us that Professor Marshall, "the prince of modern English economists," "thinks notwithstanding, that the Malthusian theory is not only false, but erroneous in its formal part." It is difficult to draw this conclusion from the "Principles of Economics." On the contrary (pp. 255-262 fourth edition) Professor Marshall endorses Malthus' first principle of supply of population as "substantially valid" (p. 257), and of his second and third principles says that though antiquated in form "they are still in a great measure valid in substance." Making a distinction between practices which result with some people from a full appreciation of the Law of Malthus, and moral restraint as a check on population, any writer on ethics would strongly condemn the former and endorse the latter. As to Professor Nitti's kindred reference to Professor Sidgwick, we find in the latter's table of contents, p. XIII. "Political Economy"—"Malthus's law of population is valid, when duly qualified, as an abstract statement of tendency; also the concrete statement that in old countries population is limited by the difficulty of procuring subsistence; but the limit is not rigid, and the standard of comfort that partly determines it is variable;" a condensed form of the argument given in the text (loc. cit., pp. 147-158). Nor do I find in the "Elements of Politics" a different stand taken. With emigration from thickly to thinly populated countries there results a marked increase of population in both. Unless the stream of emigration be abnormally large. For a Government to take direct measures to add to a thickly populated country "as England or France, would be assuming too great and dangerous a responsibility; owing to the danger that the increase of numbers would be accompanied by a lowering of the average quality of life in the increased population." Emigration is only to be encouraged as an expansion of *civilized humanity*; for granting that the stream is an expansion not abnormally large, those who remain behind quickly propagate up to and beyond the old standard of pressure. Hence emigration can be encouraged in so far as it does not affect the standard of living in the older country (loc. cit. pp. 315, 316. Cf. also 159). Note how the discussion is in relation to emigration. Professor Sidgwick distinctly assumes the discouragement of population in European countries apart from emigration. And this involves cost of transportation and unwillingness to emigrate. The italics are mine.

In discussing Malthusianism I use the term in reference to its operation within classes, these being determined by the greater or less power men have to provide for the future; as also with reference to the ratio between labour and capital giving the greatest productivity under the existing conditions.

Labour according to capacity and reward according to merit. This form is akin to other forms of socialism in so far as inheritance is eliminated from its system. For the rest, all that ability can command or personal taste impel to gratification would form the incentive for the individual. In the words of a socialist writer, "if Jones prefers *objects d'art* and Smith prefers "fast horses or a steam yacht, each will be free to follow his inclinations so far as his resources will permit. If, on the contrary, "one should prefer to hoard his wealth, he would be free to do so. "The inheritance of such accumulated property would, however, "necessarily be denied, society being the only possible inheritor of "property."* Now a whole list of questions might reasonably be here interjected. Questions which are to-day forcible and practical ones—as to how many hours a man shall be allowed to labour, as to how much he shall be allowed to do in the hour, and so on, all very practical issues in the levelling policies of the trades-unions within their membership. This is by no means unessential where the object is to prevent competition within the ranks. Radical socialism would never fall into such a particularly rank inconsistency which leaves competition just exactly in the existing condition, establishing a living for the lowest class, a proposition much heard of to-day. This of course means to make society a huge eleemosynary institution in which the capable are forced to contribute to the support of the incapable. This form of altruism has very immediate limitations, outside of a little band of philanthropists. The other alternative† is for those to starve who cannot command this minimum price for their labour. If a man cannot legally accept what his labour is worth he must starve or be supported. There is no alternative. In new and badly undermanned countries, such as New Zealand and Australia, operating under a sweeping exclusion policy as to all immigration, this can be carried into effect—for a time. In New Zealand at all events there are palpable signs of dry rot. Nothing is done until it has to be done. However, as yet the labour there is still so far below the demand as to call for an annual migration of some twenty thousand from the neighbouring Australia.

All this, however, is really beyond the mark. The socialist writer just quoted, *in re* Jones and Smith, says (previously), "it "may be freely admitted, however, that the ideal to be aimed "at ultimately, must be *approximate* equality of income. Other- "wise class formation must take place and the old problems "incidental to economic inequality reappear," or never disappear

* J. Spargo, "Socialism" p. 236. That well worn stage expedient, buried treasure, would find a real field of usefulness. Any man with a glimmer of acumen could give his natural heirs a hint where to dig in the back garden. The treasure-hunter not the moon shiner would be the game of the socialist detective. Such expedients are hardly the best economic use of such hoards.

† Dr. Hadley's "Economics" p. 363 treats the whole question. Cf. Mill's "Political Economy" Chap. XII. as to the "living wage." His remedy is found in Chap. XIII.

is somewhat more accurate. It is therefore somewhat hard to get down to the next practical reward of thrift in this modified socialism. Parents would strive to attain all the rewards of thrift for on this would depend the training that they could give their children in fitting them for the battle of life. This is all they could give them, any form of inheritance not being allowed. And in this connection the efficient civil service of Prussia is often quoted, in which, open to competitive examination, the same families have maintained such efficiency as to render office with them hereditary. Efficiency can be granted as a practical test in Prussia; as contrasted with inefficiency. Whether the *most* efficient, and not simply the efficient, reaches the desired position one can perhaps reasonably doubt. Where traditional deportment and an educational course must make up part of the examination test it is quite possible this gives an advantage to heredity and a constant environment. But the question can well be asked does not this remove from the competition those whose bread-winner is removed by death before he has been able to educate them for this higher standard—for his exertions must be strictly limited to the immediate demand? Why perpetuate what is felt to be an existing condition of inequality? And here we are confronted with a situation that is often brought forward and summed up in an aphorism containing about as much fallacy as has ever been foisted on a long suffering world: namely, that the world owes every man a living.

Mr. George has put this substantially in another form by claiming for every child that is born into the world an equal claim to the inheritance of the community in which he lives.* It is true that the child has not been consulted as to his appearance. Neither has society. These "pledges of mutual love" (or lust) are to be made the burden of everybody but the parents who in this respect are regarded as a sort of cattle to breed for increase. But it happens that in similar cases in the feral animal world Nature takes care of the surplus by eliminating the excess, and in man's domestication of animals he reserves the privilege of limiting the increase to the available support. It is true that the child brings to society two arms to feed its mouth, but it is also true that if it was left to itself when first born it would not live twenty four hours. For years the child is absolutely dependent for its existence on the community in which it lives. Children are a tax not a use to the community. Society exactly measures out to the thrift of the parents their limit to sexual indulgence; and one man is not called on to support its results beyond his own efforts in that line. And this is not a human law. It is a law of Nature, and is tersely expressed in the old Hebrew Book, "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me." The efficiency and happiness of the succeeding generations are the direct result of

* "Progress and Poverty" p. 337.

the care, thrift, and self sacrifice of the parents. It is neither fair nor right that one man shall be allowed to neglect this plain duty and then compel his neighbour to divide with him. It is a fact, and a cruel fact, that there are numbers of children born into an absolutely hopeless position in the world. As far as this is the fault of society it can be and should be rectified. But it is impossible to strike at thrift and energy without striking at the efficiency of society. It is possible to drag down when the object should be to build up. And the exact limit of this building up with the least damage to society is to-day eagerly sought by society for its own sake. The situation can only be tempered by giving wider opportunities to those who show the energy to take advantage of them. The levelling down process would be fatal.*

One of the great features of our modern learning is the abundance of teachers and small number of disciples. A brain full of all kinds of knowledge useless to the owner, and a belly empty of any kind of food for the support of that brain, is the cause of much of the existing discontent. Perhaps the reason for this is that dignity and reward, as two different questions, have not been well distinguished. It is a probable fact that no occupation is largely overpaid. Some professional men get very large fees, and they probably deserve them. People usually pay for what they expect to get and not for the fun of the thing. It is also equally true that a large number of professional men never rise above the wages of a good mechanic, and in many cases are well below them and much more uncertain in their receipts. This in spite of the time and cost of their special training. No man, however, is going to assume the responsibility of his own deficiencies. Society's shoulders are broad, so he shifts the burden there, and the reason why people do not flock to him as doctor, lawyer, engineer, poet, writer of books, etc., is because there are too many of him. So in desperate cases he turns anarchist, or socialist, or social reformer which sometimes is almost as bad. There is discontent in every society which is ranked according to ability, for every man puts his own ability at a fair high mark. But the most serious source of discontent is found in the man who has struck beyond his abilities and failed, and hence this more intelligent discontent forms a formidable directing power for all discontent. Part of this is the fault of society which should depend on ability, not on the nature of any employment. The expert mechanic is a decidedly better man than the professional plodder who has stamped nothing on his brain but the letters of his books. Ho

* I have before me a common enough item from the newspapers, of the capture, arrest, and fining of a man for desertion of his wife and children. The fine (or imprisonment) was remitted on the man's plea that he had run away because he had no means of support for his twelve children, and the expectation of the thirteenth had been the last straw to break the back of this town bull. "It takes nine tailors to make a man," but this particular tailor had made a good baker's dozen.

knows quite as much and has taken much less time about it. Professions are held in too great social esteem, and manual labour in too little esteem. There is a distinct limit to the value of the professions. They are very necessary to the community, but they are in a certain sense merely regulative and hence non-productive. To give an artificial value to them draws into their ranks and from the producing ranks a greater number of men than they can support. Addition in excess to the professional ranks does not add to the health of any community. Addition to the producers does so add. The ranks of the manual workers for many generations have been unduly depressed, but the rise of the engineering industries gives reason to believe that the sharp distinction made between the professions and manual labour is broken into. There is a gradation for example in every large steel works that makes it difficult to determine where manual labour begins to shade into brain labour pure and simple. The "doctor" in his chemical laboratory, highly trained as he is, does of necessity an immense amount of manual labour; and the boy who grinds and prepares the reagents must learn something of their nature or run the risk of poisoning himself. This gradual shading through the ranks is as it should be. It leads to a natural distribution of the rewards.

These can only be graded by competition. Any other method is hopeless and, as we have seen, modified socialism finally has to come down frankly to the level and say that the "ultimate object" must be levelling. Or else the rewards must be fixed arbitrarily. In the vast complexity of modern society this is impossible. It could not be done without the grossest favouritism. If difficulties stagger us over fixing a "living wage," an exercise purely of the police power of the State, they would be insuperable at this point—outside of Utopia. If society, apart from competition, arbitrarily so fixes the scale and then leaves the places open to competition, there will naturally be a rush to the most desirable and consequent over-crowding. If these places are limited and are filled by some scheme of selection there is a field opened to political corruption of the rankiest kind. The example best known of such selection, the most efficient in theory and the most corrupt in practice, is the Chinese civil service. To leave it to popular selection would be to arouse the worst form of class feeling under the worst possible conditions of this centralized State.* For it is not to be forgotten that centralized it must be. To allow one community to break the rule would simply arouse competition between communities,

* Or under the most unintelligent direction. The Paris Commune of 1871 is the classic example. According to these pundits any invention or object of research was first to be submitted to a committee of average citizens who were to pass on its practical application. If their judgment was unfavourable the subject dropped. Shades of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton! The discovery of the asteroids or Neptune had important but not immediate bearing both on navigation and mechanics.

in which the rest would have to follow the example of the most efficient, and one of the gravest problems of any socialist State would be how to face the competition of a State which gave every advantage to individual efficiency. Besides, men cannot be so treated as stocks and stones. They have their likes and dislikes, and will deal with those they like and avoid those they dislike. There is something more in life than mere cold officialism, especially in that more private and intimate connection of direct personal intercourse whether in business or pleasure. And, as said, a good name with generations behind it has a true market value. Where anything of value depends on it, with its long record of favourable environment it will be given the preference. It is hard on the man who cannot point to anything but a record of obscurity, but once more we are up against the natural law—visting on the children the deficiencies of the parents.

What is greatly needed is greater efficiency in the lower class of labour. It has been fashionable to abuse our factory system whereas it has been the greatest boon to labour, bringing it out into the open where men can see it in its workings. It is a notorious fact that the sweat shop instead of being a product of the present is a survival of the past. Apart from certain undesirable features which associate them with those tyrannous organizations of mediæval times, the guilds, the principle at the base of the trades-union can be most heartily endorsed. Accepting the more modern principle that the competition is between capital and capital on the one side, and between labour and labour on the other side, the complete unionizing of labour would carry no detriment to the community at large. It might be said that under such circumstances capital would be at the mercy of labour. The nature and necessity of capital in any form of modern State has been pointed out. In the intermediate forms of labour the labourer must be fed and supported until his product is finished and marketed. Capital is the result of some man's thrift who is willing to forego present enjoyment for the benefit of a share in future production. Capitalists are not necessarily capitalist managers. Its reward is represented by interest. The trades-union therefore could not beat down capital (whether belonging to the State or individual) beyond a certain point, for it would cease its operation and await a more favourable opportunity, or else go to other and more profitable fields. A community might be at the mercy of some special organization of labour if they occupied the same illogical and irresponsible position that they do to-day. This is the objection to the treatment that is given to the trades-unions by modified socialism. The trades-unions are to take over under socialism the direction of their industries; the question of capital and mobility being eliminated. As long however as the organization of the trades-union is respected, what is to prevent its squeezing the rest of the public to the last possible limit, and far more effectually, as its rival—now the State—must supply it with its living fund? It is frankly the object of the unions to get as high wages as they can, to make

the public pay as much as any monopoly renders possible, to take no risks of any enterprise, to exclude all competitors within their ranks as far as possible, and to gain all these points just in so far as their particular position of advantage in the social war allows. Compulsory arbitration is as strenuously objected to by the trades-union as by any trust organization. Furthermore the principle of exclusion has long been carried beyond any mere limitations of membership, and one of the serious questions of the larger federations of allied trades is to meet and prevent the fierce wars waged between unions to maintain the integrity of their own special field. The exclusiveness, the brutality toward all non-union labour, the resort to violence or the attempt to thwart every effort to its suppression, are enough to convince any observer that the present object of the trades-unions is to secure to themselves monopoly. This is their weakness in the public eye. And again, how is the trades-union to attain the greatest possible efficiency unless a due reward be granted to the brains that manage its industry? This is well illustrated by the history of co-operation. Co-operation is extremely obnoxious to the socialists. Its object is to prevent the entrance of incapables, for every diminution of efficiency means inequality in sharing the profits. In another direction their failures have been largely due to an undervaluation of the importance of really good management and the reward necessary to secure it. The contest between the employer and the trades-union also hinges on this, and the suffering caused by strikes is an expression of their mutual discourtesies. Labour suffers more immediately in these contests and capital suffers more permanently.

It has not always been the rule that free competition should govern the relations of men. The rule used to be that of pure might, the strong exploiting the weak, with only that regard to their condition as the profit of the master called for. To hamstring, mutilate, blow into atoms, or carve into little bits their neighbours' cattle was a perfectly legitimate occupation—and perhaps under the form of war indemnities is so considered to-day. But even under these boisterous conditions of ancient times there was rebellion on the part of the exploited, usually unsuccessful. This was incited by a pressure which had carried living to the verge of weariness and suffering to that of endurance. In the majority of cases, however, living was found at least tolerable under the conditions, and the rebellion was found against change in those conditions. This seems to have been a universal law, for the records of civic life in both Europe and Japan are marked by petitions for the restoration and stability of conditions "as they were in times afore." They are not pleas for privilege but pleas for stability, and sometimes carried to actual rebellion. Such a condition, however, could never become acute until the increase of real knowledge of physical principles led to the invention and introduction of machines which could do the work of many men. The first demand of the workers was, of course, that this should be stopped;

and the further step usually taken was to smash the machines and the inventor too if they could catch him. It was the operation of a feeling ground into the soul of the worker, and perhaps very natural; and just as rigorous in its operation to-day, when the announcement of a new labour saving device in a general utility sends a thrill of pleasant anticipation to the hearts of many, and sends an icy thrill of despair to the hearts of the workers engaged in the existing industry. The defects and advantages of machinery are hardly germane to the present subject.* No one will now seriously dispute the advantages to the general public, no matter how serious may be some such revolution in production to a section of the community. Machinery so far from lessening the demand for workers has noticeably increased it, and has probably driven every community in which it is in operation to a point from which, if they could be reduced to former conditions, such community would find itself face to face with a very practical application of the Law of Malthus, until the charity of their neighbours stepped in and helped them to their feet. This, fortunately, is only the case in those less frequent instances where some great natural cataclysm has stripped a working community of its power of production. San Francisco is no longer the most recent of these terrible practical applications of Nature.

Socialism of the most radical kind does not deny the advantages of machinery. In fact it is to it that Marx attributes the supremacy of capital which he claims has absorbed all the advantages but has left the worker in his original place, or out in the cold to compete with the diminished demand for labour and hence compelling him to take just what capital chooses to give him. He holds therefore that instead of labour saving machinery going to diminish the necessity of labour and hence benefitting the community, its fruits have entirely gone into the pockets of a single class and have left labour infinitely worse off than before; that every discovery should go to making lighter the labour of the community; and presumably it can be inferred that this lighter labour is to be the main object and not the meeting of new desires. This latter object it can be added is strictly in line with the levelling ideas of radical socialism. It cannot be said that Marx's argument is convincing even on the surface. Machinery has not lessened the demand for labour but has increased it enormously, as the wide range of entirely modern industries shows. His "overproduction" and "crises" are due to shortsightedness inevitable in men, consequent timidity and panic, and resultant shrinkage of volume of business, a condition of affairs as inseparable, under existing means of information as to the business market, in a socialist as in a contract State. The relations between capital and capital and between labour and labour have undergone no alteration. A certain class of the

* See Hadley. "Economics" Chap XI for discussion on the subject.

population have multiplied up to their economic limits as they always have done and always will do, thus throwing away any of their share of advantages under the new conditions.* Moreover under these new conditions there has been given a distinct advantage to labour inasmuch as its concentration enables an organization impossible when the relations between employer and employé were those of two individuals. Labour it is to be noted was the first to grasp this principle. To follow out his proposition, made in cold blood, and cease all production at a certain point; to carry the working day down to eight hours, or six hours, or one hour, simply means stagnation in any society, or else the exploiting of the industrious at the expense of idleness, or else the overseer's lash to keep the idle up to the pace set in some theoretical way by some theoretical body. It savours exactly of the propositions often posted up in Japanese villages—and authoritative—"this year the village will exercise frugality." His proposal in reference to progress is unthinkable and probably is not intended to be so associated, for the idea of the radical socialism, it is to be remembered, is the complete cessation of *all* social strife.

In connection with the discussion of the last three or four paragraphs both old and new Japan perhaps present some useful lessons, for the conditions of a society that could maintain its isolation so effectively as Old Japan are peculiar. Old Japan was essentially a socialist society exploited by a bureaucracy. The levels were carefully maintained in the lower ranks, the citizen was for the good of the State and not of himself, and he found out that every movement was to his disadvantage. All the pleas sent up to the Shōgunate at Yedo are against oppression by the bureaucracy and for a restoration to the old conditions. The one thing they dread is change. For change could only come from above, and its burden would not be light for it was probably due to a conception or misconception on the part of some particular member of the bureaucracy that more milk was to be squeezed from the cocoanut. A society adjusted itself to these conditions, and as will be seen later Japan had adjusted itself to them, although natural inclinations were driving the country close up to the limits of endurance of the then community. In its existing condition it was suddenly thrown open to no competition in its own particular lines and to a lively demand for labour outside its own particular lines. The introduction of machinery can be said to have been a sudden and great benefit to

* There is a book more often referred to than read—More's "Utopia." The positive denunciations of socialism can be said to be taken from this book—not always with due acknowledgment—and a y positive features found in socialist writers can usually be traced to Sir Thomas More. On this particular point the opening lines, "Of their living and mutual conversation together" (Bk. II) has application. More unconsciously ran against the rock of all socialism—the Law of Malthus. His only remedy—as is the only practicable remedy to-day—was the barrack system. As to Machinery Cf. "Capital" Chap. XV.

Japan. The transportation system (by junks and pack trains) was already utterly insufficient for the needs of the existing period. The industries started were all new and displaced no old ones. Machinery therefore found places for many who were beginning to feel the pressure of conditions of overcrowding in the old system, and it suddenly expanded the range of the system and gave an impetus to population that has made the Japan of the last two generations an abnormality in such increase. It is not to be understood that this invasion did not have its drawbacks. Old Japan worked to a considerable extent under the sweat shop system, but it also took up the factory system under the same preconceived ideas and without any of the modifying altruism which has made this system such an object of care and supervision in the West. It is better of course to have a superfluous girl go into a factory than to get rid of her at birth or send her to a brothel at puberty, but still the conditions of the factory, especially in the case of women, admit of vast improvement in Japan. Where machinery has been brought in contact with a few already established lines—as in electric roads displacing the *kurumaya* in large cities—there has been suffering and protest of the same kind as in the West, namely violence attended with stoning of the cars and destruction of property.

One would feel inclined to predict that the lot of the inventor in the modified socialist society would not be a happy one, and rather than any reward he would be far more likely to be greeted with the soft side of a brickbat, and in far more jeopardy of jail than any junket or socialist token money as a reward for his labour in diminishing the pains of society. The socialist State—as any modern State—must classify its labour. There can no longer be hunting on Monday, fishing on Tuesday, war on Wednesday, scalping and burning the prisoners on Thursday, and so on through the week of a primitive and perfect social circle. If the labour was lightened for a class they would gladly encourage anything tending to lighten their labour under equal conditions. But every such invention would necessitate a redistribution of rewards. A whole labouring class unit would find its time value diminished according to the principle that the difficult labour gets the greater and the easier labour the less reward. Their reward therefore being diminished they would protest against innovation, and they and not economic laws would be in control. Modified socialism breaks down here, and the uncompromising lines of Marxism—equality of income—come out far more sharply than such a qualifying phrase as “ultimately approximate equality of income” allows. And this phase is far more consistent. If the invention is allowed the inventor must be rewarded, for otherwise it would simply mean that the community absorbed the value of the inventor’s brain—which Marxism does—and to so reward him would imply the creation and dangers of a privileged class—as Marxism

claims.* It seems hardly necessary to say that invention could not flourish under such strenuous discouragement. And it might be added that it does not flourish; of which Old Japan is a shining example of a most ingenious people, living under a similar system of discouragement of anything new. For fourteen hundred years they evolved nothing of value to make easier the daily life of the people. Entirely too much trust is placed by theorists in man's natural inclination toward change. Savages show exactly the opposite tendency for an obvious psychological reason. Their channels of thought become fixed. It is a fact that some man did conceive the idea of a crooked stick to turn up the ground, and that in this way the plough and the spade came into use without the existence of any patent law. These were very useful and primitive inventions in their day. And they remained primitive because they required no great strain of absorption from man's mental machinery. No one could make that assertion of the conditions of to-day. The knowledge implied in any great invention involves a training in natural science, and a particular and earnest application of that training that may extend over a long term of years. Mr. George's idea that simply because a man thinks of a thing before another man thinks of it he deserves no protection for his idea is most inexact. This may answer for haphazard thinking. If one man does get ahead of another it is fair to presume that he has either given the matter greater study and attention, or has a wider and quicker grasp of the whole subject and hence can reach more quickly a definite conclusion. And the cold hard *fact* remains that protection by patent laws and the exhibition of capacity for invention have gone hand in hand. The world had a fair knowledge of natural science necessary to invention previous to the nineteenth century, but the practical application of that science to the mechanical arts has closely followed the granting of patents to those successful in such application. The same reasoning also applies to copyright, for what is granted to the inventor and to the author is not the idea simply—as to originality of the idea there can only be a platonic discussion—but its application in practical form. It is the set form of words to which copyright is granted to the author; and it is the set form of the machine, or its description in very exact terms, that is granted to the inventor, and the less exact he is in his description the wider open does he throw his invention to infringement. And both facilities—copyright and patent—have been granted because society has found out by practical experience that it is to its own advantage to so grant these advantages.

With this most marked phase of modern life—machinery—there has, however, been a most dangerous survival of the past and the continued existence of a human anachronism in the modern competition of iron and steel. This anachronism is the

* From cover to cover "Capital" has nothing (good) to say of the inventor. As to skilled labour Cf. p. 179.

"sweat shop." For here we have all the advantage on one side and all the disadvantage on the other. The problem is strictly one for legislation, and a very difficult one it is admitted to be on all sides. It is not to be stated in a few words how these people reached and have perpetuated such a condition. The perpetuation is distinctly against all the theory and practice of our modern life. The cause undoubtedly in numerous cases has been misfortune, and these are the hopeful cases; the groggeries standing at every corner of our great city streets are another plainer indication; idleness, vice, disease, and a constantly vicious circle set up by these conditions all go to perpetuate it. The difficulty with these people is that they can do nothing. They present beef and bone—unskilled labour in its most depleted condition. When there is a ditch to be dug or a needle to be dug in a line through the cloth following a pattern cut out in a like mechanical model, then work can be found for them. Otherwise there is literally no room for them. Before the machines their personal incompetency makes them helpless. They are willing—most of them—to labour and yet can make nothing that anyone wants. Both the steam shovel and the sewing machine can do their work vastly better. Under certain conditions they are cheaper to those who can exploit their labour. Of course they have no mobility. Their incompetency attends to that. They stick therefore to their "trades" to the injury of all. In other terms they are the remnants of society—the hopeless. They present at least two phases to legislation. It is impossible to say to them that they shall not work for what they can get, for they probably get just what they are worth. It is a terrible thing to bring the limited physical capacity of a human being into competition with a machine, and yet if this is done the value of such a mere matter of physical capability must be measured by the result and rewarded accordingly. It is equally impossible to let them starve. No man is knowingly allowed to starve in these days. They are in a sense the field of true philanthropy, but society is beginning to wake up to the fact that this in its turn can be dangerous. Philanthropy may perpetuate this pauperization. It needs therefore the guiding hand of the State restraining and measuring out the relief directed towards its own ends—the good of the State. The State therefore has a mission in elevating if possible the hopeless mass, and this mission is limited exactly by what society, for its own good, will sacrifice for this purpose. And this sacrifice is limited in turn by human selfishness and by the equal danger of threatening the sound elements in order to effect what often is of problematical value and outcome—the saving or cure of the unsound. With their lack of intelligence, and the terrible immediate pressure under which these people live, a certain form of almsgiving does nothing but pauperize them. Social reform therefore is curbing the tendency to such indiscriminate charity and is devoting itself to raising the tone of these people to a point where they themselves can begin to assist in the task of elevation. This can only be done by

teaching better habits, particularly to the younger generation ; and winnowing out the criminal and the vicious, the confirmed criminal being more and more regarded as a fit object for permanent segregation. With better knowledge in living, particularly in cooking their food and in sanitation, there comes an improved physical condition and hence greater efficiency, and this rise in efficiency may put some of them on their feet. Public works have often been suggested in reference to them and it has equally been pointed out that this is nothing but an extravagant form of almsgiving at the expense of society at large, and at best can only be spasmodic unless it is proposed permanently to tax the industrious for the benefit of what is mainly the result of idleness and vice. Until men grow wings there will always be a percentage reduced to helplessness by vice or misfortune carrying down with it a great mass of helpless women and children in its train. The misfortune is a subject for public charity and the vice for public correction. Modified socialism offers no real remedy for this defect in human nature—except the extravagant proposition to support the spendthrift at the expense of the industrious, or to adopt the meaningless shibboleth of giving him equal credit in the State on equal security offered. As if the idle and spendthrift could offer any such security ! All socialism here can propose is a *forced* altruism carried to the extent of extravagance. Marxism faces this question fairly and says that society must be forced to this altruism. Other socialism, less frank, shirks the question altogether or prattles about a hypothetical radical change in human nature in which we are all to be wise and industrious. Human nature has improved, it is possible to say. The general tone of society is palpably better, in the sense of a wider range, than it was in the days of Cicero. But the improvement is very slow in the general mass no matter how great it may have been through the upper ranks of society. There were beasts lurking in every Roman alley in the days of the Empire, and there are beasts lurking in the alleys of every great city to-day, as every man knows who takes the trouble to go out the back door of his community instead of at the grand portal kept open for fetes and festivals and public business. This question of the submerged tenth is purely a question of personal thrift and ability ; and unfortunately, from the lack of both in the class affected, is a question of the Law of Malthus, for the most conspicuous disregard of any restraint on the sexual passion is best illustrated among these people. There are, however, possibilities of raising some of them. As it is they are a constant menace to the sounder elements of the community, bringing their feeble incompetent labour in mass in competition with the individual skilled mechanic, and thereby dragging down both in the struggle. This menace has actually had curious political effects for it has driven thousands over the seas to the colonies, and perhaps Great Britain can be said to owe her colonial empire to the unsuspected writhings and indirect influence of her submerged tenth. It is only on very rare

occasions and by outside assistance that the ranks of emigration have been recruited from this source.*

The value of technical schools and the wisdom of their increase can be better understood in this wider light of the importance of efficiency. We do not want schools turning out professors and brain workers *ad libitum et nauseam*. The question of competition always will settle just how many are needed in any given occupation, and no other method ever will settle it fairly and without resort to the questionable wirepulling of favouritism and politics. The higher schools and the technical schools will adapt themselves to the call made upon them. What they can do is to offer to those willing to take advantage of them greater opportunities for efficiency and diversity, a wider spread of useful knowledge, and a thorough understanding through the community that it is the living and not the job that makes a man "respectable." It has long been accepted that education is primarily a function of the State. It is a fact that some occupations take longer in preparation than another, and they command for the rewards of the successful a higher return than any mere mechanical trade can ever hope to approach. The interests at stake are much larger. It is also probably true that these positions must be reserved for the most capable in the community. The struggle here cannot be thrown open to all. To do this it would first be necessary to strip these positions of the incentive to gain them. The youth whose parents had exercised no thrift could only be brought to the necessary training at the expense of those who did exercise thrift and they would naturally therefore cease to do so. Just as Nature selects out the strongest in the animal and vegetable worlds, so it looks as if a generation or several generations of either brains or thrift were a necessity in order to store up the honey on which the young cub must subsist before he starts gathering for himself higher up the tree. How little of such sacrifice really is needed is shown by the numerous brilliant examples of our "self-made men." If on the contrary parents or candidate squander the resources in saloons, or summer parks, or "socials," the cub will probably follow in his father's foot-steps. As stated, there is a limit to altruism in this direction.

The results we have reached are not very difficult to summarize. We find that modified socialism—labour according to capacity and reward according to merit—aims at many things which are not socialism at all but which are to-day the legitimate object of society in its normal development. Most of them are questions long debated and settled or in course of settlement on a basis of experience the direct reverse of what the real teaching of socialism means—the extinction of the individual. What makes the socialist politician particularly undesirable and dangerous is this secret dogma of his creed, rarely openly

* For Mill's discussion of Malthus—Cf. "Political Economy" Book II, Chap. 12, § 3, 4, 5. As to common sense *versus* sentimentalism § 6.

preached and usually with Jesuitical reserve denied or kept in the background with such phrases as "ultimately" and "approximate." The historical side of the question has been admirably summed up by Professor Fiske* who showed that just in so far as the Aryan nations preserved their individualism did they avoid the fate—even and ever threatening them—of the stationary East wrapped in the iron bands of custom and subjecting the individual absolutely to the community. All that appears in this form of socialism is an extension of Government powers that are plainly and palpably dangerous and that men have found so in the past and only freed themselves at great cost. It is hardly necessary to warn an American of the danger of an extensive Government patronage. Once more we find the radical socialist to be consistent in his views of what socialism really must be, and in *his* extension of Government activity to *all* the life of the community. The individual is then completely sacrificed to the Government. As completely so in the socialism of 1906 A.D. as in the "Utopia" of Sir Thomas More, and on pretty much the same terms, except no writer of to-day has More's quaintness, graphic power of description, and unstudied eloquence. What is everybody's business is nobody's business, and the difference of incentive between an individual working for his own profit and working for another man's or everybody's profit is not unknown. As to the incentive to keep his place, enough is likewise known in America on that point of practical politics. The question of Government is better taken up later, and it need only here be said that a purity of politics is presaged in most schemes laid down by European socialist publicists that can only be attributed to guilelessness or to the interesting fact that they have had but little practical experience of what they preach, for when they try to start Utopia human nature will be found to be exactly what it is and not as it is painted in these schemes—for, moreover, as implanted in their own bosoms, the officers of the future theoretical State seem all to have been selected. The proletariat is to rule, and of course the ruling brains—will not come from the proletariat, for they are not to be found there, but from their recognized leaders. And so "the gang" and "the boys" and "the boss" do not figure as entirely absent from the drab canvas of socialism. There *is* more than one colour on their palette.

But the greatest boast, and perhaps the greatest error, is the exclusion of inheritance. They make a man's work—or incentive to work—depend entirely on his own selfish pleasure. Here is indeed a belly philosophy! Ninety per cent of the work done in the capable classes is done for their posterity. The man who shows disregard on this point is subjected to adverse criticism. "Books, pictures" and fiddlesticks! These are the amusements and attractions of a very few. The vast majority of men "drink beer and go with the girls," race automobiles and play poker. The vast majority of men expend their surplus in purely sensual

* "Cosmic Philosophy." Part II Chapter XX.

enjoyments. But a man will work like a dog for his children, and the greater his intelligence the harder he will work. On his own account he will simply live from day to day. He is immortal in his own opinion, and with health and strength can take care of himself; and if not—the community has to take care of him anyhow. This striking at the incentive of inheritance strikes at the very root of the family—an institution as misty as the history of primeval man. One cannot accuse socialism of any shrinking from possibility in its schemes. In thus forcibly laying hands on this human altar of sacrifice it at least shows boldness. Of course if the State is to rear the children individual efforts would cease to be exerted for the community, and personal pleasure would be doubly an object. Just as much could be gotten out of a man as could be forced out of him. Individual efforts spread out in the whole mass are too diluted to do anything but discourage the individual by their dilution. And this question has been carefully tested. Society has tried it with the family system, tried it with the community system, and has found it most successful with the individual. The present is undoubtedly an evolutionary stage and every practice is under constant revision. What is to be sought is efficiency and this is to be controlled by efficiency in its units without danger to the State from the units. Society has also had experience with these men who have grown too great. None of that fraternity are wanted either. Testamentary disposition always has been and always must be regulated in the interests of the community. The socialist can show none of those dangers that require a universal negation of this incentive to industry. On the contrary it has been the *experience* of society that it is a necessary factor to the efficiency and progress of society itself. Psychology gives us the reason for the necessity of high efficiency in the units, and experience gives the exact range for its encouragement.

As to efficiency therefore this modified socialism sacrifices capital which is essential to future production in any form of State. It withdraws every inducement from the individual to do more than live for the day. It produces for consumption and lays down no scheme by which the individual is to be enticed or forced to provide the necessary surplus; it substitutes for thrift, individual selfishness; it weakens, if not aborts, the family by removing the greatest incentive of parenthood, self-sacrifice for offspring; it supports incapacity and idleness, not only at the expense of the able but forces the able to share with idleness—"the ultimate object being the approximate equality of incomes;" its treatment of the questions of the day is worse than insufficient, trades-unions, thrift, education, distribution, discontent, are only met by the sacrifice of ability to incapacity in removing all competition, or by a total negation of its own principles; in fact the only pronounced feature on this more positive side of its programme is a very pronounced view of the exercise of the

police power of the State.* On this point it can simply be said that they are reactionary. Society has been progressing out of the defects of communism, giving more and more value to the individual because it has found it to its advantage to do so. The socialist is either ignorant or forgetful. His promised land is the mirage seen in the desert. It can be granted that the land beyond Jordan is not as fruitful as it might be, but the task of cultivation is under way, and with the only unit available—the individual. For here lies the unscientific and fatal defect of every scheme of socialism. "In a community the psychical life is all in the parts. In an organization it is in the whole" says Professor Fiske, and with wide application here. Without the individual the community must come to the ground. Only a band of enthusiasts, who translate their own possibilities of holy furor into everyone else, could miss the plain and very positive psychological law. But it is missed. And hence we meet—in the same trusting spirit of confidence in their fellow-man—with that which political experience has shown to be a most unwise extension of the Government into the affairs of its units. Add to this the removal of all incentive to the individual effort by eliminating the right of inheritance and hence interest in the future generation, another feature likewise opposed to all experience of the past, and the result is a complete paralysis of such a community before any other community that chooses to retain and encourage these essentials to progress.

Society, therefore, is absolutely dependent on the individual for its evolution. It is perhaps to be suspected that in carrying out this principle society has not been overly wise. The French Revolution carried individualism to a great extreme at a time when there had been no training to fit it for its new position and responsibilities. It was revolution not evolution. It is in the position of some useful animal, harmless under ordinary conditions but which should find itself in the presence of its natural enemies to keep it within bounds, otherwise it will become as noxious and destructive as the rabbit plague of Australia and California. But the principle of individualism is thoroughly sound and scientific. The words of Professor Groos† might here be used as to the principle involved:—"So the struggle for liberty turns out to be the highest psychic accompaniment of the struggle for life. The instinctive propensity

* The police power of the State is directed to keeping the peace between its units. For instance a man is not allowed directly to poison his mother-in-law. If he does so, and is found out, he is hung. There is no reason why he should be allowed to poison her indirectly by means of borax, salicylic acid, formaldehyde, or other chemical "preservatives," or to kill her by inanition brought on through foods padded out with pretty much anything from coal-tar to sawdust. Inspection of food products by the State has no more to do with socialism than the cut of a man's coat or the ancient and honourable processes of the district attorney's office. It is a legitimate exercise of police power in both the above cases.

† "Play of Animals"—English translation by Eliz. Baldwin p. 322.

"of all living creatures to preserve their independence, to shake off every attempt on individual liberty, culminates in the effort after intellectual liberty." What incentive does socialism hold up to the individual beyond "belly timber" and personal gratification? This is to be the basis of "progress" in the socialistic State, the feet of whose god are indeed made of clay.

§ 8.

Putting aside for the present all questions as to the possibility of a community remaining in a stationary condition—there is positive biological proof that a complex organization must either progress or undergo degradation—let us pass on to the question of maintenance within the society itself. Radical socialism says it could not maintain itself, and bases this judgment on the tolerance of classes within such a society, a radical deviation, as it points out, from the levelling principle. Modified socialism, however, claims all the present advantages of individualism as existing under this State of the future. The artist for instance would do his work more slowly and better since he would not be under the pressure of providing for his immediate future by hasty work. This is making two assumptions. First that men work for the love of their art. There is much truth in this, but it can also be added that it is the great reward at the end of successful art that attracts men to it. This has been the case throughout the history of the world, and the great artist has also been a great power in the land. It is not to be pretended that, in the Italy of the Renaissance, Michael Angelo and Raphael Sanzio and Ludovico Ariosto received the financial reward due to their great talents. Times have changed very much for the better in that respect.* But their access to the brilliant court life of the period was supposed to represent this, utterly insufficient in our eyes but in the eyes of their contemporaries enough to make any monkish craftsman with the brush an object of envy to his humbler brethren; and, in the technical terms of an eastern religion, he won "much merit" when he turned from this brilliant sphere and clung to the shadows of his cloister. To reduce the artist to bread and butter wages, as in radical socialism, would cause him to act as any other man. He would not make a stroke of the brush more than was absolutely necessary. He works for fame (power) and pelf (reward) and neither of these rewards can socialism give him. It is committed to the levelling system and no exceptional influence can be granted to any element of the community. The second and graver assumption made by modified socialism is that the artist would find a clientele to reward him, that the only

* Flattery passed current as cash in those days. To-day it does not.

outlet for thrift would be found in the encouragement of the artistic side of the world's production. No legitimate place for thrift is to be found in any of these socialistic schemes. They are committed to making men equal in effort. If part of the community are allowed to amass their surplus what is to prevent a continuance of the old oppressive system supposed to be represented by that bug-a-boo capitalism? It is the old idea of holding in the capable man that rules. That is, it is mediocrity that is to rule. It will probably not be disputed that where belly not brains rule the general standard will be lowered. It is not to be forgotten that the dead weight of the body is to rule the brain in the new socialist State. Evolution is reversed but that makes little difference, for human regulations are to be substituted for it and any inconvenient reminiscences of that unpleasant law are to be suppressed. Pure human law as evolved by the proletariat is to take Nature's place, and woe to the man who attempts to question its wisdom. How then can genius receive its appropriate reward from minds which cannot rise above bread and butter. His clientele are not likely to over value the efforts of the great artist. They are not likely even to appreciate his efforts. Socialism has no groundwork of fact for the sense of artistic appreciation in the mass. A striking illustration to the contrary is our great American Republic. As a people we have a very mediocre appreciation of art. We are an industrial people and it is the industrial people that rule in the United States. Our public collections are due to the spurring on of (artistically) dull minded councilmen by a few persistent men who hold up the example of European municipalities. And they do not like to feel that we are behind in anything. Of all public institutions our art collections are the most perfunctory and are treated in the most niggardly manner. So much for art in an industrial community.

Modified socialism, however, is going to reward the individual according to his merits. It says this in one breath and takes it back with the next by recognizing the danger in this unequalizing process. For instance the professional classes and the inventor would form a clientele as efficient as the old clientele in support of art. More so as it would be the only outlet for their surplus reward. Upper classes in socialism somewhat stinks of bureaucracy, but that does not concern us at present. Socialism is essentially German to-day and every man has a sneaking desire for a band to his cap. The tale is told that Bismarck referring to Lasalle thoroughly granted his monarchical principles, only it seemed somewhat doubtful to his mind whether Lasalle favoured the Hohenzollern dynastic rule or the Lasalle dynastic rule. It is not at all sure that the great band of manual labour in control of the machine is going to admit any such rewards to brain labour. Socialism seems to point to the æstheticism in the present upper classes as continued in their scheme and urging men on to greater endeavour to satisfy their greater needs of mind in addition to the mere satis-

faction of the body. But class feeling and concentration of wealth into a class would be a source of danger to their community. Elsewhere it has checks but it would have none in the single centred socialistic scheme. And yet certain men are sure to gain a higher reward under any scheme, and in the future as in the past the powerful elements in the primitive community outlined by socialism and from which commercialism has been eliminated would be the medicine man, the priest, and the "boss." As to the first two, man is as big a coward as he ever was. An ache or a pain puts him in the doctor's hands unreservedly, and the doctor and fear for his soul puts him in the hands of the priest. Now it is not meant for one moment to hold up as a menace to the community our little round bellied doctor with his soft but nervous fingers probing our pulse and his gold rimmed glasses detecting all the sins and lies that our tongue has laid open to him as to our self indulgence. The medical fraternity have long deserted politics for science; a change for which we are all to congratulate ourselves, for true science is very exclusive in its demands. The doctor is no longer associated with the *shaman*, the rival to the "boss" in more primitive communities. But he is a good illustration of the necessity of caste in any society, and answers as an illustration from which it is possible to pass to the really dangerous instances. Under pure socialism our doctor would stop as soon as his daily sustenance was secured. Socialism regards this as desirable. Another steps into his place. But suppose he returns again, having expended his surplus on the artist, personal pleasures, etc. (He has no other outlet for them). To avoid "overproduction," having two men in the same position, society must either pension him to stay out, or in the first place force him to stay in. If it refused the one and attempted to do the other it could be hoped that he would again enter politics to the undoing of the socialist State. Many other classes would be in the same predicament.

As little would we want to attribute any sinister intentions to our spiritual doctor with his corporation "with fair capon lined," with his undeniably good intentions (individually) as to our future life and non interference in the affairs of this one. On purely historical grounds, in the past and to-day, he however stands on very different ground from the medical doctor. And in the great levelling sweep of socialism this man again would be left with an undeniable claim on the souls of men, which yet he possesses in the greatest militant organization for rule found among man, and which was only combatted by the political virility inherent in Protestantism. Protestantism has always been unconscious that its real strength lay in its heterogeneity and hence in its activity of thought. It embodied in itself progress, and in the battle, necessarily a political one, the countries attached to the Reform have steadily drawn ahead from the countries still clinging to the dogmatic principles of authority as represented by Catholicism. The very uncertainty of their ground, however, is shown in the constant watchfulness of the

Protestant bodies and their instability of tone before the might of their centralized antagonist. Modified socialism meets this question of religion by ignoring it, or assuming its subjection to the State. They ignore the fact that to-day religion not only acts on sentiment but directs this into politics, and wherever there is a centralized Government there is a struggle with Ecclesiasticism for supremacy. It is only in a few democratic and Protestant countries, where power is so split into a set of checks and balances that the question cannot be concentrated on any one point, that there is not this struggle of Church and State. It is an active factor of every European State—conspicuously so in France—even in England. It is a minor factor in the United States, where, however, it can only act effectively on very local interests, so distributed is the governing power. Radical socialism attributes its own Positivist or Agnostic ideas to the mass of men, but this is such a gross error of calculation that it does not need specific refutation. In Russia the State controls Ecclesiasticism because its people are a unit in subjection to the Greek Church, in its turn a creature of the Russian Government; but such a situation is inconceivable in any country in which either Protestantism or the Roman Church govern men's consciences, for both these organizations claim an independent control over men and claim to mark their own boundaries by an authority higher than the State. The Protestant churches govern heterogeneous units which Socialism ambitiously proposes to paralyse. The Roman Church is at the start frankly anti-laical. This has been the mainspring of its history from the early contest with the Eastern Church down to the present day. There cannot be two such powers in the State. One must swallow the other—a battle by no means new to Rome. It is sanguine at least to find such flimsy ground taken against all historical precedent. Some socialists, conspicuously Lammennais, frankly transfer priestly Government into the socialist State. Lammennais recognized the logical necessity of amalgamating the two forces. Bishop Ketteler, and more recently the Christian Socialist movements, are the legitimate continuation of his policy.

As far as our Anglo-Saxon communities are concerned these influences fade into immediate insignificance before "the boss." Not that the "boss" and the "boys," the caucus and the steering committee, are by any means confined to the soil of Anglo-Saxondom. The whole system of European Government is that of the apotheosized "Boss" supported by the "boys." Representative Government is tolerated on European soil simply by the exigencies of its politics. External politics put the control of great standing armies in the hands of centralized Governments; and internal politics give this centralized Government the privilege of directing this force against its own people. External politics force the Government to seek internal support. Remove the outside pressure and leave an armed Government with all the patronage in its power face to face with any discordant elements in opposition and the victory would be

certain. There could only be a different outcome in the face of such positive misgovernment as existed in France in 1789. The Russia of 1906 is a striking illustration of the strength of an armed bureaucracy even in the face of almost universal discontent. A Government can always find a strong enough public opinion to back it up if it has the power and the will to use it. And European socialism recognizes this fact, for their own proposition is to capture the machinery and substitute their leaders into the present armed organization. Discontent in *their* system is to be subordinated in the same positive manner. Modern Europe is no new example of this condition of suppression. It is simply an outgrowth from past institutions, and the whole operation of the present bureaucracy is an opposition of great fiefs held by a caste instead of by a man, and which keep their balance by means of councils, concordats, and congresses held from time to time. Japan also is one of the most consistent illustrations of such an organization, and only differs from Europe in so far as homogeneity instead of heterogeneity has allowed an organization of the subject elements to an extent impossible among the mixed and discordant peoples of Europe. That representative government should escape under such conditions is unlikely, and the weakness of the French Republic in the face of the standing army is a constant menace and at times a very serious one; as seen in the spectre of "the man on horse back" agitation, so conspicuous in 1886 when General Boulanger gained such notoriety.

Under the most radical form of representative government the difficulty is only minimized and does not altogether disappear. Such a government is supposed, in its device of Congress, or Assembly, or Parliament, to be a balancing of interests, which latter rouse and keep active the watchfulness of men. But in the socialist State there are no such interests. They are all neutralized. What is left is a watchfulness to maintain the *status quo*. This shows a trustfulness in human nature that experience certainly shows is not justified. Divers interests—over what shall be required of men in a most heterogeneous society—do naturally exist. And they have in addition a great object of interest perhaps also natural—the patronage of a Central Government. To say that there is no possibility of cliqueism against the general interest, under these conditions, raises a smile in everyone who knows anything about primaries and conventions. And to say that men are not sharp enough or strong enough to put it in practical operation shows an interesting ignorance of at least one prominent episode in American history. It was not to the interest of the white people of the Southern States to fight the war of secession for the benefit of the slave-holding class. But they not only did so, but did so most enthusiastically, and with an energy and strength which Americans of a united Country, though they had very different feelings at the time, now look back on with pride. No guarantee of a Central Government to its units as to a particular form of

Government is worth anything when the Central Government itself is everything and is the object of attack by ambitious men. And to offer to lay the ghost of ambition—an avowed object of socialism—is evidence enough of a utopianism in the proponent qualifying his claim to good sense and arousing it in the mind of the listener.

The result therefore, under the representative system can only be a "Boss," with all the physical power in his hands and with all the patronage of the Government—the right to say when and where and how a man shall act and live. Whether single or multiple the "Boss" necessarily becomes the representative of a great central bureaucracy. Against this the citizen could be allowed to protest platonically—perhaps. But it is not the man who votes—if he were allowed to vote; it is the man who counts the votes; and when these socialist schemes are heard it is conjectured whether the proposers ever heard of certain southern States of the United States, in which there is an unarmed population that can vote and an armed population that counts the vote, and the armed population are always the "Ins" and the unarmed population are always the "Outs." In the socialist State the Centre and its arms must be organically a unit. To apply Professor Fiske's dictum to it—the psychical life must belong to the organism as a whole; to allow separate existence to the parts is to allow competition, and this is directly against the original object of the socialist State. And it can be added that the expression of political competition is not and cannot be made esoteric—except for a very small band of men extremely gifted with altruistic feeling. The expression of political competition is exoteric, and is merely a form of expression of men's material interests. In other words political competition can only exist through material competition and differentiation, and hence the socialist State is the exact reverse of any form of representative government—of which the United States is the most complete example. This is well understood, and hence the meaning of the shibboleth of radical American socialism—"To Hell with the Constitution." No legal fiction can bring that instrument under socialism.

Exceptional influences leading to class formation can only be met by competition, as in our present State, but this is out of the question in a socialist State, and without it part of the community would have to be milked to provide for the deficient classes. If art and science and service are not to be rewarded, the problem is how to force their service. This follows of necessity. The artificial equality of the socialist State breaks down before the real inequality of Nature and shows the old ugly spirit of despotism at the base of its rule, all the uglier as personality escapes the odium and masks itself under the abstraction—community. To suppose a privileged class would be to suppose a centre of influence and power involving the old round. And if this is to be avoided and yet the inequality of natural ability admitted—as it must be—it can well be asked, what

right has the community to the surplus of the individual alive or dead? It is not its creation, and its ground principle is that no man (including itself) shall enjoy anything but the fruits of his own labour. And again it can be asked, in what way are the dangerous missions to be distributed among the community? Certainly not by the greater reward offered. It seems difficult here to avoid the formation of a privileged class, and many forms of socialism frankly admit it, and it is not very easy to see their supposed superiority over our present humdrum but go-as-you-please individualism where a man gets no support outside of himself. He is not held up by a bureaucratic class—or at least he ought not to be so held up. Socialism perforce has to admit the supremacy of brains in the community, and has to submit these brains to the brute force of the community. To suppose the supremacy of brains is either to fall back at once on our present system, or to admit the possibility of that dream of all writers on political science—a benevolent despotism. This has never been seen working yet in human affairs, and it is to be suspected that it never will be, simply because human nature is what it is—very selfish. All known schemes practised have involved favouritism and despotism. If the socialist scheme is to be worked at all, however, the benevolent despotism is its only workable form.

The benevolent despot as individual or group of individuals, historically and to all practical experience, is a myth. Unfortunately the preaching of holy men for many centuries has led us to believe very strongly in our terrible badness, and to treat our fellowmen on David Harum's principle. We do not follow the Golden Rule, but we anticipate men's intentions through interpretation of our own. It is only these latter day holy men that preach the universal goodness of humanity, very much in the face of a tolerably long history that is known, and a still longer history that can be pieced together from the human shin-bones split by fire with obvious intention to get at their marrow. It is to be suspected that Doctor à-Kempis is right when he preaches the corruption of man, and not Doctors Louis Blanc and Karl Marx; and as we are not to rely in these latter days on aid from the outside, as we understand that we have been given powers in order to use them, we must accept this defective moral condition of man, and seek to obtain justice not by trusting to his moral sense, but by trusting to that balancing of interests which make our present political life possible. Wherever, therefore, we find this element of the supposed goodness of human nature entering into any scheme, socialist or other kind, as an essential basic element, it is to be rejected at once and the strength of the scheme is to be tested by what is left. Revelation may outline a church or a commonwealth. It will not build or put in motion either of them for an hour's time. Experience therefore leading us to reject the individual as capable of filling this rôle there remains the community. It could be said that this too has been tried—as in Sparta, the

French Terror, the Paris Commune, on a large scale ; Shakerism, with its Oneida Communities, and Mormonism, etc., on a small scale—but this point need not be pressed as yet. The question is, how does the commune propose to play the part of benevolent despot, overseeing and prescribing the actions of all its units down to the minutest particulars ? Working for the general good it selects its agents, permanent or temporary, changing them at its pleasure if they fail in their duties or show any sign of that human weakness so prevalent now-a-days. There would have to be a deal of winking of the eyes and dereliction from the strict line marked out, and the ill natured might question just where they had gained by change in this direction when they found themselves dependent on a more autocratic set of officials than before. They indeed might cavil a little ; but this is not part of the scheme, questioning and caviling do not form any part of the socialist Government. Again, the community sets up rules which are to be carried out. How and by whom are these rules to be determined ? By the whole adult mass of the community ? But a stream cannot rise beyond its source, and we are distinctly understanding that the brains of the community are not to rule. The brain of the majority is to rule. It is a little difficult here to see just how socialism proposes to suppress the influence of higher brain power. It absolutely ignores a psychological law and one which in practice it makes constant use of itself—suggestion. We are all influenced by it, and are a little ashamed of ourselves when we are carried away by it, and make an exhibition of ourselves either on the platform as a hypnotic subject or as a more or less conspicuous unit of an enthusiastic or howling mob. In the calm seclusion of retirement we either laugh at ourselves or tear our hair in repentance. It is the old battle between reason and blind feeling. We find ourselves naked and we are ashamed.

The town meeting, the congress, except as a selected body of cold blooded experts,* would seem out of the question in the socialist scheme, for in it dissent can find expression and dissent is not provided for but on the contrary is suppressed. If the community is to allow free expression of thought in these meetings the system does not differ from the present. To-day brains rule through their influence over the brain of the majority—the mob. But they are the brains directing the diverse interests of the mob, clashing and checking and compromising between these different interests, and none of them getting the upper hand. It is said that they rule unjustly and take more than their due. This perhaps is the case, but with the higher brain goes the higher ideal and the higher ethical standard to temper its tyranny. Utilitarianism is at the root of all our actions, but the higher brain can see that this is not to

* The working scheme with many socialist writers. They have as much horror of universal suffrage (except to get them "in") as any anarchist. But for different reasons.

be found in immediate sensual gratification but ramifies far back to a point where often great self-sacrifice is a true and poignant pleasure. It is this far-seeing power of the higher brain that makes ethics an actual factor in our daily life and not a matter of abstract speculation. The standard of the mob is much lower. They can only dimly appreciate this far-reaching utilitarianism. The example must be very concrete to them. Compare, for instance, the best brains as found in our labour unions. These run through a whole gamut; from the very aristocracy of labour unions—our great corporations, which are nothing else but such unions—down to organizations conserving the interests of the most unskilled labour; and be it noted that the ethical element which rules our higher intelligences steadily diminishes down through the scale, until we find brute force and thuggism often ruling in such organizations. We understand this thing perfectly in our political life, and when we hear of one of these "leaders" maintaining himself in command by means of his "gang" and the gentle persuasion of the knife or the fist or the soft side of a brick, we are quite prepared to attribute the result to the proper cause. It is interest and interest alone that rules intelligence in this practical life, and people who can see nothing but their immediate sensual needs use the means that seem to them best adapted quickly to secure those needs. When we find the ethical element lacking in men who should be endowed with the more far-seeing grasp that is involved even in affairs of interest we take genuine alarm. "Honesty is the best policy" is not only ethical but thoroughly utilitarian, and the further blindness to justice in the relations between men extends, the nearer such a community is to abdicating its rule over its own affairs. It is the necessity of this justice that has slowly compelled man to draw a distinction between himself in politics and himself in his purely personal interests. In the first he deals with those broader ethical relations founded on a far-reaching indirect utilitarianism. In the second he deals with direct utilitarian interests, and it is only in so far as the first enters into the second that he is entitled to credit himself with advance in the ethical scale. In this matter the higher grades of intelligence have a much better claim of justification than intelligence as found in the mob. Their sin is greater in as much as they sin against their recognized ideal. The mob sins through ignorance but it sins just the same, and the lack of check on it through intelligence makes it all the more dangerous. But we are asked to deliberately put this short-sighted, prejudiced, almost animal mob at the head as the directing agent. Sam the Slugger, not Socrates, is to be rendered the object of an apotheosis.

The mob, however, is impossible. Socialism only recognizes it theoretically. The highest intelligence must rule in the community. The mob is supposed automatically to choose out the best. And it can well be asked—how? One of the great difficulties at present is to pick out the best man for the place,

and there are exceptional advantages in a system where keen competition between a multiplicity of interests drives a man to select the best representatives for his interests. And it is the clashing of these interests, so diverse that a competition between a part of them is almost hopeless, and the combination of the whole is the community, that prevents brains from obtaining a monopoly of the reward. It cannot be emphasized too much that because a railroad president gets thirty thousand dollars a year and a day labourer digging a ditch gets three hundred dollars a year that there is no intrinsic injustice involved. The president holds his position in the face of open competition and draws his salary from thousands of stockholders, not because they want to make him a present but because to get him and hold him they must pay him. There is no monopoly here, but an instance of the vast requirements made by our present involved system of finance and economy on the brain power of a man, and the very few men competent to fill the position. The mistakes of the ditcher are rectified at the cost of a few dollars. The mistakes of the president cost hundreds of thousands, and go on spreading and ramifying through unforeseen channels in the financial and commercial world affecting the livelihood of thousands of people. In the United States it is not a monopoly established by a few higher brains that direct affairs. It is public opinion, which, however, only acts through opposed interests making these higher brains their mouthpiece, and interested that no one interest shall obtain an advantage over the others. Here brains are controlled by other elements; but these checks and balances are impossible in the socialist State in which all the interests are centred into one—the Executive of the community. Here lies the sole source of power. It holds all the means of physical force belonging to the community. Unless it is proposed, as in the days of Old Japan and Yoritomo, to place the military chief beside and apart from the civil chief. Only the socialist is blind to the inevitable result of this vulgarest kind of despotism. It requires no perspicacity to foresee this. History is crowded with examples of it in the past and to-day, among savage and civilized peoples. The slow evolution of the individual is gradually carrying us away from a condition back into which socialism with the dream of an ideal man again wishes to cast us. The anarchists are keen enough to see this flaw in the socialist State, and some socialists have seen it. A rapid rotation in office of the whole adult community has been proposed. This of course is no remedy at all. Combination can be effected as well out of office as in it, the only object being then to await the opportunity and office if this latter is necessary; the socialists themselves, whether expecting revolution or a *coup d'état*, are an example. But apart from any such consideration there are far more fools than wise men in the community; and one thing is certain, that the delicate machinery of modern life cannot be trusted to the fools. It would soon be wrecked. It is proposed to draw up a scheme in

which the personal equation shall be eliminated. There is an interesting side issue here. Brains cannot be allowed to draw up such a scheme for the reasons advanced. If a general congress of the community is to do it, then it can only be carried out on certain dogmatic lines. Dogma somewhat stinks in the nostrils in these latter days, it can be added. There is here no possibility of progress or providing for progress which is entirely dependent on the "sport," a recognized psychological fact. However, an unchangeable scheme is to be drawn up somehow. Where is the human brain to do it? Certainly not to be found in present day socialism which has never evolved anything but failure. And afterward who is to fill in the working details to prevent brains getting a far stronger and harder grasp over a community as well drilled as the fellah of Egypt and with no greater power of resistance to the Executive and its Janizzaries?

And to all the difficulties of working proposed against the socialist State the only answer made is by schemes. More and new schemes based on theory and the ideal man overtop the practical difficulties raised by past experience. One would suppose the French Convention of '89 had again come to life. It is not in the present, in the working capability of existing institutions that a remedy is to be sought, but it is to be sought in this field of pure theory. This has never been successful. Man's present institutions are deeply seated in his knowledge of human nature. And it is exactly this that these socialistic schemes leave out of account—this human nature which grasps power and seeks to retain it. With its single system, in democracy it would lead to nothing but the "boss" system in its worst form; in a despotism, it would lead to the worst form of imperialism. It was not Napoleon that overthrew the French Revolution. It was the band of keen unscrupulous men that always drift to the centre of power, and which it is the object of a democratic society to hold in check. The single power with all the physical force of the community can soon find its minions to fasten its will on the rest and reduce them to helotage, or something very much like it. Reasons for repression can always be found. Napoleon the Great found no difficulties in snuffing out Venice in 1797, and the Venetian States groaned in chains and suffered under real stripes until 1870; and Napoleon the Little had as little trouble in getting rid of the French Republic. The accident of the war in 1870 rendered his career meteoric. Curiously enough, as Professor Bryce remarks, the three peoples, German, Italian, and French, recovered their political status with the birth of the German Empire. It is favouritism, and jealousy of the favouritism, that in the smallest communities has split apart every attempt made on a small scale of realizing in practice the socialist State. How much more would it be the case when the central power was far removed from the range of the individual and yet

retained all its crushing power over him. It would be the little group ruling at the centre that would direct this dull body of workers without any individualism. Just so did the Directory, and afterward the Empire, in France hand down its will to the communes, and ran the whole body politic on the rocks in its selfish greed. There is here another point. In Europe at least socialism must triumph everywhere and at once. Standing armies are fatal to it. Such a weapon in the hands of mortal men without any of the checks of the present system would be irresistible. The excuse of its temporary existence would soon become permanent. Socialists know this, and their answer to it is "The International."

§ 9.

The Government of the American people is not without interest in this connection. Leaving out of account the nice political balance existing between and in the Federal and the State Governments, it will be found that in the operation of both there runs a system of checks and balances intended to prevent any one of the included interests getting a preponderance. There is a democracy exercising universal suffrage, and the question naturally arises—why do not all the objections to rule of the mob apply also in this case? They do not apply simply because the People of the United States are grouped under their many interests. For these interests to be properly conducted and to gain an efficient hearing in the national councils they must be represented by the best brains attainable for that purpose. Again, the preponderance of any one interest cannot be allowed at the cost of the others. Their jealousy is quickly aroused. Combinations of interests, in a dangerous sense, are practically impossible in these days when any one interest is widely scattered over the land. The most powerful Trust can only oppose to the public interests its local influence, and this is a vanishing figure against the real (one might say regal) power that the smallest of the States can bring to bear against the Trust. Concentration of one powerful interest—the slave holders—did lead to a long and bloody war, but slavery admitted of concentration and commercialism does not, and the conditions are not likely to arise again. Such combination hardly threatens in the existence of the commercial Trusts—Employers or Labour—for their very weakness lies in the divergence of the interests of their constituents as consumers and producers. All our present combinations or trusts are commercial. They have no political concentration within a well marked territory. Their interests are scattered and their

strength is scattered.* There is no political fear of the Trusts in any American. And as a business man he does not propose to strike at the interests of another man at the risk of bringing his own to the ground, unless those other interests threaten his interests. Again it is the system of checks and balances in the commercial world, and well under control through the political world. A great combination of all the commercial interests would simply be the People of the United States; given a political expression—as at present. Politically of course the balance finds expression in the independence of Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary; and it is of the first named that Americans are most suspicious, inasmuch as the physical force of the community is concentrated in its hands. This is the reason of the jealousy of a standing army among the American people, and the power of control over it is put in the hands of the Legislature which holds the public purse. Of the Judiciary there is no such fear. The Judiciary merely interprets the law created by the Legislature in terms of a fixed Constitution. As far as there is judge-made law through such interpretation it is subject to revision and amendment by the Legislature or by the People where constitutional amendment is necessary. Americans, in their attitude to the Judiciary, are tending to Mr. Spencer's ideal State.

Under the socialist scheme the judiciary is at once eliminated. All contracts fall and the judiciary has nothing to do. Of the two remaining bodies one or the other must have the physical force of the community under its control, with no balance between them, or between them and the citizen. Naturally this falls to the Executive unless the Legislature also is made a permanent body. Or perhaps some such scheme as that proposed by the anarchists is to be effective; the call to arms or council by the small communes, which in rotation assume the duty of remaining on guard. But what chance would such a body have against the strong power of a Central Executive? The good-will of the citizen toward the common wealth, it will be answered. But the good-will and interest of the citizen lies in the Executive which controls his interests. The *crux* lies here. Under the socialist scheme the Legislature can be nothing but a mere council of the executive. There is an organic central law of which the executive has the interpretation. The only business of the Legislature would be to govern distribution, external and

* Somewhat to be qualified in the case of the Labour Trust. The Employers Trust is a corporation acting under charter or license and is legally liable for all its acts. * Apart from local strength it stands on the same ground as any other citizen in reference to the preponderant power of the State. The Labour Trust is not licensed, has no legal responsibility, personal or financial, and can bring all its power to bear against any community or against any State. The legislatures of Pennsylvania or Illinois have it in their power to control any combination of mine owners. They have no control over the mine worker. This latter can raise prices to the limit far more effectually than any "coal combine."

internal. But this is executive not legislative. It is in no sense legal. And it means between Executive and Legislature similarity of function and not opposition. It simply means a standing army of functionaries with the physical force of the community at their command. There is not a single one of the checks and balances created, both politically and commercially, in our present American democracy that could exist under the socialistic scheme. The political powers merge into one central despotism in which we are asked to believe that the citizen could maintain his place; and the commercial interests are also merged into the State and fall into the same powerful hands of the Executive. We have seen such a State existing in history, and with just these results. Also all the gain found in the delicate balance between Federal and State Government comes to the ground, and which, in the material limitation of the power of both, is the citizen's source of refuge in case of the assumption of power by an irresponsible revolutionary element. But under the socialist scheme the State organization must go, for otherwise there would be competition between the States, and this is no more allowed than between individuals. There can be but one strong central power in the socialist scheme; and all such schemes recognize this and provide for it. It is this singleness of organization that the wisdom of our forefathers avoided in drafting the Constitution of the United States. As they foresaw, only one result could possibly issue from the concentration of the physical force of the community in one body, everywhere existing. And they grounded their foresight on that long struggle familiar to them as Anglo-Saxons in history and in their own experience. Socialism could only have the same effect in the United States as in Europe. The nucleus of revolt would be constantly present in the dethroned classes, and with all the checks and balances of our present system removed ambitious men would soon seat and maintain themselves as the centre of power by means of the tremendous instrument placed in their hands. It is only these checks and balances in constant action in the *individual* life of the American that preserves him from feeling this tremendous and remorseless power of the abstraction known as Federal or State Government. Just in so far as he does lose this individualism and is swept into the drag-net of the people acting as Community—whether he be summoned as jurymen, or soldier, or tax-payer—he feels the impersonality of the grasp clutching him. Fortunately it is only the atmosphere of our courts that is pregnant with this overshadowing influence. It is an excellent and cardinal principle of Americanism, that the best Government is that which governs least—advances as little as possible into the lives of the people. Power always finds satellites ready to accept its rewards. Discontent forms the nucleus of ambition, as one striking instance of European history has shown. The term "Janizzary" is not so unfamiliar to American ears, in its application to certain petty despotisms in the body politic, as not to enable them to understand it in this wide and fearful sense.

§ 10.

The milder form of socialism is not that toward which the socialism of to-day is tending. This is rather toward the formula—to each according to his capacity and to each according to his needs. The idea that the man belongs to the community and not to himself; that the State is not a contract with reciprocal rights and duties between its individual units; but that the State is absolute sovereign over the individual, has always been the root and basis of French and German socialism. The French, in spite of their incisive and mathematical turn of mind, have always given a large place to sentiment in the schemes to carry this into effect. All such schemes are based on the term—"Fraternity." From St. Simon to Louis Blanc this is the keynote dominating the economic side of the question. Fourier, although he put men under military discipline in his phalansteries and allotted to them their tasks, expected the motive power to be that spirit of competition in men which incites them to surpass each other. The pleasure of victory was to be enough to drive communities (or individuals) to greater effort in raising the biggest and best pigs or turnips. Louis Blanc based his whole system on the simple proposition that the strong should aid the weak, and that each man's talent belonged to the community. As a first step he proposed his "ateliers sociaux," in their first form a method of treating the problem of the unemployed. Under this scheme the State was to establish workshops, furnishing tools and plant. Capitalists were to be invited to enter into this enterprise. Working on a large scale, with the resources of the State behind them, and with the means to balance losses in one plant by gains in another, the individual capitalist could not compete with them and would soon be forced to come into line or be bankrupted. The reasoning was clear and perhaps an illustration of its successful issue is found in the tendency of large concentrations of capital into corporations. The worst feature of the enterprise is that the State takes all the risks under particularly disadvantageous conditions. It goes into partnership with that particular class which has conspicuously shown lack of ability in management. Somebody must pay for their blunders. It is either a huge eleemosynary institution or a co-operation in which the financial partner—the community—plays at the cheerful game "heads I lose and tails you win," and the distinction is hard to detect. Loan associations, on the contrary, in which the members have such an intense personal interest in the success as they must shoulder the losses, have been successful. A well-known example, and bitterly opposed by the socialists, are the successful Schulze-Delitzsch co-operative banks.* Whether, as Louis Blanc outlined his scheme, it could

* Socialist opposition is grounded on the assertion that the few profit but the many are held down by their economic condition. If the few can profit, however, the many could in their turn. Perhaps this would bring about a level of effort akin to socialism. This opposition makes plain enough the forcible character of socialist philanthropy. They recognize that the masses will not make the effort by themselves,

have been successful is doubtful. His workers were to form their own little internal Government, and distribute the work and the rewards among themselves. And were of course to be guided by altruistic sentiments. But little attention is here paid to human nature, and as latter day experiences have shown it to exist in such socialist communities, which have split up under the effects of jealousy, bad temper, and favouritism; the stronger and more energetic members either dominating or drifting away from the community. The quarrels and recriminations of these societies are constantly kept fresh in the public memory by the meteoric shortness of their corporate lives as they rapidly succeed each other on the stage of a capitalist court, playing their rôle in the drama of bankruptcy or liquidation. The few successful examples have been dominated by a religious ideal. The Shakers are a monastic order the members of which have sacrificed family life and progress. Their ideal is not found in this world. To progress requires the individual, and the individual requires reward. Otherwise one would merely live; which is actually the condition of the industrious Shaker. No such society has been successful in its growth. A Shakerism maintained by force does not present such an attractive feature that any nation has been found willing to embrace it. Socialism, therefore, has adopted into its scheme, all the attractions of modern life due to individual effort, without any indication as to how they are to be materialized. Even co-operation, which is supposed to bring the most capable together for purposes of pure self-interest, has never succeeded in attracting the very elements necessary to its success. The old hitch arises in the distribution of work and reward. The abler workers in co-operation communities have quarrelled over their compensation or over the reward given to the mediocre workman, and have drifted away to get the reward that competition in the open market gives to their superior skill. A close corporation does not seem to have given them this opportunity. Mediocrity has dominated the schedule of distribution. There are successful co-operative associations, mainly as distributing not as productive organizations, and these show a balance on the credit side of the ledger; but the cold hard fact remains that they are without influence on commercial life, although they have had every opportunity to show their superiority if such existed, and to crush out their rivals by their economical system of operation.

But this French form of socialism, in which fraternity dominates the economic, has made way for a later German socialism in which the economic dominates the fraternity idea. The object sought is to suppress the individual as dangerous to the community, to strip men of all natural advantages; for there are here only two alternatives—either the community is to take to itself this surplus, which would be another term for robbery or slavery, or it is to prevent its use. Socialism as expounded by Karl

Marx* himself, strictly speaking, does not accept the whole of this programme. He lays down its methods, points to the one road which logically it must pursue, and then takes refuge in a negation. He omits any constructive programme. But it was not necessary to do so in set terms. Marxism has steadily drifted to communism, and its one object to-day is the levelling process—or in the veiled terms of the propaganda, “all competition must cease.” The reason is found in Marx’s theory. Marx, following the idea of Rodbertus and accepting the teaching of the English Manchester School of economists, started out to show that the present evils of society are not excrescences that can be pruned away but are inherent in the social scheme itself. In ancient and feudal times all the community was needed to produce the necessities and wants of society. But the introduction of machinery has changed all this. Now all the necessities can be produced in a comparatively short time. Instead, however, of this being to the profit of the whole community the capitalists have absorbed (“stolen”) all the means of production. Labour must accept the terms of capital, or starve. The economic value of any article consists in the amount of human labour involved in it. Ordinarily the process would cease with the satisfaction of labour’s wants. But capital from its dominant position is able to buy the whole of labour up to the limit of its physical efficiency, and use it to satisfy desire for superfluity. For this it pays labour its value in exchange and pockets the surplus. He illustrates this by a formula, $a-b-c$, in which $a-b$ is the economic value of any article and $b-c$ the amount of that article produced by labour working beyond the actual necessity.† Capital and

* “Capital,” called by socialist: “The Bible of the workingman,” can be said to be the Old Testament and “Progress and Poverty” the New Testament of modern socialism. The first is far harsher, sterner, and unbending, in its dogma. And the two schools absolutely reject any idea of vital connection.

† Worked out in Chaps. X and XII “Capital” English Ed. 1906 Marx carried Ricardo’s narrow definition of labour to what he considered to be its logical conclusion. The economic and historical fallacy of Marx’s work is well epitomised in the article “Socialism” (Enc. Brittan.) by Thomas Kirkup.

“Surplus value” was “expropriated” by Marx from the Chartist movement, and thoroughly “exploited” by him. As the notes to Volume I of “Capital” show he gave full credit to his predecessors. The same cannot be said of his disciples. Marx developed the idea with a power of dialectic far beyond the first propounders. Both in form and fact, however, his logic was vitiated from the start. Equalization of the rate of profits as a matter of fact has no relation to “variable capital” (labour power) which, according to the requirements of Marx’s theory of surplus value, alone can create value. The labour incorporated in products is but one factor in exchange (Cf. the excellent preface of Scott and Feilbogen to their translation from Böhm Bawerk—“Recent Literature on Interest”). Marx’s omission of the time factor led him not only into a repeated *ignoratio elenchi*, but into positive contradiction. He proved, let us say satisfactorily, what was already familiar to generations of economists, that $M' > M$ (not always be it added. M is money capital in the Marxian formulæ of the circulation of capital). But he failed to prove that this was

labour try to push *b* in reverse directions, thereby increasing or diminishing this forced contribution of labour; but all the advantage is with capital, as "overproduction and crises" render labour helpless and fasten on more securely the present system of unequal distribution. This will tend and is tending to a point when wealth will be concentrated in the hands of a few and the many will virtually be the slaves of these few. He therefore allows capital no place in his system, in which money becomes only a token. The leisure class and the reserve army of capital (the unemployed) disappear together. Every one of Marx's economic dictums have been dissected and refuted and the economy of Marxism is no longer a practical feature.* That "the poor are growing poorer, and the rich richer" is merely a

due to any "surplus value" exploited from the labourer; and, as noted above, the facts as to equalization of profits in connection with "constant" and "variable" capital contradicted him at the vital point of his theory. F. Engels attributes two great discoveries to Marx—the materialist interpretation of history and "surplus value." We can follow the unconscious sarcasm of Mr. Kirkup—a very friendly critic of the socialist movement—in his remark that materialism is as old as history and "surplus value" is a fallacy unfounded in fact. (Cf. "History of Socialism" Chap. on Karl Marx). It can be added that the great Colbert would have been astonished to learn that the end and object of his policy was not economic; or that of the great king, his predecessor, Henry IV, who wished every Frenchman to have "his chicken in the pot" and whose wars were directed toward this object—even if somebody else had to pay for the chicken, the object of most wars since the dawn of history. In fact the two great reputations of socialism are built on economic blunders, (1) that of Lasalle on the "Iron Law of Wages" and (2) that of Marx on "surplus value." Which of course is a tribute to the great political skill of these two leaders in seizing shibboleths so attractive to the ear of the lowest class that "scientific socialism" still brandishes them very much out of season. That form of socialism—as the English—which comes out frankly as a movement for and by a class, and with a "you have what we want and cannot pretend to get without a change in our human nature and habits very unlikely and at least very distant" is much to be preferred to either an altruistic mysticism occupied in chasing rainbows, or a calculating hypocrisy with castles in Spain (or on the Rhine) seeking power in social disturbance. [Note 1907].

* The economic system of Marx—and of his school—is based on his theory of "surplus value." Withdraw this and the whole tumbles to the ground. It is based on the Ricardian theory that the value of any commodity depends on the labour incorporated in it; concerning which Ricardo is *silent* as to any time factor. Marx specifically denies any value to the time factor ("Capital" Vol. I, 168, 598. Vol. II, pp. 138 to 142 to 146; 272 to 276 to 283 Eng. ed.) He also equates brain and manual labour (l. c. Vol. I, 162, 169, 494); which not being the case in Marx's time is still less so to-day. Manual labour is a small part of the value of most commodities to-day, especially machine made. The cost of production is largely due to the management; success in this latter, the accurate judging of output, of opportunity, of place, of management of men—all requiring a body of men, experts in their line—spells the difference between success and failure in marketing any commodity. The capitalist takes all the risks, and this is demanded by the worker. And as a rule he runs on very narrow margins as the bankrupt list shows. The wage and

catching aphorism for the popular ear, the evidence in every form of saving on a small as well as a large scale being to the contrary. This battle cry really comes down now to the much milder slogan and reproach that "poverty *persists* in the midst of wealth." The slogan of Marxism as to the ultimate danger to society from individual wealth touches a subject that society has always shown itself able to regulate. The constant tendency has been to do this more and more perfectly. The strength of Marxism really lies in its presentation at a time when society is faced by grave and new phases of problems to be adjusted to its social life. It contains the grain of truth as to the real danger existing in these new phases. It carefully conceals the fact that these are new phases only of old problems and to be dealt with by experience. Its economic fallacies held to the light, stripped of its sophisms and shown to be an old world solution of an old problem—a reversion of type—its persistence lies in the pressing necessity of these new and obscure phases calling for settlement. Society under such conditions will listen to any voice until it finds out that the relief offered is an old threadbare and rejected type of former days. It is for a good reason that socialists—

salary sheet, however, is really a question between labour and labour. The machines cannot render labour supernumerary. Apart from history which is against Marx in the rise of real wages, fall in cost of production in one product means a flow of capital and labour to those products which necessarily must rise in correspondence to this fall. Exchange is again brought to a level. Marx' "reserve army" is as much of a myth as "surplus value." This so called surplus labour consists of those unable or unwilling, through thriftlessness, misfortune, or never being in the right place at the right time, or downright incapacity, to equalize their expenditure. For every reason but the first named I would see the workhouse and the public soup kitchen made "respectable." A man who has done his best and reached either of them certainly has nothing of which to be ashamed. He may be unfortunate, or stupid, or both, but he is not a criminal. The good for nothing capable man rarely ends at the almshouse. He ends in jail. How small a percentage of the community the helpless class is really, is shown by the small number coming on the public for support in times of crises. These latter, by the way, are caused by the invasion of distrust, properly aroused against speculative operations, into sound and conservative quarters; no better proof being wanted than the data so carefully brought together by a socialist writer, Mr. Hyndman. As to the machine itself (including rents, profits, and interest) John Rae showed clearly enough that it owes its origin to the willingness to project a part of present enjoyable wealth into future instead of present consumption, (cf. "Sociological Theory of Capital, particularly Chapter VI); what Professor Fisher calls discounting future value, the rate of interest "being the preference, in a given community, for a present dollar over a dollar of future income," (cf. "The Rate of Interest" pp. 3, 20, 215, 256, 288, 343). In the text the premium view of interest in the narrower sense of current economics has been taken. The view enunciated by Professor Fisher is decidedly broader, simpler, and is thoroughly consistent in all its parts. The two volumes—"Nature of Capital and Income" and "The Rate of Interest"—are models of lucidity and give an interest from style alone usually foreign to the "dismal science" 1908.

Marx included—offer no constructive programme. To do so would at once strip the veil from the wrinkled old beldame of communism. It is safe to enter on a field of criticism as to the aberrations and deficiencies of modern society. As long as discussion is left in this nebulous condition common questions can be claimed as common issues. It is a matter of congratulation that so called “scientific socialism” is being forced out of its nebulous stage into a sharp definition of its basic principle—the levelling of all the units of the State. Such a principle demands the extinction of all individuality, and such extinction can only be secured and maintained in one way—a merciless and inexorable espionage into every phase of relation between man and fellowman, between man and the smallest group of which he is a member, between man and his own thoughts.†

Marx’s levelling principle, however, is to be thoroughly understood. It gives the rule to the proletariat; to that class of the community which by its lack of intelligence is not otherwise able to compete with the intelligent classes.* Brute force is in the majority and brute force suffers. Hence it is just to subject the less to the same conditions as the greater. Suffering in such case may be less, and at all events the majority will be relieved of a present oppression. There is legitimate ground here to differ as to what the majority is, and likewise to question as to whether the suffering of unassisted brutality would be less

† A political economy—such as that of socialism—which makes thrift and energy an object of attack; which denounces as “unprincipled” the far sighted man willing to sacrifice present gratification to avoid future suffering and using the energy which Nature has planted in him, can be claimed to be an unusual, if not an extraordinary economy. It is a reversal of the common-sense so evidenced through the whole of organized matter that as a principle it seems strange that it should find advocates; for the substitution of altruism as a motive principle is too unpractical for serious consideration. As a matter of fact this root principle is rarely brought into view but is concealed under the specious cry to protect the virtuous weak man against the wicked strong man. Socialism has the distinction of advocating the hoarding of wealth instead of its use as capital (for production). If wealth is to be held in suspension at all. That socialism—or any other society—can avoid the use of capital is of course impossible. Socialism itself must set a standard and *force* those above and below the “honourable” mediocrity to conform to it (Marx’s “Capital” Vol. I, p. 320, 349, 350, 539, 540, and 578. That the proletariat is to set the standard is seen in his definition of skilled labour p. 179). In other terms socialism and despotism coalesce in the same definition—both containing the term “force.” The world has been at some expense of blood and treasure to eliminate just this very word from its vocabulary of political life. It can be added that it is not necessary to accept Marx’s dictum as to “necessary labour.” Work to-day is all necessary work. The “one level, one desire,” system of one form of socialism would eliminate those living by the higher standard of the more capable. A more far-seeing socialism aims to make a high standard, maintained by force; the capable paying the bills.

* On skilled labour and its position. Cf. “Capital” p. 179. English Ed.

if all the brains that give rise and direction to the accomplishments of the many desires of men were suppressed. To look for the operation of brains in the devising of new channels for man's industry would be to get something for nothing. The ground work of the scheme is laid in the condition of savages. These multiplied up to the limit of subsistence, but in such cases a few families required a hundred miles square for its hunting. Man is only allowed to increase beyond this stage as he finds new outlets through his ingenuity. And this can only be done by fostering and encouraging brains. Marx, however, takes the ground that wealth is all stolen, that the many industries of men would have arisen spontaneously and without incentive, and that brains have done nothing in giving the mass direction and outlet beyond the hunting and fishing stage, which would have very positive relations to the Law of Malthus and would imply the immediate adoption of the methods necessary under the operation of that law. However, under the levelling principle and the "necessity" of giving the direction to the unintelligent class it is possible to understand his reason for directly attacking thrift as dangerous.†

Socialism directly attacks individual thrift as dangerous to society. It advocates immediate consumption of the product and limitation of production to immediate necessity; a fair deduction from the stress laid on as little work as possible with corresponding leisure.* This is a great feature of

† The ancient world, which *worshipped* fertility, realized far more exactly than we do to-day this relation between subsistence and population. They had reached the limit in their civilization and they knew it. The state of moral culture permitted them to adopt methods of restraint (infanticide, abortion, religious prostitution) not permitted to the moral conditions of the modern world. A population does, however, advance to its permissible limit.

* Marx, like a Cagliostro of the XIX century, with his conjurer's wand of "surplus value" has sketched out for the proletariat a working day of eight hours, six hours, two hours, no hours at all;

"What then is life? a wild conceit,
 "What then is life? a mad deceit,
 "A shadow, a delusion,
 "And the greater good is the reverse;
 "That everything in life is a dream,
 "And dreams are dreams."

Following out his favourite pursuit of standing inverted German philosophers on their feet, he has done the same kind office for Kant as for Hegel. The famous distinction the Königsberg sage drew between the thaler in pocket and the thaler in imagination disappears in the magic crucible of the Marxian formula, and Marx proves to the satisfaction of the *practical* reason of the proletariat that Time is simply a process of mind. Be it said that there is not an iota of evidence as to the possibility of shortening the working day except by certain well established factors. The length of the working day is determined by the ratio between the means of subsistence and all other commodities. The prices of the first rise or fall according to the means of production, and the prices of other commodities fall or rise in proportion. The cheaper the cost of production of the means of

socialistic literature in which the use of statistics to thus regulate production is substantially made the central industrial dogma. This is based on Marx's idea of the cause of "overproduction" together with the idea so prominent even to-day of limiting the product to maintain high prices. Radical socialism to put this in operation goes still further and enters on construction. The only practical method is suppression, and modern German socialism recognizes this. The army is made the basis of its system; the army just as it exists in Germany to-day, differently officered. Subordination, elimination of all individualism, is to be complete. The place and the task of everyone is fixed, to be performed silently and without question under the direction of the commanding officer. To the official, while he holds his post, is due the prompt unquestioning obedience of the soldier, not of the citizen. These officers are to be chosen by popular vote. The best will naturally be chosen. There is to be rapid rotation in office and absolutism. This absolutism directs itself to the preservation of the existing system. Literature and teaching are under a rigid censorship, and nothing either in pedagogy or in inquiry is to call in question the socialistic system. The fate of all our great literatures of the past would be sealed in the hands of these iconoclasts. To be consistent all record and remembrance of great heroes and kings and scientists and inventors would have to be wiped out or misrepresented, for these men reaped the rewards of their great talents and might stir minds within the socialistic mediocrity to discontent and

subsistence the shorter can the working day be made. I use "cost of production" in the sense of being governed by "marginal utility". The controlling factor which enters here is the standard of living. If the means of subsistence in a country are costly and its standard of living is high its working day will be long as in Europe and the eastern United States. If the means of subsistence are cheap and the standard of living high, this latter will very exactly determine the length of the working day as in California or New Zealand. If the means of subsistence are cheap and the standard of living is low, the length of the working day will be short as in underpopulated countries within the tropics. If population presses on the means of subsistence so that their cost of production rises out of proportion to the prices of other commodities the standard of living will necessarily be low as in the East. These ratios hold good in the absence of monopoly. Legislation can experiment with them—and take the consequences. It is safer to leave them to the people, except when public health or monopoly is plainly threatened. There is no such thing as the "surplus value" as defined by Marx. What he calls "surplus value" is John Rae's "effective desire of accumulation," formulated far more broadly and given sharp definition by Professor Irving Fisher in his recent book on the "Rate of Interest." Distribution of the products is strictly determined by personal qualities. If a man's thrift, or that of his parent's, has added to his resources income maturing in the future—(i.e. the discounted value of an income stream from capital, the enjoyment of which has been postponed to the future)—he is fortunate; but no one else has been deprived of what otherwise he would have had. Except in so far as the latter has profited by the State's expropriation in the shape of income or inheritance taxes—1908.

rebellion against the system. So also all children are to be brought up in common. They are to be taught what to think, not to think; for all originality must be stamped out. It leads to individualism. As women are free and parents are relieved of all care as to their children it is only the purity of ethical love that is to keep man and woman together, a purity of affection rather to be generated under the stress and strain and self-sacrifice of modern life than under free love and the conditions where responsibility not only does not exist but *contra* Nature is stripped from the parents. It is to be suspected that under the Spartan barrack system of modern socialism, and with a knowledge of the average of human nature, pure love in the large majority of cases would mean free love. And of all things to be avoided is overproduction. Statistics figure largely in every direction but this. Here they are silent. Marx says nothing of overproduction in relation to population except indirectly to approve of it.* How the German who has suffered so from the tyranny and brutality of an army system, the scandals of which get frequent airing although for one public case there are presumably a thousand not brought to public notice, and can conceive the idea of its perpetuation is hard to see. The army brute to-day is at least frowned upon by men of his class who ethically cannot endorse his brutality. The brute of the untrained lower classes would be infinitely worse. As is shown in more spheres of life than the army. But the real German system of socialism is the levelling system, and it advocates maintaining that level by force. Its object is to prevent any head sticking above the crowd. And for this purpose the army system is the only one. It thinks in its pride of mass that its democracy would be safe without any of the checks that existing democracy has found necessary. And in this it goes directly counter to the teaching of history. But history finds no place in this socialism. On the contrary it is banned. There is not an objection to be urged against the merit system that does not apply with double force to this army system of radical socialism. The only checks on the present army system in Germany are the conflicting interests, external and internal, in so far as they control that army; and in so far as they do not, it is dangerous.

* Marx says of Malthus—"the conservative interests, which Malthus served, prevented him from seeing that an unlimited prolongation of the working day, combined with an extraordinary development of machinery, and the exploitation of women and children, must inevitably have made a great portion of the working class 'supernumerary' . . . It was of course more convenient, and much more in conformity with the interests of the ruling classes, whom Malthus adored like a true priest, to explain this 'over-population' by the eternal laws of Nature, rather than by the 'historical laws of capitalist production.'" (Capital p. 539. See also 648). The effect of machinery is well understood to-day, and *not* according to the above dictum of Marx. Darwin was led to the discovery of the process by which Nature works by his application of the Law of Malthus to the organic world. Evolution can be said to be based on the principle of which Malthus made use.

The socialist State therefore being in theory and practice an avowed despotism the question of supremacy in it becomes a very serious one, for naturally the object of the theorists is to make it a benevolent despotism. In one thing the socialists and Japanese Statesmen of the reactionary school are thoroughly agreed; that is, that the relations between State and individual involve no sense of contract in which State and individual have their mutual rights and duties. On the contrary the State owns the individual and it is his duty to obey.* Of course the State will act for the benefit of all. The first thing both despoticisms do is to eliminate the judiciary. The socialists altogether as it does not form part of their scheme; the Japanese as to the relations between subject and State, as the subject has no rights in relation to the sovereign. One of the delicate questions that comes up in this socialist State is the relative determination of the value of manual labour and brain labour. Is the six hours of the railroad manager to be regarded as equivalent to the six hours of the ditch-digger, or is a value to be given in time reduction, for the principle of equality of income must be maintained? Now manual labour by no means looks with unprejudiced eye on brain labour, physical exhaustion is so much more apparent than brain exhaustion, which on the contrary is likely to set up a vicious circle, spurring on its victim to an unnatural exaltation until the break-down comes suddenly and completely. It is often said that in these modern times "it is the pace that kills." And it is true in this sense of brain exhaustion. So much so that the work drains our men in high position long before they have reached their three score years and ten. In a country where retirement is not the practice the number of such break-downs is alarming. This is, however, hardly to be appreciated by the manual labourer, and as he is by far the more numerous element, in the socialist State he will presumably set this time value of brain labour proportionately low, the more so as he is afraid of it politically and unwilling to encourage its expansion. This is by no means the way to effect progress, and it is no great strain on the weight of evidence furnished by the past to say that the socialist State would be a plant of humble growth and fixed type. In fact we have an example of it in the old Japanese State where for so many years the mercantile class or brain of the community were placed and kept at the bottom of the social scale, where all advance depended on the vices or frivolities of the ruling class, and hence where all progress was confined to dilettanteism while the nation as a whole stood still. Perhaps the manual labourer, however,

* "There may be all the forms of political freedom with no free exercise of personal rights guaranteed to the individual, and with their constant violation by the community; while, on the other hand, it is possible, where there is no proper self government or share in public power, for the individual right to be defined nicely and protected faithfully." Woolsey—"Political Science" Vol. I, p. 33.

regards his kind as too stupid to be dangerous; a fact which can be disputed, for cunning is found in all ranks of humanity, and it is cunning not brains that are dangerous. However, he replaces money by labour units. There seems some confusion of ideas here for money to-day has no value except as a labour unit. And it does not appear clearly how, except by force, its accumulation in the hands of the thrifty is to be prevented in the socialist State, and all the more dangerous as all the checks of our present system are removed and the man who by its use could capture part of the political power could capture just so much of the State. Socialism recognizes this danger inevitable to its scheme and hence its steady march to absolute communism. The ideal to-day is equality in fact as well as theory, in consumption as well as in production. Brains are to be suppressed, and this is to be effected by an army discipline which hopes in a way not defined but well understood to enforce their use to the community. Brains at the head would quickly lead to the old system under infinitely worse conditions. Brawn therefore is to lead the procession. What are its qualifications for such leadership?

The great difficulty to-day at the basis of the question of the well-being of the lower classes is to teach them self-restraint. Man is very close to the animal at root, and he is all the more dangerous as he is an animal with developed brain power. His nervous system is not entirely adapted to his later environment. As Mr. Spencer has shown, pleasure is the normal healthy aim of animal life, and implies the very term—moderation. But in a false environment Nature's balance is overthrown, and pleasure on the contrary is carried into excess and becomes positively injurious to the species. If there is any man in the world whom it behooves to restrain his sexual passions it is the man who is uncertain of the means of support for his offspring. It is fashionable now to call such self-restraint—race suicide; but it is strictly logical. As a matter of fact the exercise of the contrary is simply an exhibition of the old savage worship of the goddess of Fertility. A class in society sets a standard, and for the individual to maintain himself and his family within that standard he must exercise restraint in numerous directions. To the labouring class, however, the question is one of living. It is a strictly logical fact that we owe much to our parents. As they have practised thrift so we profit by it, and every man who possesses a higher standard is indebted to their self-denial and inherits the duty to practice the same. The man who is near the bottom of the ladder has no idea of this. He is very animal and he is troubled with his sexual passions. And he gratifies them with small idea of the propagation of the species. This talk of the question of race suicide is a positive wrong, especially in reference to a class which need restraint in that direction, not encouragement. Society is under no obligation to pay the bill for a man's lust, or find places for its results. The man who brings offspring into the world without any means to support them is strictly responsible to them for an almost criminal folly.

And it is often to crime that such "overproduction" in the lower class leads. But of course any preaching of restraint in this direction is cruel. This is "the poor man's pleasure," and society must pay for it; and in these days of standing armies, when food for powder may be needed in the immediate future, and food for machinery is needed in the immediate present, the Government encourages the idea of society as a rabbit hutch. To Napoleon also the best woman was the one who had the most sons.

The same can be said of "the poor man's beer." It makes little difference if the man with thousands a year reels out drunk every night from his club. It makes a great difference if the man with a bare living reels out drunk every night from the saloon. The former cases are very uncommon. Drinking to excess and thousands a year to a man in active business are becoming contradictory terms. The club drunkard is on the exact plane of some old Japanese *saké* toper, who turns over his property to his successor burdened with his annuity, goes into retirement (*inkyō*), and proceeds to spend the balance of his days in as complete and comfortable a condition of intoxication ("civilization" the late Doctor Maginn called it in distinction from grosser effects) as the annuity allows. In some countries—France for instance—if such a useless individual threatens to impair the means of support of his family and to make himself and them a charge on the public, the Government steps in and places him in charge of a trustee. As to the labourer he is placing his offspring directly as a charge on the community, to whom it is certainly no object to diminish any of the pains and penalties of his extravagance in this direction. It is a fact that the sins of the fathers are visited on the children to the third and fourth generation. Society's interest in these children is limited to seeing that the sins are not visited on it, and just so far is it interested in raising them from their fatal environment and heredity. It may seem unjust that this should be so, but it is the action of a natural law. It is equally unjust to impose on the thrifty in society the misdeeds of its spendthrifts in sexual or sensual pleasures. However the cry is against preaching restraint in women or whiskey, especially against tampering with "the poor man's club." It is unfortunate that these pleasures cannot be more economically obtained. Perhaps the practice of the Kamschatka natives and the growth of the *amanita muscaria** might meet this demand for pleasure. And the keynote of this lack of thrift so terribly evident in the lowest strata of society, so closely approximating them to other mammals without any of the instinct of some of these animals as to their food supply, except as they can strip it by sympathy or by force from the more far-sighted, is lack of self-restraint and thrift, encouraged and pampered by those who should be preaching its restraint. And

* An intoxicant and highly poisonous agaric with a peculiar effect on the urine. Cf. A. Winter Blyth—"Poisons-Effect and Detection" p. 394.

it cannot be too much emphasized that the bulk of mankind rarely think. They move in well-worn ruts. In their fortunes and their pleasures they display this utter thoughtlessness. An unexpected fortune falls to one of this thriftless class accustomed to live from hand to mouth, and the newspapers are full of the grand piano purchased, the presents to neighbours—and the quick return again to the dependent position. The holiday tripper from our large towns is a terror to every lover of a bit of natural scenery. He flocks to it without one thought of its æsthetic value. He spends his time and money on merry-go-rounds, "shoot the chutes," dancing, and other very personal pastimes. Going and coming he may cast a casual glance at the beautiful or imposing scene around him, but it is neither his object or his interest. To him a good time means the satisfaction of his animal appetite; plenty of beer, sandwiches, and human society of his class. He leaves his trail and tastes behind in the shape of a clutter of rejected bottles, half knawed remnants and their wrappings in last week's newspaper. Harmless reminders in themselves except in so far as they recall the hideous nightmare that has taken itself back to town, to re-appear again in a week. And so with his "lodge" and its regalia and medicine man formulæ and high sounding titles. It is only recently that columns of the valuable space of great city newspapers were given up to grave discussion of the childish difference between two "lodges" of one of these harmless aggregations; the great question being one of precedence in the parade of the brotherhood, claimed by one contestant because it had a gaudy uniform and (more sensibly) by the other contestant as having a large contributing membership.

§ 11.

In connection with this question of thrift something is to be said as to the Law of Malthus. If Mr. George had made this law the basis of his attack on society in its treatment of the land question his position would have been much more easily understood. Of course this would have raised the issue as to the ripeness of experience of society as compared to the ripeness of experience of Mr. George. For society distinctly holds its position in the face of Malthus' law. Instead, however, he laid the basis of his work in an elaborate attack on the law itself, and founded the validity of his own conclusions on making man an exception to a palpable law of Nature in the whole of the remaining organic world. In the examples selected a happy choice certainly was not made. To base evidence on lack of fecundity in the British peerage calls for some agreement on the subject, and this there is not. Mr. J. S. Mill, in his controversy with Mr. Carey, directly refers to the British peerage as an

example of fecundity. The confusion here lies between associating fecundity and the British law of primogeniture in the male line as to succession; the two, primogeniture and male succession, disguising any relation between fecundity and the holder of the title. A man might have sixteen daughters, but unless he had one son the succession to the title would go to another branch of the family or would expire. As to property governed by succession, in its final issue it can be said that Great Britain profits as little by its law of escheat as any other country, and profits as little from the peerage as a source of such revenue as from any other class in the kingdom; perhaps less so, there being a greater object in tracing out the heir.*

The instance of any given Smith and his wife is almost equally unfortunate. This is based simply on the usual geometrical progression applied to issue from a single pair, if there were no reasons to prevent increase in such progression. Arithmetically it is correct—provided the four grand-children all agree to have no more than four children in the fourth generation. This can be said to be the case in France. Elsewhere, however, the death rate and birth rate do not coincide, the latter being in excess. The further consideration involves his argument concerning the descendants of Confucius so we can stop for a moment on this point. Anywhere else than in China it would be extremely doubtful if eleven thousand male descendants of any man who lived twenty six hundred years ago could be traced, and China is to be congratulated on the obstinacy with which any such record has been maintained. The apocryphal nature of the whole story arouses scepticism in the minds of those not so trusting in the infallibility of eastern methods of recording historic events—especially on the side of mathematical accuracy. The record doubtless was about as fair as that of the number of Moslems entitled to wear the green turban as lineal descendants of the Prophet, an example much nearer home in time and space and historical legibility. The East has no hesitation in manufacturing a genealogy if custom or prejudice requires it. It is not ethically an offence against truth—for the ethical element is *the* important element, and the preservation of custom by a little invention is not even a pious fraud. We do not have to believe that the sacred fire of Vesta was never extinguished during the many centuries of Roman life. And the accident of such extinction was provided for by a legal fiction. How many times a lazy or sleepy nun did have to start it up again would never be known, and would never figure except on some occasion of great publicity as to the unfortunate occurrence.

China has passed through so many convulsions of Nature and man that it can be reasonably believed that the eleven thousand descendants of the Sage are in many cases a legal

* Mental development has been more justly charged as a cause of sterility. Although Mr. Bagehot cites the English Judiciary to the contrary—"Economic Studies" Prelim. of Polit. Econ. p. 119, Ditto as to the peerage p. 122. Silver Lib. ed.

fiction, especially knowing what we do as to the practice of adoption in the East. Wars, pestilence, and famine, do keep the death rate in some reasonable ratio to the birth rate. So far we can follow Mr. George and grant that the geometrical progression does not take place, without trying to trace a particular Smith or Confucius through its generations. *But the limit of the ratio is the Law of Malthus*, applicable to man as well as animals. It is a fact that the man has the whole globe to draw on—if he will. But he will not. A man's opportunity is limited to the community in which he lives, and unless he is removed, willingly or by force, his condition there is very exactly measured by the natural capacity of the soil to feed him, this latter being subject to the law of diminishing return. It is true that China, and India, and Japan, could support a greater population than they do in some places. It is also true that in many parts of China and Japan cultivation is so carefully and skillfully carried out that it carries the absolute limit of population that it could sustain under any circumstances. It is calculated that there are other lands in Japan which by improvement could enable a considerable extension of the limit of population, and it is equally to be admitted that the population would at once extend to that limit. These lands cannot be brought into cultivation, however, without a considerable expenditure. They are at the start subject to the law of diminishing return. It is not that they are the poorest lands fixing the value of other land. Their value is at present a *minus* value. They are worth less than nothing, although the limit of cultivation in other land is almost reached. However, it is cheaper as yet to turn energy and emigration in other directions than draining salt marshes or making sand bear vegetation.

Man cannot live by bread alone saith the Georgite. He has two arms and it is as a producer that he lives by supplying the desires of other men. There will be a much wider limit to man's energies when the millenium comes, but meanwhile in these present days of limited spheres and hostile tariffs it is better to remember that the field for energy is limited, that man does live by bread alone, and that the bread market and its capacities are well within mortal ken. Then, like Captain Cuttle, make a note of it. The Chinaman is supposed to be so handicapped as a producer that he is reduced to "rats, cats, and puppy dogs." As to rats perhaps the Chinaman would plead the necessity that at times amounts to a state of siege. As to puppies he would enter an emphatic dissent; for the rice and milk fed and fattened puppy is a luxury in China, and perhaps would even appeal to the palate of the Georgite—if taken, unawares. Indeed could this latter say positively that he has never eaten cat instead of hare,* or horse and even dog instead of beef as file^t or hash or sausage. If all the parkland of Great Britain were to-morrow turned under the plow it is doubtful if it would affect the market to an appreciable extent.

* Or instead of mutton pies according to Mr. Weller's amiable informant.

Great Britain has distinctly out-grown its food supply. This is so notable that Great Britain for this purpose maintains an enormous navy, and her neighbours—except the United States man, who finds his best customer in Britain and has no axe to grind politically—anticipate gleefully the day when they will be able to squeeze and mulct and fine this industrious population by the scattering of that powerful fleet and bringing fifty millions of people to their knees by the simple process of starvation. A *vis viva* bluntly and inelegantly described by a great statesman as making the other fellow “cough up.” It may be said that this would be the method of the highwayman. So it would; but it is the method of war, and a direct recognition of the Law of Malthus as an existing fact. In reasoning from premises based on an inductive science there is always danger of a logical fallacy—an *ignoratio elenchi*. It cannot be assumed as Mr. George did because there is a limit to bears that there is no limit to man, and that man’s possibilities extend with his necessities;† that because savage man was limited to the bear condition and found his way out of it into the civilized state that the limit was not merely extended but was entirely removed. “Matter is eternal and forces must forever continue to act.” But forces do not continue to act in every direction. The irreversible reaction is such a common-place experience to modern chemistry that this limitation of forces—in the sense of transmutation—is well understood by chemists even if it was not appreciated by Mr. George. To make the chemical beefsteak we must have something more than the mere constituent elements. In fact in “eternal matter” and “ever acting force” we are given rhetoric not fact; and it would not create one ounce of beefsteak if a hostile fleet was ranging at will the shores of Britain.*

† Professor Nitti in his own attack on Malthus, refers to this optimistic stand taken by Mr. George and others.

* The question is one dealing with the facts of a Science and hence a subject of inductive examination. The field of these facts comes under the canons of induction. Undistributed middle of the formal logic would only apply to the form. As to the facts both biology and the political economy of practical life accept the theory of Malthus and act upon it. Its denial is a matter of assertion based on the ground that it has never been brought to the actual test—for the obvious reasons, as Malthus claimed, that tendencies are constantly at work to prevent its action, which tendencies can be said to be automatic, advancing and retiring with pressure. Unpleasant tendencies it must be admitted. As to the limited sustenance of bears and the unlimited sustenance of men; a man can make tables but he can only turn these tables into a certain number of turnips, and all the table-turning in the world will not enable him to get beyond a given number of turnips. Man’s sustenance is limited by the turnips not by the tables. The actual form given the reasoning seems to be—men’s powers are without limit; food is due to men’s powers; therefore food is without limit. The acceptance of the major premise should be determined by fact and not by sentiment. Are men’s powers *without limit*? It is unfortunate that the term “distribution” does not find as complete application to fact as to logical formulæ.

The fact then that in the fifty square miles comprising the metropolis of London there is going on the production and support of five millions of people means nothing, for they are drawing on the world for that support and not on the corn fields of England; and the reason they can draw on the world is the physical force that keeps the roads open to their supplies. It is true that the city of London was destroyed by fire and successfully rebuilt. This has little to do with the Law of Malthus it might be added; as also it is true that if there had been no capital to support these people until they rebuilt their industries many of them would have perished. This can dispose of the example of New Zealand. If the population of Great Britain were summarily transferred to that very pleasant if distant island—and were allowed to land, which they would not be under existing New Zealand legislation—they would either have to live on what the New Zealander advanced to them for their support, or they would have to perish. The history of the world has unfortunately illustrated the fact that every movement of this character is necessarily a war of invasion, the existing population although having no set theory of ratio between subsistence and population instinctively recognize the existence of a stern law governing it. On a minor scale, where people have been cast away on an island, or lost in the desert of ice or sand with no means of support other than their own good right arms, they have either perished miserably or nobly, or they have turned those arms against one another with the result of Mr. Gilbert's song—"for I am the bo'sun tight, and the midshipmite, and the crew of the Nancy's gig."

Mr. George's question of progress and poverty was entirely beside the Law of Malthus. Over-population and poverty in certain grades are a prime cause. Such an eminent authority as Doctor Hadley tells us that "while it is true that poverty exists in the midst of wealth it is not true that it increases, as so many people are led to suppose. Judged by the best criteria which we can apply, poverty as a whole is diminishing rather than increasing;" and he goes on to point out the rise in our general standard of living, and that the cause is due to the greater surplus, in its turn due to greater family responsibility. Pauper children can only be maintained at the cost of thrift. It may not be wise to carry restraint to the extent that is done in France, but at all events "the evils of thinking too much, and trusting Providence too little, seem small in comparison with those which arise from trusting Providence for every thing and not thinking at all." Socialists do not meet this question. They ignore it or run away from it, and the only point they do emphasize is the sin of restraint. The nearest approach to an argument is the biological one of functional adaption. Now this is to transfer the feelings and ideas of a highly ethical and very trifling minority to the sensual ideas of the great majority. We are told that man would rise to this level. And the first step taken is to relieve man of the greatest incentive to it—responsi-

bility! In plain terms what is the step taken by peoples faced by this question? Have they put a limit on their sexual appetite? This is a very serious question, for man in some way has freed himself from the natural restraint imposed on other animals, and is no longer limited to a season of rut.* The answer is plain and concise, and is given by experience. Such peoples have adopted the practices of abortion, infanticide (especially of females), of questionable practices for the prevention of pregnancy, and of the hideous passions, not of a refined but of a baser civilization seeking by disgraceful and unnatural means to avoid a deadly law. Very shocking undoubtedly, but these are the facts, and the first process of the socialist State is to level down the community into the ranges where passion still has control, for the very good reason that any immediate raising of the ninety-nine per cent of human civilized society to the level of sexual abstinence preached by the societies of the day for ethical culture is a recognized absurdity. The animal man to-day, with every inducement to the contrary, refuses to limit his indulgence; and to his numbers are to be added the vast number who are only kept in restraint by the fear of consequences to themselves as the parents of children.†

Two elements of modern society stand in direct ratio to each other. Machinery and progress. The former is the direct outcome of individualism and except in very simple form was almost unknown previous to the French Revolution. Socialism finds much to sympathize with in the times preceding the Revolution, and naturally this would be so. Essentially the State up to that time was socialistic. It makes little difference that there was inequality of classes and distribution under the old State. Its theory was the absolutism of the State over the individual, and such absolutism seems necessarily to give rise to inequality. Socialism as an absolutism, as far as history is concerned, warrants the statement that it would tend in the same direction and end in the same slough. The burden of proof is on it to show the contrary, albeit there is not a single such example in its favour. The development of machinery was practically impossible under the old socialistic State. Its struggle also was to maintain the *status quo*. The Emperor Augustus would have smashed a labour saving machine as disturbing the balance of his economic system. The Emperor Charlemagne would have done the same, with the additional motive that the devil had certainly had a hand in the invention. The Prussian Government in the early nineteenth century held up on economic grounds a labour saving invention. As recently as 1905 (in Japan) a mob has smashed machinery because it disturbed the existing method of local transportation.

* Clothing, improved food supply, and artificial heat plainly influence but are not entirely satisfactory explanations of this exemption.

† Mill (Polit. Econ. Bk. II, Chaps. 6-8) gives details as to the "magic of property" in inducing restraint. Ditto as to effect of legal restrictions on marriage cf. Bk II, Chap. II, § 4, 5.

If the Government was directly under control of the unintelligent classes it is safe to say there would be no smashing of machines and as little introduction of novelty—unless of course that novelty accrued to the benefit of the small class affected, and this would introduce the very inequality it was sought to avoid, for where every one was working on equal time wages and for equal times (unless excused for cause) either less time or more pay would have to be granted or the surplus produced confiscated by a society whose ideal must be equal consumption as well as production. This would be getting something for nothing. There would be no object to any man to pay anything but mechanical attention to his task. His labour would not be lightened an hour by any thought of his on the subject. Society would depend for progress on public benefactors, of which all that can be said is that there have been such and most of these have had a deep personal interest in their benefactions which have brought them substantial rewards as well as fame. Proudhon has admirably summarized the attitude of the mob to brain power. In his scheme society was to supply the scientist with his apparatus and the poet with his writing materials and books. What more could either demand? Further exertion, beyond bread and butter, was to be for the benefit of the world. Certainly no hard hearted socialist cleric would be allowed to tell the poetaster that "beer and the girls" were not for him unless he turned poet; and if he could get "beer and the girls" without turning poet why should he do more than his allotment; and if "beer and the girls" for society in general depended on his own exertions he would stand aghast at the enormous dilution of his efforts and the realization of the unlikelihood of effecting any change in level in the mass and without which change he himself could gain nothing. How long could such kitchen-garden vegetation stand against a more vigorous animal growth elsewhere?

There is little use in apotheosizing the action of the mass. Individually there is an immense amount of intelligence and of good in men; progress together with kindness and mutual aid. But in the terrible potentiality of the mob all this is lost under the influence of "suggestion." Man is no longer himself as soon as he sinks his individualism to become part of this abstraction. The whole value of a man is in what *he* thinks apart from the mass of men. And he must separate himself to think. Every great strike, every great disaster shows the necessity of the strong arm to prevent the occurrence of murder, riot, and pillage by men who would never dream of it—except as mob. And it is the strong arm of authority not of themselves that they respect, as is shown in the distinction made between the use of regular soldiery as contrasted with the police or the militia. For their own self-control they could not show greater contempt. And in their control they have shown their absolute unreason, as a long list from Socrates to Van Artevelde teaches the world. From the greatest of their victims and the truest of their friends we name our era. There is nothing astonishing in this. The

purest of men, in the past and to-day, have interested themselves in their welfare but they have rarely been the chosen leaders. When such a man does succeed in holding influence over them for any length of time the world stops in wonder to look at him. And the world does not stop and wonder for nothing. The man truly qualified to lead them cannot be of their class. If sincere they must hear from him of their defects. They turn therefore to the demagogue, the man who tells them what they want to hear and that tickles their ears. The truth and the unpalatable as to their defects—idleness and unthrift, drunkenness and lewdness—has often marked out their victims. But they are an easily led animal. All their history has not been that of a directing brawn. This is a contradiction in terms. The muscles cannot rule the brain. But brains through them have ruled and exploited the balance of brains. It is a terrible discouragement to every man to feel his unreason as a unit of the mass, to know that no matter how far he may have emphasized his control over himself through his individuality that as soon as he abdicates, this self-identity he becomes unreasoning, either to run riot or to be directed without will and without other restraint than any ordinary hypnotic. And with little more moral responsibility. All our real thinking ought to be done in our own exclusive companionship. And few men do this under any other conditions. Not to be carried off our feet by environment is a rare trait. It is a sad feature and a strong proof of the unscrupulousness of the few and the mere veneer of *manhood* in the many that men in mass are always available in the field of controversy or prejudice, whether ecclesiastical in the past or socialistic in the present. We are reminded of some rough words of good old George Borrow, equally applicable to all forms of popular intolerance whether in burning a "nigger" or breaking the face or neck of a "scab." They run as follows:—"Said the man in 'black, coolly sipping," we have "always armed the brute population against the genius and intellect of a country, provided that same intellect and genius were not willing to become its instruments and eulogists, and provided we once obtain a firm hold here again, we would not fail to do so. We should occasionally stuff the beastly rabble with horseflesh and bitter ale, and then halloo them on against all those who were 'obnoxious to us.'" Ecclesiastical preaching of this character is dwindling into insignificance, but it sounds very much like the preaching and practice of certain latter-day socialism.

One striking feature in modern socialism is its relations to the family. The attitude of the plebs to children is a peculiar one. All the tender affection of the animal for its young is found among them. And yet they are strangely callous as to their future welfare. The strongest opposition to child labour legislation comes from the class most interested in the suppression of such labour. As the father did, so he expects his son to do, and the cases are not numerous where he sacrifices his own gratification to the son's future. The cases where parents pinch

and starve to give children a better chance are rare among the lowest class. They are to be found higher up among the small farming and shop-keeping class. In fact the idea is not to throw the young out of the nest as soon as possible but to make use of them. A short sighted idea for the young man makes a nest for himself as soon as he is worth anything. In the rare cases where he does not do so there is a sensible relaxation of effort on the part of the older man and a corresponding greater strain on the younger. There is a tenacious clinging, a pride of caste, in manual labour. How often are well meant efforts to advance some bright boy balked by the parents who take him away from school and put him to work, so that he may be of assistance to them and not grow up out of his class "and despising of his own parents." But more interesting still is the position of socialism to women in the family relation. Whether from the successors of the pure St. Simon to the "trial matrimony" advocates of to-day the freedom of the sexual relation is to be complete.† Woman is to be free to contract her alliances and break them at will. Presumably so likewise man. Now among a certain class of people who go around in a dream of esoteric affection between the sexes the animal nature of this relation and its sway over ninety percent of humanity is totally and entirely forgotten. It expects these higher relations, only influencing a small class of the community, to take the place of the strict family and social guard kept in our present society. But this is either ignorance or blindness to what is going on around them in the world at large, and in which laxness in these relations among the lower classes is a distinct object of reform both to the statesman and to religious organizations. This is a trusting condition of mind akin to that of the Arunta savages of Australia who do not yet know that children are the result of copulation. The relation between the sexes, however, is to be made one of convenience. And very much so it is to be suspected, for the natural "law of antipathy", which drives men to seek the society of men and women of women under ordinary circumstances, would not tend to bring them closer together in the socialist State where the bond of the family is removed or relaxed. Society to-day, in the general sense, is nothing but a continual construction and re-construction of the family bond; society's method of mating the young. The dominance of this family *motif* is what makes it decorous. It makes it decorous even when it is an open secret that license is really ruling some small section of it. A state of society where this bond was openly renounced would resemble that happy state where every man and his mort sought refuge under the hedge. It would, however, be entirely consistent in its association with communism, that return to a primitive state of man so bepraised. Descent again would be recognized in the maternal line, it would be a prodigious child

† Cf. Bebel's "Woman and Socialism;" Belfort Bax—"Marriage" in "Outlooks from the New Standpoint."

who could recognize his own father, and it cannot be denied that to many people it would be a great weight off their minds. The experience of all time, the invectives and the ironies of the poets concerning the known instability of the affections and the love of variety in man and woman, would hardly be wiped out by a law of license. From the point of view of propagation society perhaps would take no harm. And the State would be a just if far from satisfactory mother in this Spartan organization. Carping critics, however, might say that *this* was the system that made of man a beast and of woman a prostitute, only it goes about it far more scientifically and with more method than the old worship of fertility of ancient times, or the cicisbeism of the seventeenth century in Europe, and its more veiled and very limited representative of to-day. It is curious how all these socialist schemes recognize the individual as very bad, and yet expect to govern through what must be a collection of individuals without reference to individual qualities.†

But there is a good reason why socialism should take this stand to the oldest and most ancient institution of the human race, for in doing so it is "correcting one of the mistakes," eliminating the means, by which man broke away from the ancient communism. It is the family bond, the family solidarity of selfishness, which is at the basis of our present system, as it has been the basis of all other systems, and this is absolutely irreconcilable at root with a socialism which continues to deal with its psychical units. Now there is here a seeming paradox, because the family itself is the strongest example of socialism in human institutions. And it is through ignoring the individual and recognizing the family as unit that the dead level of socialism was maintained through all the grades of ancient society. The State found the principle ruling this family unit to be the ideal one for its own purposes, and using it, and encouraging it, and co-operating with it was enabled to hold every individual member tightly in his place or niche. It was an abstraction dealing with an abstraction and through abstractions. There was no tangible *man* to take hold of in the whole business. This has been the case with every unprogressive society which history and tradition connects with an unbroken paternalism (or maternalism) or tribalism; in other words with all else but the Aryan peoples. The family in such case could not break away from the State, for this required departure from custom, and it was the family

† Socialist writers treat our "civilization" with much the proper scorn of the Selenite invaders of the Earth in reporting to their sovereign "Man in the Moon." "We find these miserable savages sunk in a state of the utmost ignorance and depravity, every man shamelessly living with his own wife, and rearing his own children, instead of indulging in that community of wives enjoined by the law of nature, as expounded by the philosophers of the moon." For this reason it is, perhaps, that they feel "authorized and commanded to use every means to convert these infidel savages from the darkness of Christianity, and make them thorough and absolute Lunatics" (See Diedrich Knickerbocker's "History of New York," Book I, Chap. V).

itself which was enforcing a tradition in accordance with its own cardinal principle. But at bottom there is a wide difference between the natural bond as found in the family, and the artificial bond as found in the State. The family are united by the blood tie, and the more this is accentuated—as among the Aryan peoples—the more sharply it marks them off from other families and marks the artificial tie of the State. The development of the individual was nothing to the family in the eastern communistic State (outside of the little official class). He was everything to the family in the western (Aryan) State where communism became in time limited to the family. In Greece and in Rome the Aryan man had broken away from tribal communism, which, however, still exercised its control over the family. The individual was helpless before the overpowering despotism of the Greek oligarchy or republican Rome just as he was helpless before the overpowering despotism of the Roman Empire; but in this latter his position was infinitely worse for the family had now disappeared as a practical factor in the State, and he was left naked and defenceless against the bureaucracy which ruled the State. But at this critical point this despotism was broken up and invaded by divers races accustomed to that wandering life which, with all their communism, still permitted to these fresher Aryan peoples a strong individuality in their units. The broken state of European society from the fifth to the fifteenth century settled the future career of the western world. No family could keep on its feet without developing to the utmost its strongest men and strongest individuality. And it alone could do so with safety on account of the blood-tie—the *natural* bond holding together its members. The history of the Middle Ages is an illustration of this. Natural disposition and national rivalries did their work. The crust of custom was thoroughly disintegrated and progress began.

Cases of purely individual selfishness are rare. Here the family and society are still at one even in the West, and the united frowns of both keep it in check. Otherwise the individual is of no disadvantage to the family and may be of positive advantage. In earlier times—the feudal period—he was of very positive advantage. The intensity of this natural bond cannot be overrated. It is possible to attack the individual but it is dangerous to attack the feeling of kinship, for in doing so it arouses every man who has the same feeling for kin as it relates to himself. The proposition therefore to disintegrate this ancient unit and isolate every man leaving him to face alone an abstract unit—the State—arouses a deep seated innate hostility and suspicion. This interest in the blood-tie, arousing a kindred feeling in every man and putting him shoulder to shoulder to protect any assault on its solidarity, has a very deep psychological foundation. It is found in man's isolation from his kind; the certainty that comes over him that he can only think of what others may think of him, the knowledge that he is walled in by his own flesh and can be certain of nothing, is driven home very

poignantly at times, and makes him cling all the closer to the most satisfactory substitutes that he can find for himself, and thus he clings desperately to the little circle of kin and friends, and guards their interests as his own and every other interest an attack on which threatens him.* The family of course is the very strongest of these ties. But it is the family—the blood-tie—which is at the bottom of all these dreadful things—capital, interest, thrift—so obnoxious to socialism. All socialistic schemes recognize this and their first move is to diminish this influence and to break it up if possible; to substitute, therefore, the relations found in the military State, to make a man the soldier, not the father. There can be no equality in the eyes of a parent.

The only possibility of communism is based, however, on the family. The inculcating in wider fields of this principle through its natural field of exercise. Historically this has been a disastrous failure, even in the East where it has found its most prominent development. The result has been communism within the grades and despotism between them, for where the individual is crushed out the power in the State is sure to drift to the strongest whether it be a single interest or a group of interests. Socialism, wisely or unwisely, refuses to build on such a basis and instead makes it an object of attack. It seeks to control its units therefore under the military system. They are the property of the State to do with as it pleases. Proudhon saw this radical defect in the socialism of his time and of all time. He denounced the exploiting of the individual by the community as equally unjust as the exploiting of the community by an individual; but his effort to reconcile the two forces was a hopeless one, for the method of reconciliation did not lie within the powers of our modern free democracy. The predatory selfishness of the individual is a matter of easy control to-day as it ever has been. As a matter of fact any wrongs connected with the individual use of capital, inheritance, etc., are well within the police power of the present State the duty of which is to maintain exact justice between man and man, not to strip thrift of its reward or to allow the oppression of poverty and misfortune. To say that the dividing line where the individual is of benefit to social life and is of danger to it cannot be determined is to grant little to human intelligence which has been experimenting with the subject since the dawn of history. There is an automatic check on prosperity as soon as this is disregarded, and a nation of freemen can adjust the balance. And tendency to pauperize the community—the term works equally well in both senses—is better detected and rectified by practice and not by theory.

That the control and direction of the tools of society fall to thrift goes without saying. They are the creation of thrift and their continued working depends on that thrift which feeds the worker until his product is marketed. To grant control and

* Forcibly developed by the Italian writer d'Annunzio in that somewhat morbid character of "The Triumph of Death"—George Aurispa.

direction is equivalent to saying that the direction falls to the most competent. But there is a double obligation here. Thrift itself without the worker is limited to the effort of one single man. To elevate itself from the hunting and fishing stage society has to make the contract that the fruit of man's toil and intelligence shall accrue to himself. And society cannot violate such a contract without suffering for it any more than the individual can so act. It will either strike at its own credit and good name or will cripple its own efficiency; and probably will do both, if existing instances of "repudiation" are any test. But the protection and concurrent obligation on the part of the individual are also part of the bond. In determining these rights and obligations capital—dreadful capital—is such a neutral element that it can almost be left out of account.* The discussion is over the direction of the industrial world and how much is due to the directing machinery. There is here a growing recognition that the subject is one of direction and that there is a limitation or qualification in the title. The limitation is exactly the one referred to above—that society is to encourage the individual effort to that point where it is most efficient without endangering society itself. The Anglo-Saxon town builder, the bureaucrat, the village head-man in a Russian *mir*, and the socialist, will of course differ on that point. However, the more reasonable view is that in doing so society loses nothing and may profit greatly. It takes no risks; and should take none, for disastrous speculation by a community causes a widespread distress that can happen from no mere misfortune of an individual. Society cannot compel a man to continue his business at a loss, but it can guard against his establishment of a monopoly against the interests of the community. The centralization of interests is leading the State to take a more active position in these matters, especially where the law of supply and demand is being curtailed by artificial restriction, for many things are becoming at once a necessity and also a monopoly. State administration has only been justified by necessity—as for example the Post Office. Otherwise it is in itself the rankest kind of monopoly and is conducted avowedly to make up a deficit in other quarters—as for example the French tobacco monopoly or the Japanese salt or camphor or railway monopoly. It is necessarily conducted therefore with the usual aim of any monopoly, to get the highest price that the public will pay. That corporate management is less efficient than individual management is a common-sense axiom at least as old as Adam Smith. State regulation, however, has been tried with dubious but still with greater success than State management. It is to be recognized that both sides—employers and labour—are seeking a monopoly. Hence compulsory arbitration is distasteful

* Its reward is interest; the inducement society holds out to men to save and not to immediately consume. Capital in this differs quantitatively from wealth. Capital being wealth used for future production. Wealth is the general term. Capital is the particular term.

to both; to employers because they feel the strength of their position under certain conditions of a waiting game; to labour unless it is to be an additional weapon in its own hands. In anything like compulsory arbitration there is undoubted danger of political corruption and demagoguery. There is another certainty also, that any community which practises either will suffer for it in the end by the paralysis of its efforts. Now if there is anything to be learned by the experiences of local communities in the United States it is that a reputation for fairness or for repudiation exactly measures the credit and progress or decline of any given community. It can be added here—what has often been pointed out—that Government ownership answers none of these difficulties as to the tools of society. Government ownership never prevented a strike, as shown in the history of many receiverships in the United States. In Europe the ingenious method has been adopted—on account of strikes in Government managed enterprises—of putting the men under military call. This exactly answers the view of the radical socialist which calls for military discipline in all the fields of human effort, and equal income to all. He is therefore prepared to force his people into unfavourable conditions and to enforce their continuance there. The existing system in democracy of course leaves this to be adjusted by an open competition between conditions and reward.

Moreover the individual is not to be so roughly brushed aside as socialism supposes. The community can only do this at certain cost to itself, for the individual is the psychical unit, not the community. If the greatest happiness of the greatest number is an incontrovertible maxim, it is also true that the happiness of the individual is a factor of the greatest importance. That the full development of his powers is necessary to the happiness of the individual is a natural law found existing all through the organic world—the proper adjustment of internal to external conditions. The State and the living of our lives are not identical. The State—the rest of the community—has no right to control the individual beyond its needs, or beyond preventing injury to others. This last be it observed is a power capable of sufficient extension, but only on these specific grounds. In any other direction efforts at equality are a wrong against Nature, because there must be exercised an unnatural restraint in its system of repression which replaces regulation. It is possible to keep down but it is rarely possible to force up. Suffering is caused with no benefit and positive loss. The society that strips itself of the strength of its individualism is sure to suffer in the end. It either stands still or sets its pace by the most unprogressive of its elements. This is a dangerous position to take in the modern world. Socialism recognizes only part of the natural law in its dread of individual ability and in its fear of brain power. Its dogma swings to an extreme. With it, therefore, the State owns the individual. It has rights and no duties. So it did in Rome and in Persia and in Peru. So it does in Japan. And in socialism it would repeat the history of these old and unhappy States.

It is this socialistic theory of the State in which consists the logic of Internationalism. One has but to cast a glance at the clash of national policies to see that in order to succeed socialism must become international. The socialist State stripped of one of the elements of power in our modern system—for at best its whole policy is to reduce the working capital to the lowest limit—could not stand the competition of the capitalist State. It is a logical necessity, therefore, that it must subdue its neighbours, and this in the face of the discontented and disinherited classes existing within its own body. The counterbalance is sought in the socialistic element spread through its opponents. When there is considered, however, the intense national hatreds now existing it is more than doubtful that the race feeling when brought to the mark would not carry the day, or at least would paralyse much of the support anticipated outside the ranks of the socialist State. There would remain under any circumstances highest efficiency opposed to an intentional and artificially lowered efficiency. It can be said that in the socialist State their own discontented class would not form a hostile element. Probably not, but the pressure of the State would have a recent and a very personal application that it would not have in the other cases. And it is to be remembered that the stress of war soon alienates half sympathies even among disgruntled elements of opponents. The French Revolution preached freedom for the oppressed peasantry of Europe, and by its continual wars and its grievous pressure on them came to be a byword and a thing of loathing to the peasantry, until the whole population of outside Europe was interested in its repression. And both the first and second French Empires went to pieces before the indifference and hostility of the marrow of the French people which they had begun to squeeze and drain. With discontented classes within, and the same classes in control without, there is always a feeling of unrest and uneasiness. It was shown in the feeling in France toward the *émigrés* and more still to those of the old ruling class that remained in the country. And this feeling found expression in excesses which in turn aroused the dormant sense of justice in the community and suppressed the Revolution itself. It is safe to say that the victory of socialism in any great European State of to-day would be the signal for the long expected European war. And with the forces of society concentrated necessarily in the hands of a few strong men the ultimate fate of society would be inevitable. And its last state would be infinitely worse than the first. A despotic imperialism would replace the balanced democracy to which our present system is everywhere tending.

§ 12.

There remain two other forms of communism which can be dealt with in a more cursory manner—Christian Socialism and Anarchy. Of the first of these the Roman Christian Socialism

from its strong organization, commands attention. It found its leading exponent in Bishop von Ketteler of Mainz, and to-day is much heard of—more especially in Italy.* The Church as the regenerating medium of society found early expression in the socialism of St. Simon and of Lamennais, although strictly speaking they were both outside the pale of the Church. Their governing power, however, was to be a regenerated priesthood, and the schemes of to-day either postulate a regenerated Church or postulate its regeneration. The reform of the Church has been going on now for some one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six years, or perhaps to try and be more exact from the date of Saint Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians, the missing epistle not the one at present so named. The results of this struggle for reform, through years of war and bloodshed, have led the majority of men to believe that the Church and temporal power have a very bad influence on each other. Bishop von Ketteler's scheme simply pre-supposed the old power of the Church of the Middle Ages, only more extended and administered by a purified Church. On the ground of human experience such a scheme can be set aside. The human element enters, and it has been proved that celibacy—the elimination of the family interest—is no bar to it. Priests are human and greedy, and the temporal power of the Church has been one of the great abuses of history, rendered all the more dangerous and exacerbating by

* William Emmanuel Ketteler, a large man both physically and mentally—"The Westphalian colossus" as Decurtin calls him. He is described as with deeply-lined frowning tempestuous brow, and an eye so terrible that a parish priest summoned to account for some offense fainted under the first savage glance the irate bishop gave him. An impudent peasant descended the episcopal stairway at one flight, impelled by the strong arm of the incumbent. Finding him still maintaining his ground at the bottom Ketteler asked him what more he wanted. "My hat" quoth the clown. And overcome by the humour of the situation the bishop descended in person with the missing headgear. He was indeed a strenuous man, who, in his youth, could lie for six weeks on his face to save his nose, nearly sliced off in a duel. These details are from Kannengieser's "Ketteler and the social organisation in Germany." Properly speaking Ketteler was not a socialist at all. He wished to restore certain features of the voluntary communism of the Christian church of the first century.

The term "Christian" socialism is a complete misnomer. Logically the two elements are contradictory. Socialism admits no dogma, theological or other kind, in contradiction to the social conscience. A socialist might be a deist, but not a theist. On the contrary, Christianity makes a dogma of the individuality of the human soul, and no social dogma is allowed any weight against the salvation of the soul. Roman Catholicism has grasped this radical distinction much more clearly than the Protestant bodies. The two incongruities—socialism and Christianity—are forcibly amalgamated through the brotherhood idea, which modern socialism—without so much as a "by your leave"—took over bodily from the early Church; and any reference to the authoritative writers of the socialist propaganda will show the application of the idea to the sisterhood *en toda la extensión de la palabra* as the horrified old Spanish lady said in reference to exuberant charms—or in the Thibetan sense of family relations.

the special divine power claimed by the priesthood. He makes one good point, and that is that when the Church lands were secularized they passed into the hands of the king and from him without compensation to the favourites. This practically was the case, and it was the custom of those days when the central power owned the community, a scheme not unlike that proposed by socialism. However, these original holders have long since realized on their plunder, and the present occupants could most and with the sanction of the State for present ownership. The Protestant form of Christian Socialism commands respect. In England associated with its first movement were such names as Maurice, Kingsley, and "Tom" Hughes, which is enough to stamp the spirit of self-sacrifice to be found in it. To-day its main exponents are the Christian Social Union and St. Matthew's Guild in London. Georgeism is a feature of the propaganda. It is an effort, to all appearances, to put into practical force the teachings of Christ. But Christ's kingdom is not of this world. It can only be the ideal for a few good men. In practical and rigid application it means extinction of effort and extinction of the race—its logical goal, better understood by the first converts than those of to-day. The rest of us must remain content with things as they are, only trying to secure its ethical ideal and an even handed unswerving administration of justice between men in their struggle for wealth; to see that the stronger does not trample down the weaker, although his superior strength must bring him to the goal that the weaker is unable to reach. Every man is entitled to his place on the pavement without unnecessary hustling, and society is the policeman on guard to see that no violence is practised by the passing crowd.

Except in so far as it advocates a looser form of communism Anarchy is the reverse pole of Socialism. The only form of government even hinted at by its mildest advocates is that of very small communities in which the members can do pretty much as they please, but are supposed not to do actual violence to each other. As far as any wider action is concerned this is effected by a sort of rotation in office of these communes, which thus have the power of summoning to action the whole body if the occasion should arise. It can be seen that the strongly centralized Government, whether in State or in community, of socialism is entirely rejected by the anarchist. The whole scheme is so loosely drawn, and so impracticable as far as human nature is concerned, that it would hardly find birth in any man's brain except one who was already gasping under such a grinding bureaucracy or despotism or socialism as is found in Russia. The oppression of the one seems to beget the revolt of the other, and it is to Russia that is owed the revolt against society found in anarchy and nihilism and the other physical force propaganda of communism. On the matter of theory anarchy is a more pleasing if still more impracticable picture than socialism. Just how a man or a community could get rid

of undesirable company remains doubtful, except by the use of the strong right arm. The weaker would suffer terribly under such a system, for under our present effete method of living we have at least the privilege of choosing our company. It would presumably then be necessary to go round with the butt of "a gun" within easy reaching distance of the right hand. Such life has existed even in our West, and men have managed to survive the period. They found it irksome, however, and a more legal condition of the community more desirable to live under. Time and experience of the ease of civilization have taught men that such a period is picturesque only in retrospect. Anarchist ideas on the subject do not seem to be strictly consistent. Professor Ely in a little volume on French and German socialism published some years ago gives the manifesto issued at the trial of some French anarchists in 1882. Two clauses strike the eye. "We wish liberty: that is to say, we demand for every human being the right and the means of doing that which pleases him, and of doing only that which pleases him; to satisfy integrally all his wants, without any other limits than natural impossibilities and the wants of neighbours equally respectable." Again: "Wicked and insane as people call us, we demand bread for all, science for all, work for all; for all, also, independence and justice." It can be noted that there is very little provision made here for work, none of the positive stand taken by socialism, and it is to be suspected that those would reap who had not sowed, and that the strongest would take the honey of the industrious. Man cannot live without work. In one form or the other he works very hard to-day, at desk or at the plough; but the anarchist scheme demands bread and work and science, and distinctly leaves a man free to get all three much as he pleases and without any logical succession in the pleasing series (as to two of the terms anyhow) as there is no form of restraint in the community to prevent him from taking what he pleases except his victim's right arm. This is theoretical anarchy trusting of course to the innate goodness in man.* As far

* Perez Galdos in "La Desheredada" dryly expresses the psychological phase in reference to one of his characters so disposed "y llegó á adquirir esas convicciones tenaces que sólo se encuentran en los prosélitos de los sistemas más absurdos." I take the following from "Los Anarquistas" by Munoz Cerisola. They are the resolutions passed at the Congress of Berne, October 1873, and have been endorsed by numerous other congresses since with emphasis on the propaganda by deed. (1) Suppression of property, war on capital, on class privilege, and on the exploitation of man by man. (2) Suppression of country, and in consequence, of frontiers and of lines between townships. (3) Suppression of the State; war on all authority, elected or not, dynastic or temporal. (4) The individual must be so free and so autonomous that no one can place in any way obstacles to his will. (5) All belongs to All, and All have equal rights in the goods constituting the public wealth. (6) The propaganda by deed, leading to the destruction of the existing condition, is the most efficacious, (l. c. p. 61). This is also the programme of the socialist extremists of the Social Democratic wing; with the exception of the propaganda by deed which is reserved for the "grand strike" or if every other hope fails. The "grand or universal strike" is to be the *modus operandi* of the socialistic *coup d'état*.

as a general principle can be said to govern anarchist reasoning, it is the rejection of the abstraction as the epitome of the concrete. That is, the abstract is drawn from individuals and must be necessarily the incomplete. Science, by its very method dealing with abstractions, is only less to be suspected than the "idealists" (metaphysicians and theologians). "If the people should guard itself against the government of men of science, with more reason they ought to arm themselves against inspired idealists." Thus Bakunin admits no council but that of science, and its votaries are only consulted and followed according to the individual whim. His "academy of wise men"† have no authority, because (1) the imperfection and flux of human knowledge permits no *ex-cathedra dictum*, (2) to permit such council as authoritative would be to create another Paraguay as ruled by the Jesuits, and (3) every such academy would become in its turn a tyrant and master. Science naturally is encouraged with strict limitations. "I do not think that society should illtreat its men of genius, as has happened in the past, no more do I think that it ought to encourage them, or, above all, to allow them privileges and exclusive rights; and this for three reasons; first, because often a charlatan would be taken for a genius; second, because thanks to such a system of privileges a man of real genius might be transformed into a charlatan, demoralizing and brutalizing him; and third, because it would impose on itself a master." Modern society of course treats science as a variable adjusted to its existing knowledge, and this is the only practical way. Some anarchists—as Malato—seek their ends through socialism; as if the vast Government machine built up by this latter was easier to deal with than modern individualism. But from the anarchist writers it is impossible to draw any feasible scheme based on human nature. Pure anarchy is advocated by but few. They admit at least a "group" or commune system. One, however, can put but little trust in Prince Kropotkin's scheme for supplying Paris by growing vegetables under glass in the parks and back-yards—if the country side refuses to come into the scheme; apart from the objection as to cost and skill, and the law of diminishing returns.‡

Eat or be eaten is the rule under which Nature's game is played. This man can modify in so far as it seems safe, but to continue nourishing the incapable at the expense of the strong can lead to but one result. Exact justice can be tempered with mercy and benevolence. Suffering can be eliminated as far as possible. But there must be a limit or our civilization will pay the penalty of the drag on it of useless members by forced submission to a more far-sighted community. The nearer a nation presses to its limit of subsistence the greater of course is the demand that the strong shall dedicate themselves and their

† "God and the State" Chap. VI.

‡ "Conquest of Bread" Agriculture, § 3 seq.

efforts to the weak. Such dilution through the mass is of course fatal biologically and politically. The socialist forces have always had, from the dawn of history, a specious battle cry in the many abuses attending the inevitable combat of life. There has always been the cry to do away with this combat, always the effort to do away with it, and it has always failed before that deeper realization of its necessity planted in human nature. The socialist takes man as he is and hopes to train him into an idea, but man is not only himself but countless generations that have preceded him and have placed their mark on him. Every levelling effort therefore has failed because the natural law was sure to reassert itself. Those abler minds which could grasp this fact could use the ignorance of the mass of mankind for their own purposes and for the subjection of others, all the worse in being a mental subjection. This has been the history of the East. The one ray of hope to modern democracy lies in that it recognizes the natural law and allows its operation without unnecessary suffering to the weak. Its ideal is to give no undue advantage or disadvantage to any. The feeling of altruism, of pity for suffering is strong in modern society, and the machinery as yet works anything but smoothly. Men get impatient with the slow adjustment to natural law. It is on this feeling or sentiment that the socialist hopes to work politically. The appeal to reason is purely specious for no workable scheme of socialism ever has been or can be proposed. Construction has been carefully kept in the background. It is merely put forward that the combat must cease. Theoretical socialists are few and far between and numbers are not necessary. What there is of them is a very compact organization thoroughly centralized as to purpose. Under modern conditions all they need is sentiment. Once in control they can do the rest through the system. It is not then proposed to convert the majority but to capture organization, and that this is not impossible is seen in a recent and almost successful similar attempt by a small minority in the United States to capture the organization of a great party; and it is also seen in both the United States and Great Britain where plurality not majority over all elects and hence allows minority rule; a result avoided by the French system of dropping out the lower polls and ordering a new choice. Once in power and with the physical force of the community at command socialism realizes the helplessness of the community. Needless to say the universal suffrage of socialism does not include "malignants." And the ballot box is no bar to the efforts of any organization which counts the votes. The nature of the socialist organization eliminates all opposition, and it defines the lines of suggestion. Once in power they propose to construct society on their plan from the ground up and with no outside interference. And their plan postulates the elimination of all human experience as palpably leading to inequality and injustice. Socialism is more likely, however, to construct a Frankenstein than to animate the Apollo Belvedere.

§ 13.

Socialism is an ideal scheme. That is to say, not being developed out of human experience it suffers from all the drawbacks of any mere paper constitution—the difficulty of filling in the details and obtaining a consistent working of the scheme. It has been tried on a small scale with the single result of failure due to human nature. The history of such failures is well-known. Oppression within these communities, the absorption of their interests by selfish men, and the discontent of individuals who find their energies cramped or absorbed by mediocrity, generally eventuate in an airing before the courts of the more powerful individualistic community in which they are planted. And in most of the cases of such oppression and deceit, sad it would be if the individual did not have such refuge to which to fly. Indeed socialism can be put down as *contra* Nature. The orderly development and heterogeneity of our modern civilized life is strictly according to that law of evolution which calls for greater specialization of function as the adjustment between the outer and inner relations becomes more complex. Mr. Spencer defines life as being “the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences.” The organization must be elastic to meet the external changes and the only elasticity in a social organization is found in its units. Socialism is a distinct retrogression to the old communal life that mankind has grown beyond. With their out-of-date military system ramifying through all private life they remind one of life in those old Mexican pueblos of the Aztecs so graphically described by Professor Fiske. A true communal tyranny in its very worst form. Socialism has all their attributes, and their tendencies as displayed in the few attempts made to put it into practice. It makes little difference that we probably would not eat each other as in those more rudimentary times. But where the lowest type is to be the directing power, as in a fleet of warships the speed is regulated by the most backward units, so in such a communal society its progress must be regulated by its most backward units. Besides, its surrounding medium is the meat and drink of a community. And this retrogression toward barbarism would carry with it all the influence of such a medium that it has cost man so much to break away from. Modern psychology teaches us that society has to depend on its ideal, and the progress of this ideal is to be attributed to those members who have a wider grasp of the data supplied them by the social medium. This implies the encouragement of the individual to the highest development of his powers. But the object of latter day socialism is the direct reverse of this. Its object is the levelling of the natural inequalities. It is shown in practice in the action of many of our labour unions, and in theory by the supremacy of communism in modern socialism. Any other theory would imply the des-

potism of the numerous mass and the slavery of the abler members. But socialism is a "freeing of mankind" and a "breaking of the bonds." It is something of a difficulty to reconcile this with man as "belonging to the State" and perhaps this latter is to be left out of account. It gets a pretty vigorous teaching as a matter of fact. Only king *Demos* is in the new dispensation to wear the crown—of sacrifice as usual.

In this regimenting of industry to suppose that the freedom of the individual such as exists at the present day could be perpetuated is out of the question. No socialism pretends to any such idyllic condition of affairs. Their direct assertion is that it is the large number of drones who force the rest to work over time. How this may be in the effete monarchies of Europe we do not know, but to find the man in the United States of America who will admit that he is a drone and that he gets from society more than he is worth is to light upon a not very numerous class. Not numerous enough to bother about. For the socialist can hardly expect the lawyer, the lecturer, the artist, and hosts of professions that provide for men's needs and desires outside of the more immediate needs of food, clothing, and shelter, to accept any such definition of "producer" as he is ready to make. One ideal is to get rid of the lawyers, in which but little acquaintance is shown with the history of law, for the lawyer is simply a device to *equalize* men before the court. The only method of getting rid of such a "non-producing class" is to get men to cease quarreling, and as to this the socialists had first better set their own house in order and an example much needed by the world. As a matter of fact there would be just as many mouths to feed and desires to fulfill as ever, the only difference being that the stronger would do their toil for the benefit of the weaker. The work is there to be done and the surplus work to-day is the work of the strong. The weak now do all they can and the only change can be the sharing of the surplus of the strong by the weak, which is wisely limited under our present system. Shares are decided by worth to the community. A man is paid an enormous fee for his ability to succeed in doing what is required, and a man is paid a small wage because there is no difficulty in finding hosts of men capable of doing the same thing. If society did not encourage the man of ability it would still be living the life of savages, arrayed in a scowl and a breach-clout, and practising infanticide to keep within the limits of its subsistence. Socialism therefore never considers any extension of the right of the individual to use his discretion as to work. It allows him no surplus except for the benefit of the whole community. The rule is well laid down in the terms of its pronounced advocates. "If a man wants freedom "to work or not to work just as he likes, he had better emigrate "to Robinson Crusoe's island, or else become a millionaire. To "suppose that the industrial affairs of a complicated industrial "State can be run without strict subordination and discipline, "without obedience to orders, and without definite allowances for

"maintenance, is to dream, not of socialism but of anarchism."* The military spirit shines out here clear and strong and frank. No one is going to conceal from himself what is the soldier's duty. In a regimented system the orders must come from above and be carried out. We have enough of it in present day life, but the individual, if he will take the consequences, *can* break away from it. Under these conditions he cannot break away for it extends everywhere. There is therefore no such question as a voting democracy in such a system, any more than in an army. There must be either an extreme of local Government granted, which is anarchy—or individualism carried to outrageous excess; or there must be an extreme of centralization, socialism—which in the light of history is a despotism under the form of one or many. The other course is a regulated individualism to which the world has been steadily progressing through the centuries. Unless there is a positive agreement as to the range of the individual, and an enforcement of this range through the physical force reposed in the individual himself, and as shown in the balance of interests retaining that control in every democratic community, the individual cannot maintain his position. The transfer into every sphere of human life of that autocratic influence which democratic society deliberately throws over its courts of justice means the abnegation and the annihilation of the individual. There is no appeal for the individual to that abstraction known as the community. Every court-room puts this to the test.

The real strength of such a rule is found in the family, and socialism in rejecting the family as the basis of its levelling system—the only true level—must resort to the military system of regimentation. Entering on the experiment in the primitive stage of the national life the Old Japanese State had great advantages over latter-day socialism. It realized the value of the family for its own system grew naturally out of it. The question of leadership is not here at issue. It makes little difference whether it was a *dairi* and his court or a "boss" and "the boys." In theory no *individual* has any rights against the sovereign power, and the sovereign power is supposed to direct the State for the benefit of the whole. Equality was rigidly sought in the ranks, and hence the natural family was used as a basis as furnishing the two necessary qualifications of subordination and equality. The simplest and easiest method was to extend this family system to the communes, and from them to the trades. And the farther it removed from the natural basis the less efficiently it worked as a system of natural justice between man and man. Who could ever suspect that a system could go wrong in which strand was so interlaced with strand that it was impossible to find the exact point where human interest would begin to overbalance natural feeling? But it did go wrong. The dogma was guaranteed from above and was main-

* "Problems of Modern Industry" p. 277 Mr. and Mrs. Webb. But the whole passage is illuminating.

tained not by force—a handful of men cannot force a nation—but by education. The best rule; and as they have no check on them or on each other they rule very much as they please. But within the classes the socialistic ideal is very complete. There is an absolute theoretical equality often mistaken for democracy. The equality is the better controlled by the smallness and isolation of the communal units, in their turn better controlled by the dominant central power of the State. No community, if it wished, could break through the uniform rules laid down by the Central Government. The only inclination to break through such rules could come from the development of individualism, and hence individualism does not figure in this State. Both local commune and Central Government are interested in his suppression. And what has been the result? No material progress for fourteen hundred years, a paralysis of all originality, a universal espionage to discover the slightest abnormality, and a social ostracism of the most cruel character to suppress it. Submission of course is an absolute necessity. There is no life outside of the local commune. No escape from the dictation from above. Its centralization would arouse the envy of any socialist, so completely does it guard and control the integrity of the system.

And yet equality within the ranks could not be forced. Efficiency demanded inequality if the service of the State was to be suitably maintained. Human greed saw the advantage to it in such a system and grasped it. The result was a grinding social tyranny within these "wheels within wheels" such as the world has rarely seen. The representatives of the community guided the common weal with reference to nothing but the custom of which they had grasped the meat and had left the shell to the others. They met all the required forms and gave up none of the substance. Education, training, had blighted the public mind. The individual only existed to be suppressed. The farmers met together to present their protests and to take their flogging or other punishment. Occasionally a man was found to assert his individuality—as in the case of Sakura Sōgorō, who acting on his own responsibility thrust a petition into the Shōgun's litter—and then they crucified him and his family. To such an extent had the spirit of duty to a community driven men! And the effects are seen to-day. The lack of progress during the centuries was due to the uniformity of Japanese thought. As a nation this had left them so helpless that in 1867 they were confronted with the alternative of going to pieces before modern individualism or throwing overboard their old system and adopting that of the invader. Never was there a more shameful confession of failure than the change of front of Japan in the last half of the nineteenth century. And this result was due to the fact that there had been no inquiring mind to break away from the customary requirements. On the contrary the only question had been, "Does a proposition depart from the norm?" and savage suppression if it did. And yet there was no nation at every period of its history more watchful and

more jealous in preserving its national efficiency against outside communities. But it was not in the system to keep up with the world. It got out of touch with it and it needed Perry's fleet to bring it in touch again. In 1625 Europe and Japan were on even ground. Fortunately since 1625 Europe gave every impetus to individualism. And in 1867 at fresh contact the Japanese found themselves under the necessity of sending a collection of antiquated machinery—political and material—to the lumber pile.

Leadership under such conditions of centralization is of the gravest importance. The Japanese got the best they had available, on such terms. Their leaders were at least trained to lead. But under the socialist proposals the result is different. Because a few worthy and philanthropic gentlemen lose sight of the character of the proletariat there is no reason why others should do so. And the proletariat under any conditions are only fit to be led. Of the possibilities of such leadership we have the type. It must be based on the establishment of a dogma easily understood by the simplest mind and censorship of any teaching in reference to the dogma. This means of course the elimination of any elasticity. There is identity of type between socialistic theory and that illustrated in history by the Roman Church and by Old Japan; and from which the latter was freed by the interference of the West—the only method by which the crust of such a society ruled by custom can be broken. All its modern life Japan owes to individualism. The single voice was rarely raised before in its history. Hence it has few martyrs for it had few individuals. All this was the effect of education, and for the same reason we hear voices—socialistic voices—clamouring for the direction of education by the State, not under the direction of the State. There is no power now to suppress expression of opinion in a State where the individualistic theory rules of the least possible Government and the greatest individual friction in everything of private concern. But the socialistic State would have the power, and must direct education against individual expression. And the Power in such a State would make every effort to retain its power or else it would not be human.

The Japanese State started with the family and ended with the bureaucracy. It had a very high standard. Its extravagance was not that of mere selfishness. Perhaps there was less of the meanness of mere wealth and power seen in the history of the Japanese State than in any other. It mulcted the people to make them helpless, recognizing that riches would ask for power. In striking at the wealth of the *daimyō*, in keeping them poor, the Tokugawa Shōgunate kept in leash the whole nation. It drove things to the limit, but so will any Government. And with all their higher ideals they could not prevent the rankest rascality and graft, for the very extravagance of the system nurtured extravagances. Any socialistic system—an effort to maintain a level in Government—is the most expensive as to taxation in the world. To maintain a level it must take all it can

find in the range of vision. But one method could accomplish this—the military system. The army ideal—soldiership—runs all through the mental equipment of the Japanese of to-day. The actual unhappiness this can cause and has caused is unknowable. There is mental suffering in this constant suppression. Dull ignorance alone tolerates it. Many a fine Japanese mind must have worn itself out in its friction against the system. What relief it found was in the details of a most exquisite if grotesque art. But these are trifling matters in the mental history of a nation. Japanese literature is generally criticised as pessimistic. And why should it not be? These people had something the matter with them. They were suffering from cramp and did not know what was their trouble. Fortunately it was cramp and not paralysis. Old Japan killed its recalcitrants where New Japan simply isolates them, for modern ideas in Japan as elsewhere do not permit the “hanging of a clue for murder” or of an idea. But the old system is still in vigorous exercise, and it is the existence and the influence of the outside world that to-day gives the recalcitrant Japanese some breathing room. This is only in certain spheres, for otherwise the social intolerance against individualism is great and the alternative is to submit to the social pressure or the social ostracism. In the small Japanese communities to-day it is necessary for such men as cannot change their habitat to submit to the old iron despotic rule, to live and think and die as their forefathers in the village did before them—or get out. Any expression of opinion means to get out. Thus socialism slept and sleeps its hideous nightmare under these countless grass-thatched huts, evolving a civilization that artists have apotheosized because it could sketch in a few strokes of the brush a landscape bristling with “impressionism,” or could line in the ivory the minutest detail of facial expression. But what it could not evolve was happiness for its people or efficiency in the world strife. For that it must turn to its *units* because happiness is bound up in the unit, which can only secure its own happiness within the natural limits of restraint involving the happiness of others. And efficiency can only be effected through the efficiency of the units, for after all the State is an abstraction, the generalization of these units, and must be the average capacity of these units.

Socialism, of course, would raise a protest against comparison with the Japanese State. It would say that this Japanese State is a despotic State, a class State. Their State, on the contrary, would be by and for the People. Every effort to lighten labour would be encouraged and rewarded. This is simply a contradiction in terms. Industry cannot be given its reward for to do so is to give industry power and rule. In other words there would be no distinction between such a State and a democracy like the United States. The whole question in both cases coming down to effecting exact justice between man and man. It is not meant to say that industry did not find its reward in Old Japan. As a matter of fact the industrious did control these classes. Power

was naturally given to the man of good character, steadiness, and knowledge of affairs. Power cannot be granted to the inefficient. This carries with it the destruction of all. Any man on the attainment of these qualities was eligible to direct the affairs of the Japanese commune. But power granted to any, and unbalanced by the competition of outside interests reaching into the commune and forming a system of checks and balances, is certain to become centralized. This equality, this "democracy" of the Japanese commune, was a force. And the great mass of the community were easily subjected without any means of appeal from the dictum of the few men ruling the popular organization in the name of that abstraction known as "the commune." Furthermore the tendency in such a close corporation is for society to get set into its several ruts. And so the landowner, the tenant, the artisan, the merchant, the coolie, did get set into their several forms, and did garner in their appropriate reward. And there was no element to break the binding force of custom. Every influence, on the contrary, existed to make it set harder and firmer and prevent any outsider breaking into the charmed circle and sharing this reward. The ideal of true democracy is where every member of the community has his chance to use his powers to the best of his ability for his own advantage; provided he does not encroach on the rights of others. There is not a shadow of this in the Japanese commune. And in fact the only remedy for the tangle that ensues from the situation brought about in communes based on such principles is confiscation or modern democracy. The first is advocated by socialism, but in such case the community sinks back into an amorphous mass, with about as much capacity for progress as an *amoeba*, and ready to again fall a prey to the enterprising and repeat the old round. In spite of drawbacks the second has found successful operation in republican States, although the hindrance here is that the checks and balances of the social interests have not yet been perfectly effected. Indeed they probably never will be for new conditions continually arise calling for new adjustment. This in every sense of the word is Life. Without progress, in any complex organization, decay and death must ensue. In this last alternative the conditions for progress do exist.

Socialism says that there would be no cruel oppression under their system; only benevolent direction. The teaching of history is against them. Power everywhere is the same, and the more centralized it is the more hopeless is any redress. And it is no easy matter to arouse opposition. The actually helpless are not very numerous. Colbert's principle was to pluck the goose with the least amount of squealing. A Government can commit an immense amount of injustice provided it does not press too severely on too many points. In our modern democratic State, where the spirit of contract pervades the whole mass, Government cannot violate one interest without arousing the attention of other interests to any injustice at the base of such action. If Government violates the social contract in one direction it may

in another. Not so in a bureaucratic Government in which classification necessarily rules. They can with impunity press on any part it, near to the margin of living. There is no sense of contract here involved. The socialistic Colbert could pluck his industrious goose without the slightest reference to its squealing. Indeed, as to some extent to-day, with the open approval of that part of the community less industrious and hence not affected by the plucking process. It is interesting to see how the upper bureaucracy breeds the lower bureaucracies in these little Japanese communes. All representing Government over these isolated and small communes, the actual living (or starving) assured by the family system and by immoveability, the "submerged tenth" were absolutely helpless and disregarded under this Japanese socialistic system. This is a matter of history. The elimination of the individual, the responsibility limited within narrow circles, the tendency to regard all action as official and according to rule, seriously hindered the development of individual sympathy. It was allowed no range out of its class. Officialdom sets the rule for such action—sets it for good or ill—and as there is no appeal from its dictum the individual naturally accepts the result of such dictum as part of a law of Nature.

Socialism says that what the world needs is redistribution. Perhaps it does, but it is better and more justly effected under other schemes than socialism. This Japanese State needed redistribution badly. And such redistribution has in part been obtained. How? By the invasion of individualism, and just in so far as individualism has been hindered and prevented by the Bureaucracy and by custom just in so far have the old inequalities maintained their ground. Socialism says it will maintain by force the equality within the groups. No such equality exists to be maintained. The abler and better part of the community can be suppressed and that is just what is aimed at; but it is absurd to maintain this as a principle of equity. Natural ability places one man above another. He will do in four hours what takes another twelve hours to do. The socialistic State says that a man shall work for his exact needs. No accumulation is to be allowed except in so far as his infinitesimal share of the division of the surplus of his own work if he chooses to go beyond his needs. This simply implies idleness or slavery to the community. But the incapables are quickly marked off, even in the socialistic State. As a matter of fact only the "submerged tenth" are incapable. The desire to profit by natural capacity would again soon create inequality. Brawn cannot hope to control brains. The result could only be in one direction; the capture of society by a small class and under far more drastic terms than can exist under any other system.

As to progress, socialism says the world friction creates progress. But socialism is necessarily isolated. Its subjects are an item over which it must maintain rigid control. They could not be allowed to escape. This is all the more necessary as the

socialist State could not hope to compete with capitalist States where the limit of production is reached, and where capital (stored labour) is still retained as a productive element in the community. Perhaps there is here the secret of socialistic failures in the bad temper aroused by the exploiting of the abler members by the community, and the contrast with the greater opportunities in the capitalist State side by side with them. It does look as if socialism had not been able to stand the contact. Ability either seeks its opportunity if domineered by the community, or else it domineers the communal society.

Japanese "socialism" in the formal sense of the term hardly makes itself heard. There is an organization but its influence on Japanese political life is nil. Sometimes it makes a public demonstration, as in a recent attack on the offices and plant of a local electric railway company, the outcome of a socialistic demonstration in protest against raising the fares. But socialistic treatment of the individual is widespread and can be said as yet to be fundamental in the thought of the Japanese people. They do not realize the meaning of their advance since 1870 in which they have owed everything to men and nothing to the communes. The organization of the whole social scheme is socialistic; and its application becomes more and more severe as we come down in the scale. This society has no use for the individual. His rights or wrongs are not a matter of discussion. He is to obey those in authority over him, and the whole force of public opinion and public practice is exerted in this direction. The labour organization on this basis is very complete and very exclusive. The leaders have absolute power, for, as said, the community can rarely take the trouble to examine into the special application of any general principle. The Japanese artisan or workman is at the mercy of his union. He has no means of livelihood outside of it. The only degree in which this has been broken is in so far as foreign life enters into Japan. And how fortunate this entering wedge has been for Japan is represented by every advance gained in political power by the People. Comparatively speaking there is a political level in Japan for all power centres in the sovereign. Whoever controls the sovereign controls the country. It is not desirable that the sovereignty should be a despotism, benevolent or otherwise, whether single or socialistic. The sovereignty should be vested in the whole people not in a class. And the sovereignty can be maintained in the whole people by a nice checking and balancing of the various interests making up the livelihood of the people. All the tendencies of socialism are shown in the old Japanese State. With no balance a ruling bureaucracy milked the people to the extent of their capacity. To-day it is practically in the same position. A wider publicity of action, a greater national solidarity, the interlacing of interests, does not make the process so safe as before. This can only really be avoided by the balance provided in the modern individualistic State where the clashing interests must arrange some compromise or become shipwrecked on

anarchy. But in this respect the individualistic State can remedy its abuses, whereas socialism cannot.

It is in the wide spread of capital—the diffusion of stored labour, hence thrift, among all classes—that the safety of our modern society is to be ensured. The most desirable of capitalists is the workman capitalist, and in the United States there are hosts of him as the vast array of Savings Bank deposits and the numerous small land holders show. With the divergent interests operating on the individual the different classes of labour reach an adjustment of the proper proportion, thrift and industry strike a bargain. The battle to-day is not between Labour Trust and Capital Trust but between forms of labour. Capital—wealth reserved to feed the labourer until his product is marketed—has a strictly market value, easily ascertained by the rate of interest which rises in scale according to risk. Allowing for depreciation the real fight is over the running expenses. How much of this shall go to labour and how much to those managing the industry. As a rule this manager is also the capitalist, but his wages or pay in successful management are strictly speaking to be separated from the capital involved. The employer usually takes all the risks and labour none it should be added, and the long list of business failures show that the risk is a very real factor. The present remuneration of skilled manual labour as compared with brain labour represented by the clerk or small business manager calls for anything but dispute.* And now-a-days there is not only heard the din of battle between "capital" (the thousand small investors as capitalists) and labour (the thousand small investors as labourers) but there is also heard the din of battle between labour, no less bitterly and vehemently fought in both cases.† Of course in the contest between employers and labour great efforts are made to win public opinion over to one side or the other. And in this labour has a great advantage. The aims of the labour trust, however, their total indifference to the public interests, and their readiness to strike a bargain with the employers to secure a monopoly and squeeze the public become plainer and plainer with their growth in power. It is not to the interest of society to allow either or both to effect this object, and its prevention would seem possible by localization of the interests of both and thus ensuring competition over a wide area governed

* In April 1906 the outstanding wage disputes in Philadelphia were as follows:—elevator constructors demanded \$4.00 instead of \$3.75 a day: The Tile Layers union \$4.50 instead of \$4.40: and the Tile Layers Helpers' union \$2.50 instead of \$2.25: The Mosaic Workers \$4.00 instead of \$3.75: The Plasterers \$5.50 instead of \$4.50: The Bricklayers were granted \$5.00 instead of \$4.80, and with the exception of a compromise as to the plasterers the other rates in the main were granted.

† Thus Mr. Gompers, the head of a powerful amalgamated labour organization, is asked by employers to force the warring unions of a great city (Chicago) to a settlement of their internal disputes, or else a lock-out must follow. *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, 25 Oct., 1906.

by freedom of commerce. There is here a great advantage to society if the distribution of both is widespread and hence can balance conflicting interests. Labour direction and legislation for itself is as much class legislation as any other form. One form of socialism is of course popular among a certain class. To this class socialism means the confiscation of existing capital but does not mean its direct absorption by the community. The worker takes over the product of his work in fee simple. Thus the miner goes on mining coal, and disposing of it, and pocketing the proceeds of his labour. But he does not contemplate the community taking over the mines and treating him on the same old terms as an employé, and with far less rights and privileges to strike than before. This very sophistical and attractive form of socialism usually finds its exponents among the "spell-binders" at periods near election time. It is checked up of course by the common-sense of the community, but like perpetual motion and a flat earth it finds plenty of adherents unable to see the fallacy at the bottom of the argument. This "local" communistic form of socialism is found almost entirely among the foreign born element of the country.*

§ 14.

That there is a deep spirit of unrest stirring in the world at present is a shibboleth that has little application beyond the expression of a truism. All life is a flux; a constant adjustment; to-day no more so than at any other time and only accentuated to us because we are living in the midst of our present questions. But the whole history of the past is made up of just such unrest, which in truth is simply an indication of a vitality existing in human institutions. The spirit of unrest therefore does not mean necessarily any new phase in the world's history in the sense that sixty years ago in Werner's day geologists used the term "cataclysm." The long battles of scholasticism, the closer warfare of the Protestant Reformation, the growth of democratic government still so incomplete, are all exhibitions of the spirit of unrest, and without which our western communities would be sunk into the numbing sleep of eastern despotisms. Socialism is merely one phase of this restlessness, and not a new one. It has figured in the history of every people and with the same cause

* A fallacy by no means entertained by all socialists. In writing the above the sunny land of France was far from thought. I find, however, that a proposition like the above was made as to the French coal mines by M. Goblet "with the concurrence and support of the whole of the Socialist members of the Assembly" and "proposed as a socialist measure." Mr. and Mrs. Webb "Problems of Social Industry" p. 271. The clause "as I understand" is inserted by Mr. Webb.

and with the same fate. In Rome and Greece these uneasy movements of the proletariat found voice in the extremists advocating the wrongs of the lowest strata, and these ancient societies adjusted themselves to new conditions in the mass and with small reference to the views of the extremists. There is a form of idealism—undeniably grand if highly unpracticable—in the brotherhood of man. But it never obtained practical application even in the race which gave it birth. This idealism was in ancient times preached by the Hebrew prophets, and it is interesting to find in its latest exponent a man sprung from the same race. It was not to the wilderness but to crowded streets that Isaiah expounded the levelling ideas of prophetism, the hatred of wealth, the doctrine of mutual assistance, equality in life as well as in theory. But the Jews turned a deaf ear to his teaching and went on, as man everywhere has always done, worshipping the Calf of Gold. The cry "to your tents, O Israel!" was never heard except as a battle cry of faction in the struggle for wealth and power. The old simple life had no attraction. Carl Marx, the latest of these popular prophets, abandoned all questions of idealism and based his levelling principle on the strictly utilitarian idea of the greatest good of the greatest number, frankly accepting with prophetism the principle of force to maintain that level set by the community and beyond which nothing must sink and nothing must rise. In rejecting idealism perhaps he made a mistake. Statistics are far easier to deal with than sentiment.

Now, as Mr. Kidd has shown, on this ground the doctrine of Marx is irrefutable. It is not the economics, or the morals, or the efficiency of Marxism that is at issue. These have been shown time and again to be based on insufficient premises and to be illegitimate deductions drawn from such illogical bases. Even socialists pitch the greater part of the economics of Marx overboard. They admit capital—as necessary for future production on the existing scale; they admit rent of all kinds, of land, of ability, of opportunity—as necessary to equalize inequalities of Nature; they even admit economic interest as a constitutional element in profits.* Of course they confiscate

* "Economic interest" as defined by Mr. Webb ("Problems of Social Industry" p. 217) is not readily distinguished from interest on the loans he describes later (p. 227). For no matter under what form, or from what source or for how long, what interest attaches to is capital without reference to its source, and all interest seeks a level below which it ceases. The tendency of recent political economy seems to be to find the rent element in every factor of production—whether land, capital, or labour. As to interest there seems to be a general agreement to disagree as to its nature and a disposition to regard it not as a factor of distribution but as only affecting capital. It has been called "commuted profits" (Doctor Hadley). The subject is treated at length in Professor Fisher's "Nature of Capital and Income," where interest figures as a ratio between values (p. 185). Values are comparable, quantities are not so necessarily. They may differ in quality. And here seems to lie the distinction between expressing interest as a quantity and as a rate, for, as Mr. Webb (citing also Mr. George) pointed out,

all these to the use of the community and then expect the individual to make the same effort to maintain them as under the double incentive of an empty belly and the enjoyment of the fruits of his industry. "If a man wants freedom to work or not "to work just as he likes, he had better emigrate to Robinson "Crusoe's island," etc. But the crux lies just here—that if such a levelling principle will put a stop to the present strife in the competitive State; if the physical force (the majority) in the State can be brought to believe that by sacrificing efficiency and hence progress they will in some way escape the constant tendency to press on the means of subsistence, that in some way the whole community will be better led to diminish this ratio between the workers as to the national dividend, than when ignorance and recklessness only are left face to face with the problem of breeding in excess; then they will undoubtedly adopt such

common parlance transfers the above *ratio* into an equation dealing with quantities. This popular use of interest is decidedly illogical. Interest is of course as much a variable as income and capital of which it is a ratio. And the capitalist must thoroughly understand its possibilities. It is a speculation in the mind of the lender just as it is a speculation in the mind of the borrower. Not in a sense a gamble, but at times where confidently counted on, either or both do not figure at all at the finish except on the debit side of the individual's ledger. But Mr. Webb makes the tail wag the dog when he refuses interest anything but a subordinate part in the accumulation of capital. What is certain is that to obtain the use of capital it is necessary to pay interest on it, and it is this demand for capital that regulates its price. Interest is the factor of "effective desire of accumulation." It is a projection of the present into the future, and as such must figure in any system of production. Safety also is undoubtedly a prime factor in the disposition of capital, and can and does drive the rate of interest very low; but the miser and hoarder are not common, and hoarding, in withdrawing at times and in certain classes, funds much needed in business is always an unmitigated nuisance and at times disastrous—as every panic shows. And certain classes—through unfortunate ignorance—are in a chronic state of panic, and always prefer the cracked tea-pot to the bank. Hoards are not a basis of future production; because when it comes to losing one's money, the average man prefers to do it himself or demands compensation for risk. Risk is an element of every loan. As long as savings banks do pay interest the burden of proof would seem to be on Mr. Webb. Money in hoards is of no use to the business world. Banks dealing in *active mercantile* accounts in the United States pay no interest on deposits, but the equivalent is returned to their customers in accommodation. In this connection it can be readily admitted that business can be carried on without borrowing—and even extended by capitalising the profits, if any. Such business would be very limited. A man *thinks* he can extend his business and he effects a loan on the most favourable terms his security admits. The lender's business may already have reached the limit of its economic extension (as *per* Mr. Webb's formula). He may not want to engage in other occupations. He estimates the risk, and the security, and lends at the lower profit he *expects* in preference to extending his own operation or consuming unproductively. And every effort to prevent this has failed. The advanced ground in Mr. Webb's exposition (Jan. 1888) taken in establishing a "margin of cultivation" for capital and eliminating the unjust *onus* placed on land as something peculiar and apart from other instruments of production is worth noting.

a levelling principle if it brings no complications to them from outside the community, and will maintain by force forced labour and a forced maximum of labour if any attempt is to be made to retain efficiency or progress. For as Mr. Kidd has shown, this result is based on an equally irrefutable law that "the interests of the social organism and those of the individuals comprising it at any particular time are actually antagonistic, they never can be reconciled; they are inherently and essentially irreconcilable."* Which simply is to say that all the benefits of present sacrifice for future unborn generations are not going to call out a single unit of force from any existing individual. It is his own comfortable existence while he exists that is of importance to the individual. The double incentive of self-preservation and desire drive him on in the present competitive State. He must sink or swim. And in this constant selection of the best and submersion of the weakest society progresses. Strip him of these incentives and he is stripped of every incentive to those efforts which mean progress. But progress interests the future generations and he will not sacrifice the present to the future, which in set terms is a necessary consequence.

It can well be asked—Why has this never appealed to the minds of men? Why, if the struggle of life can be avoided, have not men tried to avoid it? This has always been an ideal. It is the basic and impracticable principle at the root of Christianity. Primitive Christianity was strictly and practically communism. "Go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come and follow me." No theory of communism could be more plainly expressed than in the words and teachings of Christ. But its extreme practice never reached or could reach beyond a little band of enthusiasts. It violates a natural law anything but well understood even now. Where there is a very simple adjustment to the surrounding environment—as in the *protozoa*—there can be a great persistency of type. Where the adjustment to the environment is complicated and must be very mobile—as with civilized man—there must be great change in type. Stagnation or retrogression in an advanced organism means decay and death. If there was a single community to deal with it is perhaps possible that some such stagnation as implied in the socialistic scheme could be put into effect, and that lazy individuals would be willing to put it into effect. But the social entity is not the exact reflection of any single unit which enters into its composition, and hence the social mind cannot put aside the future as can be done by the mind of any of its units. It perforce must think of this future and use a compelling force in its units to provide in the future for this progress which is to enable it to meet future competition of other communities. It is man's power of extension in time—his foresight—that in this respect has

* "Social Evolution" p. 84. Cf. also Mr. Spencers "Principles of Ethics" Chapters on Egoism and Altruism.

differentiated his communities from the communities of brutes, has enabled him to progress. It is this wider extension of the foresight that has given to civilized man his power over savage communities. Hence any attempts to enforce such communistic principles have met with defeat. This law has been beautifully expounded by Professor Fiske * in his theory of the evolution of mind which separates man from brute. Comte has remarked in the history of civilization the gradual substitution of altruism for egoism. Fiske, basing the first tendencies to sociality on the lengthening infancy of early simian man and hence the necessity of parental care, shows that this increased sociality—binding interest within the community—must reach a point at which all individualism within the community ceases. This means that communal stagnation such as is exemplified in the eastern State. And this has been the fate of every people except those Aryan races which succeeded in retaining enough of their communal interests to enable them to act efficiently against outsiders, but in developing their individuality so as to ensure a continuous and steady progress of the individuals within those communities. In other terms, what has ensured progress and the evolution of our modern State has been the instinct of social self-preservation, which in the aggregate has been too strong for the selfishness of the individual who would let the world come to an end—in say a hundred years—provided he and his immediate descendants had a comfortable enough time of it. “After us the deluge” applies to the units of every class in society. But this instinct of social self-preservation involves personal self-preservation because it sets the pace for the individual within its own limits and in terms that he is unable to avoid. Socialism by some theoretical Universal State which does away with competition between communities† tries to avoid this necessity of high efficiency and hence the operation of this law of social self-preservation, and it rejects the second law of personal self-preservation not recognizing that a social organization only exists in the psychical entity of its units, that the social mind—unlike the individual mind—is yet only the abstract expression of the summation of these individual minds. The history of society has been to follow the most effective units. In the East it has resulted in an alternation of despotism and bureaucracy. In the West this has been lightened in modern times by the rise of democracy, still standing on ticklish ground as shown by the cases of Venice and the French Republic already cited.

The question can at last be asked for a final answer—what is socialism? Its economics are defective, its morality questionable, its statecraft is idealistic.‡ What logical ground has

* “Cosmic Philosophy” Part II Chapter XXII.

† So that the German and Frenchman, the Russian and the Englishman, the American and the Japanese are no longer to take the best opportunity to cut each others' throats.

‡ Its ethics are treated by Mr. Belfort Bax. For instance “Outlooks from the New Standpoint” pp. 123-124.

it for existence? The answer is clear enough—it is a religion. We are indebted to Mr. Kidd for a valuable exposition of the importance of the ultra-rational element in religion, and an explanation of that undoubted softening of character that has been increasing altruism at the expense of egoism so constantly in our modern world, although this may be perhaps spoken of as ethical rather than as religious. This softening is of course not to be found in the ranks of socialism but in those of its opponents. A true ethics comes from above, not from below. The necessary idealism in the extension of that cosmic religion, that better understanding of natural law, which teaches us that sin and misery is due to mal-adjustment and is not to be avoided by any other means of repentance than by conformity to the environment.* Improvement in man's condition must therefore

* See Fiske's "Cosmic Philosophy" Part III, Chapter V, Religion as Adjustment.

What is implied in this altruism as described by Mr. Kidd is a public movement toward the elimination of unfair advantages in the competition of life. This would not, however, mitigate the struggle of life. The evolutionary process admits of no such alleviation. Competition is the very life-blood of the forward movement of humanity; and is what prevents retrogression, for it is not likely that such a complex structure as human society could stand still. It can be seen what a fundamental opposition there is between this natural law and the great principle which lies at the bottom of the socialistic movement in the whole of its history from the earliest times—that is, that all competition must cease. In speaking of altruism as prevalent in existing society it is not then meant that society will organize as a huge charity movement with its mainspring as this altruistic feeling. This would simply mean auto-poisoning for any society. And yet such is the organization and the acknowledged goal of socialism. Its idea is to exploit the strong for the benefit of the more numerous incapables. That is the intention of their argument that the strong owe nothing to intrinsic qualities granted by Nature, and everything to the inheritance from the past which is due only to the social organization. At least that is the result of the communistic theory of the Marxists; and these to-day govern the socialist movement. The Fabians and kindred "high collar" socialists do not count. If the socialists were carried to the top by a revolutionary movement, it would merely be a matter of time when these worthies also would figure, in American political parlance, "outside the breastworks"—or on a lamp-post; for the least acquaintance with the material behind the leaders of the socialist-anarchist movement of continental Europe leaves small idea of anything but a repetition of the French Terror, if it should come to the surface. The latter-day Jacobins would make short work of this Girondist movement in the party ranks. In conclusion it can be said that much has been added to the social inheritance since the sixteenth century, but not even from the socialist ranks has the world been furnished with another Shakespeare. The social medium is merely the (night) soil in which genius and ability flourish. And richness of such soil is no criterion of the plant, human or any other kind. The most beautiful orchids do not flourish in the richest soil. Toadstools—the Marats of vegetable life—spring from vegetable mould; and mushrooms, their mildly useful first cousins, are nourished and grown on the dung heap. The dialectic of socialism delights in paradox, of which this question of the origin of genius is by no means the only example, although it is one of the flimsiest pretences of the propaganda.

be accompanied by better adjustment of all to the environment. The powerful spur this gives to altruism, the recognized helplessness of ignorance continually sinning through ignorance, is perhaps an explanation of how heartily this element enters into schemes of regeneration that are perhaps directly against their own interests. They recognize the necessity of self-sacrifice to cause any permanent rise in the condition of the mass. But this is not ultra-rational. It is highly rational. Highly rational whether God be called "Jehovah" or "Cosmic Spirit." Socialism however, although a religion as being ultra-rational, rejects any such adventitious aid. It claims to base itself on purely "materialistic science," whatever that is. It would be interesting to estimate just how much Marx and his contemporaries owed to the Philosophie Positive. Marx was a child of the Revolution of 1848, (he was born in 1818) and his scheme if it does not actually adopt Comte's "Religion of humanity" does not at least go beyond the Positive Philosophy by recognizing the wider range of an unknowable reality. Now the Positive Philosophy by confining its investigation of the phenomenal strictly within the limits of the several sciences entirely failed to grasp the importance of the interdependence of all the sciences on each other. Sociology therefore as a science was capable of interpretation within its own narrow limits and without reference to any of the principles found to rule in the other natural sciences. It is this spirit of exclusivism—particularly a rejection and hatred of the biological law of evolution—that has ruled the propaganda of modern socialism. It has always rested on the empiricism of Comte. But the last thing that bothers a religion is a scientific basis, and any basis of socialism in so far as it rests even on the defective science of the days of Comte has been torn into ribbons, and any scheme it proposes to-day is either unthinkable or is a mere adaptation of methods to which the world has been drifting without any thought of the dead level of socialism. There is presented therefore the paradox of a religion posing as a science and yet rejecting all the teaching of science. The question, however, can be asked—is any religion consistent? Do people believe in a religion because of its consistency? Certainly not. In Christianity, for instance, any attempt to show inconsistency was met by persecution not by argument.*

To attempt to meet socialism by argument in the ordinary sense is therefore out of the question. The man on the other side of the fence holds a dogma against which any kind of proof of refutation is impious. The argument must be conducted on his premises or not at all. This enthusiast is therefore just as hopeless timber for conversion as any neophyte of early Christianity, or any preaching friar of mediaevalism, or any hysterical revivalist of to-day. As little is he to be met by persecution or denunciation. This only attracts people to his defence, especially

* Marx accepts the Hegelian dialectic in that whereas Hegel "stood it on its head," he (Marx) "stood it on its feet;" whether Hegel would appreciate the materialism of Marx is perhaps doubtful.

when he tells every man how badly he—his defender—is treated by society, and how he is really preaching his crusade. Such unreason as a religious propaganda must therefore be met by other weapons. The cold dissection of the ridiculous, the accentuation of the incongruities of its dogmas and the absurdities of its practice, and above all encouragement to test these visions on a small scale—they are sure to fail on either large or small scale—and a careful dissection of these failures, are worth tons of argument and are the real reason why Utopia is as far off as ever.* And there is always the cold test of personal appeal to the individual case: "You, John Jones, earn 800 or 1000 dollars a year. And you deserve it. James Smith digs ditches and earns 300 dollars a year. And he deserves it. Now are you willing to relax your efforts and desires and come to the level of James Smith? Or are you willing to increase your efforts for the benefit of James Smith's desires?" It makes no difference where you take up the scale, the slowest unit of the socialist fleet must set the pace and *everyone* must take the consequences. It has been maintained that there is a limit to this determination of altruism. Where that limit will be fixed will be determined by society which must suffer if it strikes at the efficiency of its constituent units. For there is another question involved here. It is possible—as socialism proposes—to confiscate the present plant as capital to be used in future

* Lucian in "The Sects" "The Double Accusation," and elsewhere pays his compliments to philosophers of his day in anything but flattering terms. They did not practise what they preached, for the excellent reason that they recognized that the preaching was theory but the actual present offered them things far more substantial. In plain terms they intended to run no risk of any possible mistake in theory as far as its practice applied to themselves. But that did not prevent their preaching—and a pretty good thing they made out of it, and a good time (according to their lights) they had of it—a lively time anyhow. Now this is not unlike the course of those worthy latter-day socialists who deny the validity of their principles on anything but a universal scale. If human nature is such that the operation and consequent happiness and progress on the socialistic plan can be secured to any society, its successful operation can be as well secured on a small as well as on a large scale; and the less successful capitalistic societies would soon boast of nothing but capitalists sitting amid the ruins of their idle machinery. The only charge then to bring against consistent socialist failures of the past two thousand years would be the exceedingly poor timber found in the rank and file of the party—for the leaders are the wisest of the wise men, in the demonstration of what does not exist. It would seem harsh, however, to compare the rank and file with that species within human society which spends its time in wearing out the macadam, when perhaps the defect does lie in the quality or the value placed on leadership. The principle of universalism is, however, a wise if not logical basis of conduct. Its advocates know that they are not likely to be called on to put their more levelling principles in practice. Meanwhile they gain no little notoriety, with the chance to profit by any hurly-burly attendant on "the great strike. Let us admit that there are genuine preachers of the propaganda—but they figure in the political movement, not in the exposition of a worn out economic fallacy figuring as "*scientific socialism*."

production. This is conveniently done on the ground that the plant is the product of the workers and that no wrong is done in such confiscation, overlooking the fact that the plant is the production of thrift and of a brain and not solely of the workers who have been paid their share, and that it would never have come into existence without thrift and brain; and that without brain men would still remain in the condition of wandering savagery in which a hundred square miles were needed for the support of a half score of families and not of a great city, and hence on whom the Law of Malthus pressed with immediate severity. But ask John Jones how he is going to continue this plant. Socialism can only answer by the lash or the goad to force brains to work for the equal income. An empty belly can and does to-day force a man to work. But could brains be forced to do so? They are a subtle and invisible thing. There is no testing machine or Bertillon system to measure their capacity or even to detect their presence. Neither James Smith nor socialism can answer this question of management in the present or future. Competition and reward—natural inequality—alone can secure the ablest, and James Smith has multiplied himself to a point where he must have brains in command. The answer of John Jones to all this would not be very doubtful. He might be willing to pull down everything above him to his own level, but he is just the man who is unwilling to work for the benefit and behoof of James Smith. And that, in fact, is pretty much the way that man in society has always tried to answer these questions. Democracy to-day is the result of a long appeal to experience from the results of communism, despotism, government by class. "*Laissez aller, laissez faire*" within reasonable limits; the term *laissez faire* being used as carried out under the conditions laid down for all by a social organization. Subject to the conditions competition should be of the most unrestrained character; equality before the law in every sense of the word. The "submerged tenth" really are the "submerged tenth." In Great Britain they are placed at the respectable figure of three millions in a population of forty two-millions. For its own sake society has a very real problem in this "tenth" and one that must be dealt with; but society treats it at least as tenderly as avowed socialists. "What we socialists are after is not any clearing out from our midst of those unfortunates who form the reserve army of Labour, even if this were possible, but the organization of public services in such a way that no such reserve army shall exist."* Exactly, but not by pauperizing the rest of the community or by sending the tenth to Robinson Crusoe's island under strict segregation of the sexes. If anything, instead of a vast eleemosynary institution society is to narrow the field of philanthropy in this direction, restricting this latter to cases of real misfortune, for otherwise as much harm can be done in the ceaseless propagation of these useless com-

* Mr. and Mrs. Webb "Problems of Social Industry" p. 268.

petitioners in the world struggle as any good obtained by the widening of the range of humanitarian principles. And there remains always the appeal to the feeling of nationality and the importance of national strength. Race prejudice has died out from the western world, but national rivalries still are strong and handicap is fatal. The brotherhood of man is a very beautiful dream, but the actually existing relation is at best one of a distant cousinship. The workers all over the world have a deserved sympathy for each other, not as brothers but as workers. This sympathy, however, does not extend to having the "submerged tenth" or the unrestrained breeding of another nation dumped down for it, directly or indirectly, to carry in addition to its own burdens—and that is what the "brotherhood" idea often means, and particularly means in the socialistic sense. The proletariat—"submerged tenth"—is a very real question in every country, affecting the efficiency of the workers, and will be a question as long as international competition does exist, and until the American stands more ready than he does now to shoulder the European "tenth" as well as his own.*

Looked at in the cold light of the evolution of history the communistic or levelling programme of socialism can be viewed without alarm. The fierce desire for personal freedom in the western Aryan has such strong hold to-day that much of the resentment of the workers is because they want direction to lie absolutely in each man's hands as far as he is concerned. They want "freedom to work or not to work" just as they like. Thus one youthful socialist in a newspaper article under the writer's eye sketches the millenium of the future State. This of course can only fall to those who do not live from hand to mouth but sacrifice for to-day in laying up for to-morrow. But in such socialists the last idea is that of a military discipline. That society should make new adjustments to new conditions not hitherto dreamed of in its philosophy; that it should take a special stand to employers trusts and labour trusts different from what it took to individuals, goes without saying. This is an adjustment to its environment and necessary for its preservation. And as Mr. Kidd says—"hence the general tendency must be expected to be towards state interference and state control on a greatly "extended scale rather than toward state management."† Now there is here no change in position. Politics and economics are matters of cold reason and guided by the experience. All the

* "*Proletarius*—One of the poorer class of Roman citizens, who, on account of their poverty, could only serve the State by their children, without contributing to the revenue—(Cicero)"—Anthon's "Latin-English Dictionary." This is not the definition of the modern workman—except as adopted by Social Democracy for reasons of propaganda by sentiment.

† "Social Evolution" p. 223, "*Demos*," so much heard of, in democratic Athens never was greater than twenty thousand qualified to act. This wise provision of limitation was to avoid what Polybius calls ochlocracy and cheirocracy ("mob rule and fist law.")

emotionalism, which is the essence of a religion, is out of place. But strip Marxism of this emotionalism, this impassioned plea for society to take up and support the incapable, this sharing of national income of the capable with the incapable, and this is exactly what is left. Society then remains as a grand eleemosynary institution. It has voluntarily been stripped of its strength to save the refuse. Great is *demos* and certain to be heard; but the voice of *demos* is the voice of many units, and it is only necessary to ensure that these units be heard, and that the united voice be not captured by a small and noisy minority, to establish the sure and onward tread of experience not of experiment. The individual in *demos* is the psychical unit, and to paralyse him by any dogma of "social level" and "equality of income" simply means slavery or the paralysis of progress. Even the proposition of such a dogma marks the rule of emotionalism. No pretence of materialism can save it. They impale themselves on the dilemma of forced altruism or forced degradation. And this dilemma has been seen. Only in phrases of "ultimately approximate equality of income" or "allowance for maintenance . . . not according to the state of the labour market, but by consideration of the cost of living" is the cloven hoof allowed to appear, and socialism eagerly throws itself into every scheme of social amelioration to claim as its own what is strictly against its fundamental principles. Society needs all the help it can get, and as long as there is degradation to point to there will always be the calamity prophets to point to and exaggerate it. It does savour of "sweet unreasonableness" of course to find Mr. John Stuart Mill, who, (as a philosopher) speaks approvingly of the altruistic sentiment found in socialism as contrasted with an egoistic utilitarianism so common among men, who speaks disapprovingly (as an economist) of communism and who finds the practicability of both altruism and efficiency in the existing system, loudly claimed as a socialist, or to find Professor Huxley enlisted in the same band because he expressed discontent with some features of modern society. Mr. Spencer's disclaimer of any connection is too fresh in the public mind to place him on the socialist pedestal of its great men, although the movement seems to be on foot to plant him in a niche somewhere. These little idiosyncrasies, however, can be forgiven for they are a legitimate part of the customary theological armour in other fields of kindred controversy.*

* The claim to Mill as a socialist (and as a political economist) is based on the famous chapters on "property" (Book II, Chaps 1 and 2.), of which the first two sections are the portion from which socialists take comfort. In the third section however Mill begins to give his economic views which meet with anything but endorsement from socialism; especially as Mill advocates liberty, inheritance, bequest, and property in land—all be it added with the limitations as he there lays down. Mr. Mill the philosopher and philanthropist arguing from the view-point of an altruistic utilitarianism, and Mr. Mill the political economist are of course to be distinguished; or in his own words—: "So much on the institution of property, a subject

In other words socialism—"scientific socialism"—having come down from the clouds of Utopia finds, just as with any other religion, that it is necessary to modify its tenets to fit modern practice. Now socialism is really an extreme phase of a practice long in operation. It is a forgotten revival. Put into practice its one real tenet—levelling communism—and there is a distinct retrogression of type. This men will not look at. It is necessary therefore to mix this with present day practice. Hence in socialism itself a segregation of its phases. The stronger and more practical element simply become extremists in the existing movement which is regulating the *new* features of its industrial world. These gentlemen conveniently push the levelling operation off into the next millenium. The radical element is put by them in the back ground and revolutionary socialism is less and less heard of—in Anglo-Saxondom at all events.

"of which, for the purposes of political economy, it was indispensable to treat, but on which we could not usefully confine ourselves to economic considerations." For an estimate of Mill's political economy as socialistic, made by the great apostle of socialism, see Marx's "Capital" p. 625 seq.—"On the level plain, simple mounds look like hills; and the imbecile flatness of the present bourgeoisie is to be measured by the altitude of its great intellects." In fact Mill is decidedly removed from the shibboleth of latter day socialism—all competition must cease. Speaking of the desirability of co-operation and creating in the worker a real interest in the work he says (Bk. IV. Chap VII, § 7)—"I agree and sympathize with Socialists in this practical portion of their aims, I utterly dissent from the most conspicuous and vehement part of their teaching, their declamations against competition. . . . They forget that wherever competition is not, monopoly is, and that monopoly, in all its forms, is the taxation of the industrious for the support of indolence, if not plunder. . . . To be protected against competition is to be protected in idleness, in mental dulness," etc. For his references to Malthus cf. "Political Economy" Bk. I Chap. X § 2, 3; Chap. XIII § 2; Bk. II Chap. VII § 3; Bk. IV Chap. VI, Chap. VII § 7, Bk. V Chap. III § 6: On property—Bk. I Chap. VII, § 6, Bk. VII Chap. I § 3, Chap. VI § 6 note: On Land—Bk. I Chap. II § 2; Bk. II Chap. VI to VIII: On Distribution (Wages, Rent, and Profits) Bk. III Chap. XXVI; Bk. IV Chap. III: On Taxation—Bk. V Chap. II § 3, 4: On Socialism and kindred matters Bk. II Chaps. I and II; Bk. IV Chap. VI § 2, Chap. VII § 7; Bk. V Chap. VIII § 1, 2; Chap. IX § 2, 5; Chap. X § 6: On Limits of Government Bk. V Chap. XI, the essay "On Liberty": On sappy humanity *versus* Justice, Bk. V, Chap. IX, § 8. As said above, Mr. Mill the altruist is to be distinguished from Mr. Mill the economist, which perhaps accounts for his depreciation of the Family (Bk. IV, Chap. VII § 4). The family does not foster the extreme of altruism, whether genuine as typified by the real Mr. Howard or fictitious as typified by Mrs. Jellyby. The family is a strictly common-sense institution of long standing. From the altruistic point of view many can and will approve (with limitations) any elevated principles that may be found in socialism. The State, however, deals with Justice not with Altruism. Any attempt to force this latter on the community is at the expense of the former. In this connection it can be said that until Justice is made equivalent to Altruism it will not be found possible to bring the Synthetic Philosophy of Mr. Spencer to the support of any such scheme as socialism.

Now the reason for this is clear. The brotherhood of man is decidedly far off. Battleships and armour plate and national efficiency will long be in demand. We must remain Nationals—as yet anyhow. To do this we cannot lose the efficiency of the individuals. Nature's laws are supreme and those men who have made that adjustment the most perfectly are the most valuable. Hence the process is no longer to be one of revolution. Gradually by taxation is the capable to be reduced to a level to meet the incapable raised at his expense; as if the former will not be quick to detect the burden as soon as it descends far enough, and to take alarm at the principle long before it has personal application. This is the programme and a skilful one it is. It differs from the programme of our existing social system which aims at spurring the individual on by every incentive to greater effort and is ready to limit its exactions by an altruism governed by the limit to which society is willing to go *with its eyes open* in the relief of its incapables. Socialism, however, is going on the principle of how much it can pluck from the goose without suspicion on the part of the goose. It is notorious that a society will spend all it can safely get out of its constituent units. National budgets steadily grow. Extravagance is no restraining object to the socialist. "Spend all you can safely levy." But the goose, like the ass, has a very undeserved reputation for folly. In the East the quadruped is the epitome of wisdom, and the biped is said to have saved the Capitol of infant Rome. The limit of altruism is reached by that delicate thermometer—the pocket of the tax-payer; and socialistic extravagance meets with its due reward as in the metropolis of London. "Obedience to the 'so-called 'laws of Nature,' which are the decrees of God, is 'therefore the fundamental principle of religion viewed practically'" Professor Fiske tells us. Now it is a law of Nature to work through the individual, and it is a law of sociology to work through his pocket-book. Deprived as yet of the compelling force of a centralized bureaucracy the socialists got a very exact measure of the limits of altruism in reference to the "submerged tenth" of the British metropolis.†

† "A healthy habit of confiscation" (a socialist dictum quoted by Mr. Bagehot—"Economic Studies," p. 85, Silver Lib. Ed.) The method of confiscation by taxation—spurring the individual on with the expressed intention of granting to each the reward of his labour, and the unexpressed intention of seizing as much of it for the use of the incapable as public opinion later may sanction—is of course simply another form of getting money under false pretences. The principle has a wide sweep even in the present taxation. After all, Justice—the foundation of ethics—ought to rule public life, even if it does not.

It is the belief and hope of the writer that the State, at least in America and the English colonies, is tending to that form of individual freedom under law described by Mr. Herbert Spencer as "voluntary co-operation," rather than to such a retrograde form of communal compulsion as contemplated by socialism; and the crushing force of which can be thoroughly appreciated by anyone who has lived in contact with such communities surviving as the dominant form in the

Long may such watchfulness—the corollary of freedom—be a feature in the body politic of Anglo-Saxondom! What the public wants to know is what are the principles at the base of a man's action; what he thinks, not what he says. This is important when a community must act through its representative man, to whom it must leave that freedom of action necessary to meet contingent conditions. The probable fate of socialism will be that of all other movements for reform, which to have any support must have some basis in fact. What is good will be calmly appropriated by society. The socialist himself will be left to kick his heels out in the political cold. The Anglo-Saxon is very quick to take a hint and rarely lets a breach in his body politic get beyond control. His institutions are a growth and hence well understood by him. He can see their uses as well as their defects, and is not disposed to throw away the useful for the theoretical. He will get in ahead and avoid the reaction. It is the practical not the theoretical man that bothers him. It is the reformation of a palpable abuse that interests him not idealistic

East, still ruled by that impersonal public opinion known as the organized commune. Without agreeing therefore with Mr. Kirkup that society in Anglo-Saxondom is tending to socialism in some form, one can agree with him that in this world progress to an ideal system of justice guiding and guarding human endeavour "it is not a paradox but the plain truth that socialists are now the greatest obstacle to the progress of their ideal." It should be added that he admits the difficulty of the population problem, almost insuperable with the existing ignorance of the great mass of the lower classes, and also he admits the validity of Natural Selection and survival of the Fittest as the governing laws of Evolution. In fact socialism cannot be adjusted either to the philosophy of Mr. Spencer, or that of Mr. Darwin. And it can be added that evolution does not mean progress except by survival of the fittest. Just the opposite is assumed usually by socialists or by writers with socialistic tendencies. Professor Ritchie (Natural Rights p. 111) criticises Mr. Benjamin Kidd's "Social Evolution" as involved in a confusion on this point. The Weismannism of Mr. Kidd, however, is at least consistent; and this only implies that in complex organisations there must be change, forward or backward, they cannot stand still. Mr. Kidd states this clearly. In fact Mr. Spencer's original formula is safe enough. "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." If we take this in connection with the corollary from the law of equilibration, that "the evolution of every aggregate must go on until this *equilibrium mobile* is established," and corollate it with the practically unthinkable period of time required for the establishment of such an *equilibrium mobile* in general terms of the Universe, we need not trouble about any doctrine of perfection, whether philosophical or theological. "Social Evolution," however, is open to criticism in making religion the dominating factor, and accentuating what seems to be a secondary factor as compared with the mainspring of all human action, self-preservation. Always admitting the influence of secondary factors, such as religion, in natural selection. Thus, to quote an example from Professor Ritchie, "cannibalism, which is in most cases connected with religion, has produced the 'survival of the toughest.'" (Cf. "Studies in Political and Social

schemes. "Pipe dreams" he is likely to call them. If coarse he is practical, and the sting taken out of his own wounds he watches his neighbours writhing. This was the case with England and America in reference to the French Revolution. French liberty, by allowing the "submerged tenth" to take control of the State, paid the bill by sinking back into Imperialism. It is not individualism that is at fault. Regeneration must come through individualism. Socialism itself is an example for it owes everything to individualism. The community can restrain capital from injurious development just as it can restrain the individual. It knows the cost to itself in going too far in either case. It can grant exact justice to all without robbing anyone of the fruits of his labour. The socialistic dictum that Liberalism has put the world in the hands of capital; that labour, art, brains, all must bow down to the Golden Calf, is not true. The statement is rhetorical. It is one sided and hence is logically vitiated.

"Ethics," p. 17; the Essay on Evolution treats religion as an important but secondary factor in evolution). Mr. Kidd, be it said, regards religion as ultra-rational, not irrational. Socialism in its effort to maintain the unfit is a degeneration from the view point of evolution. It is also possible to dissent from Mr. Kirkup's opinion of Ricardo as "a man singularly deficient in the requisite historical and philosophical training." Professor Marshall has pointed out how Ricardo has been misunderstood by his successors, and the reason for such misconstruction. (Cf. Kirkup's "History of Socialism" Chap. XII, pp. 375, 376, 385; Marshall's "Principles of Economics" pp. 61, 176, 240-3, 451, 561-70, 575-77, 632-3, 719-23.

It should be added that Ricardo is silent as to the time factor in reference to value (in general) as due to labour (in general). There is no necessity for him to be otherwise. When, however, he has to distinguish between the effects of different kinds of labour—as in discussing fixed and circulating capital—he emphasizes strongly the importance of the time factor (Principles of Political Economy, Chap. I, Sect. IV). Marx emphatically denies the effect of the time factor as in any way creating value. "The general law is that all expenses of circulation, which arise only from changes of form do not add any value to the commodities." There is no necessity to father the vagaries of Marx on Ricardo.

APPENDIX.

I give below some of the municipal taxes—*shizei*—of Yokohama, for the current year 1908. The tendency is to a rising scale of such taxes; a proposition being on foot to increase the below taxes or levy new ones. Although determined from year to year, as a matter of practice they are practically permanent on these lines. In addition there are also the ken (district) taxes throwing their protecting influence over part at least of the same range. And over all is the aegis of the Central Government, with its monopoly taxation of tobacco, sugar, salt, etc.; its direct and indirect taxation through a most comprehensive customs tariff, and through mercantile, license, and business taxes; its monopoly of transportation; and blanketing the whole a most complete and inquisitorial progressive tax on all incomes of 300 yen (\$150.00 or £30.00) and over. These taxes are to be taken in connection with the earnings of the labouring classes—(Resumé Statistique)—and with the income tax returns and voting lists. A direct national tax to the amount of ten yen entitles the assessed person to a vote. Yokohama, with 350,000 population, has a voting list of 5,000. As in all taxation there is attempt at evasion; and equally skilled effort to prevent such evasion. This list is not meant to be complete. Many trades and occupations are not mentioned, and all private house taxes—even a patch of flower bed is carefully measured—are entirely omitted.

Figures represent yen, or fractions thereof, tax paid on 100 yen; unless otherwise stated.

Business involved	Wholesale	Retail	Realty Capitalised (by rental value)	Capital	Insurance or Guaranty	Compensation	Revenue
General and Sundry	0.19	0.63	1.46	—	—	—	—
Money Loans, Goods loans, money exchange	—	—	1.46	0.80	—	—	—
Transportation	—	—	—	0.19	—	—	—
Building, workman	—	—	—	—	0.17	—	—
Lodging houses and inns	—	—	3.60	—	—	—	—
Intelligence offices, <i>nakodo</i> or marri- age brokers, brokers	—	—	—	—	—	3.5	—
Manufacturers, printing, photogra- phers	—	—	1.46	0.60	—	—	—
Restaurants, eating stands, tea houses, theatre teahouses, house boats ...	—	—	5.50	—	—	—	—
Bath houses, barbers (on every 10 yen)	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.15

It is evident the same goods and services are caught more than once even in these *shizei*: So also with the *tatemono chinkashi kingaku*—translated above “Realty Capitalised” for in addition there is a house tax (of several kinds) paid by landlords of rented houses. The term “capitalised” is used in Professor Irving Fisher’s sense of “stock” the value of which is determined by the income or “flow” of services therefrom.

The following *shizei* are monthly rates: geisha houses, full grown girl 0.80, child, 0.40; eating places employing several servants, 2.40; one man, 1.20 (practically the push-cart man); dancing schools, 1.20 to 2.40; dancing teachers, 1.20; wrestlers and umpires, 0.40; actors, 0.75; men geisha, 6.00, (Yoshiwara); geisha, full grown girls, 6.00 to 8.00; children, 3.00 to 4.50 (not in geisha houses); servant girls in restaurants and eating places, 1.0; ditto in house boats, tea-houses, theatre tea-houses, 0.50; stalls in market places, Minato-cho fish, flesh and fowl market 44.00, other places 2.00 to 7.20; theatre, per *tsubo* (36 square feet), 0.048; travelling outside shows, per *tsubo* 0.024; panorama per *tsubo*, 0.024; entertainment halls per *tsubo* 0.136; sports, etc., billiards, 4.80; target shooting and other games, 3.40; carriages for hire, two horse, 19.00, one horse, 12.80; luggage and freight horse vans, 6.00 to 8.00; jinricksha, double 3.50, single 2.80; freight and luggage carts, 2.26; bicycles, 3.00; automobiles, 18.00.

The following *shizei* are yearly taxes: railway and electric cars per ken (6 feet) 0.14, private cars, 0.02 to 0.05; skiffs cargo-boats, river-boats under 50 tons burden, 48 feet 4.00, 42 feet 3.50, 36 feet 2.90, 30 feet 2.30, 24 feet 1.70, 18 feet 1.16, under 18 feet 0.88; junks 1,000 to 50 tons burden 4.00 per 100 tons; foreign style coasting boats, steamships over 500 tons 18.00 per 100 tons, under 500 tons 25.00 per 100 tons; sailing-ships over 500 tons 16.00 per 100 tons, under 500 tons 20.00 per 100 tons; launches, 3.00; riding-horses, 4.80; dogs, 1.00; cattle, 0.70; horse, 0.35; sheep or pig, 0.17; electric, telegraph, telephone instruments for hire, 3.00; hunting licenses, 0.40 to 4.00.

Rural taxes have also interest. I select a tiny property in the country district of eastern Japan. The total value, I am informed, is about 300 yen; and the "farm" yields rice with a sale price on the spot of about 25 to 35 yen according as the year is lean or good. The taxes (ranging from 0.13 to 6.00 yen) together sum up to 13 yen yearly, and are so split up that the tax receipts bunched together look like a strayed letter from the Japanese post-office, in which every failure to deliver is faithfully recorded by a fresh and additional tag attached.

These taxes would seem to deserve the name of catholic, reaching into every cranny of the peoples' lives. It is of course true that a *kurumaya* (jinricksha runner) finally shifts his tax on the consumer, and himself consumes little in the way of jinricksha rides. But he is a consumer in many other directions, and wherever he turns he finds himself taxed. Ideas on this subject of taxation are supposed to be vague or well-defined according to the Japanophobe or the Japanophile tendencies of the critic. Where brickbats are flying it is as hard to find a *via media* as was ever the experience of a late eminent ecclesiastic. Thus an editorial writer in the Japan Mail (June 16) says that the Japanese labourer pays "virtually nothing at all" in the way of taxes, and that "in very few countries are the labouring classes so little troubled by taxation as in Japan," which arouses in the minds of his readers the question what does he understand by "a tax"? and why has the price of rice and of other necessities—as indexed by enhanced cost of labour in wages—increased so enormously in the past two years? Some of the above taxes on amusements might well be raised to a prohibitive rate—to drive them out of existence, *hokan* for instance.—1903.

VII.

PEOPLE AND POLITICS.*

"Man is a machine made expressly for sorrow; he has only five senses with which to receive pleasure, and suffering comes to him through the whole surface of his body; in whatever spot he is pricked, he bleeds; in whatever spot he is burned, he blisters. . . . You have not a nerve, a muscle, a sinew under your skin that cannot make you howl with pain."

"Reason" said my uncle "amounts to nothing; it is simply the power of feeling present evils and remembering them. The privilege of abdicating one's reason is the only thing of value."

My Uncle Benjamin (Tucker's translation).

§ 1.

"The Revolution of 1867;" let us stop for a moment to examine this term. We speak of the Revolution of 1688; really the end of the war waged for over sixty years between the king and the parliament, and resulting in the establishment of a great and new principle—that a new element, the British people in parliament, were henceforth the rulers of the land. So of the American Revolution; connection with the over-sea monarchy was severed and a republic was established by the revolted colonies, thus changing the basic principle of rule and giving birth to a new nation and a new people. So with the French Revolution; there is a complete change in the theory of the State and government passes into the hands of an element hitherto ignored in the body politic. Subsequent "revolutions" in Europe have been merely the efforts to extend these principles; as in France at different intervals, and particularly in 1848 when the movement found abortive expression in Prussia and Austria and the petty Teutonic despotisms. "Revolutions" are also spoken of in South America and in Hayti and Santo Domingo. There is no principle, however, involved in these latter movements. They are mere conspiracies, more or less successful, of the "outs" against the "ins," organized for purposes of political plunder. The term "revolution" is therefore applied to two different uses. Properly speaking it is needed to qualify those greater movements in which great principles have been involved—as in England, America, France,

* The paper of Mr. A. H. Lay on "Political Parties in Japan" (Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan Vol. XXX) has been a chief source for the data of political party life (1870-1900) treated in this chapter.

and Italy. Some other term, such as "rotation"† is needed to qualify the outbreaks in Latin-America. Neither term applies to the Japanese movement of fifty years ago. There was no change in the ruling element. There was far less change in the principles on which that element ruled than is generally suspected. The theory of government substituted for feudalism had always existed, and was supposed to be in actual living existence at the time. As far as that theory of government was concerned it was a "Restoration of 1867." Such changes as have taken place in the machinery of government have been regulated in the cabinet of the ministers and are akin to the constant modification going on in every stable modern political organization; movements, more or less rapid, to meet new conditions. We could as well speak of the "Revolution of 1830" in England when the corn law agitation was in progress. There was in Japan a reorganization in 1867, when one party in the State replaced another party and restored the old forms of governmental machinery existing under the first empire. More properly there was a reorganization of 1871 when feudalism was formally abolished. From that time the conversion of Japan into a modern nation has been going on steadily, but with far less radical change than is commonly thought, and with none of the violent suddenness associated with the term "revolution." This term cannot be applied to Japan. Perhaps it would have been better for it if it could.

The year 1867, therefore, strictly speaking was no experiment. For some years previously political feeling, as far as it could find ground in a feudal society, had been gradually rising. The incapacity and bad government of the later Tokugawa period made itself felt in widespread misery over all the land. Taxation was heavy, extravagance great and deliberately encouraged to weaken possible hostile elements, corruption and bribery were widespread; and above all there was a weakening in the central power plainly visible to the keen and ambitious eyes of vassals ready to rise in its place and on its ruins. This plain and growing weakness of Tokugawa was enough in itself to justify the belief that although the machine might have run on for perhaps a generation or so longer it was bound to come to the ground before ambitious rivals. The question of foreigners at bottom had little to do with the Japanese politics of 1867. They were the fulminating powder that exploded the great mass already ripe for explosion. In so far they had their value. Tokugawa's difficulty was the lack of a really strong man, an exceptionally strong man, one of Nature's rarities in fact. Any ordinarily able man would not have answered, for the materials to his hand were rotten. All the strength lay in the Opposition. However, there was still some power of resistance left in Tokugawa, and when Chōshū moved prematurely they were promptly.

† An entirely legitimate term—"rotation—vicissitude of succession, as with change of crops or officers"—Webster's Dictionary.

met and thoroughly crushed. But in the very machinery of action the victor showed his weakness and inability to follow up his success. An interesting feature here is the opportunism of Satsuma. They are first found lined up with the Tokugawa. In fact the early Tokugawa success was largely due to the strength furnished by Satsuma. This was quickly seen and any punishment of the offending clan and real diminution in the strength of the Opposition was prevented by the strongest element on the side of the victor. The test once having been made, and real weakness of the existing regime thus forcibly demonstrated, the end was certain and swift. Satsuma changed front, organized the Opposition, and Tokugawa and all with it came to the ground.

What was then left was the strong victorious element of the South—Satsuma, Chōshū and Tosa—the broken and dispirited adherents of Tokugawa, and the scattered and minor clans throughout the country. Just as in Tokugawa days, a strong and united minority prepared to maintain themselves in power by a judicious dispersal of the strength of any opposition. There was every prospect of a repetition of the days preceding Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu. The situation would have been identical but for one fact—the *modern* armed western world standing at the doors of Old Japan. If it had not been for this there is every likelihood that the situation of 1867 would have given place in short order to one of those healthy civil wars so familiar in memory to Old Japan. But the necessity of reform was plain to many. It was a palpable case of self-preservation. The general feeling of the clansmen at the time seems to have been to retain as much of Old Japan as possible, and to put the defensive and offensive forces of the nation on the new basis. This was to all a very congenial task, and directed their energies into a very congenial channel. The large majority probably never dreamed of the Europeanization of Japan. There were a few far-sighted men, however, who could see that European civilization was behind and was the cause of Europe's great material efficiency. Many of these men at the risk of their lives had left the country and had studied this question at first hand, and it is unlikely that they did not foresee the ultimate results of the grudgingly permitted first intercourse with the outer barbarian. To learn his "medicine" and then to turn him out of the country for good and all became merely the iridescent dream of some worthy old gentlemen who long clung to the memory of a queue and two swords. The men of knowledge of this western world were naturally the ones to turn to in order to face it, and the study of European institutions showed the necessity of the introduction of these together with the results that must follow from them. And there is reason to believe that there were still more independent observers who saw that the future progress of Japan must lie along these lines, and that only so much of the old could be retained as did not conflict with this new import—that the old must give way to the new and not that

the new was only to be introduced in so far as it was not incompatible with the old. That a compromise should be found along all these lines was inevitable. This is human history and therefore necessarily the history of Japan for the past fifty years. The conservative element at the start was of course in an enormous majority, but it was forced to depend on men who knew something and had a leaning toward the new instrument which was to be put to use. The radical western element had little voice in affairs, however, and barring the constantly increasing knowledge, the opening of the eyes to the spirit of western civilization, they could not have existed except in their private capacity as students and therefore men of a wider and more special knowledge uncalled for as yet in the practical affairs of the life around them.

The final intentions of the southern clan leaders—the “clansmen”—was plainly to govern. Everything was directed to that purpose. But the reform element in the clans saw much farther than the reactionary element, and in part could see that one element of European civilization necessarily followed another. Thus the re-organization of the army could not be conducted on the old clan lines. It was necessary to turn to the nation at large to form a modern army. Hence on certain lines the old clan organization had to give way, and the further the reform went the broader the lines became. We have here in this ignoring of clan organization, one of the roots of the Satsuma rebellion of 1877. On the whole, however, the opinion of the ruling element in Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa, was fairly united. The Emperor's oath in 1867, the conditions it can be said under which the old Imperial Government was nominally allowed to resume power, says that men shall meet in council from all parts of the country. The term “nominally” is used here, for the old Government of the twelfth century was by no means restored. The predominant power in the new Government lay in the clans and not in the *kuge* or court nobles; and wisely so, for these latter in long centuries of deprivation of all power in the State understood nothing and thought of nothing but a round of vain ceremonial. The *samurai*, even if only a part of the *samurai*, were still in the saddle and had no intention of losing their grip. With good military forethought, however, they intended to render the machine under their control far more efficient for the serious purposes in front of it. The first step was the re-organization of the Kyōto Government under the direction of the leaders of the clansmen. This was made to consist of the *sosai* or imperial government by three princes of the blood, counselled and supported in the new movement by the clan leaders; of the *giyo*, a council of princes and nobles; and of the *sanjo*, a larger council consisting of court nobles and retainers of the *daimyō* representing more directly the clans in general. All were appointed. The discussions of these councils were strictly limited to the matters laid before them by the *sosai*, and their powers were simply advisory. This term “advisory” can be noted, for it

will be found to be the dominant note through all the reorganization of Japan. In 1869 a general council—the *kogijō*—was called in Tōkyō. Each *daimiate* sent one representative to this body, the discussions of which were strictly limited to the academic discussion of roads and bridges and such local necessities. The members were all appointed from the local Government officials and of course found no reason for any extension of political power beyond their class. This *kogijō* seems to have been so useful that it expired of inanition in 1870. And so for a long period other councils follow—indeed they are not entirely out of date to-day. Three things are to be noted of them—their advisory capacity, their official character, and the lack of any idea of an electorate. They are all appointed.

In 1871 feudalism was formally abolished. This simply means that the centralization of government had been carried far enough to realize the necessity of doing away with the relics of any other system existing in the land. Feudalism was plainly an impossibility. It was totally at variance with all idea of that centralized Government so necessary to New Japan if it was to successfully face the more intimate relations with foreign nations. And the shock of change was by no means so great as has been almost universally heralded. We have but to look at existing conditions, recognizing the fact that the Central Government simply stepped into the official place of the old Daimiate Governments. Under the old Governments the lower classes and the peasants attended to their business and paid the taxes. Under the new Government they did the same, and they went to the Government office with the old sign of the *daimiate* official still visible under the coat of fresh paint. The actual land-holders were hardly affected. The *daimyō* themselves were a class largely sunk into innocuous desuetude. Custom rules in Japan and custom had long delegated their powers to their officials drawn from the *samurai* class. These drew salaries and pensions before and drew them after the change. Many feudal rights had to be and were extinguished by cash payments. The rights of and from the *daimyō* were so extinguished. That a Central Government growing stronger and stronger should more and more put its own valuation and time of payment on such claims, and should give cause for much complaint from the *samurai* class, goes without saying. And the suffering was great and undeserved. This brought a second element later to the Satsuma rebellion. It can be imagined that the triumphant Bureaucracy did not go out of its way to favour political opponents, and a centralized Government of course drew very different lines from the old ruling local officialdom of the *daimiat's*. Many officials were dropped as useless, government was much concentrated, and the meagre commutation of the pensions granted by the *daimiat's*, and under the new Government extinguished by payment of a lump sum, soon passed from the unskilful hands of recipients, one of the maxims of whose training had been only to know the value of a coin as a piece of uninteresting information, not as a matter of use. The

possibilities of resistance to the new régime were not bright in 1871. However, if the future could have been foreseen it is doubtful if the victorious clans would have been so easily settled in their position; or if it had been foreseen before 1867, whether they would have been settled there at all. Tokugawa would have been a rallying ground for privilege. Officialdom within the charmed circle was of course safe, and the wider its centralized organization grew the stronger it grew. But there was much at stake. The supposed "renunciation" of privilege of 1871 is a historical gloss of later date. It was really a transfer from one authority (local) to another authority (central). Local officialdom was just as necessary to the Central Government after as before the change. Its range could not be suspected at the time. An official Mr. B. paid the said salaries and pensions and commutations instead of an official Mr. A. And if this strong centralization was not carried out the consequences of the rope of sand of feudalism were plain enough. It was a case of all or none.

It is by mens' actions not by what they say that we must judge of the real motives beyond sight and inspiring action. "Language was given to conceal thought"; and judging from the course of events, what is to be witnessed in Japan is not revolution but reorganization. It comes out very clearly in the years 1867-1890. What there is really is a central bureaucracy of the dominant clans replacing feudalism. This is a much stronger organization than feudalism, and in so far as it wields and controls the machinery of the modern world much stronger than the early centralized Government of which it is in a sense a "restoration," for the leaders of the dominant clans replace the worn out *kuge* or court nobles. It being early agreed that only a centralized Government could face the modern world the elimination of old lines was fairly complete. The old provinces disappeared to be replaced by prefectures. The favour of office was of course shown to adherents of the clan Government. Much of the old officialdom necessarily kept its place; and as much of it had no understanding and sympathy with the movement toward modernization they were, many of them, found inefficient and made way for those more in sympathy with the central powers. The whole course of affairs tended to strengthen and knit together this central organization. In 1871 a mission was sent to Europe to study foreign institutions at first hand. One notable member—then a junior—was Itō Hirobumi. He had already in pre-Restoration days visited Europe, risking his life for thus leaving the country without permission. It is noteworthy to find him thus early appearing in a rôle toward the country and toward imperialism that was to have very important results. In Japan itself there is at this time a suggestive touch in a memorial of one of the Government leaders—Kido Takayoshi—cited by Mr. Lay. The subject of the memorial is a complaint, not against the laws but against laws made in the morning and discarded by nightfall. In fact there was a radical disagreement within the Government itself. This

is interesting for it can be said to mark the first rise of "parties" in Japan. There were two elements in the Government circles—a conservative and a progressive element. Both be it added were devoted to progress on modern lines. There was no disagreement as to necessity, but as to the extent and as to the rapidity with which matters should be pushed forward. The whole course of the controversy is suggestive of the change taking place in Japan as a reorganization not a revolution. The ostensible cause of the split in the Government was as to the policy to be adopted toward Korea which had acted rather badly to Japan in rejecting any advances to a closer diplomatic intercourse. Very justly suspicious of the European Powers, realizing the importance of Korea, and roused by the action of Russia at Tsushima and Masampho—only prevented by the prompt and well intentioned warning of Great Britain to the Japanese Government—the first idea was to forestall any newcomer on the peninsula. Korea, however, did not receive these overtures kindly. One party in the Japanese Government advocated force and a declaration of war. The other considered the matter capable of solution by diplomacy. And they were the stronger. Their policy was carried out and the war advocates withdrew in disgust. This quarrel was of great political importance. In an apparently homogenous liquid a most important thing is the first appearance of a nucleus. There were plenty of men in Japan with a knowledge of western methods and imbued with a desire for a new Japan on western lines; but they were voices crying in the wilderness. This organized opposition to the existing Government on a specific issue brought the Opposition within hearing distance of each other. Those elements in the Clan Government that had disappeared with the fall of Tokugawa, or had been frozen out by their comparative political insignificance now had a chance to be heard. And one of the first things the seceders from the Government attacked was the spirit of bureaucracy that had invaded it. They certainly were well qualified to judge. Western lines were frankly adopted and the first "party" in the modern political sense of the term was organized in 1873—the *Aikokutō*.

It is to be granted that the Government showed no unseemly agitation over this momentous step taken by their opponents. Old Japan was still close enough to men's minds to strip them of any uncertainty as to how to act if the occasion should call for it. Government action toward parties was and is thoroughly determined. The only difference between now and these early restoration days being that in the earlier times the methods used were more rough and ready. Where force was frankly used in the seventies and eighties a refuge was later taken in the Constitution with the somewhat impolite question—"What are you going to do about it?" Meanwhile they went on with their own scheme of governing the land. In 1874 a deliberative assembly made up of officials from different prefectures was formed. In 1865 the Genro-in or council of elders was established. This nominally

disappeared on the promulgation of the Constitution but really reappears in the privy-council, and apart from this official body still exists in name and fact as a standing complaint in Japanese political life. These experiments of the Japanese Government with their assemblies of provincials are not mere dead lumber. They have a living interest in the reawakening of China, and even if the period was unduly prolonged in Japan they undoubtedly had a real value in attracting attention to the working of an advisory body. In the delicate relations of Japan—internal and external—at this early reform period they were possibly the only advisory body possible. They might have been given more influence in the State. The advisory capacity exclusively was too much emphasized—probably intentionally so in the light of later events. For one thing is clearly shown throughout—the determination of the Clan Government (the “Clansmen”) to follow as far as possible the lines of the earlier Empire. This is carried into formula to a somewhat extravagant extent. If anything is modern it is the reorganization on European lines of the Japanese army, and yet we are solemnly told that the conscription law of Meiji (1871) was based on that of the empress Jitō (687-696 A.D.). This is much as if it was asserted that the existing law in the German Empire was based on customs of the Germans of the time of Tacitus. This, however, is probably to be taken in a Pickwickian sense, as also the citation of Jimmu Tennō and other such pre-historic characters. The year 687 A.D. has one advantage in the existing contemporary record of the Nihongi.

The Government had one advantage over its opponents. It thoroughly knew its own mind. Indeed for some time it can be said that the attacks are directed simply against Governmental policy because it originated with the Government. This was necessarily the case up to 1881 when a legislative body was definitely promised. It was, however, previously and rather vaguely understood that party government was an object. The clansmen were equally determined to avoid party government. It is a spirit they have never lost to this day. Every form of local government was tried, and much is heard of the liberality of the Japanese Government to local government. This is decidedly specious. The Japanese communes always did manage their own affairs under Government supervision, which laid down the lines within which they were to be conducted but did not otherwise interfere with them. The set meeting of officials was undoubtedly an innovation and laid down on western lines, but consultations of officials informally or on order with each other and with the better equipped officialdom at Yedo were common under the Tokugawa. The assemblies previous to the Diet of 1890 can be classed with such comparing of notes and difficulties, carried out under modern forms. They were in no sense representative. And this conservative stand taken is well illustrated by an example—the refusal to receive the petition from the Country, presented through the *Aikoku-tō*. The determination of the

Government to maintain its stand was by no means to be taken in a Pickwickian sense. Its repressive measures were met with spirit by the opposition. The result was a condition of disorder, ranging from the attempted assassination of Prince Iwakura in 1874 and deliberately planned rebellion against the Government—such as that of Etō Shimpei in 1875—to the formidable civil war of 1877 in Satsuma. This latter seems to have been held off too long to be effective. The root of it lies in what has been the only radical difference existing in modern Japanese political life. A conservative element advocated contact with Europe in so far as it was necessary to arm and protect the country against Europe. It viewed with alarm the steps taken to change Japan into a western power. They were not unprogressive in the sense of being reactionary. They wished to retain the old forms of the imperial government with the new strength of modern times. Their ideas were not different from the ideas of the clansmen except in so far as they were adverse to undertaking a dangerous experiment. They foresaw the difficulties sure to arise with the introduction of western machinery into government; difficulties which did arise with the first meeting of a representative assembly. They did not foresee that a Constitution could be made a means of opposition. What they advocated was a strong foreign policy. That is, a strong Japan to exclude foreign methods and influence in so far as it affected the ancient institutions of the country. For they did see the modifying influence that western methods must have on such institutions. What they wanted was a strong Japanese Japan. General Saigō was no moss-grown conservative. He was one of Japan's greatest statesmen, combining much of the strength of the Old and the New. As a Satsuma leader he was thoroughly abreast of the time. What he fought for and lost was probably impossible of attainment. There seems to be a necessity of a certain uniformity among modern nations. The attempt to preserve Old Japan was a gallant one, however, and the "Satsuma Rebellion" is a term used very much in the sense that we speak of "the Rebellion" in reference to the civil war of 1861 in the United States.

The repressive methods used by the Government were those usually put in practice. We are familiar with it in the Russian censorship and in the same as put in practice at times in the German States. In 1875 severe laws restraining the liberty of the press and of public meeting were promulgated. Editors were held responsible for every utterance in their papers. Fine and imprisonment were mercilessly exacted on one side and a straw man as far as possible offered up on the altar of sacrifice by the offender. At the worst times violent philippics were printed against the Governments of other countries, the articles really referring to "things Japanese." The Government did stand on the letter of the law and these transparent devices met with their due reward; they rarely escaped. In 1877 when the Satsuma outbreak was in progress Government regulation became still more

strict. They descended in force on Kōchi, a district of Shikoku, and arrests, exile, and imprisonment scattered its public men far and wide without much reference to offence committed. The exasperation and resentment aroused had one sad result, Minister Okubo, one of Japan's great men and in all the troubles steadily devoted to the modernization of the Government, was assassinated in 1878, only strengthening by his death the physical force men in the Administration. In 1879 so severe were the repressive measures, and so general the disorder aroused by them, that a petition went up to the Government from all quarters of the country—a petition said to represent seven-tenths of the Japanese people; that is of those who had any understood claim to a voice in public affairs. This was presented by a committee selected from the *Aikoku-tō*, and the *Genro-in*, to whom it was presented, refused to receive it. Why? Because there was no provision made for the reception of any petitions by any branch of the Government! No channel for communication between prince and people.* This was followed up by a law against public meeting and directed against the agitation everywhere springing up against the Government. The very violence of the agitation and of the repressive measures clearly show one thing—that the interest in government affairs was becoming widespread. As in some chemical mixtures when the reagents are in proper proportion and reach a certain stage there is a sudden clarification throughout the whole mass, so it came suddenly in this seething political world of New Japan. The Government took alarm. Perhaps it plainly saw that the nation at large was becoming aroused. In 1881 a legislative assembly was promised for 1890. Let it be understood that the intentions of the clansmen had not changed one jot or iota. The man selected, closely identified with clan interests, shows that. Itō Hirobumi, the chosen vessel, came to the front. He was sent to Europe again, this time as sole member with a staff of subordinates to select a model suitable for the Constitution of New Japan. Needless to say his studies were not to be directed in any way to supporting the views of the Opposition. Rather they were to be directed to learning the best methods how to thwart that Opposition. And he sat at the feet of the best teacher of such methods—Otto von Bismarck.

The announcement of an organic instrument by which henceforth the Government was to be administered was a great event. Party lines were at once projected by means of which this promised Constitution should be put into effect. Prospective party leaders became very active with this somewhat delayed invitation to the public crib, up to this time monopolized by a

* Contrast this petty spirit of a red-tape bureaucracy with the ringing words of one of the world's great monarchs. Says King Pippin III in the *Capitulare Aquitanicum*—"Si aliquis homo ante nos se reclameverit, licenciam habeat ad nos venire, et nullus eum per fortia detineat." Cf. Freeman's "Western Europe in the eighth century," p. 285.

few. They might have spared themselves the trouble. The chosen few had no intention whatever of sharing the spoils with anybody. For the others were to be prepared painted counter-felts, readily detected of course by the unfortunates to whom they were to be offered, but genuine provender to the mob carefully kept at a distance. However for a time there was a general halt in agitation. In 1880 the first regular party organization was formed. The *Jiyūtō* or Liberal Party. The Government gave them promptly a taste of its quality and intentions, and for two years they did not gain the official recognition necessary for existence. This period was spent in the usual course of hazing—breaking up of meetings and imprisonment of the leaders. The intricate history of Japanese parties is ably and elaborately presented by Mr. Lay.* The only feature of interest here, however, is with the general conditions. Owing to legal impediments, devised for this purpose and soon to be touched upon, Japanese parties were in a continual process of dissolution and re-formation. The general lines are from conservative to liberal. Radicalism has hardly raised a voice, and an entirely unintentional reference to a Japanese Republic in a speech caused the overthrow of the one party cabinet Japan has ever had. Generally speaking parties in Japan have directed their energies to obtaining ministerial responsibility to the Diet. Against this the Government, when it seemed worth the trouble, has organized a Government party with no particular aim except to thwart this effort of the widely distributed opposition. But they used far more positive and effective methods. The laws governing party organization were elaborate and ingenious. At this period no party could have branches throughout the country. This of course put an end to any formal agitation by a strong centralized organization. When we consider the lack of cohesion in local bodies everywhere and the rallying power of a great party name, it can be seen how the Government cut all standing ground from under its opponents' feet, and left nothing but an honourable committee of gentlemen in Tōkyō to recommend their views to such outside local organizations as chose—to some extent—to favour them. Considering the chaotic condition of the Japanese political mind at this date, and the need of the clarifying agent, political party, it can be understood how effectively the Government had succeeded in paralysing its opponents. And there were further difficulties in the way of a well-knit opposition. Reading over the party platforms there is a vagueness of doctrine which is spread equally over all of them from Conservative to Liberal; so much so that a man could cling to almost any one of them without gaining political identity. Thus in the two party programmes of a short-lived Conservative Party, organized specifically to support the Government in the pre-Constitution days (1882), and of a more recent programme issued by one of the

* A. H. Lay—"Transactions. Asiatic Society of Japan," Vol. XXX.

many combinations of Japanese Liberals resulting from Government pressure and previous and consequent dissolution of the more formal party elements, there can be found but little difference. The first is of the Meiji Government Party, and the second of the *Kenseitō*, a party formed by the dissolution and recombination of two liberal parties—the *Jiyūtō* and the *Hiyōtō*. They are given by Mr. Lay in his paper just cited.*

I.—Programme of the *Rikken Teiseitō*, 18 March, 1882.

1. "The opening of the Diet in 1890, which the party accepted as determined by Imperial Ordinance."
2. "Approval of the Constitution as it should be determined by Imperial order."
3. "The Sovereign Power lies in the Emperor; but its exercise is governed by the Constitution."
4. "There should be two houses of the Diet."
5. "Members must have certain qualifications."
6. "The Diet to discuss and settle laws."
7. "The final determination of questions to rest with the Emperor."
8. "Naval and military men to keep aloof from politics."
9. "Judicial officers to be independent with gradual completion of the judicial system."
10. "Public freedom of meeting and speech in so far as it does not interfere with National tranquility. Freedom of newspaper writing, public speaking, and publication within the limits of the law."
11. "The existing paper money system to be gradually changed for convertible paper money."

II.—Programme of the *Kenseitō*, 1898.

1. "Reverence for the Imperial House and maintenance of the Constitution."
2. "Party Cabinets and fixing of (ministerial) responsibility."
3. "Development of local self government and restriction of interference from the Central Authority."
4. "Protection of national rights and extension of commerce and trade."
5. "Finances to be placed on a firm basis and balance of accounts to be preserved."
6. "Inter-communication between national and foreign finances and development of national resources."
7. "The army and navy to be proportioned to national needs."
8. "Speedy creation and completion of means of transport and communication."
9. "Spread of Education and encouragement of technical education."

* "Transactions" pp. 389 and 436, Vol. XXX. It can be said here, once for all, the party division in Japan is based on the foreign policy of the country. Other radical difference there is none. And perhaps this is at the root of Japan's reputation as an international brawler. Party differences need, in any country, to be based principally on internal policy.

Shades of the Russian Douma, which at least had the courage of its convictions! As Mr. Lay remarks, the leading points here are the fixing of ministerial responsibility and party cabinets. The method by which these are to be obtained is not even foreshadowed in this neutral document which has anything but an aggressive ring.

But it is not to be thought that Japanese party men have confined themselves to these manifestoes. In fact the very colourlessness of these documents speaks volumes and shows the difficulties under which they were issued.* Japanese party men have fought hard for their ideas and undergone fine and imprisonment for their opinions. As said, they have been hampered by disunion. They had but one set determination—to govern. There was no great constitutional end in view such as splits the two great parties of the United States and keeps them from any compromise on the root doctrine of the nature of the Administration. In Japan there were many theories of many men studying many different systems of western economics and government. There were therefore many leaders and many quarrels, and quarrels between these leaders. And to crown all there was the compact hostility of the Government carefully watchful to prevent any useful union between them, and to meet it by fresh decrees if such threatened. Any popular excitement was an incentive to drastic repression. In 1883 newspaper responsibility was greatly widened to reach almost the entire editorial staff of an offending paper. They were required to enter heavy bail to be allowed to publish at all. In Tōkyō the deposit required was 1000 yen (500 dollars); in Osaka, Kōbe, Hiōgo, and Yokohama it was 700 yen (350 dollars); in other places it was 350 yen (175 dollars). These were staggering fines for the Japanese newspapers, limited in circulation and liable at a moment's notice to suppression and confiscation. There is a great compliment here to the foreign settlements of Yokohama, Kōbe, and Nagasaki, for it shows the influence these sea ports had on Japanese sentiment.

At this time Itō Hirobumi returned and at once went to the head of the Government and become also minister of the Household Department. This combination of offices at once attracts the attention, for the Household Department of the Imperial service is a department widely separated and independent of the ordinary machinery of the Government. It is the stronghold of the conservative element. What it meant in this case was that the new Constitution was to be drawn up under the close supervision of the reactionary element in the State, which was vitally interested in conserving its interests, and in conserving the dominant position it had assumed in the Government. It

* Japanese Liberals in 1867 were somewhat in the position of German Liberals in the Congress of Vienna (1815). And the experience of Japanese Liberalism since 1867 has been close enough to the kindred history in Germany (1815-1866) to make this latter worth their study. Cf. Bryce "Holy Roman Empire," pp. 459 seq.

had not taken power to resign it at every challenge. Any symptoms of a Liberal changeling would be quickly detected by these sharp eyes. And in the outside political world the strong hand of the reactionary minister was quickly felt. The press and the public were severely treated. It is to be remembered that the police in Japan—more properly the *gendarmérie*—are really a branch of the army service. They have no connection with the public except as an arm of the Administration. Never given to a liberal interpretation of administrative regulations, their action is of course still more restrictive under a Government that makes this policy an aim. All public meetings were held under police supervision, and public meetings became almost impossible from the very narrow range of expression allowed by the police, to whom nothing short of a panegyric of the Government was satisfactory. Secret meetings were attempted and this Government, supposed to be engaged in the drafting of liberal institutions, showed its real intentions by the wholesale banishment and imprisonment of every man marked with the qualities of leadership in opposition. Such a Government was not likely to hear panegyrics. And little was it concerned about them. The policy was mapped out, to show itself clearly in many meetings of the Diet during the later years. Present circumstances were to be buttressed with documentary sanctions. The indifference of the public in one direction, and their ignorance and lack of foresight in another direction were to be taken advantage of to fasten on the country an existing system, recognizing the great difficulty in effecting any change and the vantage ground given to the clique in power. Whether such a frank straightforward fighter as the Satsuma leader of 1877 would have accepted this change to the weapons of an underhand diplomacy can perhaps be doubted. But the results were the same. A preliminary step was the establishment of Orders of Nobility and resting this on the Government. Nominally this was only a change in terms. Really it was a very radical one, for the old *kuge* were a noble class in the European sense of the term. The new nobles are as subordinate as in Russia. Of old time nobility formed a caste; to-day they head a bureaucracy, and unfortunately this was made hereditary. In 1889 the Constitution was promulgated. The actual terms of the instrument we will return to later. Sufficent to say here that it came up to expectations. Its real influence was not, perhaps could not be understood until actually felt in operation. The limits of its force are perhaps not understood in Japan even to-day.

In taking up the development of Japanese parties we will return for a moment to 1887 and the formation of the *Daidō Danketsu*, of especial interest as it had its successors. Anywhere else than in Japan it would raise a smile. The *Daidō*, as they were called, were those gentlemen of the Diet (or those who proposed to form part of the Diet) who were qualified for union on the negative ground of not agreeing on anything. As is well-known there are logical propositions which in themselves

imply the existence of a negative—for instance Fichte's famous proof of the not-Me, or Hegel's identification of pure Being and pure Nothing. The *Daidō* proposed to themselves a rôle much like that of the elder Mr. Weller's coachmen friends. They stood around to see that everybody played fair. Having no particular opinions to bother them except these altruistic ones—and incidentally holding the balance of power—no matter how much one might jeer at them as a party they have had undeniable influence. Like the independent voters of Eatanswill of strong convictions they were to be reckoned with. Naturally as a permanent organization they could not hold together. They either rise into office or sink into insignificance. The second stage is conditioned by the first and followed by the drafting off of the units of the main body to the party nearest in affiliation to its varying membership. Real party work is of course very different. At the start the Government took Time by the forelock by *forbidding any combination or alliance between two party organizations*. This was another foretaste of the future, and the parties met it by dissolution and reorganization of the members under one body. Of course party membership was better defined under the old organization, and this heterogeneity thus introduced into a party was a poor guarantee of stability. However it was the only means to meet the Government move. In parties that could have no organization throughout the country the chances of subordinating its members to some few well defined principles were not very great. Previous to the meeting of the Diet the *genro-in*—council of elders—was abolished, but practically reappeared at once in the privy-council and in an unofficial *genro-in*. Discredit with the Legislature has no influence on this body. The nature of the hereditary and appointed Upper House was another barrier interposed to any effective action against the Administration for the popular assembly does not stand to it as the English Commons to the House of Lords. Its spirit is best illustrated by a quotation from Mr. Lay which exactly illustrates the course of affairs up to the present time—in reference to the replacing of some bills of public expenditure on the House calendar, he says; "The Upper House manifested what has since come to be recognized as its habitual attitude towards the financial wishes of the other Chamber by promptly restoring these items." In 1890 the Diet met. This first session with great difficulty was gotten through without dissolution. The second, fifth, and eleventh were dissolved by the Government. The third, fourth, ninth, and twelfth sessions were suspended. The sixth, seventh, and eight kept peace on account of the war with China, then in progress. The thirteenth and fourteenth were marked by political fighting merely, both sides having learned that their adversaries could leave a mark where they struck.

And in the earlier history this was a severe mark. The election of 1892, both Government and Opposition having thoroughly learned each other's intentions, was fiercely fought

and was marked by bloodshed, especially in Kōchi, a hot centre of opposition to the clansmen. By 1893 the necessity of some sort of a *modus vivendi* was recognized. The Government saw that it must find some formal support in the house. A Government party needed no particular weight. All required was to draw together the elements favourable to it to form a well-knit centre around which the hostile elements in their mutual quarrels could gather. The power of a nucleus of this character can be understood if the membership of two widely separated Diets is examined. Party names go for little on account of the peculiar law regulating party organization and causing numerous reorganizations. The figures are from Mr. Lay's paper already cited:

1890.	1902.
Independent 69	Seiyūkwaï 192
Daidō-ka 55	Kenseihontō 88
Kaishintō 46	Sanshi Club 8
Aikokutō 35	Niigata Progressives ... 8
Hoshutō 22	Independents 59
Kiūshū Shimpotō ... 21	Imperialists 20
Jiyūtō 16	
Jichitō 17	
Officials 18	
Uncertain 2	

From the figures given for the Independents the influence of the Daidō (of the time) can be understood. Japanese members of the Diet, it should be added, are not elected as from a particular district. They have no responsibility to their particular electors but are representatives at large.

The real struggle of Japanese politics, the aim of all parties, has been ministerial responsibility. It has been seen that this was first formally brought forward as early as 1890. The progress made is illustrated by the events of 1897. The *Shimpotō*, chief of the then existing parties, had drawn up a set of resolutions calling for such ministerial responsibility. These were answered by the premier, Count Matsukata, in a set memorandum in which the principle was flatly laid down that in neither the appointment or removal of cabinet ministers or the conduct of the administration would any interference be permitted. This was in October. It is hardly necessary to say in what spirit the Diet met in December. The Lower House changed the order of the day to admit a motion of want of confidence. Perhaps in the history of constitutional government never has the Legislative body of a great nation been treated so cavalierly. No vote was permitted on the motion, but with the close of the reading the House was dissolved. It is pleasing to be able to state the cabinet felt its own position to be an impossible one and had the grace themselves to get out. Marquis Itō took up the task of government. This far sighted statesman at least saw the necessity of some compromise and of

support among the parties that could be relied on by the Government. He could not, however, carry his colleagues with him and resigned. This made possible the first and only cabinet Government that Japan has seen. Strictly speaking the Okuma and Itagaki cabinet was not what we would call a party cabinet. They were only so as distinguished from the clan Statesmen. The fate of a cabinet made up from different parties and containing also men hostile to party government was already foreshadowed. Everything was against them—the hostility of the hereditary House of Peers, the skill of their veteran opponents, and their own internal dissensions. But the experience of 1898 was not without value. It has shown an inherent weakness in Japanese political life, the necessity of some fundamental issue, so deep and radical as to govern men permanently instead of allowing them to be swayed by the momentary issues of the hour. This long political battle has brought about distrust on both sides. There is distrust among the parties as to their ability to rule, and there is distrust among the clansmen as to their own ability to rule alone. War has been followed by the inevitable expansion. This has of course made the financial necessities very great. To listen to the voice of the Diet is becoming a necessity, and dissolution before a vote is not likely to occur again. At least it is to be supposed so. Curiously enough both sides have been drawn together, and one of the great political parties chooses as its leaders men from the older Statesmen; men accepting such party leadership with the distinct understanding that they are opposed to party government! The leadership of the *Seiyukai*—the reorganized Liberal party—by Marquis Itō, and later by Marquis Saionji is an illustration of this spirit. The result has been a comparative period of peace since 1901. The agitation, however, has sunk into the hearts of the people and finds now its expression there, as at the close of the war with Russia. With all the strong feeling aroused the restraint of the Diet has been splendidly shown during the stress and strain of war. For at such periods its opponents have been given full rein, and the Diet deserves all credit for its consideration, the only consideration shown in Japanese political life which has been marked by tenacity on one side and brutal repression on the other. But with modern expansion political life and responsibility have greatly widened. The question arises, can party government premise success? The answer to this must be found in the Japanese fundamental law—their Constitution.

§ 2.

Liberal constitutional government has taken two forms in the West. In Europe, whether under a written or unwritten Constitution, of the branches of Government—Executive,

Legislative, Judiciary—one overshadows the other. This is markedly the case in Imperial Germany and to some extent in Republican France, the Executive overshadowing the Legislative, and the Judiciary being practically a branch of the Administration. In England the Legislative overshadows the Executive; and the Judiciary, although substantially a branch of the Executive, is entirely under the control of Parliament. In all three countries the Executive is represented in the Legislature by the ministers who form the cabinet and at the same time are members of the Legislative body itself, and these ministers are held responsible for their acts. The power of the purse is strictly defined and vested in the Legislative, and no ministry could remain in office and defy the will of the People as expressed by their representatives assembled in Parliament, Assembly, or Reichstag. That if any one branch of Government is to be given supremacy over the rest the Legislative is far the safer to give such power is well illustrated by the course of English history and the prosperity of the people. That a supremacy of the Executive leads to danger is equally well instanced in the history of France, and as always threatens to be the case in the much newer experiment of constitutional government in Germany.

In America a different course was taken. Having experienced the tyranny of both king and parliament, and realizing the necessity of independence of both Executive and Legislative in their respective fields, the Fathers of the Republic defined the limits of these fields, and separating the Judiciary from the Executive placed it between the two bodies, its own field being, by the very necessities of the case, capable of sharp definition. Working under a written Constitution, which can be changed or amended on a three-fourths vote of the People acting through the State units as represented by Convention or by Legislature, the Supreme Court of the United States defines the application and the range of the laws passed by the Legislative and enforced by the Executive. Its functions are purely judicial. It deals with the letter of the Law without reference to the convenience which is given thorough discussion in the Legislative, and which must conform to the organic law as laid down in the Constitution. The Executive is left free to apply the law in the form most convenient for administrative purposes. It is really and truly an Executive. The terms Legislature and Judiciary are equally sharp in definition. In connection with the Justices of the Supreme Court is often heard the expression "the nine kings that rule the United States." This is a misnomer. The very nature of their powers—defined by the Constitution as judicial—limits their activity to this particular function. To put their decrees in force they must call on the Executive and the Legislative. In this latter is vested the power of the purse. Representatives of the People the necessity of the control and safety thereby afforded are well instanced by the disputed election of 1876 in which the knowledge, widespread among the people, that no control of the Executive by either party could give or make it

master of the situation, ensured a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The distinguished expounder of the Japanese Constitution leaves out of account that in 1877 in the United States the action of the Legislative was to prevent the possible use of armed force by the Executive in an internal question properly to be settled by judicial procedure.* Rooted in their common experiences of the wars of 1642, in both the Anglo-Saxon peoples is found this dislike to put a preponderant power in the hands of the Executive. For this reason England, owing to her position in reference to European politics, has built and maintained a great navy. In the United States the people have never grudged expenditure on the navy, and an Administration has always found popularity in strengthening and advancing this arm of the national defence. Both countries have a very legitimate fear of a standing army, although there is no intrinsic dislike of military training provided it can be acquired without putting a large armed force under the control of the Executive, thus disturbing the delicate balance it is sought to maintain in the body politic.

As in continental Europe, we find in Japan an Executive with the Judiciary as a dependent arm of the Executive. By means of what can be described as Administration Law the Government is practically freed from any direct control by the Legislative which figures as a mere advisory body to the Executive. In other words there is a so-called constitutional government in which one element is the predominant one, with all the forces of the State at its command, and able to give what interpretation it pleases to the organic law restricting it. The definition of the powers of this Government, even under this Constitution, are simple enough. They are as wide as the powers of the States as contrasted with the Federal Government in the United States (less the important check of the rivalry in well being between the States). The definition is singularly akin in both countries. All powers not specifically granted in the Constitution are vested in the Sovereign.† The difference is that in one case it is the Sovereign People and in the other case it is a single individual or the party at the time in power.

It has been said that the intentions of the clansmen had never really changed. Their idea, as always, was to maintain the supremacy of their own caste and as far as possible of their own clans in control of the Government. This is clearly shown in the close relations between Marquis Itō and Imperialism which was to him his very breath. A student at first hand of western politics, eagerly desirous of making Japan a modern State in the material sense, he never loses sight of the political conditions of Old Japan. The chosen messenger, sent to Europe

* Marquis Itō.—"Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan" p. 149—Article XXI. The President can call Congress in extra session. In this case it was called in early session by President Hayes, in October 1877.

† "Commentaries," p. 35, Article XVI.

Legislative, Judiciary—one over the other, with a view of select-
markedly the case in Imperial Japan, his ruling idea is the
Republican France, the condition of Japan under
tive, and the Judiciary while in real substance it
Administration Executive; and the Executive. In fact he tells us so on the
the Executive. "It is hardly necessary
all three conditions the great constitutional
by the those in which Institutions had been a
mer thought and discussion and investigation for
a" not meet the case at all. England and the
France, and Imperial Germany, were merely
States to see what to avoid; and what is turned to is the
element in the Constitutions of the German States—
Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Saxony, and Oldenburg.*
progress in western Europe had left the sixteenth century behind
it. Reactionary as they are the German States found a wider
field and influence for their subjects in a Federal Legislature;
but Japan, without this modifying factor, was to remain plunged
in political darkness. The object of construction therefore was
not to loose but to bind. In this connection the experience of
Japan teaches what a watch is to be kept on words and their
implication, and especially their application; for the real range
of the Japanese Constitution was only patent to the eyes when it
came to be applied, certainly so to the political parties to which
it was applied by their political opponents. The two questions
involved are—where does the supreme power lie, and what
restraint is placed on it? Supreme power, it can be added, has
nothing to do with individuals. It lies in the interests or the
faction controlling at the time the national machinery, which
is a very complicated affair. A Constitution is not made for a day
or a generation. The individual strong enough and able enough,
even in ancient days, to rule a great people is the rare exception and
examples are limited to a few individual lives. All history shows
this, and very especially Japanese history. Sovereign means the
party, or clique, or caste which has gained control—it may be per-
fectly legitimate control—of the machinery of the State. Whether
empire, monarchy, or republic these questions of power and
restraint are of paramount importance. Now herein lies the
importance of the intensity of Government power, using the term
"Government" as that abstract entity which presses on and
summons its people to its courts and armies simply by the imper-
sonal issue of a writ in some form. The individual, from the highest
to the lowest in the land, and in any country, is in the deepest
sense interested in how, by the whirligig of fate, that intensity may
press on him. This, moreover, limits the scope of the inquiry
practically to our single point, and enables a sharper definition
of that element of the past as directly stated in the words

* With due respect for these State Constitutions which are of
real importance; for, through the Bundesrath, in Germany the tail
wags the dog.

of Marquis Itô.—“That express provisions concerning the sovereign power are specially mentioned in the Articles of the Constitution, in no wise implies that any newly settled opinion thereon is set forth by the Constitution, on the contrary the original national polity is by no means changed by it, but is more strongly confirmed than ever.” As this is the twentieth century and not the ninth century it is to be suspected that there will be found in the instrument either a lack of consistency or a lack of what the twentieth (or the nineteenth) century regards as constitutionalism.

The author of the gloss being a prime mover of the document itself* the preliminary exposition can be accepted at its face

* The gloss of the Japanese Constitution here followed is the “Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan” by Marquis Itô. English translation of 1906. The following text is the “official translation” published by the Okazaki-ya, Tōkyō:—

Article IV.—The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them according to the provisions of the present Constitution.

Article V.—The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article VII.—The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives.

Article VIII.—The Emperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, issues, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial Ordinances in the place of law.

Such Imperial Ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve the said Ordinances, the Government shall declare them to be invalid for the future.

Article IX.—The Emperor issues or causes to be issued, the Ordinances necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws.

Article X.—The Emperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration, and the salaries of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the same. Exceptions especially provided for in the present Constitution or in other laws, shall be in accordance with the respective provisions (bearing thereon).

Article XI.—The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy.

Article XVI.—The Emperor orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments, and rehabilitation.

Article XXI.—Japanese subjects are amenable to the duty of paying taxes, according to the provisions of law.

Article XXXIII.—The Imperial Diet shall consist of two Houses, a House of Peers and a House of Representatives.

Article XXXIX.—A Bill, which has been rejected by either the one or the other of the two Houses, shall not be again brought in during the same session.

Article LII.—No Member of either House shall be held responsible outside the respective Houses, for any opinion uttered or for any vote given in the House. When, however, a Member himself has given publicity to his opinions by public speech, by documents in print or in writing, or by any other similar means, he shall, in the matter, be amenable to the general law.

value, the omission of the Japanese People as a whole and reference to them only in their individual capacity as servants can be taken to be intentional, and the principle of the Constitution as "opening a wider field of activity for serving (the Emperor)" to eliminate any question of there being

Article LIII.—The Members of both Houses shall, during the session, be free from arrest, unless with the consent of the House, except in cases of flagrant delicts, or of offences connected with a state of internal commotion or with a foreign trouble.

Article LV.—The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it.

Article LVII.—The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law according to law, in the name of the Emperor.

The organization of the Courts of Law shall be determined by law.

Article LXI.—No suit at law, which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the executive authorities, and which shall come within the competency of the Court of Administrative Litigation especially established by law, shall be taken cognizance of by a Court of Law.

Article LXII.—The imposition of a new tax or the modification of the rates (of an existing one) shall be determined by law.

However, all such administrative fees or other revenue having the nature of compensation shall not fall within the category of the above clause.

The raising of national loans and the contracting of other liabilities to the charge of the National Treasury, except those that are provided in the Budget, shall require the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article LXIII.—The taxes levied at present shall, in so far as are not remodelled by new law, be collected according to the old system.

Article LXIV.—The expenditure and revenue of the State require the consent of the Imperial Diet by means of an annual Budget.

Any and all expenditures overpassing the appropriations set forth in the Titles and Paragraphs of the Budget, or that are not provided for in the Budget, shall subsequently require the approbation of the Imperial Diet.

Article LXVII.—Those already fixed expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the Government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet, without the concurrence of the Government.

Article LXX.—When the Imperial Diet, cannot be convoked, owing to the external or internal condition of the country, in case of urgent need for the maintenance of public safety, the Government may take all necessary financial measures, by means of an Imperial Ordinance.

Article LXXI.—When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year.

Article LXXII.—The final account of the expenditures and revenue of the State shall be verified and confirmed by the Board of Audit, and it shall be submitted by the Government to the Imperial Diet, together with the report of verification of the said Board.

The organization and competency of the Board of Audit shall be determined by law separately.

Article LXXIII.—When it has become necessary in future to amend the provisions of the present Constitution, a project to that effect shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order.

reciprocal rights and duties as existing between sovereign and subjects. So far this is clear and consistent to all, acceptable or not according to political bias. What remains then to examine is the formal extent to which this absolutism is asserted or implied, and any inconsistencies with such stand found in the document itself, best tested article by article. As a preliminary it can be pointed out that the gloss clearly asserts absolutism, (1) Sovereignty and government being confined to one individual (page 3); (2) in whom all governmental powers are centred (page 8); (3) who has absolute veto power (page 11); (4) and without whose sanction nothing is law (page 13). Sovereignty and Government being here fused together, the formula can be stated in the terms that—the power is centred in the Government (Emperor). The first three articles are formal under any usual interpretation. They merely define the Emperor's position in the State. In Article IV. the document becomes more positive. This defines the Emperor as sovereign and head of the State. This as a formula is usual enough. Sovereignty must exist somewhere. In the People through their representative or representatives or in an individual, although western minds would reject the dictum that "the combination of "all the governmental powers of the State in one person is the "essential characteristic of sovereignty."* But there is a contradiction here in connection with a constitutional State making the absolutist definition of sovereignty all the more ambiguous. The "carrying of those powers into effect in "accordance with the provisions of the Constitution" certainly does not denote the exercise of such sovereignty as above described. It describes a limited sovereignty. If the Constitution is to govern the sovereign he must descend from his absolutist position. This inconsistency is still further emphasized in that the consent of the Diet—a created body—must be obtained to alter the document (Article LXXIII). If on the other hand he can override the Constitution at will, then it does indeed, as the learned commentator says, become an absolutism like that of Imperial Rome which "cannot be accepted as a constitutional principle." That absolutism is really meant is indicated further in Articles V and VII, the former of which

* The sovereignty of the People as an axiom of western thought is well established in these modern times. The same principle existed at the base of the Roman Empire, and in the customs of the barbarians. Its continued existence during the Middle Ages is ably elucidated by Mr. James Bryce in his exposition of secular and ecclesiastical thought of that time. (cf. "The Holy Roman Empire" Chap. XV.)

In Germany the sovereignty does not rest with the Kaiser. The sovereignty lies in the "totality of the allied governments." These are represented in the Bundesrath. cf. Howard's "The German Empire," pp. 32, 58, 59, 116, where a number of native authorities are given. For instance Bismarck (in the Reichstag 19 April 1871) says: "Die Souveränität ruht nicht beim Kaiser; Sie ruht bei der Gesamtheit der verbündeten Regierungen."

defines the Diet as a convenient means of expression for the Executive will, and the latter specifically nullifies any act of a Diet not convoked by Imperial Order. The further enforcement is found in numerous other Articles:—

ARTICLE VIII.—Government is possible by Imperial Ordinances. These are to be laid before the next Diet for approval. But there is nothing to prohibit their re-issuance in principle on dissolution of the Diet. Only re-issuance of the act form is prohibited. No punishment can reach the Administration which itself interprets the form and in any event is only chargeable with "breach of the Constitution." "You cannot hang a clue for murder" says Mark Twain, and the Japanese Administration seems to be in a similarly happy predicament.

ARTICLE XXXIX does not allow a law unsanctioned by the Government to be again introduced at the same session of the Diet. This simply means that the Government's veto of any Act passed by the Diet is absolute. There is no passing a law over such veto.

ARTICLE LVII.—(Gloss p. 9) makes the Judiciary a branch of the Executive, and

ARTICLE LXI goes on to protect the Administration against any undesirable interference from such an umpire by requiring that all illegal acts of the Administration shall be brought before an Administration Court of litigation. Only as a matter of favour is the citizen or subject of any State allowed to bring suit against the Sovereign. But an interpretation of Administrative or Legislative Acts can be asked for and these are passed on by a Judiciary acting in their ordinary capacity as a branch of the Sovereign power. It is a principle widely accepted in the West that individuals are at times to be sacrificed to the State—with the proviso that suitable compensation be made. The absolutist principle at the base of the Japanese Constitution, however, comes here clearly into sight. It is one of those threadbare spots in which the Old Japan lurking underneath is most conspicuous. It makes the Judiciary a branch of the Administration but goes still further in identifying the Administration with the Sovereign. The Legislative being reduced to an advisory council, such doctrine is both absolutist and socialistic.*

* The reasons given in the gloss hinge on the necessity of the Administration not becoming subordinate to the Judiciary (a body confined by the Constitution to interpretation!) which would deprive it "of freedom of action in securing benefits to society and happiness to the people." Administration officials being constitutionally responsible they should "possess power to remove obstacles in the path of these measures, and to decide upon suits springing from the carrying out of them." Otherwise the Administration could not perform its duties. The second reason given is that individuals are to be sacrificed to the State. "But the question of administrative expediency is just what judicial authorities are ordinarily apt to be 'not conversant with.'" Commentaries pp. 130, 131. In his "Political Science" Doctor Waddy, says: "If the Judges could make as well

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ARTICLE LXIV sets forth the Budget as the gauge of national expenditure, but the gloss states that no Minister of State is bound by the Budget if occasion requires. This found expression under the Administration of 1901.

ARTICLE LXVII.—States that expenses authorized by the Emperor, or by law, or by legal obligation of Government are not to be rejected or reduced by the Diet. This Article follows the usual type and is in practice elsewhere, but in view of the freedom from control the position of the Government is very different from examples cited in the gloss. The concomitant conditions are equally important and are disregarded in western instances selected for approval. It is plain enough that there is a very dangerous power under Japanese conditions granted to the Government in this Article, and it gives still greater independent control of the finances to the Government.

ARTICLE LXX is the terse and suggestive one that when the Diet cannot be convoked the Government takes all the necessary financial measures to meet any situation. And the gloss emphasizes this absolutist position. "The withholding of approbation by the Diet refers only to the continued efficacy

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"of the measures in question, and shall not possess the retrospective effect of annulling past proceedings."

It has been said that the term "Sovereign" necessarily means the party in control. The absolute despot is little known in history, and the individual cases of the really strong men are quickly followed by a Bureaucracy. This seems not to have been entirely out of mind.

ARTICLE X (Gloss pp. 24-25) states that the Board of Audit, the Judges, and the Law Courts shall be organized by legal enactment, and the Judges shall only be dismissed on judicial decision. There is here limitation of the Sovereign.

ARTICLE XXXIII gives some value to public opinion and to representation as a means of ascertaining that opinion. The rationale of the present Constitution shows forth well in this article. The necessity of two houses to balance each other most people will admit, although this is a European institution and not a Japanese discovery. One can almost hear the sigh over the whole unhappy necessity in the expression—"if no representative government is instituted, well and good. If not. . . ." etc. etc; let us have two chambers anyhow.*

ARTICLE LV requires the counter-signature of laws, ordinances, and rescripts by the Minister of State, and no law is put into effect without it. There is here a plain and palpable limitation on the absolute sovereignty. The necessity of these inconsistencies seems inevitable to any prudent mind in the view of past history, especially the past history of Japan.

ARTICLE LVII.—The organization of the Judiciary is settled by law. Its judges can only be dismissed by legal process. Nominally at least the citizen has the protection of a legal system. And in so far there is again a limitation placed on the absolutism of the sovereign. If the absolutism maintained so often through the gloss is an actual fact, then this independence of the Judiciary is of course the merest sham and it is dependent altogether on the good-will of the Executive.

The Administration itself, as distinguished from itself under the specious term "Emperor," is still further freed from control:

ARTICLE IX.—By means of this Article they can govern through Imperial ordinances. These are good in law and are issued either by the Emperor or in his name. As is pointed out by the learned commentator, in France and even in Prussia such ordinances are confined exclusively to the execution of a law. The Japanese ordinance, however, is very different. It is itself a law. To cite the commentaries—"The object of the Administrative ordinances is not confined to the negative measures of police, but their object should also be to take the positive measures of promoting the material prosperity of the people etc." This plainly gives legislative power to the Administration in terms which allow its operation in pretty much any field the controlling power of the Government chooses

* Cf. Woolsey "Political Science" Vol. II. pp. 311-316.

to regard as for the good of "the material prosperity of the people." The gloss goes on to say that "the Executive ought not to interfere with the liberty of the individuals guaranteed by law" etc. The Executive doubtless "ought not," but when there is nothing to compel it to do otherwise except a Legislative body which has been reduced to a mere advisory council expressive of public opinion it is not hard to see that there is no check whatever on the controlling Power.

ARTICLE LV.—The Diet can only demand explanations and address the Sovereign, and the rather mild suggestion is offered that in appointing ministers "the susceptibilities of the public mind must also be taken into consideration." This has always been a wise principle of the Japanese Government from ancient times; not to drive the people too far; but it is a principle that has little relation to their well-doing. The ministers, be it added, are individually responsible to the Emperor alone. The principle being distinctly laid down, that if the cabinet were a corporate body and so held responsible there would be party government over-ruling the supreme power of the sovereign. "Such a thing can never be approved of according to our Constitution;"

ARTICLE LXI grants the judgment of illegal acts of the Administration to a tribunal forming a branch of the Administration itself. This must be taken on its face, and the conclusion drawn that as the individual is at times to be sacrificed to the State the means adopted may not stand the cold eye of the independent Judiciary.

ARTICLE LXII secures all Administration fees and other revenue having the nature of compensation.

ARTICLES LXIII, LXVII, LXX, LXXI provide for maintenance of the Government by means of Administration taxation thereby practically freeing it from the fiscal control of the Diet.

ARTICLE LXIV states that expenses in excess, or not provided for in the Budget, shall subsequently be laid before the Diet for approval. Has the Diet the right to reject these expenditures? Not at all. It may make them a political question, with political and unpleasant results to the Diet itself; repeatedly witnessed in the history of the last seventeen years, and of which the Diet of 1897 is a classic example.

It can be well asked then—What is the sphere of the Diet? For what is left is a somewhat astral body. Its rights are best described in the Commentaries itself: "*first*, the right to receive petitions; *secondly*, the right to address the Emperor and to make representations to Him; *thirdly*, the right to put questions to the Government and demand explanations; and *fourthly*, the right to control the management of the finances." By the gloss to Article XVI it only possesses the powers specifically granted to it, but these powers are by another article so stripped from it that practically there is left to it nothing but a feeble power of protest and petition and this has been its history since its inception.

ARTICLE XI puts all the physical power of the Government in complete and unhampered control of the Administration, Properly so if the Diet had such control of the purse as not to enable this force to be used for selfish purposes of power. But Articles VIII and LXX both limit the fiscal control of the Diet,

ARTICLE LV frees the ministers from any responsibility to the Diet.

ARTICLES LXII and LXIV free the Administration still further in securing their engagements and in giving them a free hand without reference to the Budget. Only pressure of necessity and an unfavourable preceding Budget can force the Administration to grant concessions to the taxing power of the Diet, Indeed under the present circumstances the greater the financial necessities of the Japanese people the greater their political advantage, for this is the one lever of power left to the Diet; a lever much hampered by the present Constitution, but still capable of good use in fighting the battle already won by the People in the West.

Other more direct restrictions on the Diet are found in Article XXXIX rendering it impossible to pass a law over the Government veto.

ARTICLE LII renders members responsible for their speeches made in the Diet and published by them outside. A provision which should have no application to political matters, but no such exemption is provided. Article LIII places members in the power of the police for flagrant delicts, or for "offences connected with a state of internal commotion or with a foreign trouble." This last is a most catholic clause.

ARTICLES LXIII, LXIV, LXXI, practically free the Administration from the fiscal control of the Diet. Only expenses requiring new taxation call for the consent of the Diet; and there is really nothing to prevent these new engagements for they can be provided for by Imperial Ordinance over which the action of the Diet is merely for the future and not retroactive.

What are the net results therefore of this examination of the Articles of the Japanese Constitution of 1890. As far as Administration is concerned there is found an unrestricted veto power, a power of initiative in all departments, a limited but effective control of the finances, a complete control of the physical force of the country, and irresponsibility to the Diet or Judiciary. As to the Judiciary, it is treated as an arm of the Executive (gloss p. 114); and yet, by an inconsistency almost necessarily recognized its organization is due strictly to legal enactment and its members can only be deposed by legal process. This is to a large extent neutralized by stripping it of its natural powers of protecting the citizens in all their legal relations, for their functions are entirely confined to criminal and private law. With administrative law it has nothing to do and the final decision of great constitutional questions does not come before the Supreme Court of the Empire. They have no such imposing position as the Supreme Court of the United States. Nor does the Diet,

when any great constitutional question arises, appoint a committee to search the records for precedent as does the House of Commons. The Diet is a mere advisory body. As a legislative body it registers what has been decided on by the Government. Its committee rooms show no such scenes of activity and debate on the scale of those of Congress, of Parliament, or Assembly. Its control over the purse is illusory. As a legislative power it finds a rival in the Administration whose acts it must sanction or reject but cannot nullify, and its only means of protest is a charge of "breach of the Constitution" met by its own dissolution. Its very membership is no guarantee beyond its walls, and its members are and have been disciplined by the Government. And the continued operation of the whole is controlled by Article LXXIII which prohibits any change in the Constitution and only allows its modification in minor details on initiative from above. The question can indeed well be asked—"Why is the matter to be submitted to the Diet at all?" And the answer is—"For the reason that the Emperor's great desire is that a great law, when once established, shall be obeyed by the Imperial Family as well as by His subjects, and that it shall not be changed by the arbitrary will of the Imperial Family." This is not even a reply to the question self asked. Is it assumed that any Diet would be the block in the way of any change?

The result has been an uncontrolled Bureaucracy, or one practically uncontrolled, for it is guarded against any concessions by the Constitution itself, can buy its way by minor concessions into the longer purse of the Diet than that afforded by the Administration orders. Meanwhile a sop is thrown to the public in the form of a written Constitution and popular government thereby permanently prevented. If it is asked how can the Government rule—the answer is "By ordinance." Its power of the purse in ordinary events and its really great power in extraordinary events are sufficient for that purpose. In England impeachment by the House of Commons at one time sent ministers to the block and to-day would irrevocably disgrace them. The Japanese Diet cannot touch a hair of the head of any member of the ministry which can always plead the public service before its own bar. It is of course much easier to rule by the House, and in these days of extravagant expenditure almost a necessity. But if any issue should arise with the Diet the power of the Government is overwhelming and has been unsparingly exercised in the past. The temptation to use the mailed fist is of course great, whoever is in power. To this point we shall return in relation to party government itself, to which it has a very pertinent relation. What is found here is that the Administration is the State. And this can apply equally to taxation. That taxation is not a remuneration for "certain favours" received will be admitted, but that it contains the mutual elements of rights and duties on both sides will be generally admitted as the dominant principle in European taxation—outside of Russia.

Arbitrary right of taxation is not a western principle. The subject or citizen is given no choice as to payment of his taxes. He must pay them. The theory laid down, however, in Article XXI, and its gloss takes the ground that it is a plain duty of the subject, the sovereign of course being absolute and having no reciprocal duty toward the subject. Based on past experience elsewhere it may perhaps be granted that the control of the Diet over new taxation will not be modified in the future. But the Diet has no control over taxation once granted and placed on the statute book. It can neither repeal nor modify a single item, without the consent of the Administration which has the absolute veto power. A tax law can therefore be kept on the statute book against the expressed will of the representatives of the Japanese people. If this is not arbitrary taxation it is something very like it. Moreover, the Diet can be called on to provide for any obligation the Administration chooses to contract under Articles LXIV, LXVII, and LXX, of the Constitution, and its privilege in this case lies indeed in merely directing the incidence of the new taxation which in fact if not in theory has been already passed by Administration ordinance.

The basic principles of taxation are well laid down under four heads by one of the greatest of modern economists. All four are well worth citing but the first is sufficient. Adam Smith says: "the subjects of every State ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the State. The expense of the government to the individuals of a great nation is like the expense of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the estate." And the incidence of taxation under such theory is far better provided for than under any Law of the Cadi or the haphazard absolutism of an Administration. Modern ideas on taxation have been well presented in a lucid little volume by G. Armitage Smith.* Arbitrary principles are equally absent, as from the principles of more than a hundred years ago. Some

* "Principles and Methods of Taxation" Adam Smith's principles of incidence and method are basic to-day, see also J. S. Mill. "Political Economy" Book V. chap. 6 § 3. The only fair method of taxation lies in an income tax carried out by "Stoppage at source" with any necessary modifications allowing rebates under given conditions. The fatal effect on progress of such forms as direct property and inheritance taxes was long ago pointed out by Ricardo. Statesmen rarely are free from the two qualities of laziness and demagoguery. For this reason property and inheritance taxes are made the shining mark, and every opportunity is given to avoid income taxes. Besides, no matter how unjust double taxation is, it is always a welcome addition to an overstrained Budget. Another absurdity is the assessment of taxes—income or inheritance—without reference to the burdens of the tax-payer. This is only more conspicuous in the case of so called progressive taxes on inheritance where the estate and not the individual is thus taxed.

of his conclusions can be summed up as follows: 1. State Income is largely determined by considerations as to necessary outlay: 2. The determining principle is necessity and desirability. Individual freedom fostering energy and enterprise is not to be restrained: 3. A State production weakens competition and discourages new and more economic methods: 4. The State should not enter on speculation: 5. Taxation being no longer arbitrary but determined by popular will conforms to justice and productiveness: 6. Contribution to public expenditures is not a purchase or exchange but a response to the national demand for the common good: 7. Benefit arising from solidarity is incalculable, and the expenditure is general. Recent principle differs here but little from Adam Smith, and the rights and duties of the State as exemplified by western theory appear clear enough. This is widely different from the dominant absolutism of the Commentaries which admits no such duties on the part of the State. It can then be asked with such absolutist theory of the sovereign, what protection is there against Government aggression? Impeachment of its ministers to the Government itself? This is indeed a broken reed shown in the history of the Japanese Diet. But under any conditions absolutism and representative government are irreconcilable. Absolutism must either masquerade as representative government or else the "Constitution" merely "saves its face" in what is really an abdication.

The real result therefore of such an instrument under the absolutist theory is a central Bureaucracy, the government of a clique strongly entrenched behind it as a bulwark. Their interest of course lies in self perpetuation. Through and by the Constitution they control the Constitution. There is no interest in the central power to interfere. Its rights and interests are specifically conserved by the document. It stands above and out of the reach of party, with a bias in favour of an instrument which does not call in question any of these rights and interests and behind which the Administration, exercising necessarily the real power in the State, makes good its position against any assault from without. In such a position it is the interest of the clique to maintain all its powers under the Constitution. The Opposition is paralysed; without control of purse, of physical power, of education, of law as against the Administration; with little personal safety, as witness the laws against assembly. Over the Japanese subject the clique in control wields tremendous power. "The individual at times is to be sacrificed to the state," and there is none to step between to determine the justice or injustice of the occasion on which the sacrifice is to be made. This is pure militant socialism driven into every crevice of a man's life. And this appears elsewhere in Japanese life. The man unpopular to official eyes is indeed in a parlous way. Throughout the *whole* life of the Japanese civilian official he is always under a military regime of obedience to his superior. He has no time in which he is allowed to think as a man and a citizen. He is identified with the Government and not with

citizenship. He must regard the Government as the State, himself as part of the official machine to which his fellows are subject. Under such conditions controlling the army, the navy, and the police, without let or hindrance the clique in control of the Government is practically impregnable. The position of the police is peculiar. Properly speaking they are a gendarmerie not a constabulary. But in addition they have taken over—perhaps from Tokugawa times*—much of what is covered in America by the “petty magistrature,” but this is given a much wider extension in Japan. Within its range their action is only subject to appeal as from a judicial body, and the interpretation of the methods by which certain statutes referring to criminal legislation are to find administrative application is left to them. Hence their control over public service and public convenience in matters of highways, sanitation, hotels, and licensed pleasure quarters is far wider than is safe to leave to such an authority which through its legislative functions is virtually in its judicial functions called upon to pass judgment on its own acts. Much of the ground covered by ordinances of municipal councils in the West is covered by police regulation in Japan. A law is passed to free the girls retained against their will by the licensed brothels. But the police can put a great stumbling block in the way of executing this law by requiring the signature of the brothel keeper to the papers setting her free. There are numerous lines on which they are called to act, as a mere matter of legal precaution, in a legislative sense, and in which there is reason to believe a purely executive function would be much more to the advantage and desire of all concerned. In these minor administrative details there is substantially no appeal from them. And they are notoriously given to red tape. There is no use in appealing to equity. The Japanese mind does not grasp this feature of jurisprudence. It is the letter of the law alone, what it allows and does not allow, and in this range the police give it definition. And in addition to these powerful levers against the public at large there is the enormous patronage of the Government service itself, having at its command an army of zealous spies and servitors, not only in the execution of their specific office but in every outside moment marking ill-wishers and mutterers. One who lives in Japan soon comes to understand this power that the Japanese official has over the lower classes under him, and comes to understand the universal cringing deference paid not only to his office but to him while he holds that office.

A difficulty in the situation, strenuously fought against by the Opposition, lies in the aloofness of the disfranchised classes. It has been the persistent effort of the opposition to extend this franchise. As first instituted the franchise was only given to those possessing a certain income based on landed property. This has been extended lately to cover income from any kind of

* The system adopted was the French system. The French police system has more points of contact with the Tokugawa than with the Republic.

property but even then is so high as practically to disfranchise the great bulk of the nation. The present rate calls for a payment of direct *national* tax of ten yen a year. Based on the income tax at the present war rate this would mean a tax return of income at five hundred yen a year. The exempted rate (three hundred yen) can be said to mark the outside limit of the working classes, the highest wage rate being that of masons and stone cutters at about one yen a day (war prices).^{*} By far the large majority draw wages ranging from six to twenty yen a month. These classes and the merchant class are by no means exempt from taxation in other forms than national taxation, for licenses and fees are required for practically all trades and occupations. Stamped paper and mercantile taxes of many shades and kinds mulct the merchant for indirect national taxes and direct local taxes, and after paying the land tax of the Government the farmer has to turn around and settle a number of village and district taxes, some of them a direct levy and others percentage based on the Government tax itself. How deeply the merchant class itself is affected can be grasped in the fact that a man with an income of five hundred yen a year is asked to pay to the Government out of his scanty store and in addition to his many other imposts the sum of twelve yen. When the merchant comes to cast up his income account at the close of the year the list will not be found to be a long one enjoying the electoral right. In 1902, previous to the Russian war the number of electors was less than a million, or according to the official figures 22 per 1000 of population. The population of Tōkyō is a million and a half.[†] These low figures for income, be it added, by no means represent a corresponding low scale of living which is on a correspondingly cheap scale. But it does represent disfranchisement. The increased taxation of the war presumably has reached much farther down the scale and proportionately increased the franchise. The income tax at its lowest step was doubled ($\frac{1}{2}$). The involuntary extension may not be without advantage. When the great bulk of the population have no vote and no hope of getting one it can be seen that the frantic appeals for greater power to the Diet will meet with very cold support from the outside. They will hardly see the difference between such power as vested in the Government and such power as vested in the national assembly. Not being personally interested, on the whole they will prefer what they are accustomed to in preference to the unknown rule of the Diet. Of course, granting a wide suffrage, the whole situation would be changed. The Japanese takes his politics very earnestly and intelligently. He has to be terribly in earnest over the question of living and would not sit indifferent to his privileges. Meanwhile there is but one check left on the Govern-

^{*} In 1903 the official returns give masons—sixty three sen; stone cutters—sixty one sen. Figures are to be found in the "Résumé statistique de L'Empire du Japon" published by the Government.

[†] In 1901 in the great commercial port of Yokohama (pop. 299,202) the Japanese paying income tax were 4,782.

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* The reasons given in the gloss hinge on the necessity of the Administration not becoming subordinate to the Judiciary (a body confined by the Constitution to interpretation!) which would deprive it "of freedom of action in securing benefits to society and happiness to the people." Administration officials being constitutionally responsible they should "possess power to remove obstacles in the path of these measures, and to decide upon suits springing from the carrying out of them." Otherwise the Administration could not perform its duties. The second reason given is that individuals are to be sacrificed to the State. "But the question of administrative expediency is just what judicial authorities are ordinarily apt to be not conversant with." Commentaries pp. 120, 121. In his "Political Science" Doctor Woolsey, says: "If the Judges could make as well

ARTICLE LXII states that the consent of the Diet is necessary for new taxes, or for the modification of old taxes. But in the next clause excepts all Administration fees or other revenue in the nature of compensation. Any control on this point by the Diet is therefore eliminated.

ARTICLE LXIII still further limits this control by keeping in effect old taxes until modified. It can be interjected here that these prohibitions are the only ones against the passage of *ex post facto* laws against which the individual is not protected at all by any direct provision of the Constitution. As to taxation there is an essential difference in the example cited by the gloss (p. 129). The British Parliament has absolute control over the finances. It can revoke any Act sanctioning payments. The so-called permanent Acts are entirely within their control, and at any time can be modified or stopped altogether. This is not the case with the Japanese Diet, whose control of the purse is severely limited by this Article. It lacks power to pass an Act over Government veto.

ARTICLE LXIV sets forth the Budget as the gauge of national expenditure, but the gloss states that no Minister of State is bound by the Budget if occasion requires. This found expression under the Administration of 1901.

ARTICLE LXVII.—States that expenses authorized by the Emperor, or by law, or by legal obligation of Government are not to be rejected or reduced by the Diet. This Article follows the usual type and is in practice elsewhere, but in view of the freedom from control the position of the Government is very different from examples cited in the gloss. The concomitant conditions are equally important and are disregarded in western instances selected for approval. It is plain enough that there is a very dangerous power under Japanese conditions granted to the Government in this Article, and it gives still greater independent control of the finances to the Government.

ARTICLE LXX is the terse and suggestive one that when the Diet cannot be convoked the Government takes all the necessary financial measures to meet any situation. And the gloss emphasizes this absolutist position. "The withholding of approbation by the Diet refers only to the continued efficacy

"as interpret laws, or the chief magistrates levy taxes at discretion, "or decide cases in which private persons had complaints against the "government, there would be complete confusion of functions; and "absolute power within certain limits would belong to one department, or at least it would be easily usurped," Vol. I, p. 283. "If a "constitution, to whatever class it belongs, can be interpreted at "pleasure by the executive or the law making power of a State, it "scarcely differs from any other law, it is substantially modified by "such interpretation." Also, citing Judge Cooley on "Constitutional "Limitations" he says—"A constitution in free States must indeed "be generally a limitation on the departments of government; but "can we not conceive of a constitution introducing despotism, etc." Vol. I, p. 285. As to efficiency, also cf. J. S. Mill "Political Economy" Bk. V, Chap. 8, § 1.

Absolutism slowly gave way before popular rights. As every concession was likely to give rise to dispute as to the range of its application it became important to impartially determine such range, and hence an independent field to the Judiciary removing its determination of such questions as far as possible from the influence of either contestant. The necessity of this long contest called for leaders on both sides—of the people as well as the king. A process of evolution it was necessarily a constant breaking away from anything that promised to crystallize into custom. The necessary factor called for was therefore the individual, the only element elastic enough to meet the rapidly shifting changes of the political scene.

Let us turn for a moment to the course of events in European history to try and ascertain the real importance of the spirit of individualism and what part it has played in the making of our civilization of to-day. Under republican Rome individualism could be said not to exist. As far as the item known as "a man" was concerned, if a soldier he existed as a subject of military discipline, if a citizen he existed as a member of the clan and through it of the family. The family alone was recognized in the eyes of the law as the ultimate unit. This had long continuance in theory. But a militant society established on such a basis could have but one ending. The physical power of the State, centred in the army, in time made the head of the army also the head of the State. There can be no individualism under any form of despotism, and none can be said to exist under the Roman Empire. The subject was absolutely and abjectly at the mercy of the State as represented by its officials. The family unit was retained for convenience of administration, but its scanty influence also disappeared except in so far as it was a means of discipline for the State. Its effective existence in a despotism is as little possible as that of the individual. It is this hopelessness of men in the grasp of such a machine that perhaps accounts for the mad break for luxury during this decadent period of the world's history, when the virtue of the old Roman State seemed stretched on its last bed of sickness with only here and there a glimmer of light to show that it still was alive. There could be no encouragement for thrift under such a regime. There could be a race for favouritism, to grasp all the wealth possible under the opportunity of the hour, and to enjoy it to the full with the momentary prospect of having it snatched away. The powerful man sought to become more powerful for his very power otherwise marked him as a victim. As to those who could not make themselves necessary or feared, it was merely a question of time when their fate came upon them. Needless to say never has the distribution of property been so unevenly proportioned. Into Rome all the rest of the world poured its tribute. The provinces were milked to maintain the Roman population in games and idleness. The largesses of the Empire were distributed as gifts to a few fat kine, to make them an easier and richer prey for the head of the State when the time for their

expropriation was ripe. The goddess Fortune was at that time the true deity of the Romans, and there can be less sympathy for wealth stripped of its honours and its riches, because so few of the holders had anything to do with earning it, except in so far as they could influence the central power of the State to direct the golden current their way to the exclusion of others. And all the better can be understood the extravagance and desire for enjoyment in this state of uncertainty when the morrow might see them on their way to a miserable exile and beggary, or the close of their feasts might mingle their blood with the wine. Old Roman families could hardly be said to exist. The first century of the Caesar's had finished what the civil wars of the Republic had so effectively begun. In the days of the Republic a family could point to ten generations of ancestors. Under the Empire the great names barely last a century. It is an entirely new patriciate under the rule of Constantine and Constantius from that under Marcus Aurelius; as in the latter's time from that under Nero. Such emperors as Aurelian, Commodus, Gallienus, Constantius, and Valentinian I were not likely to encourage an old family line.

Of course there could be no true economic development under such conditions. Men must have an object. They must be able to look beyond the question of mere bread and butter, to feel that their work has some permanency beyond the present day. Otherwise their efforts are devoted to purely sensual purposes. Bread and butter does not mean mere subsistence. "Subsistence" is a wide term with very different meanings in the mouths of different men. But the fight for it and its enjoyment arouses simply the beastly qualities in men. Success merely emphasizes these lower tendencies. This is a very different spirit from enterprises involving the ingenuity and the higher intellectual qualities of men, but these could not develop under Imperial Rome. For such, stability and a reasonable prospect of being allowed to enjoy the fruits of one's success is necessary. The tendency therefore was to two extremes. The great man could not compete with the Government, but he was the only *item* capable of existing under it. At the height of its power he was its milch cow in time of stress. Meantime it taxed the rest of the people to the limits of their endurance. The freeman cannot compete with the slave on the same ground. The result was to drive the humble independent class into a condition of serfdom. It was easier to give up personal liberty and to take up land of the great official which, as free from taxation, he could offer on much easier terms plus the onerous but vague burden of personal service to the owner. This was almost the universal condition throughout the provinces and in Italy; and times of stress were not less infrequent as the custom spread. In Rome itself there was a beggar proletariat; a gang of clients and a gang of slaves accompanied the progress of every great man through the streets. More so in the days of Ammianus Marcellinus than in those of Juvenal. And

throughout the great mass there is not a particle of solidarity. There is not a trace of feeling for each other. It is not a pleasant fact but it is a psychological fact that we feel for others primarily because we feel for ourselves. The utilitarian principal can be traced at the bottom of our holiest emotions although its existence is little suspected. Individualism therefore is almost a necessity to charity, which accounts for the utter lack of it in the socialistic civilization of Old Rome. Hence the bloody sports of the arena in which men and animals were both sacrificed indifferently to amuse the Romans; and an indifference to the human body and its individual actions that drove all modesty from the public mind and relegated it—as Renan puts it—to the little band of Christians to whom the individual soul was everything. Charity therefore, as we understand it to-day, was practically confined to the family. We have an instance of its narrow scope in Seneca's "Essay on Benefits" in which, while the secret and generous hand is not unknown, it plays a subordinate part, the true feature being the worthiness of the object and the obligation to repay the benefit; and although this latter is to form no part of the expectation of the giver, yet it is to be taken into account in considering the worthiness of the recipient; a truly neat question of casuistry. Politics and the customs of an Age strongly influence morals which in themselves differ little in the ground principles of Eternal Truths. There are no sterner morals than those of Cicero, the Stoic, as laid down in his "Offices," although he countenances some things, not only in politics but also in morals, which grate harshly on us to-day.* And three centuries later Symmachus, the shining example of perhaps one of the most attractive societies of puritan Rome, holding its own in its austerity among the laxest of morals in the outside pagan world and an almost equal laxity in the surrounding Christian world, could countenance the arena and bitterly bewail the suicide of the Saxon gladiators which he had carefully collected to celebrate the games of his Consulship. Our highest standard to-day can hardly be said to be higher than that of Cicero and Symmachus, but our average is perhaps higher. The disproportion is not so marked as to our surroundings, as is the case with the little coterie which followed the wise instructions that fell from the lips of the Stoic philosophers. Perhaps it needs such corruption as was found in Old Rome to emphasize and enforce the practice of the high ideals requiring such austerity of living.

Gibbon in his study of the history of this great political machine marks three points which have no little application and warning to men of later date. Thus he refers to the auspicious influence of the Roman Empire, that period in which the expression "Peace of Rome" had real meaning and value. If there had been any real economic value in the Empire at that

*. For instance he condones judicial advocacy for purposes of revenge, or by way of patronage.—Book II Chapter XIX.

time it would have given it such strength that the barbarian nations hovering on its outskirts could have made no real and serious attack upon it. Rome's economic efficiency, however, was exhausted by the close of the third century. A second factor to which he refers had by that time full operation. The principles of a free Constitution had entirely disappeared, or rather the old socialistic structure had ripened and gone down under the inevitable necessities of the situation which, concentrating power in the hands of officials, in time had placed the whole community at the disposal of those officials. Giving no influence or standing to the individual the old Constitution of Rome stripped him of all protection when the family and clan structure went down before Imperialism. This has inevitably been the fate of every body politic so constituted, whether it be a wandering Tartar tribe settling into a national community, a City State delivered over to a "tyrant," or a Republic degenerating into a centralized bureaucracy. They all tend to this conversion of an officialdom into a bureaucracy. The sovereignty, whether single as a monarch or an abstraction as the People, is dethroned from its proper place. This has been illustrated more than once—in the histories of Greece, of Japan, and of France. An existing instance is Russia whose Czar a hundred years ago did not hesitate to apply the lash over the backs of the highest of his kneeling officials, and who to-day is nothing but the mouth piece of such a bureaucracy. But if the "*Pax Romana*" was an auspicious element in the then existing state of the world it had another very terrible meaning. Personality which had no meaning in the days of the Republic came to have a very terrible meaning under the Empire. As Gibbon puts it, there was no place to which a man could fly who had offended the master—and it might be added the servants of the master—of the Roman world. The cruelties that men endured from Aurelian to Valentinian I were such that cause wonder that men did not rise up *en masse* to protect each other from them. The reason was that, as always happens in a socialistic State, the men struck at were those whose heads appeared above the mass of the people who were at best indifferent to their fate. What the Empire was living on, however, was its capital. It was cutting off gradually its real source of revenue, the valuable brain power of the community. To confiscate and live on their possessions was an easy matter, and it kept the Roman Empire on its feet for over a hundred and fifty years. Then this source of power was gone and the whole machine came to the ground with a crash and with a suffering to the peoples of South Europe that lasted for centuries. There were no material resources and no brain resources left to meet the onslaught of the northern nations whose slaves and victims they became. There is no better illustration than that given by the historian of the "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" of the necessity of reform and not of the destruction of any one element in a community. A debauched population and a selfish aristocracy together ruined the world's greatest Empire.

Even if it is a passing to feudalism it is a sense of relief in the history of individualism to pass on to that element injected in western civilized life by the German tribes. At the worst there is always the personality of the German inherited from the days when he was the companion—the *comes*—of his chief. And in his relations with that chief there always exists a sense of contract. Feudalism is based on contract. There were rights and obligations on both sides. And then the possibilities of the times were great as compared with those which had preceded. A man had his value as such, and the market was wide within which he could find a purchaser for his right arm—if it was a strong one and still attached to its owner. Those were the days of the individualism of brawn as distinguished from our present individualism of brain, and due credit must be given to its commanding figures. The extreme disintegration of feudalism rendered individualism in this sense more pronounced; and events, whether of war or the Crusades, greatly favoured it. These latter were a god-send. They accomplished three important results. They impoverished the feudal nobility which had reached its full strength of service and could only later become a drag on the world's progress; they strengthened the power of the wealth which represented then, as it does now, thrift; they failed in their immediate object. The most valuable result of the last mentioned, as Gibbon puts it, was to bring nations together whose prejudices had been increased by their ignorance of each other. Meanwhile lasting results were obtained in the rights wrung from needy nobles in continual feud with each other. And these rights were practically irrevocable. Champions were always to be procured by the wealthy towns, and the mercenary armies of the nobles were met by the mercenary nobles armed in defence of the towns. And there were some rights belonging even to insignificance which, in those piping days of war, could walk around and view the more distinguished and elevated heads rotting on a pole. On the whole, however, the general condition of feudalism was a favourable one to individualism. The spirit of vitality in the small unit was an immensely valuable one and much is owed it to-day. It always maintained its ground in Germany, where the nobles were united with the Emperor outside of Germany and united against him in internal politics. Hence the German Diet was a real legislative body for the class it represented. In England, Parliament and People united until Parliament came to represent the People. In France the Estates-General early fell into innocuous desuetude, Parliament was a mere advisory body, and there resulted the despotism of the French monarchy akin to that of Imperial Rome. It is noticeable how the mutual support of the ecclesiastical and secular arms aided both. If a strong Huguenot party could have been kept alive in those days in which nothing but religion was capable of fighting imperialism, the French Parliament might have been revived. As it was the whole machine became incapable of reform.

It is in the French Philosophy of the eighteenth century that the latent spirit of individualism in the old Frankish people found its expression. Every trace of such expression had been crushed out of Gallic institutions and it was necessary to build from the ground up. It is perhaps this necessity that gives it a touch of idealism, almost of extravagance. The innate perfection of man is no basis on which to build. Experience and history sadly teach that man's institutions must be based on his imperfect nature. But its individualism was perfectly sound and rings true to-day. It found its real expression in the States General and the Convention before this latter passed under the control of the Jacobin minority. But this Old France had the same problem to face as modern Europe. There were but two parties in the State—the Government and the Radicals. The great mass of the conservative body in the State—the Middle Class—stood coldly aside to let the latter wreak its will on the former, in which itself it had no interest but dislike. Excess brought reaction. But the real failure of this first experiment was due to lack of experience. Reaction in its turn went too far, and in seeking a new basis for the State sought it only in the form of visible created wealth. For a moment the beautiful dream of every man with his interest in the State had been disclosed only to be defiled by the pollution of the Terror. But the remembrance of it still remained. The new regime turned in a different direction. Laying down the axiom that a man's interest in the State was determined by property, it left out of account altogether the property which is vested in a man's right arm, and which is the fundamental basis of all property and which has a determinable assessed value as every income tax law shows. Needless to say this wholesale disenfranchisement of a large part of the producers has aroused the discontent existing in France at the present day, and unfortunately has created the same gulf that exists in the monarchical countries between the so-called labouring class and a ruling caste. And the reign of the bourgeois class has been anything but satisfactory. With its thoughts turned to property, with property raised on a pedestal and converted into a deity, it has turned to the worship of money, to the measurement of success by money in a sense never dreamed of in America so generally accused of aureolatry. In America it is money as power that is sought. The apotheosis does not involve that niggardliness that is at the basis of French saving, and of which two of her greatest realists—Balzac and Zola—have given such similar and vivid pictures in "Les Paysans" and "La Terre." The French bourgeois was therefore totally unable to rise to the situation. He was frightened by his first plunge into the unknown, and having recovered his balance, abandoned his dream and returned to his money bags and his money grubbing, recognizing the strength of his position and unwilling to share with any other interest the plunder he had gained by the disorder. His individualism therefore is of a very false tone. Individualism does not mean license, although that

is an interpretation given it in his practice. There is no worse rule than such application of "laissez faire." The point is not to interfere with the working of a natural law. But it is equally necessary not to mistake men's laws for the laws of Nature. A natural law once ascertained, the object of the laws of men should be that none should interfere with its operation. Men should be forced to give all an equal opportunity, to observe the natural law without trampling on each other; a course which in these days of "graft, and pull," and favouritism generally is not followed in many other lands than France. There has been therefore a most unwise disappointment among thinking men over Constitutionalism, mistaking for it a narrow Commercialism.

The crying source of discontent in Europe therefore has been disfranchisement; effected not by class but through property qualification. And this has been due to an abuse of political position. Intentionally so in the monarchical countries where it was determined by the ruling caste to maintain their exclusive position at any cost. Unintentionally in France where reaction threw the bourgeoisie into the arms of imperialism, or something very like it. At least one thing was thoroughly gotten rid of—the idea of "God's Anointed." Democracy, however, was not entirely crushed as was shown by the risings of 1848, the culmination of a series of oppressive measures directed by the Un-Holy Alliance against all liberal thought in Europe. Owing, however, to the narrow definition given to property, democracy has had to turn itself from any idea of political alliance with the bourgeoisie and adapt itself to local circumstances. A straightforward political programme of republicanism therefore has still a bad name on European soil. In Germany it denounces caste rule, and lays down an economic programme nominally directed against the caste and wealth but really directed against a great mass of smaller bourgeois. Political events and an unwise conservatism have therefore brought about their legitimate results in Europe. The strength of the military monarchies in Europe to-day largely rests on bayonets, with the cold but alarmed support of the middle class having still in mind the French Revolution and the minor revolutions which followed in its train for more than fifty years. Hence privileged classes have managed to maintain their sway under one form or the other. Neither of the opposing elements in European politics are very homogeneous. There is a good deal of democracy inherent in the ranks of the privileged class, and the great middle class is naturally democratic, which is one reason for the distrust of their allies at the seat of power. And so in the ranks of socialism itself. The violent noisy extremists are the ones who make themselves heard, but fluctuation in their strength, coupled with such differences on question of dogma as to negative any constructive programme, shows that much of their constituency consists of people who dislike caste rule and see no other way of getting rid of it except by an organized opposition with positive aims. A great mistake was made in the first instance by ignoring the vital interest in the

State possessed by the labourer as well as the capitalist and the hereditary land-owner. This has widened the gap, to make of the two elements two absolutely opposed and incompatible interests. The organization of the labouring classes almost necessarily follows this idea, and its agitation for enfranchisement apart from property now takes on a very different meaning from what it would have had before this differentiation sprang up. Never has the wisdom of the English body politic been better shown than in its history on this point. And European statesmen can bitterly regret the history of Continental Europe which shows repression instead of guidance. Labour naturally turns to the direct opposite of all that it finds in its opponents. Hence its turn to socialism for its only strength seems to lie in union. Hence its view of militarism which is a training for its own system. Hence its hatred of any personal superiority and its seeking safety in worse than mediocrity. The principles of the French Revolution are rejected and it is openly denounced as a "bourgeois revolution." The past tyranny is forgotten in the present. This position of labour in European politics is of great interest in view of the preaching it gets in Japan. The whole point is there missed. The present labour-socialist programme of Europe is confused with democracy. And wonder of wonders! the dangers of individualism are drawn in glaring colours as the attributes of a socialism to which the very name of individualism is as the name of the Beast and the sign-manual of the Evil One. On the contrary, the drift of European labour is not towards democracy but towards communism; and the Japanese should feel flattered.

§ 4.

There can here be marked a difference in the stages to which the European peoples have advanced in their political thinking. And with a difference probably in results to the future. The little "streak of silver" which separates England from the Continent has enabled the English people to work out their internal problem without interference of foreign pressure. There has been just as much resentment against the organization of the lower classes in England as anywhere else. But in English Society and in English political life it has not been found possible to draw sharp lines. What has been won for one has been won for all; in time, if not at once, for the widening circles ever bring new political powers into the field. The tone of English legislation (and therefore of American legislation which inherits the same principle) has been against class legislation. It deals with the individuals; and this importance, this sacredness of the individual, runs through all Anglo-Saxon thought. To legislate as to the personal rights of a class, and not applicable to all men, is

repugnant to it. To speak and to act as one pleases soon takes strong hold on a man. To allow interference from another is as displeasing as to allow it from a Government official, and hence the main duty of Government has been to prevent such friction between the units. It is the creed of a strong self-reliant race, and it is a just and reasonable creed when tempered with pity for the weak or fallen and when it really strives to attain its ideal of exact justice. And it has the added advantage of efficiency for it calls out the very best from its units. This development of the individual, Continental Europe has not been able to push to such extreme for it has never been able to break away from its military habits. Internal problems have always been complicated with external problems. The military ranks of the population therefore have never been broken, and industrial life is developed on a kindred basis of class privilege and subordination. Men in operating by classes, therefore, have known nothing beyond the class, and privilege acquired has become an attribute of the class and with no reference to the individual except as a member of the class. The widening of the circle, therefore, grants a right but does not grant all the rights inherent in other circles. In other words legislation applies to classes, and the individual in stepping into the charmed circle of privilege does not find himself heir to all that has been acquired heretofore, but is confronted with an immense number of special privileges still hedging him in. As an individual his value is therefore very small. It is only as a factor of an organization. Thus the great middle class in monarchical Europe in being admitted to power finds itself not admitted to a class but allied with a class on just such terms as it can force from that class. A class peculiarly sensitive to contract must sign a contract leaving most of the plums in the hands of its allies.

Such is the construction of the Constitutions of most monarchical countries. This alliance has taken the best element out of European democracy. It has left the ruling caste with lukewarm support in the great middle class. This class having no responsibility for the greater affairs of government, the management of which are retained in the hands of the upper class, devotes itself to its numerous special interests. There can be no government by great parties held together by a few fundamental principles of policy to which all special interests must accommodate themselves. Hence in such a class government there appears in it under the names of parties, Poles, Alsations, Hanoverian Guelphs, Danes, Social-Democrats, Clericals, Radicals, Liberals, Conservatives, Agrarians, and kindred minor interests, all figuring as parties with a very local object as the guiding principle of their political action. The difficulty of getting into line these discordant elements, unaccustomed to act together, is very great. Government in the interests of privilege is naturally satisfied to see disunion in the ranks where it can seek support and might find opposition. If the opposition were limited to these nebulous elements class

government would be very secure. But it is not; under property qualifications a large class of the nation are shut out from the suffrage; and under the existing system of pre-emption in Government position a large class that do have the suffrage are shut out from any advantage beyond giving their "yea and nay" on procedure. Organization on the one side and leadership on the other give a voice to those who otherwise would have no influence on public affairs. This is the position of the Social-Democrats in Germany. Determined to rule by the caste system the Government therefore is satisfied to drive the active element of the great middle class into the ranks of the socialists, trusting in its turn, not to the support of the middle class, for even these invertebrates are not likely to give them something for nothing—but to their neutrality.

Placed in a position where they must go ahead—no Government can stand still, without a programme of any kind—the German Government substitutes paternalism for socialism. It does not seem as yet reasonable to charge them with socialism. Most of those cases in which Government has entered directly on public administration instead of public regulation have been in fields which are everywhere recognized as under certain conditions legitimate for the operation of the most conservative of Governments. Germany is a military State with a great military organization, and the operation of the railways by the State can be said to be a military necessity.* Certainly not an economic one for their efficiency and return to the public would be greater in private hands. But much of the so-called socialistic legislation is not socialistic at all. Socialism operates the individual in behalf of the State. It places the charge of unthrift on thrift. It sets a standard and the capable are relied on to maintain that standard, to make up the deficiencies of the incapable. The paternalism of the German Government is the direct opposite. Its compulsory insurance, old age pension, and similar laws are to force thrift on the individual. It says to the working class—"since you will not save, we will save for you," and deducts it from their earnings. In fact it adds just so much to the wages of the class living on the subsistence line† and in so far is socialistic, but this class is really not a large one. The unfortunate and the helpless are taken care of by the usual channels familiar in all western civilized communities. But paternalism does not shift the burden of the incapable and idle on the capable beyond State necessity to prevent a burden in direct alms giving, but forces the man to take it on himself. This is a wide extension of police power of the State, and perhaps is only advisable or possible under such a military regime as that of

* Nationalization of railways has been a subject of discussion from their inception. They are in a sense public highways. The discussion ranges between best management for public purposes and the danger of adding a great mass of patronage to the Executive. It has only recently been brought up as a question of socialism.

† The "submerged tenth."

Germany or similar States. Much depends on the material to be made use of. The point lies just here, and it has been made a subject of investigation. Does not such a system of regimentation, as is aimed at by German paternalism, in sacrificing individualism sacrifice in part efficiency? That great material advances have been made in Germany in recent years nobody would deny, but these are to be attributed to its splendid educational system, especially in its upper branches. The universities and the schools have been left unhampered. The Government does not clutch a man until he has been educated. But the German workman is decidedly less efficient than the American workman. Now there is not here distinction between personal capability for there are plenty of Germans brought up in America just as capable as the native. The favourable result in this case can only be attributed to a quicker intelligence aroused by his freer institutions. They require him to think for nobody is going to think for him. There can be immense material progress on German lines, but there can be greater material progress on American lines for the material itself is better, not intrinsically but owing to its conditions of life.

Retaining a form of State in which *status* is as yet a fundamental principle, and hence a limiting condition of contract, the object of the German Government is to remove the causes of discontent, to take away any visible vantage ground from the opposition. In other words to steal their thunder. It meets demands by anticipation on their own grounds but by the Government's own methods. It cuts the ground from under the radical feet. It further gives a very positive interest in the State to every man so mulcted of a portion of his wages or salary. But there is not to be noted a sign of intention to admit these beneficiaries into any voice as to their own affairs. It may be just and it may be unjust. Those subject to the process must judge by the results. Of course only a military Government could carry out such taxation without representation; and a strong Government. There is no sense of instability in the German Government. The mulcting of the people is performed for a well defined and well advertised purpose as to their own good. There is no attempt to develop individual tenacity of purpose among the people. They are taken in hand as soldiers (or children) and treated as such. Germany may be a military camp but it is a nation in arms. Constantinople is also a military camp but no one knows when its mercenaries will fall to cutting the throats of each other, or amicably divide the pelf of the flocks and herds which they are supposed to guard and march off to their different mountain fastnesses. Writing years ago de Amicis tells us how this essential instability of the splendid Turkish military organization impressed itself on him. And so in Russia. Here there is no provision made to meet just discontent but brutal repression and trusting purely to military discipline in the cohorts. Men are murdered judicially or otherwise. Women are stripped, whipped, and suffer worse abuse.

Such stories—by no means modified in the telling—naturally arouse feeling to a white heat. No man wishes to compromise in such cases, and murder and rape are met with the bomb. Brutality is met by brutality, and hideous as are such crimes as those of “the Reds” in the streets of Moscow and Warsaw the world looks on much as it would at two wild beasts tearing each other.

Outside of the contending political interests there are other factors combating human action. These by choice act in the political field to secure their own ends. It is an interesting question therefore as to where the Church stands in the political struggle. Perhaps fortunately it preaches resignation not revolution and does not add the religious passions to those of the mob. For the irreligion of the mob is all on the surface. It is that boldness which carries the man away in the mass, and in which he lets loose his real savagery under the impression that his responsibility is lost to sight in the multitude; to cringe afterward in his individuality. For the propaganda, however, property is a necessity, and the Church's temporal interests maintain her conservatism. This is the practical side. The importance of real conditions is never lost sight of in idealism. This has diminished her influence—even neutralized it—in great revolutionary movements. The object of the Church is supremacy, and for this is necessary stability. Power and instability are incompatible terms to a permanent organization. In working on the religious passions of men it will be found on the side of authority, seeking substitution of control in order to accomplish its peculiar ends. For this it must be in the position of a giver. The Church dispenses charity. Its means of charity are its right. Religion is one of the most powerful of human motives and it cannot be lost without a corresponding equilibration in human thought. The neutral position of the Church is peculiar, and accentuation of personality in it by diminishing the Church influence is therefore a positive injury in disturbing the present equilibrium. Reform in the hierarchy and temporality in the direction of making the personality less conspicuous, and the uses of its resources, as the purely public institution that it is, more conspicuous, would give the Church far greater power against hostile interests. As long as religion so powerfully governs men's actions—and there is little sign of anything to the contrary—the Church will stand between the rich and the poor; to energetically preach the duty of the former, and to unhesitatingly rebuke the defects of the latter as well as pour oil in the wounds of misfortune. The public spirit of the Church can only be lost sight of at cost of diminishing its spiritual influence. It is essentially a democratic institution.*

* As to religious influence in vexing social questions the Spanish writer, Pedro de Alarcon, tells us that this came to him as the only means of salving the wounds of his country in which the Church plays so conspicuous a part—“democratizar la Iglesia.” His views are found in that interesting little book of travels in a Spanish by-way, “La Alpujarra”—See the Epilogue.

One element is much exaggerated in present times—"the Goths and Huns of the alley." That riot and disorder follow political movements, to-day as always, is true; but the delivery of our modern civilization to such elements is no longer possible. That form of the French Revolution cannot repeat itself. It was the newness of the phenomenon that took the world by surprise. The minority of this band of plunderers, always lying in wait for its opportunity, is now too well understood, and its first manifestations are the first sign for the community to bring itself up with with a sharp check in what is often an expression of just indignation. The Paris Commune found its greatest foes in its own ranks. All the solid elements lined up at once against what on the surface seems only in its extent to have been an unreasonable demand for home rule. Where Government is paralysed a community can act by itself. Thus Leadville was "regulated" free of its bad characters; New Orleans suppressed a band of assassins; and the bottom drops out of most of our dangerous strikes carried to the point of contempt for public order.

§ 5

That it should be the field of Government to supply the best facilities for individual training, should furnish to its citizens every information for the better conduct of the national production of wealth, whether by investigations which can only be carried out effectively by a national Government, or by statistics that can only be collected through the wide range of a national bureau, or should undertake public works of national interest is an accepted maxim of every civilized nation whether democracy or monarchy. However, to take the individual in hand and to limit his field of action is to limit his efficiency and hence to limit the efficiency of the State. The best test of the value of individualism is seen in the two Anglo-Saxon nations that stand in the forefront of industrial progress, and the best counter-test is seen in the fact that Continental Europe has fallen behind in just those departments where the State has laid its restraining hand on the citizen. It is not fair to lay the difference of efficiency between the American workman and his French or German *confrere* in the wine drunk by the one or the beer drunk by the other. The American himself is no teetotaller, and this would be to give whiskey an advertisement anything but deserved. The policy of the Anglo-Saxon has been toward a pronounced individualism with steady elimination of class privilege until it is the individual and not a class which confronts restraining laws. This is a very different situation from that presented by class privilege. Interests or combinations of interests can present a front against the restraining power of the State, but these interests—such as mercantile interests—stand on shifting ground. They can only

plead advisability not privilege; a contract by its very nature limited in time and extent, not *status* permanently defined for all time or as long as the State lasts. And this very condition carries its opposite with it. Knowing the real helplessness of any individual before the united action of the community in the State, and having a voice to determine the range of that action which must fall on all whenever it does act, the citizen for his own sake must exercise that action with due circumspection or pay the penalty perhaps in his own person. This is one reason for the stand taken toward universal suffrage which is such a bug-a-boo to the average European politician. Just why the magic line should be drawn at the man who holds a tax receipt is hard to see. Outside of the almshouse there is no man who is not a contributing member of the community. The product of a man's arm is as much an asset if he spends it in food and clothing and shelter, as when he puts part of it aside and invests it in a house or in funds sufficient to bring him within the income tax. There may be—and is—difference of opinion on the advisability of giving property a separate right of suffrage. It seems, however, difficult to draw the line between the millionaire and the centenare in such case, and the safety of property certainly does not depend on any such line. It would be in very poor case if it did. But it does not seem reasonable to refuse to regard earning capacity as an asset and to limit suffrage to certain forms of taxable property.

The position of the unit in an individualistic State is a double one. The one tendency drives him actively to assert his own desires to their logical limit. But this applies equally well to everyone of his fellows which it is equally his self-interest to oppose. Hence there is a centripetal tendency forcing him to lean on and give his support in turn to the community. Just what institutions will be evolved under such conditions depends on the average making up the whole mass. Here lies the distinction between a State that is only partly individualistic—as Germany—and States that are wholly so—as England and the United States. In the first case the Constitution is laid down on a basis of privilege. In the second case the Constitution simply defines the right of the units through their representatives to determine the relations between the units themselves. The right of the British Parliament is paramount. In this respect they have not pressed individualism as far as in the United States where the action of the units is limited by a written instrument to maintaining "a republican form of government." The British Parliament could establish a dictatorship if it wished. The American Government—with unanimity in all its three branches—cannot; without amendment to the Constitution. This means that the community in the first instance is supreme in Great Britain; whereas in the United States to avoid the terms of the written instrument there must be a referendum to the units, successful effort of change requiring a three fourth's majority of the States.

Evidently what is sought in the two great individualistic countries—Great Britain and the United States—is to strike the balance between the centrifugal (egoistic) and centripetal (communistic) tendencies so as not to hamper individual capability and not to impair either the efficiency of the State or of the units. The position of the American citizen is an interesting one. The basic principle can be said to be “the least government is the best government,” with a due regard to the two dangers threatening him. The powers of the Federal Government are therefore the ones carefully defined. Beyond that the State steps in to protect its citizens against the Federal Government. This question of definition is an important one. To say what a party to a contract shall do is a very different thing from simply defining what it shall not do.* Broad as is its field it can safely be said that, unless they are drawn into service in a Federal Court, or are so misguided or unfortunate as to figure before it in a more unpleasant capacity, or belong to the little band strained once or many times through the custom-house, ninety per cent of the American people only come in direct contact and knowledge of the Federal Government through the post-office, the newspapers, and their action as voters on national affairs. Many of them pass their lives without entering any Federal building except the post-office. The real “Sovereign” to the American citizen is his State; and this is limited by the obligation to maintain a republican form of government, and by the obligation that its legislation shall be in conformity with all legislation passed by the national Congress and held to be constitutional. There remain many and broad questions which can be said to be local issues, but in such cases its action is checked by the competition with the other States. This it cannot check or prohibit, and any questions arising in connection with it come before the Federal Judiciary and not before the State tribunals. It is no easy matter therefore in the first case to avoid the review of its laws by the Federal Courts, or in the second case to avoid putting its own citizens at a positive disadvantage in reference to the citizens of other States. Even therefore where the citizen (in the minority) is exposed to the full force of the State, which may be disposed to exercise its power tyrannically, he is not without recourse, for this power cannot be exercised without injury to the majority. It is to the interest of no State to drive capital away from its borders. Hence the law of New York, directed more especially against personal property, has simply had the effect of driving many of its wealthy citizens to live in the neighbouring State of New Jersey which has been more modest in its demands. New York has the power to tax the property within its own borders, but has no power to tax it anywhere else.

The American citizen as individual seems therefore to be well protected against oppressive action by the community, which

* A radical difference expressed in the attitude of an eminent English statesman toward Irish “Home Rule” in 1885.

in its turn has full power as a sovereign State to drive matters just as far as it dares (1) against public opinion of the United States as expressed in Federal and State legislation and (2) against its own well-being and progress as a community. It has wide powers to do so but the question always confronts it—will it be profitable to do so? For this is not a case where it can hedge itself in and protect itself against outside competition, but it has to face the actual test of such competition. The American State has the control of the individual to the full extent of the socialistic experiment—provided it establishes this on a democratic basis and erects no bar against the competition of the other States. There is in this federal constitution of the United States a factor not found in Continental Europe or even in Great Britain. The restraint is not legally defined. The Federal Government of the United States has wide powers for all the purposes laid down in the Constitution. The State Governments have the still wider field of everything not specifically granted to the Federal Government by the Constitution. But these latter have to consider that there are limits beyond their control but with equal privilege for citizens there residing. They can tax these “foreigners” just to the extent that they can tax their own citizens, but if these outsiders have more favourable conditions for their production they are simply cutting the throats of their own citizens.

Perhaps this to some extent explains the attitude of the average American to the question of the Trusts. A democratic government is peculiarly fitted to deal with just such questions which are not to be dealt with by means of the club of the despot, benevolent or otherwise. The cry against the fitness of democracy is very specious and reverses all the predictions (likewise vain) so often made that democracy would not deal tenderly with vested interests. The Trust which aims at monopoly and nothing else must, however, press on the citizen to that point where his individual interest is less to him than his interest as member of the community. There can be no better proof of this than the fact that Trusts can only be said to be becoming an issue in the United States. And then more in what they threaten to do than in what as yet they actually do. When intelligent men have the remedy in their hands and hesitate to use it, it is safe to say that the pressure on them as yet is not very great. For the weapon is two-fold, known to all, and gets a vigorous preaching. Against national monopoly can be thrown open the doors to international competition; and the States themselves can forbid their citizens to enter into a monopoly by combination, and can force an outside monopoly to comply with the same law within the State. Under such conditions it certainly seems more difficult for monopoly to square its interests with the general average of the mass of citizens than with any particular caste. The German Government finds itself no better able to handle the Agrarian interests, than the average American Commonwealth to handle a national monopoly of one

of the necessities of life. In fact the American Commonwealth has rather the best of the argument, for the monopoly has to fight for its life in the Courts, whereas the Germany monopoly openly comes forward as a political party. And so elsewhere with the "landed interest" and a host of other interests. The German expedient of shutting out the foreign Trust and State administration of its own Trusts creates in its turn a State monopoly which is simply socialism with all its wastefulness. A State monopoly has never been found to be cheaper than any other monopoly. If it restricts production according to the socialist programme it must force prices up. If it carries on the monopoly as a matter of business it has exactly the same complications to meet as any other business—cost of production, management, wear and tear, *risk*. It must cover all these; or, in other terms, be run at a reasonable profit. If it goes into the monopoly to make it pay, it does as any other monopoly—forces the public to pay as much as can be got out of them without diminishing the demand. The American system of State prevention of combination among its citizens and national prevention by international competition seems here at least as likely to be effective. The capability of killing monopoly by localizing its operations and then dismembering it by means of State laws is getting a wide preaching. Its natural and necessary corollary, however, is Federal action against monopoly so wide as to be national. The real weapon here is the tariff.

For after all these Trusts which are so much spoken of as a modern development are nothing of the kind. They are utterly opposed to any theory of individualism. They are a reaction. Quite as much so as socialism. Most of the eloquence expended on the subject in our newspapers and magazines can be traced to the thorough discussion given the subject (under the name of mercantilism) more than a hundred years ago by Adam Smith. Mercantilism was finally broken down in England by Peel and Gladstone, and combinations to restrict trade must at least fight without the aid of tariff or bounties. This reduces such combinations to fight a war of extermination with their rivals in order to establish their monopoly, and frighten any would be competitors of the future by the carnage of the previous scene of battle. That free trade is a valuable deterrent against corporation monopoly is plain enough from the fact that in the very country in which mercantilism had its earliest development the power of the Trust is practically limited to the "landed interest" which is a natural not an artificial monopoly. It would doubtless be an equally valuable weapon in the United States, for the mere threat of it in the removal of a very small tax is said to have been a powerful factor in bringing together the warring interests in the anthracite coal strike of Pennsylvania in 1903. It is much easier to get a law on the statute book than to get it off, but where one article of a tariff is concerned discussion may be opened as to all. The United States possesses in its State Governments what England does not possess in Parliament.

Parliament must use a club once for all, and take up the difficult question of putting a limit as to legal combination or forbidding it altogether. It legislates on particular lines. The American State need not take up this question at all. It can forbid combinations in restraint of trade, a regulation to which any foreign (other State) corporation is equally liable in its dealings within the State. Corporations within a State have to meet the competition of free trade between the States. If this were not the case monopoly would have an easy control through the tariff, and in the case of certain national monopolies which have or threaten to complete their circuit it is to the State and the tariff that people are turning for their weapon. Where the State Government is confronted with difficulties is before a national monopoly of a necessary of life over which it has no control within its own borders. Fortunately or unfortunately Nature has so distributed some of her favours that they are concentrated in particular spots. For example—anthracite coal in Pennsylvania, and oil in Pennsylvania, Ohio, California, and a few other States. If there is not interest enough aroused to attack these monopolies through Federal legislation, powerful as it is any State—or even minority—has to suffer. They have but one satisfaction—that their citizens will suffer no more than the citizens of the State possessing the monopoly. The State legislatures and the Federal legislature are so all powerful in their given spheres, that when it is found that they do not act it must be assumed that the men sent to them are given no earnest commission by their electors.

The other form of Trust—the Labour Trust—presents another phase. This likewise is an anachronism—the legitimate and necessary counterpoise of the other*—tracing its ancestry back to the guilds in which the same principles ruled, limitation of membership and of production. It differs in so far as a permanent separation between master and man having taken place the Trades Unions are confined entirely to the employed, and hence their objects are not only limitation as above to secure the highest price for their work, but also to share that wage equally among its members. To do this the pace is set by the slowest. The strength of the Unions lies in maintaining a certain grade of efficiency. If it falls below this it must either widen its membership or compete with the scab. It has two bodies of dissenters to deal with; the more capable who are prevented from exercising their natural powers, and the incapable who are unable to keep up. It is unlikely that the question of dues keeps many men out of the Unions. They are below the Union standard. This standard in itself is nothing to the Unions. It is an old and dead principle of two hundred years ago that quality should be a matter of concern to the maker. The Unions are willing enough to lower the standard. But if the standard is made too low the monopoly becomes less and power to compete much

* The Labour organizations antedate Employers organizations.

greater. What the Unions seek in their field is monopoly. Quite as much so as the "Trusts." The bitterness against the "scab" is because he makes off with what they regard as part of the Union cake. If they take him in they must share with him. What they want is the power to exclude him altogether from competition.

As it is a passing down in the scale to men in which the brutal passions lie much nearer the surface and under much less restraint the nature of this warfare does not present features pleasant to contemplate. There is an appeal to public opinion for it happens that the people of the United States are not the "submerged tenth." The actual physical combat, however, is in the lower ranks for it is these which are in competition. And these use their own natural weapons of violence and villification. The unionists have the advantage of organization and the natural sympathy of all the wage-earning class to those striving for the higher wage; fewness in numbers and the monopoly feature not appearing or being translated by every sympathizer to his own sphere. This is behind every movement to prevent strong measures against riot and disorder which are of use to the labour leaders to influence public opinion to a demand for peace at any price. Terrorism is an invaluable weapon. A long stand-out, fight may be inevitable in the end, but terrorism at the beginning may bring about a quick settlement or prevent an early defeat. They stand to gain much and to lose little by its presence in a big fight, for in a long test of strength any disorder at the beginning is forgotten in the final settlement. How far some of these organizations will go is seen in public trials that have followed great movements of this kind. And such Labour organizations seeking monopoly are difficult to deal with under existing laws. Not being incorporated and having no visible assets their responsibility is practically *nil*. There is difficulty even in enforcing the criminal law against men who sink their individuality and their duty as citizens in their Union membership. Every principle of right and justice, even the decent suspension of judgment in the face of legal indictment for grave offences, is put aside by popular passion, and a most indecent expression given of endorsement of anything or any man with the Union brand. It is "the Union—right or wrong." It is the tacit endorsement of criminal acts, because they are committed by fellow-members even against themselves, that works grave injury to the public *morale*. Men engaged in murder or criminal assault will hardly be found to give evidence against themselves. Not long since in an internal dispute of one of these organizations a man was abused and nearly murdered, but neither from him nor from those who witnessed the assault could any information be obtained by the law officers of the Commonwealth. All the conspirators and the victim himself stood pat. The refusal was boldly based on the superior rights of the society as against the Commonwealth whose law had been broken and derided. This occurrence hardly called for half a dozen lines in the local

newspapers. We can denounce the Black Hand and the Mafia, but these little *contretemps* in a labour union meeting seem quite *en règle*.

The question of the Labour Trust, therefore, in its peculiar position to the public presents as important and as pressing a problem as any Employers Trust. In these days of large combinations no one would for a moment desire to leave unorganized labour confronting organized management. If one can be tolerated to a certain point by public policy it is still more necessary to ensure the other in anything that pretends to a republican form of government—and in so far as it is not feasible to suppress both. But driven to its logical conclusion—what is to prevent a great Labour Trust imposing its yoke on the community, and all the more impregnable because, as a rule, its units have little to lose and much to gain, and at worst can walk off on two legs having brought things to a state of wreckage? Such an illegal and intangible organization has also the united and equally intangible support of a national organization, and a sympathy bound up in the magic shibboleth "Union." There is nothing to touch such an organization. Not even the criminal law except in those very occasional and difficult prosecutions against individuals, and known as "conspiracy cases." The people of Florida, or Iowa, or Massachusetts are as much at the mercy of the miners of Pennsylvania and Illinois as of the "coal-barons"; and the distemper has extended still further when the rebuilding of a great city is made to depend on the inadequate facilities of the local organizations, holding off themselves and forbidding all other outside labour in an attempt to dictate the prohibitory terms of monopoly run mad. Such action is of course only enforced by villification. A bad law which cannot stand public discussion is always subject to repeal. Some communities, however, are ashamed to repeal those laws which enforce the fundamental principle of justice—the right of a man to work for what it pleases him to take. So they do not enforce it. If it was not the will of the community the law would not be on the Statute book.

Nullification is of course a serious symptom in any community. It implies cowardice or faithlessness on the part of somebody sworn to perform their duty; disorder and failure to protect where it is the duty to maintain order and to protect citizens acting under their rights. Oppression and the remedy for both these monsters that can exert such pressure on the official soul seem to lie in the same direction. A community is as much entitled to protection from labour monopoly as from employer monopoly, and national combination in the one case as much as in the other should be broken up. Labour in the United States is already protected against outside competition by the contract labour law as to immigration, and there seems no reason why one section of the community should maintain an artificial level higher than another, that the surplus of labour in New York should not have the privilege of competing with labour in San

Francisco, that free trade between the States or between towns and country within the State should be limited to products. In normal times the so-called "reserve army" too often amounts to just this—that there is a glut in one section of the country and a crying need for labour in another quarter, free movement being prevented by the labour unions to maintain artificial high prices which cut the throats of local manufacturers helpless before the free trade between the States. It goes without saying, however, that the two Trusts—Employers and Labour Trusts—must diminish *pari passu*. The States have full power to deal with any and every combination between its citizens. Socialism, of course, does nothing with this problem—quite as pressing under their own theory—except to offer its panacea of "no competition" and equal income." This only finds an echo in the "last man" rule of the Unions. In other respects any such solution meets with the coldest reception, for the very good reason that the Unions have no interest in equal income except within their own narrow limits, and the total they intend to make as large as possible by means of monopoly. The "grand divvy" at the start sounds well until looked at in the cold light of principle and practice and what must be the subsequent condition of equal reward and unequal effort if the present efficiency is to be maintained. The Brotherhood of Airship Engineers has little affiliation on such uneven terms with the Amalgamated Association of White Wings for the purging and purification of a great city's highways.*

It has been the deliberate judgment of experience that State regulation of a natural monopoly is better than State management, this latter being the most wasteful and expensive of any corporate management and leading directly to temptation and corruption of public men and of public life. The less patronage any Government has at its command the better for the citizens at large. The less "the Ins" have to say as to the disposition of the lives of "the Outs" the more these latter have control over them and their choice in the many other relations of life.† But there is one form of natural monopoly which has in recent times aroused active discussion; namely municipal franchises. Some of the conditions of city life depend for effective working on the granting of a monopoly to private citizens or its management by the community. In the first case it has been made evident that the monopoly must be limited both in conditions and duration.

* Throughout—as to membership (determined by standard) and particularly as to apprentices—there is an unconscious(?) recognition in Union circles of the Law of Malthus. The apprenticeship question carries with it its own limitations, beyond which a new and hostile organization would be formed. After all, and strictly in accordance with the evolutionary process, the solution of the "submerged tenth" question will probably be found in the invasion of their field by more intelligent and well quipped labour *from above*; not *vice versa*.

† A majority in Government employ—ultimately a minority—is answer enough to any wide schemes of "nationalization." The position of the "outs" is too plain.

In the second case it has been made evident that any idea of profit must be made subsidiary to public convenience and the known certainty of a greater or less use of the monopoly for purposes of political patronage. Where failure to fulfil a contract exists the municipality stands in the position of intermediary to enforce the contract. Where, however, the municipality is the offender the public convenience is subject to such strength as the local political opposition organization can command. In America the drift of municipalities is against ownership and toward marketing the franchises. The reasons are good and sufficient in basis; more so than in working, for the marketing of the franchises gives opportunities for corruption. There is, however, an intense dislike of officialdom and its patronage in the hands of political chiefs; and there is the experience that municipal enterprises do not pay. The few successful instances have paid expenses and even a small dividend, but they do not succeed as in private hands and cannot be so estimated on. For the plain reason that they are over-manned and politics has more to do than economics in the working, or than practice in the selection of men for the work. Moreover it is not only a question of dividend but of progress and this can be better obtained from franchises than from practice, the municipalities not finding themselves tied to obsolete methods, a risk that must always be taken in modern business methods which deal with machinery. The classic instance to the contrary is Glasgow, a city much to be congratulated therefore for the position it has taken in men's eyes, if for nothing else. The point, however, is as to whether the municipal operations of Glasgow pay the city what they would pay if under private management, and whether they progress as they would in private hands; whether the city might not get more and require more by the franchise system. Public enterprises, whether socialistic or otherwise, are not exempt from the necessity of providing for such vulgar details as depreciation and consequent replacement of capital sunk in such enterprises, even of a premium (interest) to induce men to provide the extra work or exercise the necessary waiting to provide such capital (plant) until that happy period when "persuasion" of some kind induces all men to exercise these qualities. Profits can be disregarded but these necessary qualifications to ensure continuance cannot be disregarded. Even Glasgow, however, finds limitations to municipal enterprise—as instanced by the telephone service; and that somebody pays the bill for municipal ownership is shown by taxation, which gives reason to suspect that the question is not one of profitable (as distinguished from successful) management but of finding the expression (mathematical) for municipal altruism.*

* "In Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Paisley local taxation exceeds the average rate for the whole of Scotland. It is noteworthy that these three cities have been specially enterprising in the matter of municipal trading. The conclusion seems unavoidable that whatever benefits municipal ownership of public utilities may have bestowed upon the masses, it has not tended to lighten the burdens of the taxpayers"—U.S. Consular Reports. Edinburgh. Cited by *Philadelphia Public Ledger*.

Americans, as far as they are concerned, are sceptical as to their own prospects of success. The attempt has been made, but in such attempts the varying interests of local, State, and national politics, usually somewhat heated, have placed in the hands of a political party a source of patronage too tempting not to use. And this with no necessary intentions of corruption. "To the victors belong the spoils." What communistic feeling there is makes a dead set for the cities as it is there that the masses of ignorance can best be swayed by persuasion and "suggestion." American corporation legislation on this point is delusive. It is all directed to politics and covers the police power of the State. It is in no sense socialistic. There is in fact grave difficulty in the way even of State socialism. Interstate commerce governs the great railway and commercial systems. For a State to separate itself by "nationalization" of its railways would be to seriously handicap itself on the great through traffic routes. Its rivals would soon leave it little to do but suck its thumbs. Federal "nationalization" is heard of at times; State "nationalization" but rarely. In commerce the experiment of South Carolina with the dispensary system for controlling the liquor traffic is the most prominent. It was originally adopted as a police measure. Its success has not been such as to cause its adoption in other States, and there is a strong movement in South Carolina for repeal on the ground of failure. The mobility of the American people is also a factor in the successful management of any community. The minority has this practical means of expression. Sometimes, with no fault but that of Nature, States have suffered severely. New England furnished the population for the North-west at the cost of scores of vacant farms. It suffered from the sterility of its soil. Nevada was almost depopulated by the fall in the price of silver. And so corporations do not hesitate to seek the habitat most favourable to them. And behind it all is the dislike of the American "to be bossed." It is behind every action of his life. It is the potent cause of many a strike, the main grievance being the oppressive espionage on his actions by his employers.

What is recognized is the danger of monopoly and probably no form of government is better adapted to deal with it than that peculiar and distributed form of democracy that is found in the United States. Any economic question is one that deals essentially with the whole mass of a population. As it presses on each man so he is likely to settle it in his own way and give his idea expression in his political action. These units must of course be reconciled on such a system of give and take as is found in a far-reaching system of representative government. No part of the community can oppress another without feeling the effect itself. The prosperity of all is more than an ethical idea in a democracy with mobile units. It is common sense. When, however, such matters have been left to the theoretical discussions of statesmen, these pundits have usually made a mess of it. This has been seen in the economic history of Spain and

Portugal, in the theories of government regulation that guided French economics under Colbert and his successors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in the little knot of land-owners and merchant princes who made the corn-laws and granted the bounties in the England of William III and his immediate successors up to the advent of the Hanoverian dynasty. It is still seen in the protection theories manipulated for the benefit of a new mercantilism, and that kind of wise hindsight which robs Peter by paying Paul in the form of "reciprocity treaties." The farther, however, the actual control is removed from the People who feel, the less remediable is this state of affairs. Just as also the remedy is far better applied by the People, who under such conditions must act slowly whereas some enthusiastic statesman with a "mandate," as he esteems it, will attempt to reform things instead of putting them in the way to reform. Around every economic abuse there springs up a number of interests which not only have the right to be allowed time for re-adjustment to the new conditions but such right must be recognized in the interests of the community itself. These interests are the concomitants of existing conditions. To sweep away abuses without due consideration of the far-reaching effect of such sudden action, a weighing of all the attendant conditions, is to lay a sudden and additional burden on the community which has found a working method under these abuses. The whole system is deranged instead of re-arranged. It is this that makes the very name of reformer dreaded, for he is almost always an extremist in everything but common-sense. The "eight hour day" is such a question. Business will not be conducted at a loss. That part of the community unable to work up to the eight hour standard would have to be provided for, either by increasing their efficiency or taxing the rest to make up their deficiency. Action against monopoly as a rule is not directly economic action. It is police action to restore economic conditions not to perpetuate abuses in another form. For abuses distress the community, and the farther down they reach the nearer they come to affecting that class which is already close to its means of subsistence. To press on this class is simply to drive a certain number into the criminal classes. This is of vital interest to the community for the only cure for crime is prevention, the disease itself being rarely cured in the individual. And the oppression itself is hostile to American habits of thought. The whole thinking is too heartily individualistic to allow him to view with equanimity the political oppression of any particular element; simply on the ground that if a class in the community can so act against the individual his turn may come to suffer in the same way. Nowhere perhaps can greater repugnance be found to all the acts of violence and crime of the "Reds" than is found in America. Indeed it has sadly been brought home in all its blind and unreasoning fury. But the passionate desire for freedom at the bottom of this blind rage of the nihilist can be understood. Esoteric

nihilism and anarchism come much nearer to his comprehension than socialism about which there is little but a vulgar exoteric practice. For the drill-master the American has no sympathy whatever. And as little for the disorder that the drill-master implies.

But individualism has another and entirely separate value in its sharpness of definition and personal responsibility. Indeed individualism, that moral sense in society which can only be brought home to man as individual, and which when he frees himself from it makes him either a criminal or one of the irresponsible units of a mob, is the sole thing that can bring home to a man the sense that his actions in the mass may be morally wrong as an individual. If the great mass of Frenchmen had not protected themselves under the specious plea of the "national good" no such moral crime as the Dreyfus case could have been so long condoned. No individual Frenchman, in the army or in civil life, given the history of this case in the abstract and without names would hesitate a moment as to his answer. So with the cases of brutality so much heard of in army circles and in recent days in connection with German South Africa. Those who deal with these cases are officers and gentlemen who in their individual characters would not condone the slightest wrongdoing morally; and yet the highest authority promulgates dicta about the rights of prisoners of war fit to issue from the headquarters of that notable who started for his destination with several thousand Turkish prisoners and arrived with a tale that could be counted in a few minutes. If the methods—or ex-methods—of Fiji are to be imported into the next European war, why not "go the whole hog" and embalm the remains of the victims in the bodies of the victor—as a matter of general economy? Does not the courage of the slain enter into the heart of his conqueror? If there is to be the old savage warfare, let us have the whole of it; and let the heads or noses be thrown down statistically at the feet of the War-Lords. In fact the suggestion as to the possible disposition of prisoners, in print controlled by the General Staff of a great military nation, simply shows how even in our modern so-called civilized times, the old predatory spirit lies just under the surface. It shows the innate savagery at the bottom of the military spirit and the danger of allowing it to have any voice in anything but its own immediate business. Individual responsibility is not to be allowed to hide itself under the mask of the community and action for the "common-weal."

Individualism with its intense personality represents therefore the highest in both efficiency and morality, which cannot be attained by any such process of abstraction as communism. The two tendencies—to and from the centre—are sure to hold the individual in his proper place, and there is no better method of finding the average than by bringing both home to every man as in a democracy. Caste rule, recognizing the natural inequality of men, involves arbitrary choice and the injustice of irrevocable privilege. Communism, recognizing the natural inequality of men, adopts the methods of its rival as alone capable of maintain-

ing a fixed condition in any society. Hence there is a frank abandonment of anything like free action. For Liberty is substituted the rank and file of military organization; for Fraternity is substituted Espionage. With this drilled community in mind as their ideal we can understand the hatred and contempt for such a democracy as is found in the United States. It is claimed that it gives rise to no rule but that of a plutocracy, without seeing that a plutocracy has no voice except by the will of the People. Wealth has great indirect power in the United States, but the voter can very exactly and independently measure the importance of that wealth to his own interest. Probably nowhere has wealth less direct influence. Men of wealth active in politics are something more than merely wealthy, and in ability will usually be found to deserve their position. For wealth itself is anything but a recommendation to the American voter. Very few fools are sent to the Congress or the Legislatures. For the control over his own affairs the German subject is however asked to perpetuate, and the American citizen to substitute an army officer. The least introspection will show the importance of the *ego*. Our happiness is our own. It is not another's. We live our own life not that of another. The object of all thinkers is to give this its fullest expansion without infringing on the happiness of others. This is not to be obtained by artificially limiting it. Hence the vitality of the principles of the French Revolution, which finds its expression in an idealistic individualism which allows such expansion, and the effort to-day is to reach it. Even the anarchist in his dumb blind rebellion against the necessities of life in a political community has seen the glimmer of light on this point and has made a futile effort, still an effort, to reach it through a communism by which he tries to carry man back to the period when he washed the tannin out of his acorns and roasted a kind of meal from them to make bread. It is only defective adjustment to-day that causes any reaction of individuals to communism; defective adjustment at the bottom of which is ignorance and unrestraint powerfully co-operating with anachronisms as great as communism—mercantilism and guildism; the vices of all three being due to a negation of individualism permitted by or enforced by the community. To substitute class for class—and such a class—would be a leading to the precipice. The leaders may be idealistic but the mob is as it always is—tyrannous, brutal, coarse, and cruel; and made up of a mass of men only prevented from giving vent to their animal feelings by the restraint of their keepers. Only the best are fit to rule, and only the best can be legitimately chosen out by the clash of individual interests which must select their best to represent them or go down in this struggle of interests. The suppression of the individual under such circumstances would be a frightful blunder. The world suffers enough to-day from mediocrity, but this would be poverty in all intellectual resources. Its remaining strength would be concentrated in a small official class whose power and direction

over this dumb human herd would be a thousand times greater than any system it displaced. But in this way we are told is to be found the theoretical average of happiness. Government can do much to cause unhappiness. It can do little to create it. Happiness lies within and not without. Mark Tapley and old Martin Chuzzlewitt are something more than mere creations of the novelist's brain.

Drill is very necessary for communism. There is nothing new in such a proposition. It has been the means of supremacy of such a centralized government in every age. The Roman cohorts were first organized for the support of the Republic and were later used for its suppression and subordination. Drill is of course very necessary all through life. But it is a very different kind of drill. It is a drill that appeals to the *morale* of a man. Which makes him turn his thoughts inward to a cool scrutiny of himself, and not his thoughts outward and his ears forward to listen for the command, "right face." The drill that is called out by the individualism of our modern life calls out the very best from a man. There is no credit exercised by fear of the guard-house. There is a great deal of credit exercised in fear of public opinion. The less of the other kind of drill obtruded the better. It cuts down the normal expression of the individual and does no good to the rest. The real battle to-day is what it has been for more than one hundred and fifty years. It is between the principles of the eighteenth century philosophy and the old oppression masquerading under a new name. It is still individualism against communism and despotism. The one involves the supremacy of free thought, the other its suppression. It is of little importance who officers the community provided somebody officers it. The result is the same. Contrast the ideal offered by the dead level of a military community with its "eyes front" and its mind on its dinner, with Mr. Spencer's ideal of a people free in thought and free in action and settling their disputes before the tribunal of a judge. In the one case we have a hungry administrative officialdom using its Judiciary to compel attention to its own wants. In the other we have an administration sufficient for the needs of the Judiciary. Such ought to be, and to an extent is the real relation between the two in the United States.

§ 6.

The position of Japan to all these questions is modified by her past history. The bureaucracy of western Europe have very different material to deal with. Communism is there the effect of military drill, and all questions of social bearing are classed in terms of national efficiency. Opposed to this is an advanced spirit of individualism throughout the units. Political communism itself is a rebellion against restraint, setting up the ideal

of ultimate freedom through communism, and making it and not efficiency the ultimate goal. In Japan, however, individualism through the mass of the people is merely sporadic. Until the country was brought into contact with the West it was unknown. It might never have been known if the contact had been brought about under graduated conditions. A Government cannot undertake to do everything at once, and many phases of western civilization were left to individual initiative, just as the phases of individual living were only guided into certain lines within the limits of their many towns and villages. But there was this difference, however, that their own living was under their control, but this western element was beyond their control. Japanese who took in hand western methods conducted them on western lines of thought which left full play to individual initiative and effort to secure efficiency. The separation of the native and the foreign habit of thought in this respect is all the more marked by the success of the Japanese in their foreign trade. The great bulk of the Japanese people, however, have never been moved from their old socialistic habit of thinking which regards the individual as something to be eliminated from the communal organization in which these new devices should take their place not development. Government regards him as dangerous to itself. Both consider him as undesirable, and unnecessary because the community or Government can accomplish the same work. The final stand gradually being taken is therefore a return to the old system of State management, of course on the much greater scale required by modern industrial life.

This socialistic habit of thought by the great mass of the Japanese people, and the autocratic power granted by the Constitution to the Government, adds enormously to the real control this latter has over the nation. In Germany, for instance, the German people are a direct as well as a real power. They are a soldierly people but they know the limits of military obedience, and as yet have so much individualism ingrained in them as to demand that Government control shall be limited to direction and that the reasons for and veto over this direction shall be submitted to their own representatives. The Japanese people, however, are not a direct power. They are a soldierly people but they know no limits to their obedience. The fact of the command coming from above makes it right. A Government therefore with a sufficient control of the finances, of legislative power, of veto power, of interpretation of any laws in reference to itself is impregnable. In any dispute with the Diet it can always take the position that everything is according to law. The people are not a party to a contract but the recipient of a gift. Their first question is on the Government lines and as to formula merely—is it a violation of custom i. e. the organic law? This answered questions of interpretation or expediency do not arise. They want and they need no greater power than the community now has over the individual. Every progressive

movement is toward individualism and finds them hostile or indifferent. Any Government act taking greater power over individuals is sure of a sufficient support. The Government, indeed, is likely to lag somewhat behind the general public opinion on this point in reference to public questions. Its members, as picked men, have all the many channels of information open to them, and are subject to influences as individuals that such an abstraction as the commune cannot feel. A general feeling therefore on national policy can propagate itself through these abstract entities, and come to the Sovereign in a form that cannot be disregarded as it is a challenge to it not to disregard the principle common to both—social action. The Japanese from his lack of individualism is peculiarly susceptible to these popular waves of feeling. The label of public opinion is enough for him never to think of questioning its orthodoxy. On such matters the vast majority of the Japanese never think. They ask for the word of command.

The Government attitude in reference to monopoly is therefore easily comprehensible. Many things have slipped out of their grasp, and it is perfectly normal for them to take these in control, and the public would never dream of questioning the expediency which does not at all enter into their idea of the State as little as the general maxim that a State should have nothing to do with speculative industries. A general policy therefore on these lines would meet with no opposition from the great mass of the Japanese people. But an avowed policy of this kind and the failure or inability to carry it out has its disadvantages, shown first in the threatened industries. Individuals are timid in undertaking any enterprise under such conditions. Improvements are brought almost to a standstill, and the prospect of a Government competitor leaves them practically at the mercy of the Government. The Government can establish any monopoly and is only limited by the fact that it can command just such price as people will pay.* It has of course an added advantage that when it blunders it can make up the deficit by taxation. As the communal experiment is extended this of course has its limit. Present experiments in Japan do not seem to augur any better success there than in other countries. The Government iron works at Wakamatsu is a well known

* Thus the proposition to build an electric road between Tōkyō and Ōsaka, to cover the distance in a six hour schedule, is squelched because this would force the Government to spend millions on the improvement of the Tōkaidō railway or put it altogether out of competition. The railways return the Government an income of ten million yen a year. And the three hundred and seventy six miles of the Tōkaidō are the main item. As most of its patrons will agree it is run on the most economical principles, and is a shining example of the disadvantage of monopoly in its practical workings, both in shabbiness of rolling stock and leisurely methods. The monopoly of the telephone supply service is another brilliant instance. This Government monopoly is so far up-to-date and demand that the "right" to be supplied with a telephone installation is quoted at 400 yen.

instance of return on the wrong side of the ledger. It is run in all its departments on the principle of an armour plate mill—for the benefit of a single customer who can pay its price and foot the bill for the annual large deficit. The tobacco merchants and the sugar and salt manufacturers were all subject to the regulation of a Government which by means of the tariff could crush their monopoly by removing the impediment to world competition. The Government tobacco monopoly now is simply a tax laid on a certain class of consumers. It was adopted for this purpose, to make it pay. So also with the camphor monopoly; but the salt monopoly touches the nation in every unit. As to the latter the Government takes over the product at a fixed price. This has paid the manufacturers so they have unloaded a large and growing stock on the Government which is threatened with loss. The industry therefore is cut down to the lowest limits by Government orders and refusal to purchase more until the existing stock is marketed. The power of a Government monopoly over that of a corporate Trust could not be better illustrated. If the Salt Trust had so acted the squeeze would have been regulated by outside competition. This is now impossible. The Government is interested in keeping up prices, and so well satisfied that a sugar monopoly is in sight.*

All these socialistic State monopolies it is to be observed are conducted on the brutally frank ground of squeezing as much out of the consumer as possible. A Trust of course proposes the same thing, but can only accomplish its object if properly bolstered up by a tariff. A Government under such conditions cannot be reached. The average results of Government work everywhere are not such as to encourage the extension of their monopoly system. It is an old axiom that a private partnership is better managed than a joint stock company or other corporation. As those immediately interested cannot see to the details others must be hired to do so, and again others to watch these as to the faithful performance of their duties. High cost is necessarily associated with Government production. And necessarily backwardness, for a Government must avoid all speculation. Government speculation being without the control exercised by ordinary prudence over the individual degenerates into mere gambling. The speculation in Law's schemes of colonial ventures by the French monarchical Government, and later the land speculation and issue of "assignats" by the French revolutionary Government strained both to their limits of endurance.

The more personal qualities of the material with which this Japanese Government has to work perhaps gives the key to the confidence of his rulers in the strength of their position against any individualism or opposed combinations. At present the main interest of the country is the agricultural interest—the only

* As to the early history of the salt monopoly, some interesting details are given by Mr. A. E. Wileman—"The Salt Guild of the Ten Provinces and its Regulation" *Trans. Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. XVII, p. 51.

one in its older civilization. The Japanese peasant will long be a main factor for conservatism. As with every tiller of the soil one source of idealism in man is removed and its inspiration becomes instead the practical issue of his life. The very helplessness of man before Nature, the ruin of a promising crop the subject of unceasing watchfulness by the violence of the elements, makes a spirit of pessimism inherent in him. Primitive methods and the necessities of a pressing population keeps this eastern peasantry as close to the soil as is found anywhere in the world. And most of them eke out their livelihood from the soil in other ways. The spinning and weaving of different fabrics especially silk, the cultivation and preparation of tobacco, being adjuncts of the always necessary rice crop, a cereal requiring more care perhaps than any other known to man—and giving larger returns. The conservatism in the practical affairs of life seems more due to caution than prejudice. The margin of success, often of safety, admits of but little in the way of experiment. It involves a very natural fear of trying new methods that may prove failures and in such case disaster. A Japanese rarely shows contempt of anything new. He eagerly examines it and tries to understand it. He can rarely take the risk of putting it to a practical test. Hence his labour is all the more severe in applying his primitive methods to modern requirements. Perhaps the intense practicality of his life is what makes his superstitions also so practical. His gods are "bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh." In anthropomorphism they are but a shade removed from human. They are to be feared in their extraordinary strength and power, whereas the *bakemono* (ghost: it has no feet, a valuable distinguishing mark as taught to the children) inspires the horror of unnaturalism rather than supernaturalism, something out of Nature's course, as in the return to man's sight of the vanished dead no matter how much beloved. Supernaturalism is companionable and does not take the tinge of the unnatural to the mind of the Japanese peasant. He removes his gods into this more companionable sphere, and as elsewhere they play many a prank on him before displaying their divine powers; but he retains the intense fear—found all over the world—of the dead still living in their personality in the memory of men.

This conservatism is very different from that shown by the Russian peasant. In this case there is lack of curiosity. This is the more marked inasmuch as the basis of both is a communism. Japanese communism, however, has gotten beyond the tribe. It makes the family the unit subject to the tribe not a congeries of families. The political structure of the commune involves such elements as families, guilds, trades, handicrafts, and kindred aggregations of workers of different industries or branches of the same industry. It is a corporation in the mediæval sense of the term. The efforts of these constituent elements are not directed by or for the individual but by and for themselves. And the commune profits indirectly by them. The Russian system on the contrary is distinctly a communism which deals

with the individual. It may deal with him through his craft but everything is part of the common pool. He carries into actual practice therefore what was only the theoretical dream in the mind of the Jewish legislator when he described the year of Jubilee. A periodical redistribution of the land—the ultimate basis of all production—is a regular feature of the government of the *wirs* still retaining their original form. This is common to south-east Europe although the ambition aroused in individuals by contact with the West is splitting it up. Such a system of course implies lack of personal initiative. And in the absence of the necessity there is lack of adaptability. There is no wish, it is even dangerous to disturb him in his ignorance. And with this ignorance goes a superstition of the grossest. Here again he differs from the Japanese in the application. As with all the Aryan races he has transferred his gods entirely into another sphere. To the necessity of a god whose personality will be understandable by such a mind he must add the supernaturalism of what is normally either a very esoteric idea of divinity and hence anything but terrible, or a very exoteric idea of divinity such as is found in the horror of the ghost. His God and his saints therefore partake both of anthropomorphism and unnaturalism of this lower kind. They become intensely real to him. A kindred feeling is found all through the lowest class of peasantry in southern Europe, Christianity being the thinnest veneer over their long lost but not forgotten paganism. In the United States but little can be done with such timber. They make peaceable and industrious citizens. They are only numerous enough to afford an instance of what to avoid; and the second generation, brought up and educated with the surrounding people, are quickly broken in to individualism and the consequent rise in the scale of progress. They acquire a new sense—ambition.

The whole training of the Japanese peasant has been such as to shut him into himself, to make him depend on himself. The consequences of invoking the Government interference in his affairs were never pleasant. He was thus led to strictly mind his own business and had little reason to mix himself in outside matters. His curiosity was limited to his own affairs, and this spirit is felt still in modern politics. Beyond was an interesting world but it was not for him. There is to-day but little wish beyond the old life. The full force of the idea of submission is still in effect. As said, the natural tendency of his occupation emphasizes this conservatism and makes him something of a pessimist. The limits of possibility in his life work are much more easily ascertained than in the speculative career of mercantile pursuits. When a man can see his whole field of effort and its limitations he is likely to rest satisfied with a smaller margin. He perhaps can balance better the true ratio between effort and reward. Men struggled and died to find the "Fountain of Youth." No one could foresee the actual cost of attaining Eldorado. If the chances for and against could have been estimated the adventurers would have been fewer in

number. Again, the ideals of the race only touched the Japanese peasant through men of his own race. Even then the fighting men belonged to a sphere entirely removed from him. The people were outside of all this. Interesting as the tales of their warriors were to them they were not the story of their own heroes, they were most distinctly not for their imitation. A life of the People never had a being. The People had their martyrs; but the martyr, although a hero, inspires rather to submission than to deeds of resistance. These found no echo in Old Japan. The heroic resistance of the peasantry at Shimabara in Kyūshū aroused no imitation. Its meaning was entirely misconceived by the very men most interested in its true meaning. These farmers, stiffened by a *samurai* contingent, who preferred to die sword in hand instead of by a slow and grinding oppression directed against them and their faith, broke the unwritten custom of Old Japan which required submission without question by the inferior.

The imaginative world, however, is as necessary to men as the practical world. If his heroes in actual life belonged to another field they made all the more real his contact with the supernatural world. And his contact with it had, as stated, all the reality of actual life. Japanese fireside lore is replete with this contact with the fairy world. The hours of relaxation can be said to be devoted to it. His thoughts therefore swing between the two fields—that of his daily labour and that of his dream life. The ambitions of the West are unknown to him. His code of manners is settled by custom. This has had the effect of making one of the politest people in the world. He is polite in the sense of the old Spanish politeness, where custom had made this everyday courtesy second habit in the absence of ambitions which invariably disturb it. This differs from Gallic politeness—the French are also a people of great “*savoir faire*” and hate to be jostled—which is guided by ambition and policy. The mask is rarely thrown off in the case of the Japanese because there is a spirit of indifference behind it. He is coldly business-like in his hates as in his affections. With the Frenchman it disappears at the first rough contact. The politeness of the Japanese *plebs*, therefore, can be attributed to a caste system which has disappeared from western Europe except in some parts of Germany and in Austria. Not that disorder is not a feature also of Japanese life. The looting of a vacant house, wanton destruction of property from a spirit of malicious mischief, finds as ready expression as anywhere. In the West this is an exhibition of individual hatred and malice and all uncharitableness. In Japan this element also enters into the depredation but it seems to contain an element of communistic dislike to unused personal property, a punishment of any assertion on the part of the owner which prevents its use by the community. As little regard is shown for public property. Only the policeman’s uniform is understood. One thing they respect—the growing

rice. Before the velvety green of the rice field their attitude is often one of positive veneration expressed in pose and thought.

The Japanese family bond further emphasizes conservatism, and this is far more likely to find expression in the country villages where at times the whole community is related in blood. There are divers interests to be consulted and the non-speculative spirit will here prevail. The unit being the family these interests cannot well be separated. An individual on his own account can take no steps independently of the rest. And in the exercise of the privileges which he now possesses in this direction the opinion of the community hedges him in. If he runs counter to this—which in Japan extends into nooks and crannies of life not thought of in the West—he might as well leave the place. It enforces its will just as it did before the new Code came into effect. *Status* not contract still rules. It is possible for him to live elsewhere but most men must cling to their homes. The mass of the population therefore changes very slowly. It clings to the past. It is the pressure on the community from the outside that makes them recognize that progress must and does come as the individual breaks away from its restraint. When the community is thus forcibly broken in on, none of the hostility to individualism is lost. In these Japanese communities this development has been unconscious. It has rarely been local. It is the return of the native, or an influx from the outside, that has broken into the routine of old Japanese life. The contrast therefore between the two systems is all the more marked. Communism and individualism stand sharply outlined. The pressure of modern life found the West already disintegrated into its individual units. It however came gradually, its operation being spread over fully three hundred years. Japan has had the shock of change within the life of two generations. The good results of individualism are so evident that necessarily its main factor feels his importance. This gives rise naturally to a good deal of self assertion in which comically enough the individual finds expression in an intense raciality. He is very unwilling to admit any obligation to anything not derived from the sacred soil of Japan. Recognizing the deviation from the accepted standard this self-assertion is but little appreciated by the mass who do not put on it the same high valuation or any valuation. Meanwhile officialdom is quick to take alarm and to preach his shortcomings. What is feared and proclaimed is the breakdown of their family communism, the substitution of this unknown factor for the "wise and paternal" Government that has heretofore guided affairs. They also recognize, however, the importance of putting these individual efforts to practical application. They cannot be suppressed hence they must be utilized. The entrance of the Government itself on a scheme of State socialism—in place of the local communism—is dictated by this spirit of retaining as much of the old as is possible in the face of the new. The old necessarily cannot face the new conditions. Japan, more and more, must pass from an agricultural to a manufacturing

phase. Hence the aim is to get control of this new change of centre and maintain themselves in the seat of power.

The power of the Government in a country in which there is substantially no check upon it is dictatorial. It is a great machine to which the citizen must submit without question. The spirit of individualism has never been allowed to develop, but on the contrary the spirit of communism has been made the ground-work of the community. That the machine is bound to control all the units without question is well illustrated by this Japanese State in which the machine has long kept this control. Russia and Japan seem far apart but they are both living illustrations of a bureaucracy sprung out of communism. Thus we hear of "Japanese socialists" who do not recognize that they are the very expression of their own individualism against the long existing socialism of their own State. What they could claim is that the State has got into the "wrong" hands, without recognizing that if power is given to a centralized Government such result is inevitable. And a centralized Government is absolutely necessary to prevent the normal growth of the individual who will inevitably seek to develop his powers for his own advantage. This right of all men, however, is not recognized. Its restraint by the balancing of the different interests is not understood. Force alone is understood, and the socialist State supplies its future tyrants with that force. Behind all in the centralized Governments of to-day is the standing army. This is a factor even more powerful in Japan than in Europe, and this on account of the communistic habits of popular thinking. Riots that in the United States or in Europe call for suppression by the police are almost invariably accompanied by a prompt use of the army. The New York or London police force would have scattered the Tōkyō mob of 1906 like a band of sheep, but in Japan prompt resort was had to the more dangerous arm. It attaches an importance to these outbreaks that they do not deserve. One reason for the disuse of the police seems to lie in their ridiculous weapon. The club and the revolver are the proper weapons for a constable. The crowd knows he will not use his sword until he is hard pressed; and it knows he will use the club on small provocation, and it is far less ready in consequence to carry matters to that point where an outbreak becomes dangerous. The standing army is, if anything, less of a menace in Europe which has developed individualism than in this Japan where the term has no meaning. It is an axiom that independence in civil life does not exist, hence the Bureaucracy can thoroughly rely on the army. An attention has been paid to it that it deserves. Although the proposed two years' service increases the cost this is mainly due, it is said, to the increased armament necessary for the larger number of men passed through the service. The long control beyond the actual period of service much increases the immediately available force. It is at once put in operation by Imperial Order and requires no action of the Diet for supplies or future

support. Experts tell us that modern war has its limitations in propinquity, and, apart from naval operations, in continental area. No matter how preponderant a force may be immediately available the physical difficulty presented by space is perhaps greater than it ever was. Alexander and his small army could over-run western Asia and live on the country, but the vast armies of modern times require a commissariat beyond any such haphazard methods. Unless the prize is within reaching distance and support, present cost is sure to force a compromise, perhaps equally damaging to the victor. In Asia the development of China is threatened as a counterweight to Japan. More impossible things have happened in the world's history. As it is, and as far as Europe is concerned, the only possible field for it now in Asia is commerce. Europe has established military positions for this purpose, although originally with the idea of empire. America has established its position through force of circumstances. The condition of China and the Spanish war brought about a situation and an opportunity to which there was but one logical issue. To the average American citizen the Philippines are simply a disturbing political element. The national system does not admit of the governance of men in their local affairs. It is the governance of the mutual interests of self-governing States. There was no wish to govern colonies as minors. But the Filipino was not ready to govern himself, or to enter into any enduring treaty or international relations. Left to himself his subsequent fate was certain, and eliminated any question of the circumscribed sphere of coaling stations to guard American interests on the Asian coast. And it was not proposed to have fought the war with Spain for the benefit of any other power. An Administration that would have allowed the Philippines to be gobbled up by a great commercial rival would have wrecked itself and its party for a generation.

In the face of the rise of a great military eastern power there is no blinking over the change likely to occur in what the balance of the western nations would make a lively but necessarily peaceful scramble for trade. And this is the more pressing inasmuch as Japanese politics do not centre around internal questions but around their foreign policy. It is to be remembered that Japanese history shows that this nation has always been influenced by the intention to take and maintain the commanding position. The opening of the country in 1867 was based on this as an object. It considers that self-preservation can only be secured by such a position, and differences have only arisen over the *fitting time* to secure existing advantages. Thus in 1872 Korea is made a question although obviously the time was anything but ripe. In 1894 it had become a threatening question, and the first step of the elimination of the inconvenient Chinese suzerainty was undertaken; a step all the more desirable as the impression of force is in itself a valuable deterrent to others. Having neutralized the Opposition by alliance with the strongest naval power of the West the final elimination of the Korean

question was undertaken in the war of 1904. What remains is simplicity itself compared with what has gone before. With the powers of Europe unable through national jealousies to concentrate their power in the Pacific, Japan as a great naval power takes control of that ocean, and the West must trade in it on her sufferance. Any nation which has wrapped its talent in a napkin is likely to have that talent snatched away, to recover it as best it can under the most disadvantageous conditions. Whoever holds "the key to the Pacific" must be prepared to develop it, and nourish it, and convert it into a Port Arthur or a Gibraltar, great fortresses with armies for garrison. In whatever falls to their share the Japanese are quite prepared to carry out this policy, feeling sure that the prize of supremacy is the reward. And the ear-marks of their diplomacy are not to be lost to sight. It would be harsh to say that treaties are made to be broken for treaties are always drawn in such vague terms that they offer ground for interpretation. They are fertile ground for growing pretexts. But as to treaties diplomacy deals with *status* not with contract. Of which the treaty of 1853 to which Russia and the European Powers were signatories is a shining example. The principles of Machiavelli to-day govern diplomacy, as they did nearly three hundred years ago, and Eastern diplomacy is no exception. The Japanese are only opportunist in the sense of waiting the fit opportunity. The policy is clear cut and well defined. National safety demands national supremacy, and national supremacy demands the maintenance of a dominant physical force. Those who threaten this dominance or hold desirable positions must give them up. The greatest mistake that people in the West can make is to regard Eastern history since 1867 as a chain of accidents. To the Japanese the rivalry of the western nations renders the solution of their position of supremacy a much cheaper and easier one—even against the greatest Naval Power of Europe and the West. To them the question is—what force will any Western Power or combination be able to place in the Pacific?*

Perhaps it is the fact that for the first time in his life the subject becomes a part of the machinery of Government that renders the entrance of a Japanese recruit on his military life something of a ceremony. It is a fact that in all countries in which conscription is in practice, and in which the great mass of the dwellers therein have little to say as to the disposition of their own affairs, there is far more fuss and feathers than with the plain citizens under democratic rule and whose contact with

* The question of the usual scope and use of treaties has never been more thoroughly and wisely discussed than by Mr. Diedrich Knickerbocker in the fourth chapter of the fifth book of his "History of New York"—to which the reader can be emphatically referred. Especially in these days when "reciprocity" is advertised as a political panacea, with enormous military expenditures on army and navy to stand by, like Mr. Weller's coachmen friends, and see that every body plays fair.

political life is a daily affair. Military service is entered on under such conditions and as a matter of public business. What attracts attention is the organization rather than the individual, and the latter being sunk in the former this gets the public attention in such stirring times when it is called upon to act. In Japan there is quite as much fuss and feathers as is usual in the military countries of continental Europe. The recruits, or men called to the ranks from civil life, are accompanied individually to the railway station by a procession of neighbours and relatives marching in regular order with the embryonic soldier in the midst; a procession that the less interested and unprejudiced spectator cannot help comparing to those of ancient times when the victim was escorted to the altar of sacrifice. It is not found necessary thus to fire the national heart by the sight of these processions even in countries specifically devoted to peaceful pursuits, nor is it well to do so in any country. The business of war is well understood by every virile people; and when a people are enough stirred to make war, whether to enforce what they conceive to be their right or to resist invasion, the stimulus is found deep down in themselves, and every outside exhibition has a touch of the artificial and spectacular. The real pathos of war is seen quite as much in Japan as anywhere else at the critical moment of the leave-taking for the front; and any railway station at such periods shows enough of the keen distress of parents and wives exhibited in the drawn faces of men and the tears of women. Processions and banners and firing the peoples' hearts is both a superfluity and only a remnant useful in its way to keep public opinion fixed on one given point. However it is a remnant, just the same, of the war-dance of the savages engaged in "getting their dauder up."

Like all communists the Japanese are far less tolerant of any independent thought than an individualistic expression of the communal thought. Their point of view is very narrow but permits individual emphasis to this extent. But the Japanese does not need any such encouragement as these processions; this metaphorical thumping of oneself on the chest. It may be pleasing to him in one sense as the first and the last (unless he is killed) occasion on which the community condescends to notice his existence as an individual. Besides, he is a thorough soldier. The traditions of the race are warlike. They have spent centuries in fighting each other and in witnessing war carried out under their own eyes. Dominated by a military caste their whole training has been in the direction of those habits of obedience especially required of the soldier. Under such circumstances the whole Japanese people were perfectly ready to drop the pick and spade and take up a more carnal and deadly weapon. It is more pleasing to fight than to be part of the baggage train, and, a fighting race, the change to this more active function is pleasing to the lower class of Japanese. He has had long centuries of obedience but not of helotage. His subjection has been mental rather than physical, which makes it all the safer for his masters

now to put weapons in his hands, whereas formerly they carefully disarmed him. The robustness of his physique and the frugality of his living react on the energy required by the exigencies of his economic difficulties. There is perhaps no race of a finer endurance which has been fostered by the frugal habits of the people. They can be contrasted with both Koreans and Chinese who are gross feeders and heat their houses by artificial heat applied by fires built in underground passages beneath the houses, raising the temperature to an almost unbearable degree.* The Japanese can be said to use no form of artificial heat. The *hibachi* (brazier) is only sufficient to unbend frozen fingers. They keep the legs warm by their peculiar method of squatting on the hams with the feet bent inward and at right angles under the body. The torso and hips are kept warm by wadded clothing of varying degrees of thickness. Their footgear is straw or low clogs in good weather and high clogs or straw in bad weather, and at all seasons. When the severe climate of western Japan and Hokkaidō is taken into account it can be seen that a people who are able to dispense with what is regarded as one of the prime necessities of life have no mean standard of physical endurance. There is an outcry when a family is found without fire during our hard American winters. A Japanese, accustomed to wading through frozen slush in his bare feet, would shrug his shoulders at such complaint; be it added that his warmer clothing—only cotton cloth and cotton wadding after all—gives him far better protection against cold. During the first months of the Russian war the men on the torpedo-boats stood for hours ankle deep in the almost freezing sea water, and if they thought anything of the hardship never claimed any credit for its endurance. With the spirit of drill and tenacity of purpose, the determination to carry out any possible order given to them, it can be understood that the Japanese had fewer difficulties with problems of sanitation. There is no question that the good results obtained can be greatly attributed to the general intelligence of the people. A stupid man can thwart the best efforts of his superiors.

The groundwork of the Japanese character therefore shows three valuable qualities; intelligence capable of comprehending instructions, virility which gives him a dash equal to the best, and a control better than most. This habit of obedience is a valuable quality to him at the present day when nations are watching each other with such hostile eyes. An exposition of ethics is hardly to be expected from the Japanese common soldier mainly drawn from the peasantry and hence limited in education and outlook. But they have the habit of obedience, and when the order goes forth "no plunder" they obey it to an extent not realized in "our armies in Flanders." Its completeness has only been realized in the annals of Old Peru. In China, during the Boxer troubles, no women threw themselves into wells or hung stones about their necks and then cast themselves into the river

* "Chosen" by Percival Lowell.

because their feet were too small to run away and their villages lay in the line of the Japanese advance; and such events did happen from their sad experience with the brutalities of the soldiery of some of the western nations.* Fortunately the guard of the "Forbidden City" was early turned over to the Japanese and they preserved what was left. A good deal of what had been there strained through western fingers and western custom-houses—an illustration anyhow of one use of a custom-house. The life of the Japanese soldier, however, is not all blows. As everywhere else he is rewarded with gifts of money and with pensions. These are not large according to western standards, but they are so according to Japanese standards, for to them they are treasure trove. The officers of course draw the larger proportion of them, and it is only fair to say that this advantage is probably a small thing to most of them. The standard of the Japanese officer is a high one. He is marked by devotion and earnestness to his professional work; position and power, not plunder, is his ideal in life. It is not pretended that an officer's commission is any diploma of "earnestness, good conduct, and industry" as the school prizes are marked. But it is so much the case that his indifference to questions of financial reward in his career has attracted the attention of many observers. Very few resign to take up a more profitable field in life. His position is the more difficult with the gradual increase

* I let this stand as written, (September 1906). The record of the Japanese army in recent wars is such as to entitle them to the benefit of the doubt in the passing to and fro of recriminations as to events in Korea. That there is a violation of the naked truth by one side or the other—or both—in reference to the doings in that unfortunate country is plain enough. Official statements and revolutionary manifestoes in such cases are of equal value. The term "rebels" applied to the Korean insurgents is a misnomer. The Korean Government is not of such a character as to permit such classification of the opposition. The right of a People—not of the Government—to determine its destinies is good Anglo-Saxon doctrine; emphasized for some hundreds of years, and put in modern terms much alike by Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick, and Ritchie. The position of the Japanese in Korea is of course a thing apart. It is possible to sympathize with or appreciate the political object they seek to attain. (Without any endorsement of their methods; for there is an element given undue prominence in the ethics of Japanese Bushidō which renders outsiders distrustful of these methods. Lord Strafford described it as "thorough.") It can be said in passing, that the term "insurgents" itself seems to fall short. In fourteen months 12,000 Koreans and 70 Japanese bit the dust. ("Japan Mail," 24 August, 1908 from the "Seoul Press"). From August 27th to 31st, forty-nine Koreans were killed, and one was taken prisoner. ("Japan Mail," 3 September). This sounds not unlike a report of a rabbit drive in Australia or California, where casualties of the driver, due to the kick of a gun or of a mule, occasionally offset the extermination of the drivee. However, the matter is really nobody's business except that of those actively concerned. The "Japan Mail" in an editorial (3 July) gives the official view—"The general impression seems to be that they [the Japanese troops] have almost stamped out the insurrection, but apparently it is considered expedient not to publish details which would merely furnish material for exaggerated stories." *Selah.*—September, 1908.

of luxury in Japanese life and more particularly affecting the class to which he belongs. There is one ugly feature that gets a prominence on occasion in Japanese army life. Habits of obedience in the race do not seem to prevent the exercise of petty tyranny, especially by the non-commissioned officers. Suicides by private soldiers bring these affairs to light, and the punishment of the offender by the military court seems swayed by the supposed exigencies of the service, and to fall far short of the seriousness of the offence.*

East and West of the hundred and eightieth meridian there is little but surface difference between the upper classes. It remains, however, to note a few of the contrasts and similarities that exist between that great mass of a people known as the labouring classes, and for this there are no better examples than those which stand at the head in Farthest East and Farthest West. Both American (native) and Japanese bear the marks of vitality in an almost abnormal development of curiosity. In its application, however, the American has a marked advantage in the training of his political institutions. These require him not only to think but to think for himself, for no one is going to do it for him. The result is a far wider range of inquiry and a broader foundation for action than making custom the mainspring of all his thrift. Besides, custom could aid him but little and be in the main a stumbling block. He has had a new and diverse environment to which to accustom himself, and physically and mentally he has often in the development of the country had to fight the problem out by himself—the civilized man under the most primitive circumstances. His ingenuity has been put to the test under the severest conditions. Successful effort has drawn with it the necessary consequences and has set the standard very high in every community; has made it, as it ought to be in every organization possessing the full tide of life, an effort to keep up with the main body, let alone to forge to the front. Such

* For the sake of argument *only* it can be admitted that punishments for trivial offences—trivial in civil life—should be more summary if not more severe in the military establishment. But in such case the punishment of the officers (the professional soldiers) should be much more drastic for offences against the moral and military code than the punishment of the rank and file (who are merely conscripts). Now this is notoriously not the fact. The facts are just the opposite—of nominal or trivial punishment of officers for offences not only against the military code in the case of the rank and file, but against civilians. Of which instances not only of homicide but of deliberate murder, are not unknown. Here lies the sting of such a book as Professor Hamon's "Psychology of the Professional Soldier." Every occupation involves a psychological outlook. So far he is right in his general thesis. But the profession of the soldier is military science. As to killing it is less directly involved than the business of a butcher. The individual soldier may never kill anybody, and doubtless does not wish to. However, this is a possible and probable result even to the individual, which makes it necessary all the more to curb, not to encourage brutality in military life. Useless brutality should be more frowned on here than in any other walk of life.—1908.

a continual spur to the nerve power has widened his ambitions and made his outlook much greater and hence more progressive. Again, everything is made to depend on his individuality. In his engagements he must look to that main asset of a man in an individualistic community—himself; for that is to whom the community will look. He cannot plead custom. What he will be found to be engaged in will therefore be something that touches him personally and in which he takes all the heartier interest the closer it comes to him. Even if he has made a mistake as to his bearings it is often as much the test of his individuality that is under inquisition. An unreasonable partisanship is more regarded than lukewarmness. The result of this width of training has been a man far beyond his class in the old country. With severe competition and a high standard his manual skill and technical training stand at the front, his horizon is wide, his possibilities great, and every man ahead of him in the race to be overhauled and left behind.

Alike in much of the groundwork of character nothing could be more different than the method adopted by the "Yankee of the East." With curiosity, ingenuity, an ambitious outlook, he deliberately turns aside from himself to find support in the community, unable to break away from that iron law of custom which so quickly throws its chain around men in masses. And yet he meets the situation. Against wider comprehension he sets perfect drill. This is directed both to the accomplishment of action and to the reduction of internal friction. This has been carried to a great science in Japanese life. Rights and duties are determined to the greatest nicety. They are not made too exacting in either case. The range is narrow but it is a public offence not to have it thoroughly in hand. This has made the Japanese labouring class one of the most thorough and efficient in the world. And it has had another effect. Thorough comprehension of ones duties gives a certainty of touch and action that extends to conduct. There were many reasons in Old Japan why the lower classes should learn the practice of politeness. One strong reason lay in the consequences if they did not practice it. But the pre-occupied man could not carry out the numerous details of etiquette required from all in social life. The less distraction therefore the better. Automatic action in the business of life left room for careful attention to conduct and one was made a part of the other. This intense application to detail had however its natural effect. Ingenuity and curiosity are turned to minor matters. The horizon was brought very close to hand. And with a mental equipment much alike in character and quality, the Japanese workman wears cotton and eats rice and radish, and the American workman wears cloth and eats meat. But the most striking is the public carriage of the two men. The American shows all the consciousness of his political position. Against this is the almost universal subdued air of the Japanese. This has but little reference to any tyranny of class over them. This only appears in the form and with the

authority of the community. It is to the community that the Japanese lowers his crest and speaks with bated breath. Take him outside of that and he is all the more self-assertive for his suppression on his own ground. Even a dog will snarl at strangers. Under the grossest class tyranny self thinking—individualism—will assert itself. From communal thinking there is no escape.

Akin in mental type, widely differing in mental training, American and Japanese have something to learn from each other. Given the same problem to carry out in the wheatfields of Dakota, and from the standpoint of economics the American carries the day. He raises more wheat per thousand acres although he raises less wheat per acre. Transfer the contest to the rice fields of Japan, or to any field where labour and not economic ingenuity counts, and the Japanese manual skill and thorough knowledge of detail comes to the front. He would also raise more wheat per acre but the problem of the thousand acres would have been entirely beyond him. This instance of statistics perhaps illustrates as well as anything the fundamental difference between the two peoples. The American farmer is something more than a farmer. He struggles with world markets, must know something as to their conditions and the way of reaching them, and must be something of a manager. He must adapt thoroughly modern methods to his labour problem. His attention is therefore taken away from detail. This is certainly no disadvantage to a general character for intelligence which furthermore is forced to give to detail all the attention necessary to success. And the conditions of success are so shifting that routine covers a small part of anything in his life but manual labour. He is not only an agriculturist but a business man, and has time to give to what is going on in the outside world and but little to give to folklore tales. There is here a premium placed on intelligence that runs through much of American labour. And it makes the American workman one of the best mechanics in the world. He thoroughly understands the machine under his hand and can get out of it all that is possible and make it do its full part in the social co-operation, and from his thorough comprehension can quickly adapt himself to any change. His field is wide enough for that. But it has its drawbacks. This efficiency in the larger field is not carried into the purely handicraft labour in which attention to detail is everything. What is given here is intelligence which gives it an advantage of method and ingenuity, but it is a dissatisfied intelligence which regards its present occupation as a mere stepping stone to something higher. In the lower trades and in unskilled labour therefore there is not the feeling that what is worth doing at all is worth doing well. The tendency is to "slick over it." In Japan as in America the object is to get as much and give as little as possible. Public opinion demands that the little that is done shall be up to standard and the supply of labour to demand in this lower sphere is close enough to enforce good work. In

America this class of labour is below the demand, and in fields where it is not threatened with machine competition it is both inefficient and conscienceless. This feeling has gone deep enough to bring good work into discredit as setting too high a standard. Intelligence is directed not to detail but to avoiding it to the limit of competition, a decidedly bad result in those matters in which detail is everything. Time can effect a change in these new communities where increase in population is bringing men close to the economies of machinery. Cooks and transfer clerks will be cheap at any price when the pneumatic tube service of some great supply company shoots our dinner on to the table and permanently does away with Bridget, who presumably will take to automobiling, typewriting, stenography, or Christian Science. To speak more seriously, there is much to gain in putting—Japanese style—attention to detail on a pedestal. Slipshod work is a poor training for higher things, and there is a sharp line to be drawn between skilled and unskilled labour in America. All the sharper as the latter is largely in the hands of the foreign element and the inefficient of the natives. These apply the standard of intelligence to matters that require in the first instance only great attention to detail. In politics they ask for protection and the right to maintain their own inefficiency. It might be added, however, that the line of this protection lies where a class is forced up to its full efficiency, where the lowest class earns the minimum set as the standard by the community. Only then can a class demand protection from outside competition. Otherwise it is alms-giving or a "holding up" of the community. And these "knights of the road" are not unknown in American labour politics.

Perfection is the rarest product in this world, or out of it. Even the sun has spots. These two types of Eastern and Western Yankee are not without their glaring drawbacks which are necessarily displayed in their contact with each other. And this contact is at other points than national ambitions. It is a contact in varying standards; a very high standard for American labour and a very low one for Japanese labour. Now it is true that a man can live on six cents a day, and it is also true that this leaves no margin whatever for a drop. It is the limit of existence, marking the lowest scale to which human desires can come. Public opinion in the United States demands a wide margin of safety for the lowest class. All the tariff and immigration legislation is really set to maintain an artificial standard which is always a little beyond the mere subsistence of the country and much beyond the possible subsistence standard. The increase in cost of living of the American labourer is far less than the increase in his wages and the best evidence of it is the scale of his living.* Confront this

* The Department of Labour (U. S.) reports in 1906 an increase of one per cent of wages over living expenses according to a standard based on the cereals and other food products and supplies used by the labouring classes.

high priced labourer with the cheap labourer of Japan and China and the result is certain. Efficiency drops out of the question. As fast as he drops to meet the competition his opponent can drop to a scale entirely outside of the experience of any western people, and to a point where all *efficiency* is neutralized because it is the point of mere subsistence. It is the "absolute zero" of economics at which all men and races are equalized. At the standard of the Indian ryot, American, European, Japanese, Chinese—all possess the same efficiency number. Needless to say a people take alarm long before they are threatened with such a degeneration. That a few thousands or tens of thousands of Japanese or Chinese would threaten the labour market of the United States is not a reasonable supposition, but these tens of thousands may threaten very appreciably a thinly settled section of the country and seriously affect its labour market. And such an invasion has a still more important influence. It prevents the influx of a labour class unwilling to compete with such a standard, leaves the field to it, and hampers the development of the country. For the methods of life and the habits of thought of the newcomers are too different to hope for anything but the supremacy of one standard or the other. Either East or West must establish itself. The two do not assimilate. It is this which makes the Japanese indifferent as a settler. If he can create a little Japan he is satisfied. If he cannot, he is very adaptable but he does not stay. And because he cannot create a section of the Japanese Empire on American soil he does not stay. In five or ten years he is back again, and one stumbles on him on some Japanese farm purchased with the proceeds of his labour. He earns his salt but his residence is conditioned on remaining an Oriental. Otherwise he is a bird of passage. With rare exceptions he always remains a Japanese. To create temporary facilities for making him a citizen would not alter his *real* position one iota. It would simply make a clannish people, gifted with high powers of organization, a disturbing element in the political life of any community. They would be the worst of ultramontanists. *Aut Japonicus aut nullus.*

The methods adopted to meet this labour question are what are to be expected from the class whose interests are attacked. It is a class particularly unwilling to admit the presence of a legitimate competitor of any kind. It therefore turns aside to any issue but the real issue, which is a broad one for national discussion and involving other interests but the class immediately affected. The primal principle then is to make a noise, and they have small scruple as to the means employed and show a tender regard for the truth in so far as they avoid its use and any consequent wear and tear on its fabric. Such methods would have little real influence if there were not the important question of standard behind the specious pleading of ignorance on the sand lots of San Francisco. It represents nothing but the clamour of the demagogue and as usual gives away its own case in trying to prove too much. It cannot be said that it appears in any worse

form than in the case with the Japanese under like circumstances. Given the opportunity—and especially under a swollen national self-sufficiency of which the ignorant are unable to take any reasonable measure—they figure as the most daring seal pirates and raiders on the Russian and Alaskan coasts, and in which they display a brutality surprising to no one who has witnessed elsewhere the abuse of animals by the Japanese plebs.* In British Columbia the provincial Government has to prevent armed collision with the native fishermen and arm itself for this little civil war; and in Hawaii troops are called out to suppress rioting on the plantations. Not rioting, for all these outbreaks were conducted by organized bands acting against the community and against a Government in friendly relations with their own Government, and on a scale unique in this twentieth century. This is the peculiarity that at once calls attention to these difficulties with the Japanese. Their organized action for offence, illegal as well as legal, puts them in the light of a little army of foreigners ready to exert the pressure of their military organization. This creates a problem for the local authorities, and also a problem for a people whose labour difficulties do not pass beyond mere rioting, and who do not wish see military organization and methods transferred to civil life. The judgment of these people can hardly be questioned then if they regard the Japanese as undesirable neighbours. In another sphere the question arises in the merchant guild, the principle of which is to support its members, right or wrong, especially against foreigners. One other phase can be touched on, in this unpleasant connection, which brings the two peoples much on a level. It is rather direction of development which differentiates them. For whatever may be the shortcomings of the Japanese in his disposition to act in mass and as the invader, to beat down his antagonist in a sheer struggle of survival of the cheapest, the difference is one of quality rather than of quantity. The American is the more efficient man even at the much higher wage. He has stood this test in a far wider market than that of Japan and against other peoples, for the world market is the test of efficiency. But this has been a market in which the contest of the material civilization of the modern world is going on. In other fields in which he must stand comparison with the Japanese he is an ignoramus—or something very close to it. The delicate silks, and ivories, and old lacquers that the roughest Japanese peasant gazes at—and even handles with the gentlest touch whenever he gets the opportunity—are no more to him than a machine stamped cuspidor. Here the Japanese has all the advantage. He is an artist to his finger tips, whereas the

* Female seals (with pups) are the easiest and therefore favourite game of these raiders. The seals are skinned alive and left to die. It can be added that these sealers are all armed. This is part of the equipment of the business, the old harpooning being long out of date. Cf. President's Message to the Senate on the Sealing Question at the Pribilof Islands 1906.

American is not even dipped as to his finger tips. Much of this artistic feeling is doubtless innate and it has been given a development in the training forced on the Japanese people to make much of detail. This has reacted in other fields and the Japanese peasant has an immense amount of *savoir faire*, the courtesy of mutual communication, entirely unknown in the American of the lower class who has but little time to waste on superfluous motions of any kind. As to intelligence American or Japanese can hardly point the finger of scorn at each other.*

* The intimate knowledge of his holding possessed by the Tuscan metayer—as described by Sismondi, cited by Mill in his “Political Economy” Book II, Chap. VIII, Sect 3—can be transferred word for word to the Japanese peasant. When the acute intelligence so widely found behind this knowledge of detail, the artistic temperament, a keen wit as found both in folklore and repartee, Rabelaisian it is true on occasion but tinged with humour and entirely free from oaths or blasphemous expressions, is taken into consideration; the ignorant denunciation by labour orators in San Francisco, advocating the cause of an element which can make no pretensions to a more acute intelligence or keener wit (to say the least), which can be far coarser on the occasions on which it drops to obscenity of expression, and which makes the freest use of profanity carries with it a bathos in its pleading of superiority quite sufficient to rouse the laughter of gods and men. San Francisco is not alone however in this superior pose, when a debating society in Philadelphia takes the same position of offensive ignorance as to the Japanese in a public discussion as to California’s justification. If American labour is not at least ready to take the real measure of a dangerous antagonist—both politically and mentally—it is likely to land on its back. The only advantage of American labour lies in its freer political institutions and freedom from the binding influence of custom, thereby gaining greater elasticity. Using the term as we understand it in America, and in its narrow local meaning, it is worth remembering that the Japanese *as a nation* thoroughly deserve their sobriquet of “The Yankees of the East.”

That treaty obligations of the United States would be upheld by the Supreme Court goes without saying. A decision on disputed points by that honourable body would guarantee to Americans the nature of any claim made under the treaties. But the remedy is insufficient. Mistakes or misguided enthusiasm of racially prejudiced officials, adjusted by such legal process, should involve the power of the Federal officer under whose department the particular application of a treaty fell to dismiss them from their position, and to begin proceedings leading to further punishment if the occasion called for it. In reference to international relations the President of the United States should have this power over the pettiest State official. In such case some enterprising politician of a little inland town or elsewhere, catering to the votes of a local labour organization, would be unable to sin with impunity and his eyes open, for he would have a very reasonable fear of the consequences to himself. These consequences are now one-sided. To the tender-hearted to whom this may seem severe, there can be suggested in certain cases the possibility and advisability of kicking these unworthies upstairs—as one way of getting rid of them. The accidents of State politics have no business to stick their unpracticed fingers, without check, in international issues. The results are quite as bad as when a social reformer gets on the Bench. One fortunate feature is that this remedy is limited, or else the upper circles of political life would become clogged by specimens drawn from conspicuous incapacity.

... If the American would find it profitable to give this attention to detail it would be equally profitable for the Japanese to widen his horizon. One probably cannot be done without sacrificing something of the other. An elasticity of intelligence is required in the modern industrial world where the methods of ten years back have already become antiquated. This elasticity the Japanese habits of thought do not encourage. The Japanese people are intelligent but they are not trained to think out of given lines. It is not their tools that need polishing, it is the users, and a long training is as necessary for the one as the other. Japanese made goods are not as well made as foreign goods, and can only compete with them on the ground of cheapness not of quality. Not only must the machine be guided by a trained hand, but the material must be prepared for the machine. This is a new business to the Japanese mechanic who might know more about the whole process of which he is a part. His former methods were slowly and carefully to work over the material to its completed form. In such manual skill with their tools generations of practice have produced a marvellous skill in certain lines. When larger quantities of the raw material must be put into shape, and the conditions involve rapidity and uniformity he is at sea; and simply because he is not accustomed to that form of working. His development as a workman will probably involve the loss of his skill as an artisan—and of a skill that can claim high place in comparison with other nations.

The present condition is a somewhat nebulous one. We have the militant Japanese *samurai* dragging along the industrial Japanese nation; very uncertain just what to do with it, realizing that the old condition of affairs is gone forever, and yet unwilling to loose his grasp on its collar. A new ray of light has broken in on him. Since reaction is being preached in the world as good policy, why not go back to the past. This is close at hand and not yet lost to memory. This pestilential western individualism* has started the ball rolling but to allow it to continue will wreck the old machine, destroy the old limits of the family, and perhaps substitute individualism in the State. And so the present idea seems to be to take the back track, to substitute the State for the individual and let the community work to support the State (and officialdom). Of course if the State pushes its extravagance far enough it will either be able to drive individuals, if they consent, to the limits of their endurance, or the State itself to bankruptcy. The experiment of State speculation is at least as dangerous for Japan as any other people, and moreover they have experimented with it for some centuries on the minor scale of the Middle Ages. Training has been shown to depend on individual effort and reward, or else it

* The comment of a famous Japanese General, on the book of an equally famous opponent frankly exposing past weaknesses, are reported to the effect that Occidental brains must be differently constituted from Japanese brains to allow the compilation and publication of such a book. So they are—thank goodness.

will come to a standstill as soon as it is understood that this reward is not to be obtained. Commerce is very necessary to a bureaucracy. Especially to pay its bills. Contact with European thought is inevitable and is sure to break down any one-sided presentation of a subject simply by the method of contrast. Industrial Japan cannot be shut out from its affairs.

Democracy cannot long remain fogged to Japanese eyes. Less will be heard of the "errors of democracy;" as if the selected representatives of great interests which are brought home to the personality of every man were not better qualified to deal with those interests than men selected from a small caste, or even clique, with no practical contact with those interests except as a source of taxation to maintain them in their position. Here lies the true reason for the apotheosis of a fictitious past. It is taught against all reason in the schools that Japanese progress since 1867 has been due to this past and that it is this past which now guides it to glory. There are two dangers threatening modern Japan—reaction and a swollen officialdom. That there can be great external brilliancy with internal rottenness is not unknown either in Europe or in Japan. Europe has forgotten its past. Japan's past is still close at hand. "The State did not allow individual initiative a field of isolated efforts, leaving to each one the responsibility of his own lot in life, whence every man co-ordinates his action to those of others. Military and civil virtue did but increase the glory of the State, which jealously watched that no man should acquire too great an authority, in order that liberty should not be buried beneath the steps of a throne. . . . In the scenes depicted by the Venetian painters, the man is lost amid the elegant confusion of the throng. This beginning of the domination of caste over the individual, that formed the civil and artistic greatness of Venice, was also the cause of its decay, since private initiative, the free spontaneity of the individual and personal responsibility did not come to the aid of the decadent State." In such terms does Mr. Molmenti refer to the fall of the greatest of European oligarchies in modern times. The principles at the root of political life to-day have not changed. The individual is of as much importance as in the seventeenth century, and his elimination can have but one result, already instanced by Venice and Old Japan.

VIII.

PEOPLE AT PLAY.

"Un uomo, cui era morta la moglie nel fiume, andava contr'acqua a ricecarne il cadavere. Uno che lo vide rimase di ciò meravigliato e lo consigliò di andar secondo la corrente:—'In questo modo, rispose l'uomo, non potrebbe trovarsi; perchè quando visse fu tanto contraddicente, e difficile e contraria alle abitudini degli altri che anche dopo morta essa andra contra la corrente del fiume.'—
Facezie di Poggio Fiorentino (Italian translation).

§ 1.

If the ideas which govern the relations between men and women in the twentieth century A.D. had governed those relations in the twentieth century B.C. the history of women in politics would be a much more pleasant and less delicate subject to handle, and it would make pleasanter reading. Unfortunately they were not. Woman was physically the weaker vessel. Where we find her, therefore, making and maintaining her position in the face of the flood tide running against her, it must be only by that weapon which nature places in the hands of weakness—intrigue. This history therefore is not a pleasant one. But we are dealing, not with things as we would like them to be, but as they are. This is to be remembered.

"Male and female created He them," and the absorbing problem of this distinction is as yet the dominant characteristic of that most thoughtful of animals—the *homo sapiens*. No matter how great an interest the other features of this wonderful world in which we live arouse they all pale before this one powerful mainspring of action. It is this that gives to organic life a liveliness unknown to stocks and stones or the bi-sexual products of Nature. And it is this reflection of himself and his own little idiosyncrasies that mainly attracts the attention of man in the lower animals. That most mechanical and over-rated of the bug tribe—the ant—arouses interest mainly through its domestic arrangements. In the higher animals this interest becomes the keener as it approximates to human feelings. Paternal protection and maternal love are recognized as the scale advances, and it is only man's own conceit that prevents him from acknowledging that the interest really lies in the mirror held up before his eyes, a reflection of his own life, sometimes too faithful, sometimes a caricature. It is the family relations of Mr. and Mrs. Lion and the little lions that attracts a sympathy far different from the cold scientific or culinary problem involved

in the breeding and cooking of oysters. And there is a feeling at bottom that if men were able to take no longer interest in their offspring than the animals do in theirs, their unions also would be of the same temporary nature. Especially in such a changeable creature as man a union originally impelled by sexual difference would soon wane before familiarity. Rare are the cases where intellectual sympathy alone keeps the home together. Almost as rare as intellectual sympathy itself. It is domesticity—that powerful function of the family as the basis of human society acting through offspring and a predominant public opinion—that keeps the great majority of men and women together after the glamour of strangeness has departed. The tremendously real help in the “help-mate” only comes from longer connection and could not establish itself unless this ancient law of the family were at the bottom to give it a chance to operate.

While it is not flattering the force of the reasoning can be understood and appreciated by which is traced through the customs of existing savages the condition of our half-bestial ancestor.* This powerful brute with his harem of subdued females, dominating them like any bull gorilla, driving the younger and weaker males into bands only able to hover on the outskirts of his preserves, still finds expression in man's savage jealousy to-day, and the harem in the East, if not a lineal descendant, is a recrudescence of this old savage exclusivism of the primitive ancestor. Grant man the wealth, the power, and the control over the female, and he acts to-day just as he did a hundred thousand years ago. And indeed many customs found existing among savage races can only be explained on some such ground as the Primal Law. Wife stealing among the Australian and South African aborigines is no longer attributed to scarcity of females, for exogamy itself erects a bar against the tribal females which must first be explained. A repulsion to too close intermarriage is certainly artificial among peoples who hardly understand what true consanguinity is, who practise polyandry and hence can only trace descent in the maternal line, among whom relationship within the tribe is governed by the generation to which the individual belongs in order to prevent relations between parent and child, and among whom still worse offences against morals are a normal practice. The relations between men and women of the same phratry sometimes, and of the same totem usually, are those of brother and sister in the same generation, father and mother in the older generation, the object seeming to be now† to place a bar between connection within the forbidden relationships and generations. Necessarily therefore the relation between the real father and child does not exist at all. The child's father is his elder in his totem clan which in

* J. J. Atkinson—“Primal Law.”

† Savage man and primitive man are two widely different subjects. For sweet simplicity see Spencer and Gillen, chapter on “Social organisation of the Tribes” (Northern Tribes of Central Australia).

this collective sense are his maternal uncles if used in our understanding of the real relations. Relations between totem clans and phratrys are so confused that the actual range of connection is not so great and any woman belongs to any man who has a right to her.† Under such conditions she is submissive pretty much at will and naturally the children born in communism do know who their fathers are—except as established by tribal usage. Polyandry does not imply a supremacy of women or even a respect for women. They are simply the slaves of a community of men extending the savage principle of communism of goods into a sphere not even recognized by higher animals; but it does imply a previous exclusivism, the necessity of bringing in the wife from an outside tribe and paying the marriage forfeit. A remnant of the primitive assertion of the tribal privilege seems to be hidden in its brutal assertion as part of the rites of an Australian marriage.

Descent therefore in the female line is now looked on as a primitive form of society and not an exotic or a "sport." Modern forms of communism harping on the "crime of private property" simply carry the doctrine to its logical conclusion in their reversion to the primitive type in advocacy of "free love" and the public bringing up of offspring. Communism of goods and polyandry are an ideal condition for the transmission of tribal property. One could go further and say it is the only logical communism. Women being the property of the tribe, and descent being traced through them, naturally no question of heirship other than tribal could spring up. The women are maintained for the benefit of the tribe. It is hard to disguise the logical sequence between the family and private property. With a definite relationship established between husband and wife, and hence between father and child, the family came into being. A man's offspring were identified to him. The original primal relation of exclusivism—the assertion of the natural jealousy of the male—was re-established, but the relations among the larger number of peoples were now very different. In the primeval days, if any old bull was to reserve to himself a greater number of cows, he could only use weapons little better than the teeth and claws of his animal condition. Later the weapons were very different. This condition exists among peoples who have increased in wealth; and polygamy, open or concealed, always has existed and does exist among such wealthy peoples. It makes little difference whether the Turk keeps half a dozen wives in his seraglio, or whether a man keeps half a dozen mistresses in different (let us hope) establishments in some western cities; or whether some woman has half a dozen husbands in Thibet, or half a dozen lovers in the metropoli of the world. The principle is the same at bottom. In the first case the family is recognized, and the fruits of the exertions of the male, heretofore the

† For instance the Urabunna of Central Australia. Cf. Spencer and Gillen (*Native Tribes, etc.*) p. 59-69, 63: *Northern Tribes etc.*: 73, 74, 95, Chapter on "Marriage Ceremonies and other Customs."

recognized producer of the world, are devoted to his offspring. In the second case communism still exists, but a little modified in form; and in its western phase it is not officially or socially recognized, a matter of no legal consequence where both sexes enjoy equal property rights and standing before the law. It is not to be claimed of course that the early days and the methods of savage tribes are to be held up as a model of excellence. Even latter day advocates would disclaim the connection. They were days of strenuous exertion and phonetic spelling (where such existed, official or otherwise). They were days in which mayhem was a legitimate and valuable means of defence and offence, not only for its present injury but for its future crippling of a possible enemy in times when all a man's anatomy was needed on the ground and ready to use. However in these very times we can see a reflection of some of our present idiosyncrasies, and the clearer the recognition the less likelihood to allow it again to come to the top.

That prehistoric Europe was exempt from a like condition there is no reason to believe. To assert it as a fact is merely to assert what has not yet been proved. The northern races when they appear in history are monogamous; but bastardy was so little regarded, and hence illicit connection, that the term "handmaiden" was decidedly loose. The Asiatic tribes invading Europe were frankly polygamous as far as their wandering pastoral life permitted. In Japan both geography and climate permitted it. The geography of the country was such as to discourage wandering and to lead to permanent settlement. The climate was not so severe as to make it too difficult for a man to provide for a numerous band of offspring. It would be rash to say there are no signs of polyandry to be found in the earliest records accessible.* The importance of the relationship through the mother is repeatedly emphasized, and it not being the practice to strangle all the litter except the prince or potentate who succeeded to power, this emphasis on the mother's side is naturally somewhat enhanced. In these secondary branches therefore the mother's name and the importance of maternal uncles is decidedly emphasized. The father controls the succession, but in the widespread concubinage allowable under the system of old Japan it can be seen that a very powerful influence is given to the maternal side.† All the new heir's influence is naturally thrown in that direction. From the legends of Jimmu and Chūai we can gather how this maternal influence prevailed, how the children "of the same belly" stood and fell together. And these very legends, perhaps, show the intimate and necessary connection between two such opposite institutions as polygamy and polyandry. The strongest influence always lies on the

* Amaterasu-oho-no-mikoto, chief of the Japanese pantheon, is a goddess.

† It is her own brother who gives Princess Yata to Nintoku. "Nihongi." Vol. I, p. 277 (Aston).

maternal side, as if Nature in contest with man determined this to be the natural line of descent,

"That thou art my son, I have partly thy mother's word,
 "partly my own opinion, but chiefly a villainous trick of
 "thine eye, and a foolish hanging of thy nether lip, that
 "doth warrant me."

But there are other primitive traits existing long in Japanese customs. Thus the visiting of the mistress by stealth can be regarded as one of these customs retained from savage life, this clandestine intercourse being a common feature. From the earliest times, however, there is at least a partial separation of the women, which is mark enough that what remained of polyandry was simply a hint and that it was long forgotten as a practice. Polygamy on the contrary is well marked but the woman is given some consideration. The wife or concubine had her separate establishment. Thus in the legend of Suinin*, his empress, who had chosen to die with her brother who was in revolt against the emperor, charges him to take unto himself certain wives of her selection. "Let them be placed in the side-courts to complete the number of consort chambers;" which is enough to indicate a separate establishment for each. And in these separate establishments the children of the same mother, brothers and sisters of the full blood, were brought up together. The acknowledgment of blood relationship through the mother only seems to here find a reflection in the stringent relations existing in this case. Both father and mother are here known but the stress is all thrown on the old custom practised among savage men, and, from the complex development it has attained, probably inherited from primitive men. Any sexual relation between full brother and sister is forbidden in the old Japanese State. This is the sin of Prince Haru, son and heir of Ingyō. He fell in love with his full sister, the Princess Oho-iratsume, and they both shared in this guilty passion†. It cost the prince his succession to the throne, and the two lovers, to avoid the inevitable separation demanded by the outraged custom of the country, committed suicide together. The relation between brothers and brothers was much as they are everywhere when ambition can intervene to disturb the natural relations. Between blood brothers as against half brothers the instances of opposition are frequent. Two instances have been cited: the children of Jimmu and the children of Chūai. This closing of the ranks by children of the same womb naturally follows under such conditions of rebellion against the succession to the throne. But where there is no such opposition it may then be found between those of the same blood, and the successful claimant to Haru's rights was his brother by the full blood, which perhaps also accounts for his successful venture, as legitimacy early assumes importance in the old records.

* Nihongi—I, p. 173 (Aston).

† Nihongi—I, p. 328 (Aston).

As to the relations existing among the lower class there is just given a hint, but the hint is there to be extracted. Shintō implies ancestor worship, and this implies a male heir to carry it on. The attachment of the wife to the husband has therefore always been a loose one and one might say conditioned by fertility in the conception of male children. There is no reason certainly to believe that the tie in these early days was any closer than in later and even very recent times;* among the lower classes it was probably only cohabitation, the responsibility of the children being placed on the father. There is also a hint of practices inherent not so much in our highest civilizations as in the lowest, perhaps indicating scarcity of females. Thus infamous offences are denounced and purification of the land from time to time is performed on account of them. One such purification took place on the accession of the Empress Jingō, the offences cited being against agricultural efficiency, personal filthiness, bestiality, and incest.† The position of woman, however, is by no means that of an absolute chattel. It is safe to say that, as always, among the lower class she did her share of the work. Her security must have been assured as she is heard of from time to time in free movement among the people. In the upper classes the women are not shut up in a harem. In the scanty glimpses of private life woman appears as the mistress or the daughter of the house and it would be hard to distinguish her position from that of to-day. Indeed in any country in which female succession to the throne is recognized it is rare that women are maintained in the state of vassalage which is their condition in countries in which they are a breeding machine pure and simple, such as among the Turks. This is the case in the whole gamut of peoples from civilized to savage. The Japanese throne in those early days was more than once occupied by a woman. It is not necessary to accept the legends of the Empress Jingō as good history, but there is evidence from Chinese sources that about the 3rd century A.D. the Japanese ruler was a woman. It is more likely that, as in these annals, Jingō spent her time in her court and was little seen of the people. Far more likely than the Japanese legends which make her a sort of Amazon. The active administration in such rough times was almost inevitably conducted by ministers, just as it was much later in the reigns of Suiko and Kōgyoku (seventh century) under the crafty administration of old Umayko and his immediate descendants. A woman has to depute the exercise of

* The accounts in the Kojiki and Nihongi can be compared with the extracts from Chinese records (A.D. 25-265) given in Mr. Aston's "Early Japanese History." Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan Vol. XXI, p.p. 53-59. As to recent events, a man divorced his wife (reluctantly) because she had given him half a dozen daughters and no son. The Japanese newspapers commented unfavourably. Public opinion ensured no resistance on the woman's part. She was at fault.

† Kojiki p. 230—Trans. Asiatic Soc. of Japan, Vol. X, supplement (Chamberlain's Trans).

those manly qualities called for in the person of a king for the defence of the royal prerogative. But all the formality of a court goes on around her person, and of course she does not stand isolated, the only female among her warriors. The very fact of there being a queen tells its own story, and women and men must have mixed more or less intimately in the social life of the time, social prejudices as to the relations of the sexes playing a part somewhat as in our own day, a condition very unlike the harem. The freedom of intercourse and lack of formality (at times) is instanced by the assassination of Iruka in full court at the feet of the Empress, an episode calling to mind the rough and ready court of Mary Stuart. It is to be remembered that among ourselves to-day the latitude of intercourse has a very wide range—from the practical seclusion of unmarried girls in the countries of southern Europe, to the wide control of public opinion in a country of easy intercourse like America. And in this Old Japan the wife's position was given full recognition.

Questions of concubinage would hardly trouble the lower classes. One wife and her progeny were probably quite the limit of their means. From a not very savoury episode in the reign of Muretsu (498-504 A.D.) it can be gathered that public prostitution was enough organized to cater to the mere pleasure of the people. The marital relations being looser among people in which property required no severe recognition of possible heirs, whether a man introduced a new concubine into his house in the guise of a maid servant, or made an actual change of wives was of but little importance. But in the upper classes there would naturally be a wide difference. The consent of the Empress seemed to be part of the formula necessary before a new imperial concubine had official standing at the court. Nintoku (310-399 A.D.) thus stole a march on his Empress, and during her absence introduced a concubine into the palace.* This was not his first offence in the marital line and seemed to be the last straw. The Empress resolutely refused to endure this insult to her position, and, judging from the strenuous efforts that Nintoku made to get her back again, the stand she took must have disturbed the serenity of the court. She died in exile. A somewhat similar episode occurs under Ingyō (410-453 A.D.). For a physical weakling this monarch made more than enough amorous disturbance. The particular instance is of value in showing that woman had a voice in her disposition. Ingyō gave a banquet in his palace attended by both sexes. The Emperor himself played on the lute and the Empress danced before him. It seems that "it was the custom for the dancer, when the dance was ended, to turn to the person who occupied the "highest place, and say 'I offer thee a woman'"; † and presumably she offered the most desirable under her control. On this

* Dates previous to 500 A.D., are mainly hypothetical. Cf. Chapter I.

† Nihongi I, p. 318 (Aston).

occasion this happened to be the Empress' sister, Otohime, the acknowledged beauty of the land with whom the Emperor was already enamoured. The Emperor having caught his spouse in the trap compelled her to extend the invitation to him. Otohime, however, did not take it in the same way. She knew the unpleasantness sure to result to herself from her elder sister's hostility and well judged the outcome. Her refusal to comply with the Emperor's wishes was obstinate. Seven times she refused, and was finally only won over by the craft of his messenger, who concealing food in the bosom of his garments, secretly sustaining himself by the concealed victuals, prostrated himself in the courtyard and refused to move without her. Otohime relented under this imposition, but was never able to live at the court as was customary. That love was not altogether a matter of *convenance* is instanced in the Nihongi as to both earlier and later times. It was of course an honour that a woman should be summoned to share the imperial bed, and Kami-naga-hime (Princess Long Hair) was thus brought to the court of Ōjin and settled in a neighbouring village. That there was some freedom of intercourse among young people in at least later times is shown in the form the writers of the Kojiki and Nihongi give the legend; for Ōjin's son had opportunity to be smitten with the lady's charms, and Ōjin had time to find it out. When he sent for her therefore for the first time to be present at the imperial banquet in the palace the feeling of the two young people can be imagined, and their grateful astonishment also when the Emperor turned the feast into their wedding banquet instead of his own. Again, when the reign of Muretsu (498-505 A.D.) opened under the doubtful auspices of an usurping minister, the young prince and the minister's son, Shibi no Ōmi, found themselves rivals for the same girl. Of the two Kagehime favoured the noble, not the prince and embryonic emperor. It is a curious illustration of the open freedom of life when the two rivals and the mistress meet in what seems to be a kind of public fair, and Shibi no Ōmi presents himself boldly before the Prince, claiming a connection with Princess Kage a good deal closer than an unmarried lady should be willing to admit. The power of a prince, however, is capable of vengeance if not of undoing the past, and the death of Shibi and distress of Kagehime, and the ruin of the minister, legitimately close the drama. That women, however, in their disposition were mainly in the hands of their male relatives is plain enough. A woman, if she could avoid an unpleasant match, had to leave the choice of candidates to others. Thus in the reign of Nintoku his half brother gives him his sister, Princess Yata, as concubine. This is an illustration of the law which forbade union between children of the full blood, and also it shows that the control lay in blood as interpreted by maternal descent (*harakara*). It is difficult to regard this as other than a reminiscence of an old polyandry. Enough has probably been said to show the importance and comparative freedom of women in these times; and to this can be

added their position as priestesses of the national religion. Tradition carries this back as far as the reign of Sujin (B.C. 92) and establishment of Princess Yamato at Ise. At all events in much later times and to-day women are found occupying a prominent position in the carrying out of Shintō ritual.

The importance of the routine of the daily life of women is constantly shown by the prominence given to domestic detail in the early records. In the house their sphere controlled those domestic affairs still regarded as belonging properly to their sex; and in their control of their relations to the other sex and to each other. The Old Japanese evidently knew the danger of a man's interference between woman and woman. As usual under such free conditions their hand can be traced in most of the ambitions and disturbances of the times. And their anger brought sorrow to others and to themselves. The careless insolence of a noble, riding past the garden of the Princess Ohonakatsu, nearly cost him his life when she afterwards became the Empress of Ingyō; and the careless insolence of the Empress Naniha no Wono to her brother-in-law Prince Ohoke (afterwards Emperor under the name of Ninken 487-498 A.D.) led her to commit suicide for fear of his wrath in his new position. She had presented him with a knife to cut a melon and with some *saké*, but in a standing position instead of the more respectful kneeling position due to the Emperor's brother. There was much savagery in this new court even if its functions were in process of elaboration, for this episode comes natural enough to the writers of the Nihongi in the seventh century. The functions of the Japanese woman, however, are certainly wide enough at this period. She controls the domesticity of her home establishment. The mistress of the household is only second to her husband and their spheres are well defined. She serves his pleasures, manages his house, and controls everything necessary for that purpose without let or hindrance. When a handmaid displeases her, the handmaid is banished, even though it be the favourite of the master. As one perhaps of several she is not merged into her husband's interests but maintains her own house connection. It is the maternal influence that enters, and hence when the term uncle is used it can almost be assumed that the maternal uncle is meant. In the legend of Suinin (B.C. 26) it is taken as entirely natural that the Empress should be engaged in the plot of her brother Prince Sahohike, and to her falls the task of slaying her husband. To thus be the executioner of the father of her children is beyond her strength and she reveals the plot to the Emperor thereby saving his life. She clings however to her own family, and only using means to ensure the safety of the child of which she had recently been delivered, she perishes with them in the flames of the castle closely besieged by Suinin. He dropped a casual tear on the smoking grave of the little woman—and presumably took a man's somewhat embarrassed care of the new-born infant. Such family differences seemed to be part of the code. The Empress in trousers can be passed

over as somewhat apocryphal. The prominence, however, of woman in ceremonial is evident enough, just as it is plain enough that she was no Amazon but confined herself to the intrigues and mischief of a court, and bravely took the consequences when perhaps she and her husband had to mount on horseback and flee for their lives.*

The people of the country lived the open lives of the peasantry, everywhere exhibited. They were subject to a sort of "*droit connubial*" which the upper class possessed over them, and good-looks and attractiveness are important qualifications in the women furnished for service. Policy or a pretty face led even the lord of all the land into amorous combats with a foe often much beneath him. Policy thus led Keikō to the arms of Ichi-fukaya, daughter of a Hiuga bandit. She cut her father's bow-string and left him helpless; and Keikō cut her throat for her unfilial conduct—and perhaps to get rid of her. That this freedom among the peasants was recognized is illustrated by an adventure of Yamato-take. Taking advantage of his youth he disguises himself as a woman and presents himself as a recruit in that capacity to the bandits of Kumaso. He finds no difficulty of entrance. Enchanted with his beauty the leader, the Brave of Kawakami, selects him at once and makes him sit beside him at the feast, and gets in reward the sword of Yamato-take in his vitals.† The records of this period are one thing of importance. These are the Nihongi and Kojiki, and throughout there is, in the case first named anyhow, a distinct translation of existing conditions—those of the seventh century—to the legends of an earlier date. Some of these incidents are, however, so characteristic of a primitive condition that they can be carried far back into pre-historic Japan. These are instanced by the great importance given to maternal influence, the careful regulation of the intercourse of full sisters and brothers, still holding its own in spite of descent by the father's side regulating all property rights in the heir-ship; by the somewhat loose relations existing between the sexes, for, related as they are at base, polygamy is a far fiercer and more exclusive cult than polyandry; by the undoubted prominence given to phallic worship in this Old Japan, and to which many an old country bridge still bears witness; and by certain offences characteristic of savagery and of great luxury, neither of which conditions existed at this virile period of Japanese history. In this early period there is not, however, the prominence given to the wife found among the German tribes of North Europe which in time was to dominate the

* Prince Hayabusa and Princess Medori for instance.—Nihongi, Vol. I, p. 291 (Aston).

† Whether in the case of a bandit, or in the precincts of the palace, the free intermingling of the sexes at their feasts and banquets in this early Japan can be noted. It is very different from mediæval Japan—even from the recent Japan—in which the woman appears on such occasions merely as the instrument to entertain. They were "gentlemen and ladies" in early Japan, not "gentlemen and *geisha*."

feeling even of southern Europe; but there is something more than was given to the wife of South Europe. The Japanese woman's power of intrigue figures prominently in these early records of Old Japan, and does not figure at all in the early records of the Roman Republic. On the whole perhaps from the point of view of respect the Roman wife was decidedly better off than the Japanese wife. From her influence, without its counterbalance of something like worship, the fall of the latter from grace was to be greater in the future, and she was to become simply the instrument of pleasure and a breeding machine. At the beginning, however, of the early Japanese Empire she was a freer woman than she ever was in her succeeding history. At least up to these days of Meiji.

As has been stated our authorities raise unconsciously a difficulty for us. The Kojiki with its more Japanese flavour to the legends and history ends with the close of the reign of Kenzō (487 A.D.) Beyond this there are a few dreary pages of genealogy. And here it can be asked—why, if there were written records to cover any part of the legendary period, it was necessary to take them down from the oral recitation of Hiyeda-no-Are. The Nihongi is confessedly not only Chinese, but the long speeches and sometimes the events are simply cribbed from Chinese tales and annals. This makes it uncertain as to the real atmosphere surrounding the writers of the Nihongi, and whether the form of the higher civilization was not given to existing conditions; the unconscious bias of the writers, as with the Spaniards in Mexico and Peru, giving a colour to the interpretation of every event and institution by those in operation under their eyes. This has undoubtedly been the case for the early history of Japan. That the compilers of the traditional history had more to go on from the date of active contact with China through Korea in the fifth century appears from the abrupt change in tone of the events recorded in the Nihongi subsequent to the time of Richiū (400-405.) And it also indicates plainly a rapid change going on in the manners of the people. The people are sinking into serfdom, the government is becoming centralized, and luxury is spreading among the upper classes. This is accompanied by a corresponding change in the condition of women. Polygamy and concubinage has always existed, but it has been of the type of Penelope and her hand-maids. There is from the beginning of the sixth century a distinct increase of concubinage of the true eastern type. Women become more and more the plaything of man; for his pleasure and for breeding. At the worst of times the harem never found a place in Japanese social life. Any seclusion of women was dictated by high station and not by sex. But henceforth woman must make her influence felt in Japanese life through her power and willingness as an instrument of pleasure. She exercises her control over man through his passions and not through his domesticity and the natural unit of the family represented by parents and children. Such a family ideal is very different from the Japanese family

in which the head is practically the despot of a little State, and a condition to some extent realized in a man with a score of wives and concubines and perhaps eighty or a hundred children, in which his personal interest is necessarily confined to the material side of any such feeling as love. This loss of her true influence foreshadowed the future. Woman must become more and more a mere chattel. The change comes gradually. By so doing perhaps the natural freedom of intercourse between men and women so ingrained itself in Japanese character that it could hold its own against the harem. There was great luxury and peace at the centre of government and there was war on the frontier, and the same men took their taste of both. Women could find but little place in the rough game going on at the frontiers, and their influence, confined to the centre, was that worst kind of influence—maintained by working on the feelings of men toward their sex. At the periphery therefore their influence was *nil*. A class was growing up "who knew not" Josephina, who knew of nothing but blows; and to them woman naturally sank into an inferior position. In the capital she was maintaining her influence through a softness of corruption that the weak find necessary to use in order to accomplish their wishes. Women ruled the elegant and refined court of Kyōto in the tenth and eleventh centuries, and woman's rule ruined the monarchy. I take from the extensive paper of Mr. Clay Macauley* two specimens of *tanka* poetry as translated and explained by him. These lyrical efforts by ladies and gentlemen of the court certainly do not give any idea of previous Spartan severity of the former to their lovers

"Now in dire distress"

"It is all the same to me!"

"So, then, let us meet"

"Even though it costs my life"

"In the Bay of Naniwa"

Concealment being no longer possible, the lover shows his "recklessness of despair" and intention to meet his mistress at the cost of his life. In another the lady vents her spleen on her abandonment, and probably wishes the contrary, in her grief over the vengeance the gods will take on her lover's broken oaths.

"Though forgotten now,"

"For myself I do not care."

"He, by oath, was pledged;—"

"And his life, who is forsworn,"

"That is, ah! so pitiful."

Alas! the gentleman's parents had found a *parti* more favoured with the world's goods, and the lady who had been jilted had no Common Pleas or Sergeant Buzfuz to expound the ethics of warming pans and tomato sauce in reference to breach of promise.

* Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. XXVII, p.p. 29, 53.

Philosophers had very little sway in these elegant circles. They could bide their time and cluster together on the slopes of Hiei-san and Kōyasan. That time came with the struggle over the declining monarchy and the advent of the feudal system. One would anticipate a severity of treatment of woman under such conditions but it did not seem to be the case. In fact woman's position became so much a matter of indifference and insignificance as to make shutting her up a matter of no importance. The social life of the time was practically *nil* and confined to a despised circle surrounding the shadowy emperor at Kyōto, and in which the men and women seemed to become almost sexless. For the rest, woman was of course a prize if she possessed beauty. There was as much feud between Minamoto Yoshitomo and Taira Kiyomori over the former's beautiful concubine, Tokiwa, as over the prize of the kingdom. Yoshitomo out of the way, Kiyomori promptly seized Tokiwa's aged parents and so brought the lady to terms and to his arms. The looseness of the marriage tie, always existing and more accentuated with the increase of Chinese learning to which the warrior class of the feudal age were particularly affected, accounts to some extent for the remaining freedom that was allowed to woman in her intercourse with the world. Provided she performed her duties as wife and mother there was no reason to shut her up. In the greatest luxury of the Tokugawa period, when woman has become a mere chattel, and a ceremonial which should exist only for women was made the object of cultivation for men, she was never reduced to that absolute automatism of the trained animal found in western Asia. It is a crime worthy of death to disturb the Lord of all the Moslem world in his hours of pleasure. But it is said that on one pretext this is permitted to a woman, no matter under what circumstances the Father of the Faithful be found. When this woman, clad in scarlet from head to foot, appears before the couch of the Sultan her mission saves her from all punishment. Her garment speaks for her, and tells her master that the imperial palace is in flames. As a fire and a rebellion are not unusual concomitants the Heir of Mahomet does not have to ask any questions, and needless to say his hours of festival are over. He vamoses.

∴ In the feudal days which have lasted down to our own generation woman in Japan reached her lowest condition. She became house keeper, an object for pleasure, and a breeding machine. What consideration was shown her in marital relations was due to the danger arising on sending her home again. These were family affairs, and unless the ground was covered delicately a repudiation might give rise to a feud the extent of which no man could foresee. This has been the case from the earliest times. The emperor Kenzō (484-487 A.D.) rejoices that the sacred duty of vengeance is nourished in every man's heart. And naturally in her very freedom of exit and entrance, amid this society of warriors who regarded her with indifference the Japanese woman took her tone from it. It had been a

rough society, requiring quickness of judgment, energy of decision, tact and promptness. It was a society of action little given to speculation. One sided, confining its social sphere to the actions of one sex, there was no softening influence; and even throughout the long peace of the Tokugawa the warrior spirit was kept alive by the private war nourished by its ceremonial within the caste itself. Where etiquette carried with it life and death, and a careless gesture, or stepping over a man's sword laid on the ground, were deadly insults, such society was still living in a state of war. The Japanese woman learned in this long and hard school self-poise and bravery. Unselfishness was more than a part of her curriculum; it became a very part of her nature, which called out three qualifications—patience, self-sacrifice, and courage. And with all this she had all her woman's work to do in the world and under such adverse and discouraging conditions. At the best to be treated with indifference. At the worst to undergo all the scorn and rough treatment aroused by the brutal passions of mediaeval war. Reduced to the condition of an upper servant, with all the responsibility of a wife and but a shadow of her privileges, she could but work and wait. And even at times gird on the sword herself and fight, not only bravely but with all the coolness called for in the skilled captain. The Japanese wife at times had to take her lord's place on the castle wall when service had called him elsewhere and enemies threatened his home. The Japanese woman did indeed face the world and not retire from it.

§ 2.

Mediaevalism and modern life almost touch each other in these days of Meiji. The great mass of the people are still controlled by the old ideas inherited not from their forefathers but from their very fathers. And so the Japanese woman has stepped into the heritage of the spirit of the Japanese woman of the past. The old tone of Japanese life still governs the home, and modern education has as yet made but little impression. And there is no reason to wish that it would change the nature of the Japanese woman. The change must come in the home life, and then it will come naturally and without shaking the bed-rock of character. This has been the course of development in Western life. To emancipate the Japanese woman by means of education would simply leave her unevenly poised, without support and with many vague and probably chimerical aspirations. The whole of Japanese society must change and the Japanese woman with it, or else it is better to leave her as she is. Nothing could be more womanly. She has escaped—through indifference—the narrowing effect of polygamy. As with the Turks it is to be doubted if in the bottom of *his* soul the Japanese

is at all assured of the existence of *her* soul. She is disposed of very much as a kitten, or a Georgian or Armenian girl. In the family her position is one of self-sacrifice which comes to her as naturally as drawing her breath—whether it be the giving up the best place or the best portion at a nod from the powers over her, or the sacrifice of her own body to the vinous necessities of some aged or parental drunkard, and the necessary *hegira* to the Yoshiwara. But there is a possibility in front of her. She may not only be wife but she may become mother of male children, and then her time is sure to come. If she can only weather through her various pregnancies and the accidents of her sex and life, and reach to an old age that comes early in Japan, she holds a position impregnable in its little sphere, and in which in time she can and perhaps will pay back with interest the tyranny that has been exercised on herself. To go through all this requires a strength of character, and perhaps fosters it. And this little soft yielding creature, all *savoir faire*, can show it on occasion. She can suffer wounds and pain with the courage of a warrior. The writer remembers seeing the hand of a little inn girl badly torn by the explosion of a soda bottle she was trying to open. The victim merely bound it up and trudged off alone to the hospital without a murmur and only a little wrinkle over the eyes. In days of the past the *samurai* woman carried a little sword or dagger for her self-defence, and did not hesitate to use it—mainly on herself. She knew just where to stab herself in the neck without unseemly loss of blood, and binding her feet with her sash so that any death struggle would not disturb her garments she performed this feminine form of official suicide to rejoin her lord or to defend her honour. And so she still thus treads the path to the land of Yomi. In these days men leave their bones on the soil of China and the slopes of Port Arthur, but the photographer has counterfeited their appearance as well as their ashes. The cases are not unknown where seating herself on the mats, with all the formalities of the old time ceremony, the young wife has cut her thread of life to follow after the young husband blown to pieces by the modern process of shells or Mauser bullets.

We have here a stage of development which has long passed from view in the West. There is plenty of heroism left in the woman of the West, as so many crises of self-sacrifice and suffering show. Whether in the hospitals of public life or in a life long martyrdom in the privacy of home and family, from time to time this fundamental quality of strong womanhood, of suffering evil without outcry, finds constant expression. The creation of the novelist's brain is not only found in the fictitious character of Eugenie Grandet, but in actual life in the columns of the daily paper. Heroics in modern Western life, however, owe very little to training. Perhaps they deserve the more credit inasmuch as the emotional expression is governed by the intelligence. Neither the surrounding medium or the past still acting on the present gives the initiative, which is due entirely to that love of praise

inherent in our egoistic personality. There are, however, peoples still existing in the earliest stages of this form of ethical development in which both training and public opinion are strong incentives to action. It is not only the love of good repute but also the active fear of the contempt or disapproval of the community which drives to action. In the West we must turn to the history of the distant past to see its force as illustrated in this type of mediaevalism preserved to our own days. And it is found most marked where woman was in early days an independent factor to some extent in the community. Among the great peoples of South-West Asia she was a slave and chattel. The higher her rank, the farther she retired from public view, and the true home of the harem, that institution which to-day governs the Moslem world, is simply a heritage from the distant past of the peoples living near the Persian Gulf. The position of the Greek wife is plainly much better, and more in accordance with the views of the Aryan peoples. The Greeks who listened to and applauded the tragedies of Aeschylus, of Sophocles, and of Euripides were certainly not showing their favour to a portraiture of a woman who in the eyes of the hearers had abandoned the proper rôle of her sex. These women of the Greek stage—so womanly in all their characteristics, even in the wrath of a Medea—played their part in the public affairs of their country. Their sphere is distinctly marked by their rights as wives and mothers of the community. And when they abandon it to come forward in a harsher rôle as that of Antigone, they do it with a womanly sweetness of character and determination, thereby accentuating the strangeness of their position and losing none of the privileges of their sex. No better illustration perhaps has ever been given of the two types of character, and the two phases in the same character, both thoroughly feminine, than in Antigone and Ismene. And when Polyxena gives her hand to Ulysses to be led away to death it is no shrinking toy of the harem that speaks the words of comfort to the distressed Hecuba. And how the old Greek poet loved the type he was portraying is shown in the words which have fairly burned themselves into the pages of the world's literature—to last as long as man.

The Persian wars and growing contact with the East undoubtedly did much injury to the position of the Greek woman. If later she did not reach the confinement of the harem she made as close approach to it as possible in view of the open life of the Greeks. The women's apartments became a very separate part of the establishment, and they rarely saw any but their own relatives, unless at some fixed feast of the master of the house. Social convention regulated much of this treatment accorded to them, and notoriously social convention is largely guided by women themselves in such spheres as they are permitted to enjoy. Their true tyrant here is the old woman. They could break through this at times; and did so, or else Xanthippe is entirely a myth and Socrates goes with her; men differ also, and it can be granted—with his existence—that Socrates was long suffering

and of great kindness—unless he owed his father-in-law money. Woman's position, however, in later Greek times became a very subordinate one. Anything like marriage was purely a matter of finance. With the absorption of men in the affairs of the State, more and more was to be expended on fitting the male heir for the battle for position. The Greek community seems to lose something of its balance at this point. Men took the State as a finished product and laboured to shine in it. With one important factor disregarded its progress was stopped. And the peculiar position of the *hetairai* can be better understood. The vast majority of these women were just what a similar class have been in all civilizations. They were whores, pure and simple; and to gain their daily bread for themselves or their owner.* But, granted a peculiar costume, they had the privilege of mixing with the world, and of this the Greek woman had been deprived. It really does seem to-day that if a human being had the misfortune to be born into the old Greek State, possessed of great talents, perhaps wealth, and the attributes of the female sex, that the only feasible outlet for the use of all these advantages was to bring her up to the career of a prostitute. Convention forbade the Greek wife under any circumstances to play a public rôle in society. Convention allowed the courtesan to do so. Between Phryne, or Thais, or Leontium, and the public woman at the beck and call of any passer by, there was a great gulf fixed. And the former were strengthened in their supremacy not only by the brilliancy of their individual talents but by the fact that they shone almost alone. The only women to contrast with them—the ignorant, superstitious, and bigoted wife, or the low drab—only accentuated the difference. This limitation of the presence of the female in society was the less felt from the peculiar cult of Beauty in Greek life. The Greeks could be said to worship Beauty—i.e. physical beauty. Their temples were placed and built to shelter some exposition of it. That they appreciated the beauty and the curves of the female body is evident enough from the masterpieces they have left, but the dominant type was the young male. Such worship cannot endure without trespassing on strange fields, and Greek love takes on a hideous meaning and found an openness of practice unexampled in the history of any civilization. It tainted the best of their greatest minds. It is strange that the undoubted appreciation of intellect instead of neutralizing rather excited to the practice of these vices. Necessarily the connection between men and women, even when legitimate, was almost a temporary one, sufficient for the maintenance of the race. Woman, legitimately speaking, in the last stages of Greece became a mere breeding machine. This was the more unfortunate inasmuch as Greek society was not overwhelmed and fossilized to be dug out centuries later. In the face of Roman practice under Roman domination it maintained always its ideals,

* A distinction is to be drawn between the *ἐταίραι* and *παῖσαι*.

if not so thoroughly its practice; these were revived and four hundred years later were to resume control of the destinies of South-Eastern Europe in the founding of Constantinople and the new Greek Empire.

The Roman wife held no such position in the State as in the early Greek civilization, nor did she sink into the degraded position of the Greek wife. Indeed the course of her development was much like that which has taken place in the development of the existing civilization. The Roman wife was the *mater* (mother) and she never lost this position which in Roman eyes was sacred. In one respect—and a very desirable one—she remained a chattel. The Roman State being based on the family the question of property was the main issue in any question of dowry. The law was all directed to maintaining property in the agnate line and restricting the use and control of the husband over the wife's property. Naturally, therefore the Roman system of marriage only in one form involved ceremonial. The *connubium*, however, was the exception, a more usual course being for the wife to remain nominally under the father's control, her husband enjoying his right in her by use—in *manus*. Between this and simple cohabitation there does not seem to be much distinction. The result was, however, to direct a great deal of attention to maintaining the independence of the woman's property right, and by the time of Trajan, when the Empire had practically split the Roman family and its rights into the practice of the merest forms, a woman was substantially as independent as she is to-day, with her property guaranteed to her use by the State. The break up of the Roman family—really representing the old republican institutions—almost necessitated such protection. The unit of the family went to pieces as hostile to the spirit of the Empire which found the human unit—the man—easier to deal with, and therefore favoured this individualism so harmless in a despotism. The single man was more easily suppressed, beggared, and exiled. The destruction of the family, however, left women with no protection, and the State stepped into the place of the family. There is something of the same principle in our own legislation which makes the husband responsible for the wife's debts but not *vice versa*. Perhaps it is possible to go farther; for the necessity of protecting the wife's dower, and her own necessary helplessness from the nature of her duties as wife and mother preventing her training in other directions, leave her more than usually handicapped in any struggle that the accidents of the world may throw on her. French legislation points the way in this respect.

As man's feminine ideal the German wife was freer and more on a level with her husband. The term "wife" took rank with that of mother. For centuries, however, the stricter Roman ideal prevailed in the older civilization. Enough of the German was retained by the invaders to maintain its life, and with the course of centuries to come to vigour again in the present age. In the feudal system there is again much of the

chattel in the treatment of women. The times hardly permitted anything else. To allow her to run free would have simply made her the sport of half the rough community which made up society in those days. She therefore has no longer any voice in the disposition of her person, which is bartered off by father, or brother, or lord, or sovereign. But she retains her property rights, as much so as ever and for the same reason—the family. This has again resumed its sway, with the modification of the looser structure given to it by the German tribes. Her position differs much in different countries and according to the social development. When men emerged from their castles to once more mingle together in social life they brought their wives with them. Unmarried women played but little part—on the surface—and marriage became the means of entrance of woman into a broader life. The sex has never lost its influence, and, at a period when intrigue and violence governed politics, just in so far as women were admitted into the social life they governed it by intrigue which is their natural weapon. And for this they were all the better fitted by the times. The rough work of war was the pastime of the men and this left more and more in the hands of the women the exercise of those polite powers of persuasion. The value of a woman was thoroughly appreciated in such times, especially in Italy, and much care was lavished on her education. She often appears at these small courts, the complement of her male companion. The elegance and the refinement of these little principalities, the atmosphere of flowers and poetry and the fine arts, can be said to be due to her presence. Lucrezia Borgia, who had half the tongues and all the feminine accomplishments of Europe at her disposal, was an intelligent instrument in the hands of her astute managers. Woman had her field, used it remorselessly, and gathered the fruits in the luxury at her disposal. All these flowers, and silks, and embroideries, and golden cups, concealed daggers and poison. Not that poor Lucrezia was guilty of half the crimes attributed to her; but where the spirit of intrigue rules amid violence it is sure to rule by just such means. Without the women there would have been the violence of the battle field; or else men would have devoted themselves to a stupid and elaborate etiquette such as was the fate of Japan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. All of it time and effort wasted. The fine arts, protected by religion, would doubtless have flourished to some extent, in Italy and elsewhere, without this general society. The monks would have illuminated their manuscripts, would have painted and adorned with sculpture the magnificent churches, and would have carved their altar screens, but much of the inspiration would have gone out of both literature and art. All the field of human life was open to poet and artist. Boccaccio, Boiardo, Ariosto, were the fruit of their soil. The mural paintings and the canvasses adorning the churches still hold our attention to-day when so much sympathy with the monk's ideal has evaporated from the soul, but we turn still

more readily to the canvasses of Titian, of Tintoretto, and of Paolo Veronese with their intense human interest.

It is never safe to rely on the tales of travellers who often put their own home interpretation on very innocent actions as practised by strange peoples. Tacitus gives us the impression that the relations between the sexes in Ancient Britain were of the loosest character, and practically amounted to a promiscuous intercourse with small regard to nearness of relationship. This does not correspond with the stage of savagery to which they had reached, and which, judging from existing savage tribes, is more likely to possess a highly intricate code governing sex relations. Also Gibbon cites the experience of the Byzantine traveller, who was led to regard the innocent habit of osculation in the same unfavourable light, and to be an indication that the same looseness of character belonged to the women of English Britain a thousand years later. The same conclusion might be drawn in contemplating the brilliant picture that Mr. Molmenti gives us from the pages of Andrea Calmo, an Italian actor-dramatist of the seventeenth century. But the line has always been drawn in the world—at least on the surface. In this picture of the gay Venetian life is seen the brilliant pageantry of the crowd made up of lords and ladies of high degree, of a picturesquely clad populace, and prominent in the crowd, courted and caressed by all, flattered by men and envied by other women, is Phryne. She is one of the striking features of this world of colour. To her beauty and to her wit are devoted the talents and the wealth of the greatest men of the time; for men come from all parts of the world to sip pleasure from the lips of the Venetian courtesan, successor of the fair Imperia. Her short period of flowering is necessarily devoted to getting all the poisonous pleasure possible out of the cup which she must drain to the dregs. This apotheosis of pleasure, scientifically sought one might say, sets a standard to society itself. The women of the period imitate the methods of the courtesan. There are brilliant sparkling eyes but within their depths the unspoken invitation. It is seen in the portrait painters of the time, against whom the charge can properly be brought that is sometimes brought against the English painter Greuze—that his virgins possessed everything but innocence. The devices of the toilet were well known to the Venetian women from the earliest to the latest history of the Republic. In the seventeenth century the use of paint was much more extensive than now.* The exposure of the person left very little to be desired—or to be imagined. It was customary to paint not only the cheeks and eyes and lips, but also to paint the breasts thereby drawing attention to their roundness and beauty. After all it is a matter of taste and social convention, and both go through a period or

* One is tempted to use the expression of Perez Galdos' as put in the mouth of the robust and astute Doña Lupe la de los Pavos—"En toda la extension de la palabra."

cycle rather than actual change of position. The young girl of to-day bares her bosom and goes to her first ball with some feeling of trepidation at exposing what her maiden modesty has taught her to be a subject of concealment and not an advertisement of her charms. Right or wrong has little to do with it. Social convention requires this exhibition in the ball room, and the unconscious shock given to the untouched female withdrawing her person from the eyes of the male is governed by social rules. She comes to regard the feeling implanted by Nature as wrong, not the institution of society. Mr. Spencer has put the case of society *versus* ethics tersely and perhaps a little crabbedly—
 “In the average mind the pain constituted by consciousness of
 “having done something intrinsically wrong, bears but a small
 “ratio to the pain constituted by the consciousness of others’
 “reprobation: even though this reprobation is excited by some-
 “thing not intrinsically wrong. Consider how difficult it would
 “be to get a lady to wheel a costermonger’s barrow down Regent
 “Street, and how easily she may be led to say a malicious thing
 “about some lady: she is jealous of—contrast the intense
 “repugnance to the one act, which is not in itself reprehensible,
 “with the feeble repugnance to the other act, which is in itself
 “reprehensible; and then infer how great is the evolution of the
 “moral sentiments yet required to bring human nature into
 “complete fitness for the social State.”

In Germany political life was much less ruled by intrigue. The rough politics of violence, the maintenance of isolation by the power of the strong right arm, was a greater factor than in the South. The Germans were differently situated than the Italians toward the Emperor. They dreaded him, and hence dreaded the preponderance of any one element in the Confederation. For this very purpose they were always ready to unite to prevent any permanent union. These were not circumstances to favour the growth of a number of brilliant little courts. What was sought was not interchange but isolation. The old German feeling toward the wife, however, was part of the race inheritance. If her wardship was stricter than ever she was still the object of man’s protection—mother and wife—and she still retains her privileged position of man’s companion not his chattel. And it was well that it should be so. This long tutelage, however, has stamped itself to some extent on the character of the German *frau*. Even in these modern times she seems to accept the character of wardship more readily than her Anglo-Saxon sister, and to leave politics aside as altogether for the guidance of men. But politics may touch so closely that home in which lies her vital interests that woman’s indifference in regard to them is hardly safe. In Spain this tutelage has been maintained on other lines. Spanish history reacting on Spanish character has given such peculiar results that the natural vivacity of a southern race has been materially modified. In Spain there was a cruel war lasting not for a few years or even generations, but for centuries and against an irreconcilable alien race. The Spanish woman

took her part in this war but it was necessarily a woman's part. And as it was a religious war, the Church which fastened itself on the souls of men, fastened itself doubly on the souls of women. Women could do little but pray. The Church does not favour freedom of thought. It claims the right to guide and to think for its devotees. The Church therefore in Spain has been the main influence for the continued tutelage of Spanish women, and in this twentieth century regulates through them the conduct of the home. Preaching subordination, the last thing to be expected from this woman of the South, is an assertion of woman's rights and a claim to an equal standing with man. Was not sin brought into the world by woman, and is not her weakness and subjection owing to Divine Law? Did not Saint Paul say—"Let your women keep silence in the Churches?" The type of her ideal is Mary, the Mother of God. Her interpretation of this type she takes from the lips of her Church. She might remember that Mary was not only mother but woman—and make stronger assertion of her position on such ground.

For society in its modern sense we must turn to another of the Latin peoples, which in this period of the Middle Ages of our civilization is the only country which has advanced from the rawness of youth to adolescence. The position of woman can be said to be strictly regulated by the waxing and waning of war. When Europe was as yet a battle ground of factions France had established a condition of comparative peace. Her wars were beyond her borders. This position in European politics and the industry of the people ensured a prosperity that quickly developed a love of luxury. French society at an early date was an elegant society. It made an art of social intercourse and threw that intercourse open in the freest manner. There were ladies and gentlemen at the courts of Henry II and Francis I, which is more than can be said of their contemporaries elsewhere, or as contrasted with the France of Louis XI. Such an atmosphere was favourable to the spirit of intrigue, and the interests of a large kingdom give plenty of ground for its exercise. The wars of the League and of the Huguenots brought about an eclipse that lasted all through the rough reigns of the later Valois kings. But the charm of society already tasted was never lost, and woman maintained her free position although much of her activity had been lopped off. Her wishes had less to do with men's actions, the stake at issue being too large to admit of the interference of those personal interests beyond which it is hard for women to rise. Perhaps one secret of her nullification lay in the fact that a masculine brain, in the person of a woman, ruled France. Catherine de Medici had but little sympathy for the intriguing spirit of her sex. She was a master hand at intrigue herself, but it had little to do with personal questions. Her spirit of intrigue was in that larger sense of statesmanship which has been laid down by the much abused Machiavelli, and the guiding principle of which we are forced to-day to admit as true—that a distinction is to be made between

public and private morals, and that the means employed by the former are a question of casuistry and usually fall within the limits of the famous Jesuitical principle. But where the spirit of feminine intrigue did win its final victory was with the close of the *Fronda*. Its aim necessarily is never high. With such personal objects in view it cannot well be a high aim. But great ministers recognized its power—and its uses—and frankly paid the price necessary to secure its aid.

With the whole of the under political world governed by this petty spirit bent on satisfying a taste for luxury the corruption of politics in the France of the Bourbon kings can be imagined. And as the plunder all came into or for the benefit of these fair fingers there can also be imagined the luxury, blind to the means by which it was secured. Corruption of political life by women necessarily means corruption of morals. There is no give without take. 'And women have but one thing to give. It is of course not true that promiscuous intercourse was a feature of the court revels. This society is the very reverse of vulgar. But what is politely described as "*civisbeism*:" was an established institution. The greater the woman the more numerous her lovers. This is but one side of the picture, but it is the official side. The reverse is found in the *Hôtel de Rambouillet* and later the devoted circle collected around Port Royal. Declining years and loss of power also acted on Louis XIV as it does on any other old bull, and his old age is marked by an attempt at reform all the more ridiculous from the suddenness with which it was put in operation. The advent of Mrs. Beauvilliers was like a bucket of cold water to young and old vice. It merely strengthened and invigorated the reins for its final outbreak under the Regency and Louis XV when a series of hawks—Madame de Pompadour combined both businesses—governed the kingdom of France. The infamous dinner of the Duke de R....., during which the revellers took advantage of the helpless intoxication of one of the frail beauties, seemed to arouse the sentiment of polite society to a feeble protest and to secure from the Regent the favour of a *lettre de cachet* for the promoter of this escapade. "Touch pitch and ye shall be defiled," and it was these dregs, risen to the surface, that destroyed the French monarchy. They represented in no way the leaders of the French people. The real stamina that was in the French noblesse was shown during the Terror in the courage with which they faced death as a matter that had always awaited them at the end of the day's work. Never did a class pay so heavily—and more bravely—for the foul work of a clique. And it showed the necessity of a man being true to himself. Mistaken loyalty had kept the French nobility in silence. Enslaved and ill-treated at Court they accepted the repulse of their hereditary leader and left the country in the hands of a band of plunderers. They were not able to distinguish between loyalty to their chief and loyalty to their country. "After us the deluge"—but they might have had more consideration for

their sons and sons' sons. They preferred ultimate destruction to union with the other elements necessary to conserve the State. Pride could go no further.

What can be noted throughout this period of French history is that woman's place is only due to her powers of intrigue. There is no respect for woman as a human being with like rights and powers belonging to the other sex. Attractions of mind or person give her influence, and more and more it is the physical powers of attraction that gain predominance, until the whole of France is ransacked for beauty as the ransom of flesh for the old goat that ruled at Versailles. From the wit of *de Montespan* we pass to *Madame de Pompadour* and the *Parc aux Cerfs*. Men's morals usually govern the politics of their time, but women's morals are usually governed by the politics of their time. The deliberate place given to feminine intrigue had its due effect in both directions, in the degradation of politics and of women. There is an illustration of this in the contrast between the First and Second Empires. In neither were morals particularly high; but the first was a period of war and female intrigues played but a small part; the second was a notorious period of extravagance and luxury, of corruption of the vilest character, and ended in self-collapse. Throughout all these changes, however, woman has secured her place for good and all, and in so securing it has marked time for her sex. French society, the art of social intercourse, was so much in advance of the rest of the western world that it has been the model for the conventionalisms introduced elsewhere. And as these conventions are regulated by women, the French woman has led her sex to that equal place which she now holds in social life. She is no longer an adjunct but a separate developed factor. To treat such a determinate factor as still under tutelage is an error. If woman's mistakes are to be corrected by the world at large little has been gained by her emancipation. If she is to be governed only by social convention, or by the so-called prejudices of her sex, and if the ill effects of a lack of independent rectitude acting through reason are to be shouldered on the community and not on herself, then she had better go back to her old position of wardship; for otherwise such an anomalous position of a factor of society without any responsibility will give rise to any number of balked efforts. The weeping and wailing over increased lack of consideration, the crocodile tears poured on the petticoats by sappy platform orators in white ties and black frock-coats at numerous meetings, seeking not equal rights but still more widely extended rights, call to mind the sageness of the younger Mr. Weller's remarks as to Job Trotter,—“And venever I catches hold o' that ‘there melan-cholly chap with the black hair; if I don't bring ‘some real water into his eyes, for once in a way, my name an't ‘Weller.”

§ 8.

On the whole woman seems to be distinctly losing ground as a special and favoured element in politics, and the loss has been just as plainly for the good of everybody, woman included. The influence she has exercised heretofore has been distinctly in this field of intrigue and the less there is of such spirit the better for the common weal. So much is heard to-day about graft and favouritism that it is forgotten that this is not a new phenomenon but that it is new that we should hear of it. A hundred years ago everything was a matter of favouritism. Not only in public life but in commerce and private life was this the case. When we hear of reciprocity treaties, and bounties, and protective tariffs, and close corporations of labour and capital, we forget that the same existed in the eighteenth century to a far more aggravated extent, and that present day Trust formation and exclusive legislation is simply a reaction toward the old system and against the preaching of Adam Smith and the French economists, Turgot and Quesnay, in which the power of the State was always maintained as a balance wheel. But economics and social life cannot be separated, for the same influences regulate both and they take their tone accordingly. Mercantilism, whether in commerce or politics, was distinctly based on keeping a good thing within a little knot who had their favours to dispense. All such work is done *sub-rosa* under the formula of general society, and no one is better fitted for that field than woman. The inventions and science of the nineteenth century have so enormously widened the field of commerce that in this twentieth century the old methods of mercantilism are feeling the strain, although they still maintain their efforts for monopoly. But where in former times it was possible for the statesman or financier to listen to the song of the siren and boost into place some booby or incompetent without much fear that he could do too much damage, such is not the case to-day. The enormity and the importance of the interests at stake at least call for men and brains—not always good men—and these are not necessarily the selection of a fairy in lawn sleeves and hair of the latest fashionable shade. The commercial world has taken possession of society now-a-days, even of that branch of politics which was woman's stamping ground. When woman appears in this field she must appear on equal ground. There are no favours shown in business. She still retains some natural advantages in the politeness due to her sex and weakness. If small matters were at stake she would doubtless meet with the same consideration as she has met with in the past. But what this new woman has invaded is the actual field of business as a competitor. In this her very advantages of sex lead to a prejudice at start against her. Her object is perhaps the more carefully scrutinized to see that unconsciously no handicap be given to her in what is the serious struggle of bread and butter. If anything any claim to favour is somewhat discounted. Of course this is

much the reverse of what she expects, and she resents this failure to make way for her on the battle-field as in the drawing-room. And she is likely to accent her displeasure in the place where she still holds sway. This failure on her part to distinguish between the two circles between which men divide their lives simply makes matters worse. It is a well-known fact that some business firms do not care to have dealings with the "woman in business."

But in other respects the change has been entirely for the good. Woman necessarily is often thrown on her own resources and in former times her field was so extremely limited that she had to sacrifice her independence and live on the charity of relatives. If the world had stood still her invasion would have been severely felt, but the widening field of many light employments requires deft fingers rather than long continued and strenuous effort. And such occupation in life may have its influence on another question. At one time the education of woman was a pressing subject. Among a certain class these educated women had nothing to do but to improve themselves on general lines, which made them and their young male companions, whose hours were spent at the desk or manual labour and had but little time for self-improvement, uncongenial in their tastes and thoughts. The task of finding mates for these mis-educated females was no easy one for the parents, and such unequal matches rarely result in raising the toiling husband to the level of the trifling wife. Her own efforts in that direction would be neutralized by the increasing cares of a household and family, and the general result would be a come down from her higher position. No fall, however, can take place without an injurious moral effect. The result too often is a discontented man and woman. If modern life and independence has induced a percentage of women to adopt celibacy in preference to marriage, the percentage is not likely to be a large one. With the great mass of humanity Nature's call of sex is too imperative, and the great mass of women will seek mates, as they have always done; but the two sexes will meet on a greater equality. It is not easy to agree with a well known scientist who on morphological grounds merely would give the superior place to women in Nature's economy. Complexity of the reproductive functions does not necessarily imply a higher type. Primacy is usually assigned to nervous development. This being equal in two given cases, would not the demand of the greater complexity of these organs on the nervous system—a far-reaching demand—more than neutralize any claim such morphological superiority would give? On the contrary, woman is at a distinct disadvantage in the contest of the modern world, a disadvantage due to her sex. As a married woman her periods of child-bearing compel her withdrawal at uncertain intervals, and positively incapacitate her for a length of time too great to make her an efficient competitor against the unmarried of her own sex or against men. And

yet if any woman has a right to her place in the world of business it is the married woman who is aiding in support of a family. One thing is certain, that her field, within the child-bearing age, is a limited one and must be uninfluenced by the interruptions so caused. Celibacy of women (or men) is hardly to be advocated by anyone in these days when "race suicide" is the bugbear; and at all events is impracticable as well as unpopular as a subject of education. It is a far more actual fact among women than among men, for reasons of social convention, and any breakdown of this strict standard would be to the unquestioned injury of the social and moral fabric of the community. Woman's competition is therefore likely always to be limited to young women who will disappear from the field to their natural sphere as wives and mothers; and to middle aged women whose field of usefulness is limited by the difficulty of taking up anything but the most mechanical of operations at such an age—and by the unwillingness to admit their limitations. The mind is too much stiffened at middle age to readily adapt itself to anything but the simplest of new functions. Man has undoubtedly felt this competition of women severely in those lighter and more mechanical positions in which women have now almost a monopoly. The unpopular female is of course the young woman who chooses to exercise and add to her independence in this way, instead of waiting at home "until she gets some man to pay her board." It is hard indeed when a married man is pushed out of place or forced to take mere living wages owing to such competition. It is however due to the change in position of woman in reference to a public opinion of which she herself has had the control, for it was woman who frowned on the appearance of her sex in public life. Certificates of necessity, however, can not be demanded at this age of the world. The only possible certificate is that of efficiency. The supply of the intruder is fortunately limited, and is removed by the natural law of marriage. Meanwhile the increasing number of occupations may keep pace with the supply for these lighter occupations.

Co-partnership in marriage is becoming more and more essential in modern life. It is only the well-to-do who can afford inefficiency at either pole of the domestic sphere. The more efficient both the partners the better the chance for the off-spring in the world struggle. If the wife can do something when the husband falls by the wayside their chances in life are increased out of all proportion to the case where she is absolutely helpless, not only on her own account but as a clog on future efforts. It is to be admitted that the tendency of to-day, and the separate sphere it has cut out for women, tends rather to separate husband and wife, but this may be a mere temporary phenomenon. The first movement of woman's emancipation (from her own toils) was toward a rivalry of the two sexes of which Nature has clearly indicated the several fields. As long, however, as the family is the basis of social life this rivalry is not likely to go

to extremes, and the maternal feeling of the woman will long come to the support of the family. The call for phylacteries and promiscuousness will not gain strength on her side as a substitute for the hearth. The present movement is so new; barely two generations old, that there are many rough points; and it still remains to the future to show that, as in the social relations between men, so in the relations between man and woman under the new conditions of equality, what is to be avoided are points of discussion. At least a proper view of their triviality, or the honesty of the opposition, is to be recognized. A discussion over the wisdom or folly of prohibition is hardly more dangerous when woman has a vote than when she has not. Discussion on such points can arouse as much discord now as later. And the man and woman who quarrel over Delia Bacon and the Cryptogram deserve to be miserable.

In the upper classes of society although social conventions are much stricter the actual freedom of women as to personal conduct is greater than with the rest of their sex. The latitude given to the range of personal conduct, within the limit of what is called "good form," is much wider. Many considerations besides convention, however, govern conduct—such as religion, moral rectitude, and even pessimism. These govern the great majority; but wealth with idleness will lead to a pursuit of pleasure which, among the few controlled only by convention, will sacrifice morals to form, and to an extent impossible where the individual is not checked by the publicity or the responsibility of competition. We must choose the barracks or the battlefield, or run into a system of social anarchy as disastrous to social morals as domestic industry is to communism; which latter, by the way, is all the more necessitated to keep its units under constant espionage as it lacks the checks of competition. However, pretty much anything is allowable in the social meeting of the two sexes provided it does not offend by that publicity which gives rise to open scandal. The spirit is that of the assertion of the right of the individual to his own personality. All that is necessary is to save appearances. If a cicisbeism can thus figure under the name of gallantry, if it can veil its meetings in society by the cold lip formulæ that society demands, this latter is not likely to lift the veil from the passionate scenes of the rented flat in which it holds its secret meetings. Poor human hearts are likely to find some sort of an outlet, and as marriage has become so much a regulation of financial interests it at times takes its revenge outside of marriage. Where much wealth is concentrated it necessarily happens that this wealth guides the rules of its distribution. This is not to be left to the caprice of a generation, let alone of two people "young and presumably foolish" and who know nothing of the responsibility of wealth. The people, therefore, who directly or indirectly settle questions of marriage are the elders. This is done directly in Europe, and as marriage is the woman's one door to freedom she is ready to accept it. In America it is done indirectly by safe-

guarding acquaintances and friendships, by selfish training, and by such pressure as every family is able to put on its members during the many hours of their association. Old people have little romance in their souls. If they have experienced difficulties themselves in early life they are all the more eager that their children shall avoid them by the possession of ample golden means of exorcism. Wealth, therefore, marries wealth, Love can and often does spring from such unions. And with it domesticity and a true home. But when marriage is simply a door for entrance to society hertofore closed, the chances are against such an outcome. The young woman does not enter on it jaded and weary and glad to try and form a household of her own. She enters on it as a new fairy land and with a man for whom she probably cares nothing, except in so far as any gratitude or usefulness may exist for giving her the chance. Her real field of battle is in front of her, the dangerous field of how far she can assert the power of her charms without incurring the penalty of breach of those social conventions with which she plays as with edged tools.

Nothing could be wider apart than the ideal of "love" in the mind of such a woman and in that of her Eastern sister. The Eastern woman has her sentiment, plenty of it as her thirst for sappy love tales shows. But her sentiment in connection with love is entirely centred around the hearth. She can hardly think of herself apart from that hearth; can hardly think of herself except as the mother of children belonging to that hearth. To her "love" is no dangerous game with edged weapons, in which as long as the woman can keep her head she has the advantage and can win great glory and profit from it. And the different point of view has resulted from and resulted in very different forms of society. The Western woman has her freedom because she deserves it. She is well able to take care of herself in this contest. She can put a very exact value on words and actions:

"Men are gay deceivers ever,"

and she makes far more fools than she supplies from her own sex. Dancing is not exactly a harmless athletic exercise from a moral point of view. It is a pleasure in which excitement is sought in personal contact with the other sex, and that impure thoughts can arise is plain enough from the constant warning against it. As a matter of practice, however, it is a harmless and even exhilarating pastime for people, but that is because social convention has stripped it entirely of offence. A young man can dance with a young girl with no other thought of her than if she were his sister. It is doubtful if he could enter the bath with her under the conditions that constantly take place in rural districts of the East, and in which the moral segregation of the sexes is at least as strict as in the West, so powerful is custom in prescribing their relations. And this alone can govern these relations. The erotic that lies concealed in every human figure—actual or counterfeit—is given due weight by every writer on

aesthetics, and is given due weight by every corset advertisement. Another harmless enough pastime, as so guarded, is kissing. Nations regard it from different points of view. With the Frenchman it has its asexual phase. Irrespective of sex they kiss each other; it is a mere friendly or affectionate formula. The Anglo-Saxon confines it to the opposite sex, but the two branches of the race differ in their application of the practice. The Englishman kisses his wife (or somebody else's wife); the American osculation is mutual, wife and husband kiss each other (or somebody else's wife or husband as the case rarely happens). But these more intimate relations of social formula really do confine themselves—as far as society is concerned—to form. What rules the upper class is ambition, and this is extended to the offspring and takes out of the hands of the young people all direction that personal inclination would give to their passions. Woman is merely a partner for position. As in these days physical force can no longer be used there seems inevitable in too many cases a cold materialism, a veiled cicisbeism, or old maidism. No woman cheerfully faces the last, *expression* of choice being left to the man the burden of proof lies on the woman as to the opportunity of refusal, and the world is coldly sceptical or down-right unbelieving in far more serious matters. In the majority of cases fortunately humanity is too dull to have much will or preference and marriage results in a home, humdrum and peaceable enough even if with none of the inspiring elements that the emancipated woman, the friend and counsellor of her husband, walking together with him equal in the sight of gods and men, is supposed to instil into it. What gives brilliancy and colour to society is the woman who is playing the dangerous game of passion. Society applauds her success and casts a contemptuous glance at her victims; but at bottom it is sceptical as to whether itself it is not being all the time hoodwinked, and that the pure and immaculate creature dancing on these perilous heights would not be found to be badly spotted if it could get near enough for a good earnest look.

Women in the upper classes are strictly speaking an idle leisure class. Social amusements as there understood, and in which they play their parts, are only obtained by their abdication in other ways; and the woman of the upper class, hedged in by social convention, free as to her means is far less free as to her goal than a woman of the middle class. Among these latter the ambition is management to which they may at any time be called. The object is yet to be obtained by which pleasure and a life of ease is gained, and this is very different from passing direct to the culmination of one's wishes. Women's thoughts are turned into far more practical channels, and in the relations between men and women there is far more of the spirit of co-partnership for a livelihood. Social convention governs her quite as much as it governs her more luxurious sister, but as the range of thought is narrower in her circle, and her own thoughts more concentrated on such affairs as do not

admit of any relaxation of attention, this social convention is likely to run also on much narrower lines. Social espionage is directed to details. The rules are not only inculcated, but they are framed and hung up in full sight, a bare and ugly reminder to all to keep their hands above the table. This class, moreover, is nearer to the very positive evil of unthrift. They are, therefore, more likely to attribute waste to any form of pleasure, and the effect of waste and its consequent poverty are so tremendous that their code against sin is often made to include many harmless pleasures. Pleasure takes on a moral or immoral aspect, Religious severity is usually the *modus operandi* and finds greatest support in this large class which forms the mass of the people. It is for this reason that much is heard of the inherent soundness of the middle class; and a general admission that when unthrift reaches into their ranks in any country it is in a very bad way. The lines of social authority therefore are much more strictly drawn, and go into the minutest details; which is just the reverse of the social law of the upper classes in which the law is drawn with wide latitude and carefully avoids going into the details of individual life. It is readily satisfied with appearances and is the reverse of inquisitorial. In both cases the law is an unwritten one and is enforced by social ostracism. And how widely these class laws deviate from the general moral sense of the whole community is shown in their direct opposition at times to the statute law enacted by the community. No matter how brilliant his attainments the religious doubter would be ignored and frozen out of scores of little middle class communities sprinkled over Western civilization, whereas they would cheerfully receive the man who had been caught cheating at cards, but who made open confession of the sin and took a seat on the sinners' bench at the revival meeting. Just exactly the reverse would be the action of the upper class of society, which would be very indifferent as to any views of the agnostic in reference to a future state and would have regard simply to his powers as a conversationalist; on the contrary cheating at cards would damn a man beyond all repentance. Both strata of society have their good points. There is a broad liberalism of thought in the freer society which is the mainstay of our whole social progress. And there is a sturdy conservatism, or even prejudice, in the narrower corporation which acts as a check on social experiments simply for newness sake. And unless there is some form of social privilege—such as primogeniture and entail, giving rise to a hereditary aristocracy—there is sure to result a healthy interchange between the two classes. To maintain a position in the upper stratum requires wealth, and to maintain wealth requires an exercise of those powers of thrift only handed on by education in responsibility. Otherwise, and if there is only the pursuit of pleasure in sight, a few generations sees the resources of a family scattered among new aspirants for their position, and they themselves come down to the wash-tub.

Men and women in the middle class are on very even ground. The woman here is a business partner. Marriage is much easier. The fortune is still in the foreground and to be grasped. But the extra leisure and education given the woman renders it likely that she will outclass the man. Daughters are harder to place therefore, and it is this class that affords the greatest number of celibates among women. Necessity knows no law, however, and the women take mates as they find them and soon forget any extra polish in the struggle to realize the middle class ideal—wealth. In the upper and middle classes, however, this complicating factor of accumulated property guides and directs more or less the passion called love. As we pass to the lower class the basis of all relation between the sexes becomes more and more purged of all artificialities. Sex rules all marriage. There are no complicating factors. Without it one human being would be very unlikely to saddle himself or herself with the possible burden of another. The object sought in the marriage is the pleasure to be obtained from it. Offspring and the necessity of the woman in the house maintain the relation. The woman of course quickly becomes a drudge. Any suggestion of restraint is resented. The poor have little or nothing to lose. The pleasures that can be obtained with the smallest expenditure or no expenditure are the only ones open to them. Hence the howl of execration that goes up when the evils of the beer house or the doctrine of Malthus is preached. If there is danger of over-education of woman above this class—over-education in the sense of that dilettanteism which calls for companionship other than that of actual efficiency in terms of bread and butter—there is infinitely more danger in over-education of girls of the lower class. Higher tastes are developed with no means of gratifying them. What the man of her own class needs is a housekeeper. It is to the credit of her sex that the number of these women who fall by the wayside are far fewer than would be expected. The recruits for the brothels are mainly drafted from ignorant beauty, making the first step usually at the dictate of passion, and led on further by the desire for the glitter displayed in the world and so attractive to the eyes of women. The cases collected by Societies for the prevention of Vice show that the first step was taken by personal inclination, and that the temptations of the seducer were those of the flesh. The factory has had just the opposite effect to what has been so often preached. Its influence has been disciplinary and it emphasizes publicity. That vice should be more conspicuous in factory towns goes without saying. Where men are congregated together they seek their pleasure in their own way, and the means to gratify those pleasures naturally drift into these centres to meet the demand. But the recruits are not the women workers in the factories. There may be cases of heterodox ideas among them on the question of sexual morality but there is not often the promiscuousness of prostitution. It is astonishing how strictly this instinct of female

modesty displays its guarding influence in the very rigid rules that women exact from each other in this strata of human life. The theoretical question as to whether or not the parson has intervened between man and woman troubles them very little at times. With them marriage is a contract, and the actual fact of man and woman living together as man and wife influences them strongly. Little acts of personal display, exposure of the person, would be looked on with wide-eyed contempt and scepticism as to character by many of these women living with a man on more informal terms. They demand that the relation shall be "her man" and "his woman" and any suspicion of promiscuousness they abhor. The bare arms and gleaming shoulders in the boxes at the opera are looked at very differently from the gallery, and it would be hard to persuade some of these people that their own primitive ideas on morals and its outward and visible signs are not to be translated into the relations existing in the classes above them. They see women of their own class under such conditions and they know what they are, and they simply convey the dance hall stage into their mental picture of upper class life.

Woman appears now in the world as an ally or a rival to the man to whom heretofore she has acted merely as helpmate. And man is somewhat uncertain whether or not to welcome her. She has relieved part of the burden of the community inasmuch as a large number of women are now actively engaged in making a living who in previous times were simply charges on their male relatives. But she has introduced complications by her competition in fields largely given to a class, which, previous to her appearance, had set a standard of living perhaps beyond what their capital (in time or money sunk in learning) warranted. The more mechanical clerking class have felt her competition severely.* She is more obedient to orders, has little occasion to spend money for other than her living or personal adornment, in many cases she has no one to support but herself, and in other cases her entrance into business is simply to provide herself with extra funds and an occupation. But her competition has lowered the salaries of the clerical staff, and it has only been the extension of business by correspondence with a more extended clerical staff that has made room for her—to some extent. She has an unquestioned right to be where she is, and she has made that

* Her competition in the lower classes is objected to (1) because she is often a mere amateur, her occupation being an adjunct to other ways of getting a living; (2) her standard of living is lower than the male operative; (3) and bluntly, she has other means of livelihood beyond her manual labour and can take a lower wage. It can be added that much of the opposition comes from dislike of efficiency and the steady effort now-a-days to discount it. As Mr. Spencer puts it, to this class it is now "unprincipled" for a man to take advantage of his superiority, not "unprincipled" for inferiority to accept the benefit of this abstention. In the St. Louis car strike some years ago, inoffensive women riders were dragged from the cars, beaten, and stripped of their clothes. Sex was no protection in the eyes of these men of "principle" composing the mob.

law which they have violated. It is society's duty to be gentle with the miserable, but society does not have to shoulder the blame of their situation.

Does woman lose femininity by her appearance in what has been regarded as the charmed circle of business in which all favours must be paid for at a market value and none are given *gratis*? Necessarily so. Woman entered this field with the idea that she would maintain her old position and meet with the same consideration. Not finding this to be the case her discontent has possibly sharpened her aggressiveness within those limits. Likewise necessarily this spirit cannot be shaken off like an office coat as soon as the office is abandoned for the day. Indeed women seem to find this spirit somewhat irksome as yet, and readily fall back into their own nature. Miss X who has spent her days typewriting for her own account and risk is a very different creature when she is Miss Y or Mrs. Y and is once more back in the ranks of women. Women certainly do not gain charm by this masculine *camaraderie* to which the necessity of business forces them. They are not men, and yet in this constant association with men they must be treated very much as such. A man's ideals in regard to women become blunted, and a woman begins to expect less of a man, and neither of the sexes particularly profits by this constant intercourse. It is the unfamiliar that attracts, and the attraction of social life to men is its sharp differentiation from the rest of the day's work. Perhaps it is more because men and women see now so much of each other during the day that they are driven more and more apart in the hours of relaxation. The complaint at one time was against men's clubs. Advocates of their suppression are now ridiculously antiquated, and only to be found in those retired and rural spots where an old fashioned religious spirit still casts its influence. Men's clubs have increased enormously in numbers and in membership, and women's clubs are also extending to wider fields. Women have just as much to say to each other as men, but the multiplication of the means of separation of the two sexes means just so much more time taken from the domestic hearth, which has indeed followed men to their hitherto sacred haunts and claimed admittance to certain quarters of the club house. The main stay of the club used to be the unmarried members, and a man's marriage meant at least a very diminished attendance. Now the club is the centre of that newer social life which has brought the telephone into the private house and extended the hours of business to a man's waking hours. The older men find it necessary to hold the reins of government now without intermission. Topics formerly tabooed form one of the objects for which a club is supposed to furnish facilities, and it is becoming a second office, a place for "deals" and "syndicates." It has always been a centre for social "log-rolling."

There is to-day—as in olden time—the choice between Antigone and Hypatia. Men will turn to the charm of both,

according as their disposition dictates. The duties of fatherhood and motherhood, however, are engrossing, and Hypatia must sacrifice something. But it is to be remembered that the attraction at bottom always is the attraction of sex. A man falls in love with the woman and not with the philosopher, and possession is very likely to make him extremely indifferent to the philosophy. Learning and dialectic is certainly no drawback to wit which is thereby sharpened. Reason however is calculating, and although strong to meet a situation is likely to strike a balance of blame or capability that is anything but flattering. Nobody, as principal, willingly engages in an enterprise doomed to failure, but it is often easier to see the causes of failure afterward than before; and easier to criticize shortcomings from this advantageous standpoint. This is very exasperating to the man thus convicted in this *ex post facto* way of stupidity. Where the interests of the co-partners of marriage are becoming so separated as is the case to-day this is more likely to happen, and to result in a wider separation instead of a mutual support. Such questions are hardly raised with the Japanese woman. Her centre of interest is maternity and domesticity. And this is regarded as her exclusive sphere. A cot-beddy is almost unknown in Japan. Women's attentions to the male of the *genus* are embarrassing at times. Not from any merits of his, be it understood, but because his care is part of woman's business, and the Japanese, whether male or female, is thoroughly complete in what is undertaken. The woman's sphere, however, extends far beyond what custom marks as her's exclusively. Any incapacity on the part of her partner falls also to her share. She becomes his substitute. Her interest is so merged in his that there is no separation of them. In fact she has no interests. They are all his and she is the deputy—with board wages as salary. The faithfulness of the Japanese woman in this, abnegation of self in the interest of another is so notable that it passes without notice. To say under such circumstances that the Japanese wife is a mere upper servant, an automaton, is a contradiction of terms. The burden that is laid on her calls not only her own natural office in life but may call on her to take man's place. It is not the Japanese habit to leave anything unprovided for. The details are all foreseen. Hence it is not surprising to find under this delicate framework, such a bundle of queer formalities and bows, great strength of character. And strength of character means boldness of sacrifice, for this alone calls for strength; to use the term of an Italian writer—"A heart of iron and a heart of gold."

In her purely feminine accomplishments the Japanese woman has but little to learn. In all the affairs of her house she is a past master. It is said that a French family could live on what an American family wastes. It is rather shameful to admit that the saying is true, for waste is nothing to brag of and "a cheap coat does" not "make a cheap man." If a high standard is accompanied by waste and extravagance there is nothing gained and

less than nothing learned. A Japanese family could live on the waste of a French family. A Japanese cat has to be provided for as a recognized member of the family or it would starve to death. Japanese home economy is driven to the extreme of efficiency. The very refuse from the town gardens, unfit food for cattle, makes fuel for the bath-house keeper. Their toyshops are a glittering delight to children. Half a cent gives a youngster something and five cents is an extravagant present. The same frugality is carried through all their festivals, and the cost of their greatest holiday—the New Year or Shōgetsu—is rather due to the number of gifts required by etiquette than their value. Gifts of great value are bestowed by the Japanese on each other, but this is more a matter of personal esteem, and not required by the etiquette of exchange which is entirely satisfied by more moderate means. It is the fulfilment of the etiquette and the mark of esteem shown rather than the gift that is appreciated. The Japanese woman has one less pressing question than her Western sisters. The servant question is of course an issue, but custom as yet regulates this department of the household, and, what is so lacking particularly in the United States, defines down to the minutest point just what is expected from and just what is due to the servant. This general understanding clears the air very materially. The Japanese community does not leave it to the individual to settle these questions, although it is to be admitted the influence works both ways; there is plenty of material, and custom decides the main lines of its treatment aside from any question of supply. Public opinion quickly stamps an inefficient servant or an exacting mistress. Both find difficulties in filling their wants, and no organized support to enforce their claims. The difficulties foreigners meet with in Japan are largely due to their standing outside this general rule of the community, and to the inferior service which they get. Service is to the Japanese girl a training for her future life, and this of course she does not get in a foreign household. Service with them therefore is purely to make money. The whole spirit is gone out of what constitutes her relations in a Japanese household in which she is not only servant but neophyte to learn housekeeping, serving, cooking, care of children, and the thousand and one things belonging to Japanese household life. Besides, foreigners are not such an object of admiration to the native as many of them seem to think. All classes, themselves included, look down on the *akudo* or merchant; and this is just the standing the foreigner has in Japan. It is only fair to say that he does not always suspect this native view of his position, and is rather disposed to set down his disadvantages altogether to his being a foreigner. This does also play its part; but his occupation has much to do with it. Why should the Japanese official or man of the upper classes draw a distinction between his own people and the Westerner? We know how the upper classes of Continental Europe feel toward the English whom they stigmatize as a "nation of shopkeepers," and the Yankees whom they regard

as decidedly lower in the scale—tricky shopkeepers. The unconsciousness of the average foreigner as to this inherent drawback, and the value he himself puts on his own superiority to the native and often shows in his intercourse with them, has its amusing side. This value he puts decidedly too high. Indeed there are exclusive districts in Japanese cities where his presence as a resident would create as much shock as the incursion of a boarding house or tenement for "gentlemen of colour" into one of our own centres of exclusive residence. He must have other recommendations than his being a foreigner if he wishes to rent property in these districts favoured of the *élite*. In fact the ideas of the Japanese upper class, as was once the case in Europe and is yet in a certain part of continental Europe, in reference to mercantile pursuits are very much at variance with the facts. In their narrowest sphere the soldier, the bureaucrat, and the merchant are much on the same level. In their widest sphere the soldier is still confined within a very narrow field of intellectual vision (professionally speaking, of course). The bureaucrat—apart from that *rara avis*, the statesman—must cling to rule, and often it is rule of thumb. The merchant, however, in his widest sphere must have a very thorough grasp of conditions—present, past, and future—not only internal but often international. He must understand not only his business but politics and finance, and be one of the keenest judges of men through that most important and subtle of factors—credit. In the highest ranks he is as much an object of Nature's gifts as the result of any training. The grasp of financial principles possessed by the Jews is justly attributed to heredity. Their factor of mental agility in this direction has been increased by use—and abuse. Contact with the "greater commerce" is changing Japanese ideas, and the term *akiudo* is gradually taking a higher stand. But the military brain does not move easily or quickly out of its narrower sphere.

Trusting in all that appertains to things beyond her house, the Japanese woman makes her field the home. The outside world belongs to man. That she is capable of filling a place in this outside world she has shown in times past, and in our own day. She is quite capable of learning the full range of the field; as much so as her Western sister. As she is entering on this outside field to-day it is more in the directions which are useful to her in her home sphere. The career of the new woman, the career of Hypatia of old, does not as yet seem to tempt her. As yet she stands ready to fill the role of Antigone. And so we like her best.

§ 4.

Woman having become an active factor and competitor in the world's life, having stepped from the home into the field of

business, her field in the West is now only limited by her strength; and her competition is only limited by Nature's inexorable law for her sex. The Japanese woman does not find her entrance into this field so easily accomplished. The consideration granted in the West to the woman as mother—if not as wife—has never found expression in the East. This is the more strange inasmuch as the individual affection for the source of one's being is quite as strong in East as in West. Just as in the West the son perhaps has a stronger affection for the mother than for the father, as is naturally the case toward the parent who is usually the shield against punishment for any childish wrongdoing. But for the abstract motherhood there is only shown that cold respect due to an official cult and never extended to the female sex in general. As little is any consideration shown to woman's physical weakness. All said and done the basis of society in Eastern countries is as yet at a very primitive stage. Its philosophers have probed the depths of the human heart for a basis of the system of morals which must govern all action. But political economy has stood still, and all these grand principles are directed toward maintaining a reasonable working of the existing system laid in the infancy of a nation. The moral code of Confucius—unimpeachable in its way—is made to bind not to loose, to hobble mankind instead of assisting their progress; and this interpretation, perhaps never dreamed of by its originator, has kept a great people in swaddling clothes. In Japan, therefore, the inheritor and imitator of this eastern civilization, woman has always been an inferior and at times almost a chattel. Physical force governs all eastern polity. The first element of its so called law is subordination; the second element is justice. It never has understood that justice granted implies subordination. The natural primacy is unquestioned.

Injustice can only enforce subordination by physical subjection. Japanese womanhood therefore has occupied a contemptible position. This, however, by no means exempts her from active work in the community. In this respect she has always filled a large place. She does so to-day. In the fields and in the country towns she works harder than a man. She works in the fields as weather permits; and she works in the house at silk spinning or weaving when weather does not permit. Deft as the men are their fingers do not admit them to this exacting form of labour. As in most farming districts, wet weather is a time for necessarily limited preparation for outside labour, and the man finds many moments of enforced idleness; not so the woman. The woman also finds a wide place—quite as wide as man's—in the factory life. This is the more to be regretted as it is only recently that any steps have been taken to safeguard her health. In the two great exporting industries of the country—silk and tea—she is the main factor. The country gets the full advantage of her very special services and does not pay her very exorbitantly for it. In agricultural labour women are paid at the rate of nineteen sen (9½ cents) and

men at the rate of thirty sen (15 cents) per day; or to women seventeen yen (\$3.50) and to men thirty-two yen (\$16.) a year. Silk spinners get twenty sen (10 cents) a day irrespective of sex, and of weavers men get thirty-three sen (16½ cents) and women twenty sen (10 cents) a day.* It is hardly necessary to say that there is quite as much necessity of a wider field for the Japanese woman, as for her Western sister. In the case of helpless members of a community the Japanese family system presents no advantages over the individualistic system of the West. In the West responsibility for support is carefully determined by law, and this determination prevents the swamping of the community, for helpless members relegated to the poor-houses are segregated as to sex and are thus prevented from bringing still more helpless creatures into the world.† Under the Japanese system the extension of responsibility can be so wide as to wreck a whole family. Support is not given by the community. It must be found within the family; which is simply relying on a broken reed, with the only resource of mutual starvation. At all events there is far less likelihood of the elimination of the less thrifty members, and far more likelihood of continued propagation with still greater strain on already weak resources.

There is a natural prejudice as yet against any action of woman outside of the narrow set formula of old time which governs personal action down to the minutest detail. A foreign woman can ride a bicycle anywhere in the Settlements without comment. A Japanese woman always attracts the most contemptuous attention of her fellow natives. It is not simply the sight of something unusual, but actual disfavour which is aroused. The Japanese woman, however, is edging herself into those same lighter occupations in which woman finds such a favourable field in the West. These give occupation to a class from the increased efficiency of which people have much to expect. They are a class peculiarly helpless if thrown on the world without resources. As elsewhere this educated little woman is now found in the Government offices, in shops as clerks, and particularly as accountants. There is one feature in their service. The Western woman is always a woman, and a little self-conscious of it. She cannot altogether separate her two fields and her two natures. She is the thorough business woman but cannot altogether throw off the influence—a faint reminiscence of a sphere in which she rules by personal charm—as soon as the office lights are out of sight. If she has any little grace of action she cannot forego its exercise. The Japanese woman is almost asexual in this her appearance in public life. Her automatism is fairly wooden in its expression. The silent motionless face speaks words from the

* *Resumé Statistique* 1903.

† There are remnants of the family system in all Western poor-laws. In Wales, for instance, responsibility once extended to the ninth generation.

tips, as water flows from the graven image of a fountain. There are no little tricks of femininity for her unconsciously to put into practice. She cannot paw her hair from time to time, gracefully pushing back loose strands and displaying at once the roundness of the arm and elasticity of the figure. The Japanese woman's hair is a monumental work of art of the professional hair-dresser, not to be touched, or tousled, or thought of except at the semi-weekly periods of renewal. Her *obi* or sash once in place needs as little adjustment as the western woman's corset, to which in fact it corresponds. As to her personal relations, she has none with the outside world except in this her official character. Otherwise they all centre around her home. No human being is so strictly "business" in a public capacity.

It would be pleasant to believe in the higher element inherent in man which finds expression in a faith which while highly respectable has little ground-work but its own earnest wish. Unfortunately all the so-called higher elements can be distinctly traced through an evolution from lower elements. The soul, originally very definitely seated in our bodies has been driven by degrees entirely outside the range of human knowledge. A very satisfactory position since simple assertion is quite enough for most people, and the impossibility of disproof of bare metaphysical assertion of an intangible element is equivalent to its proof. The less their capacity to understand such mysteries the greater their confidence. That the higher elements in our nature are the ones to be cherished and strengthened and "evolved" into still higher elements is the object of all advanced civilization. Religions, however, are compelled to recognize the material nature of man, and every religion has been forced to recognize the natural relation of marriage. The demand for women as wives—obtained either by force, or barter, or flattery—has given a prestige to marriage. The man, among savage races, who cannot appropriate to himself one or more women suffers under some deficiency of physical or mental ability that marks his inferiority. The advantages gained from gregariousness and the mutual responsibilities engendered render necessary a determination on whom shall fall the care of offspring; a question settled in one way by the savage and by socialism, and in another way by the family system as yet in favour among the nations who have progressed in the world's civilization. In the West marriage, after passing through all the stages of chattel and of sacrament, is now regarded as a contract and necessarily implies obligation on *both* sides. The disposition is to extend this and to dissolve the contract on the failure of either party to live up to it. There certainly would be no objection—except religious—to give the widest extension to this view when the parties could be restored to their original *status*. This is perhaps the reason of the liberality of some of our Western divorce laws. Certainly the side seeking divorce on any other ground than the statutory cause is not entitled to any other relief than a cancelling of the bond, unless a value is to be placed on virginity,

which is virtually the plea entered to-day in such cases. The side asking for divorce on the ground of incompatibility of temper and for other trivial causes is entitled to no additional compensation but their freedom. The present drift, however, is to favour the female and mulct the man in his property by a discrimination little justified unless credit be given to a sort of cult of woman worship, one of those revivals still occurring in communities of advanced civilization and still subordinating reason to sentiment. On the contrary in the man's case a claim for alimony, or for breach of promise, made in his behalf would merely add to the usual gaiety attendant on such proceedings before judge and jury. The real complicating factor in divorce lies in the question of provision for offspring, and it is here where our courts have shown a wise conservatism and care as to both the future livelihood and education of such offspring. It would seem just that the children brought into the world by parents who later agreed to separate should be ensured both in respect to the present means of those parents and should also share in any future prosperity. In Europe, if woman is still to some extent a chattel in form, the *marriage de convenance* and the established dower of the wife have undoubted advantages both to the children and to the community. The form of marriage has less evil effect than it implies because the social restrictions on the unmarried woman are so great as to make marriage welcome to her as a means of entrance on a wider life. Youth therefore bows to the calculating spirit of age in the settlement of its freedom. Such arrangement of marriage therefore only in form resembles the similar methods in vogue in the East. In the East woman is still a chattel in fact. From beginning to end she is merely regarded as a breeding machine. One thing has saved her from being the merest toy of the male community—ancestor worship. To maintain this she is a necessary vessel—a useful and indispensable instrument of the sacred paraphernalia. The good of ancestor worship in giving a sacredness to her maternal nature has far outweighed its evil in making her connection with the male dependent on male offspring. Without it, in the polity of such barbarism as really underlies the Chinese and Japanese state, there is no reason to see why she should ever have been anything but the merest toy of man's lust. It is not to be claimed for Eastern women that they are free from the failings of their sex in other lands. The purity of married women is heralded in the East and probably has not been exaggerated, but their social life is extremely narrow and affords but little field for intrigue. The punishment of this sin has been summary, and there are people living in Japan who can remember men carrying through the streets the gory heads of wife and paramour to register the act and the vengeance at the police station. At the beginning of the era of Meiji retribution was still in the husband's hands. Law can only lay down the general lines of offences, and cannot safely go into exceptions. Our Western communities

recognize individual action in similar cases. It is necessary for the avenger to prove his case. The jury does not evade the facts, it construes the facts; and the judge who might feel compelled to follow the letter of the law, has to follow the finding of the jury as to its application.

It is not to be supposed that Japanese women are left entirely without any means of showing any preferences as to their proposed mates. Even a mule has its likes and dislikes; and that impatient animal can show a wise restraint in selecting the time and occasion to express its dislikes. The natural indulgence of parents toward children finds its expression also in Japanese life, although so conventionalized is that relation that neither the child's preference is likely to find display, nor is the parent likely to take notice unless such display is very marked. Theoretically at least girls have a right to reject unpleasant suitors, but the woman's position in the household is so very subordinate, and she is so unprotected in what in the West is regarded as the commonest legal right, that the family pressure in her case is many times what it would be with us. Also, her fewer opportunities of choice, together with a training that leads her to regard this form of matrimony as a part of destiny and the necessary result of her being born a woman, render the whole unfolding of her life process anything but complicated. To withdraw women still further from the marriageable material might even have its consequences in prolific Japan, for to-day she is out-numbered by the opposite sex to the respectable figure of four hundred thousand. The curb, however, placed by parents, by public opinion, and by centuries of custom on her natural inclination, is enforced by her feeling of depreciation. Her insignificance and foolishness have been the constant theme of preachers for thirteen hundred years; and this has worn a very deep rut. Even the strongest self-conceit has misgivings when it faces a robust and universal chorus of such depreciation. When self-conceit has had little chance to develop it readily accepts this outside estimate, a course often recommending itself to even the strongest expression of individualism in these modern times. If the disposition of the person of the Japanese woman takes on a form not unlike that of the market it is after all only a matter of degree. To look the matter fairly and squarely in the face, let us ask ourselves if the condition described by so many writers is a fancy portrait, if it is not the fact that among ourselves service of women with a certain class of employer does not mean concubinage. Are the conditions painted by Balzac—for one instance—and occasionally illuminated from time to time in the police court so entirely unknown in France to-day; or in England or America, or elsewhere? Are our women of the wealthier class free from the sacrifice to "the idols of the market"? As soon as a girl is of marriageable age she is at once put on exhibition as such—"trotted out" as is the significant expression. The proposed purchaser must go through an examination as to his position

is a good "pârd." The girls are trained to "catch a husband," but they are hooded like hawks and only allowed to fly at the right quarry. The means to "persuade" are not so drastic as they are in the East; but an absurd law which allows a man to bring all the children he can procreate into the world, and then allows him to leave all their support to some hospital or for the conversion of negroes in Central Africa, gives him the power of a pasha in his family. Through giving the right to make a will to a man with children, the community tacitly makes good the assertion that "the world owes every man a living." The relation of women to the marriage market has not changed an iota since the days when Jacob served fourteen years for Leah and Rachel. The price has gone down a good deal since then. No man would now work fourteen years for the questionable privilege of tying himself up for life. The new woman has changed the standpoint of the two parties to the contract very materially, but she has not changed the methods of the old sale and barter. The object to-day is to get as much for the girl as is possible, by either paying as little or lightening the family burden as much as possible. This is the whole principle at the bottom of what mothers call "settling their daughters in life." Fortunately the State, with an eye to the Family, looks at it as a matter of contract and hence takes, in some countries, an interest in the regulation of its terms.

Over-education and the inability to satisfy the desires so aroused, or of procuring mates to satisfy their ambitions; ignorance with the same desire to share in the attractive glitter of its surroundings and careless as to results, or trusting to a misleading empiricism and shallow information that gives confidence in remedies or means of avoidance that in fact have but occasional application and only do not prevent utter recklessness; on some occasions only want of the actual necessities of life and ignorance so phenomenal as not to know where to look for aid; beauty combined with all these lead in too many cases to but one thing—prostitution of the female. In the West the ranks find recruits from but one source, the woman who has made a mistake. She steps at once and forever down from the pedestal on which her sex had raised her, and necessarily in the atmosphere in which she finds herself soon adds every vice to this first sin of her body. From merely moral sin she soon becomes an element of the criminal class. Whether or not the social evil is necessary is much debated. The press of modern life has driven men to the point where marriage with any prospect of taking care of offspring is necessarily postponed to full maturity and something more, and this period of postponement is not diminishing. Nor is it advisable that early marriage should be encouraged in any community. The source of the social evil, however, is plain enough. Men seek to gratify the passion. In rare cases women are spurred on by the same cause to break the unwritten law of their sex; but their main contribution is due to the causes just described, and best summed up as vanity combined

with ignorance based either on lack of knowledge or actual misinformation as to physiological results. In the animal kingdom Nature has implanted a rivalry that drives the male to display all his glitter and gorgeousness before the dull-coloured female. In man Nature has planted this desire for display in the female. The women of course keep up the supply for the ranks of the fallen. Actual want is seldom and so unnecessary a cause that it can to-day be put aside; and besides, but few of the recruits have risen from rags.* The name given them is literally true in the vast majority of cases—"fallen women."

That the vice cannot be suppressed by legislation is plain enough. It would require an espionage over the community impossible in any case, and intolerable in its uselessness. Licensing has been advocated on the ground that suppression merely drives these women into the midst of the pure women and makes them widespread elements of corruption. The dangers of our great cities do not come from the licensed women but from the "gay girls" that occupy every nook and corner of the Boulevards, and in some cities drive decent women off the streets after night fall. In the West, moreover, our police control is wrongly directed. This whole traffic is made a matter of secrecy whereas what is required is the widest publicity. Its secrecy gives opportunity to a moral leprosy in official life that could only thrive by secrecy. The colder, more open, official matter of business this whole question is made, the better—if it is to be made a question at all. It should be stripped of every part of romance, deprived of all the glitter of lights and entertainment and enjoyment. It should be frankly admitted as a social evil; and while it exists be openly reduced to the barest satisfaction. There is little necessity of suppressing it under such conditions. Indulgence can be granted on such terms, not necessarily at the cross roads of the city, but where the possibility of concealment would be minimized.

In the East the decent woman can walk the streets without fear, day or night, for the question takes on another phase; but for the moral health of the community a far more terrible phase. Woman is a chattel and naturally is the more valuable the younger she is. Hence girls are sold young, as near the age of consent as possible, to fetch their highest value for such purposes. There are all the usual tricks of the brothel keepers; enormous charges for clothes, constantly renewed to keep the victim in debt; every trifling illness or incapacity is made a source of revenue; the term of service is extended until her indebtedness is discharged. She rarely is discharged as long as she is of any profit to her keepers. Some remain in the Yoshiwara* because they have no place to which to go, performing the offices of servants when their occupation as *Jōrō* is finished. They

* The Japanese licensed quarters and the Tōkiō Yoshiwara are comparable to the *πορνεα* or State managed institution of the same class in ancient Greece.

become mere slaves. The majority, however, die young of disease or are turned out when of no further use. A few make money. There can be no complaint of publicity for everything is open and above board. Little complaint is heard of the nature of the police control; perhaps because the Yoshiwara naturally comes under a department subject to check and inspection from the highest quarters of the Central Government, and is not a matter of local control. The objection to the licensed pleasure quarters in Japan is that they are made a source of attraction. This is the exact reverse of what under sound public policy should be the case. The vice is surrounded with music and lights and dancing, instead of being reduced to the coarsest surroundings.* This is the failure of the Japanese system, and far more glaring from its official character than in France where supervision is limited to license and inspection. Pleasure is not lost sight of in what is a degraded business. To the police of course, as elsewhere, the Yoshiwara is a net which gives them an extra control over the criminal population. They feel tolerably sure of finally landing their game in one of these places; but the cost to the public is too high. And the public has no interest in these spots of moral leprosy. It has an interest in their unprofit rather than their profit. Their business is one legitimized by law and hence it can be understood that the courts should protect the contracts of the brothel keepers; but it is the practice also that contracts whose fulfillment carries contingent disadvantages to the State shall be enforced to the letter of the contract, and no more to the detriment of the public than beyond its possible and supposed advantages. The liquor traffic carries evils with it apart from the practical necessities it fulfills for the public. The courts therefore look on its proceedings with an eye to giving it no more advantage than the very letter of the license grants. In other businesses there are legitimate extensions provided they do not violate the terms of the agreement with the State. A railroad company can improve its service and attract greater patronage. These questionable occupations, however, stand on different ground. Government sharing with prostitutes is not a legitimate source of revenue in any form. That side of the question can be dismissed at once as to revenue from taxation. If such revenue is devoted to the maintenance of anything but a mere keeping the peace it is simply an inducement to maintain the attractions of these resorts and to insure the receipts for their maintenance. The bare-faced taxation for profit levied during the *lustralia* by the Roman emperors would not be tolerated to-day in any civilized country. The official compulsion which prevented girls from abandoning their occupation as dancing girls too often finds only a less open expression. Far too much consideration is

* Paragraph 12 of the "Satyricon" of Petronius answers very nearly to the description of such a Japanese kennel some twenty five years ago.

shown to licenced pleasure quarters in Japan. There is a scramble for Yoshiwara real estate, in which if anywhere there is shown an "unearned increment," for the rents are high and the space within the high wooden walls limited. Nowhere perhaps is the question of taxation on the surface more complicated. But it is only on the surface. The Yoshiwara is the strictest kind of monopoly. It is confined to the particular district. It conducts a business that is criminal in itself but countenanced by a supposed expediency, and as such is under the direction of the police force of the community. The contracts entered into by the community have to be fulfilled even with brothel keepers. The mistake seems to have been to give these people any freedom at all in their development. Fine and extinction, or the removal of the pleasure quarter elsewhere—most of them, originally placed on the outskirts, have been grown up to by the larger cities—and new contracts with new people under stringent terms making the business just as profitable as it could stand without collapse would eliminate some objections. No Government is bound to guarantee its tacit countenance to any business. It does not hesitate to move its mint or city hall where it pleases without reference to individual property holders. Individuals possess the same right. A man can move his factory where he pleases. He at least is governed by conditions of power—to move his machinery. But in this case the material—raw and finished—is mere woman's flesh. It can bear transportation anywhere. The Government could strike a body blow at the brothel keepers and make terms in any new quarter from time to time to suit itself. Most of these quarters in Japanese cities are entirely too close to hand to the general community. In Yokohama the pleasure quarter lies right athwart the town; in Tōkyō the Yoshiwara lies close to a populous business section and cheek by jowl with growing suburbs; in Nagasaki a quarter of the town finds its nearest outlet through the pleasure quarter, anything but an edifying sight for the younger element.

The brothel keepers rejoice in all the modern methods of finance and operation. They have a guild and joint-stock companies. That a man is interested in such ventures, or holds property in the Yoshiwara or other pleasure quarters, or lives on the rent of these girls seems to be little drawback to his standing in his grade of society. Perhaps he sees little difference between his girls and the professional divorcée with half a dozen living husbands. The distinction is not easy to make. There is a social purity society in Japan, backed strongly by the missionary element, which has taken up the gage for the girls. The peculiarity of the situation is that they have adverse influence to struggle against, both in official and public opinion. The licensing feature has plainly been deficient in this respect of having made the pleasure quarter not a necessary but a desirable factor. The official world is always slow to move. They probably regard it as the easiest way to handle the question and regret the introduction of a disturbing element in a section of the community.

running smoothly under their control. They are not interested in the damage done to the individuals. It is not easy to get the Japanese official mind to take into consideration any effect on the unit. They look at the question merely from the communal point of view. The Salvation Army is the corps which invades the field in person. They have done much to bring to the attention of the victims themselves certain features in the Imperial Rescript which offers them a chance to escape from their bondage. Legal methods cannot operate unless through the victim. The army methods are the only ones to bring the point thus home. The application is *vi et armis* and more than one battle is chronicled as fought between the adherents of the dive-keepers and the invading army in the usually peaceful streets of the Yoshiwara. In the operation of this licensing system beauty of course is always available. As the question stands it is really a question of a proper limitation of age; to protect young girls, almost children, from their elders and to prevent a virtual sale and barter of human flesh in this vilest of trades. A girl of sixteen or twenty has no conception of the contract entered into with her consent. In Western courts any such contract would meet with short shrift and the adults engaged in it would repent their connection with it. The youth of these girls—the fact of their being under age and under contract—is evidence enough that no such protection is extended to Japanese women. Of course in older women, those competent to judge—say at least thirty years old—the physical attraction would be much diminished. But after all this is not a matter of attractive presentation in fact or in print. In print it forms a necessary but painful part of any discussion of Japanese manners and customs, and is a minor feature accentuated through the pure carelessness of Japanese thought on the question. *Jōrō* are commodities for export to every neighbouring Japanese settlement. In fact it should be handled in the coarsest terms and not made a dragnet for beauty. Under such conditions Dante's inscription—emblazoned now on the walls of the Yoshiwara for so many young hearts—would fade from sight: "*Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch'entrare.*"

§ 5.

Much is heard of the "eternal feminine" and its charm, and if this quality is to be found in contrast with those of men certainly the Eastern woman will not be found deficient. There does seem to be a law of Nature which sends under the yoke such "unequal pairs" as the general average of marriage displays. It is said that any woman can marry the average man if she makes up her mind to try. Perhaps this is the principle at the basis of this apparent inequality, for women of strong and

masculine temperament would sacrifice their strong desire to be ruled in the greater privilege of ruling. A man is always conceited enough to regard himself as the ruling power until experience teaches him to know better. For these inequalities, however, the field must be prepared and that has never been the case in the East. Society is there ruled without reference to the individual. Long centuries have determined woman's place and that place has been one of an elder child. Weakness is always relegated to this position. In the West woman tries to retain as much as possible of the charm attached to such dependence without losing anything of her real gain. She realizes its value but necessarily must sacrifice in one direction what she has gained in another. All this charm is retained by the woman of the East, with but little of real childishness. As wife, manager of a home calling for the exercise of skilful economy, such a quality would be out of place. Her seclusion, however, in a field never encroached on by the other sex has left her with all her femininity. She has rarely been brought in competition with men and men's methods. Japanese home life is so centred as to aid this seclusion very much. The family system—the headship of the parents with children and children's wives and children forming the household—narrowed very much the outside circle. The young wife did not pass to her own house. She passed from the charge of her own parents to those of her husband. A woman's apprenticeship in her life business was long and severe. There is more of a movement now to secure separate establishments, which must necessarily widen the social circle. A small circle of the single pair cannot be so sufficient unto itself as the wide circle of the old Japanese family. It should have an effect also on concubinage. It does not seem difficult to neglect the wife in the home circle; but it is not good form in Japan or elsewhere to introduce the concubine into the household of the wife. This is done sometimes in Japan, and the Japanese wife is more helpless than the Western woman. It does, however, carry with it a stamp of social disapproval, and the expense of more than one outside establishment is too heavy for anything but wealth. This virtual polygamy exists in Japan—just as it does in Europe and in America—but it is doubtful if it is in much more general practice East than West. The whole is a question of expense. With all the feminine charm what appeals particularly to the observer is the defencelessness of the Japanese woman, and her earnestness. Her frivolity of necessity is directed into far less harmful channels than in the West. Her earnestness makes her turn the more eagerly to this modern education which is going to do so much for her. She is no dilettante student, and as little of a blue-stocking. She is one of those extraordinary cases that are willing to spend much effort for the public good. This is because the idea of self is hardly a live issue to her as yet. But a wider range, greater usefulness outside her accustomed sphere, seems at any rate a step to wider consideration. A person trained

consistently to selfdepreciation values all the more the crumbs of praise falling to her share. Her own sphere is so settled by social convention, in it she is so completely stripped of individuality, that it seems easier to find it in this newer sphere. In her old life she could never do anything that was not already expected of her. All this never for a moment takes her out of the home circle. She is not individual enough to detach herself. Of course she will do so in time, but this result does not seem to be suspected. The idea of the "new woman" is scoffed at even as a possibility. Some day Japanese society may wake up to find the movement already beyond any control.

Mr. Spencer has discussed the difficulty experienced in getting that practice in common life necessary to develop the higher qualities of brain necessary for the more abstract thinking. The position of men in life bringing them in more immediate contact with its difficulties makes them on the whole readier to appreciate the many obstructions raised by the different interests of a society. Women without this close contact are much more likely to set before themselves some fixed purpose—or perhaps ideal—and without experience are totally unable to see why they should not go straight to their point. As to his remarks, there is not much to choose between the two sexes in the great majority of cases, although men have this quality of arresting judgment and restraining their enthusiasm in order to weigh the existing difficulties—and thereby making their responsibility for their blunders all the greater. The relation of the two sexes to the outside world for centuries ought to have given them an advantage in this respect. The efficiency of the cold and calculating woman, however, opposite to the general temperament of her sex, shows that the pertinacity of women on a course chosen at random is a matter of training rather than of sex. Speaking of the necessity in intellectual evolution of a consensus of the conceptions, their representativeness and re-representativeness becoming more and more complex as we rise in abstraction from the simple to the complex forms, he says:—"This *consensus* throughout the development of the conceptions, is, indeed, an organic *consensus*. "There is among them an interdependence analogous to that existing among the functions of the viscera; no one of which can be efficiently performed without the rest being efficiently performed. How necessary is this *consensus*, we may, indeed, see in the less-cultivated of our own society; and especially in women of the inferior ranks. The united traits distinguishing them are—that they quickly form very positive beliefs which are difficult to change; that their thoughts are full of special, and mainly personal, experiences, with but few general truths, and no truths of high generality; that any abstract conception expressed to them they can never detach from a concrete case; that they are inexact alike in processes and statements, and are ever averse to precision; that they go on doing things in the way they are taught; that such a thing as framing of an hypothesis, and reasoning upon it as an

"hypothesis, is incomprehensible to them; and that thus it is impossible for them deliberately to suspend judgment, and to balance evidence. Thus the intellectual traits which in the primitive man are the results not of limited experiences only, but of correspondingly undeveloped faculties, may be traced among ourselves in those cases where the life, relatively meagre in its experiences, has not cultivated those faculties up to the capacity of the type.*"

That is to say that woman is a very average human when taken in the mass; and the same can be said of man. These two very average mortals make up the great bulk of society. Placed in recent times under conditions radically different from the relations so long existing between them, the first tendency is to accent their separation; the woman to assert a separation of interests that really only exists superficially; the man to shift responsibilities that have hampered him, and perfectly willing to allow woman to accept equality since she wishes it that way. No favours are naturally to be found on the battle-field; unless the equivalent is given. Until the natural law on which the family is based begins to reassert itself in our Western life the tendency to drift apart will continue. That it cannot go beyond a certain limit is clear enough from any study of the natural history of man. Whatever destroys the family and leads to promiscuousness is a restoration to the primitive condition of mankind. And this primitive condition is a regression not a progression. The family was man's first step in advance. Every attempt to dispense with it—Enfantineism, for instance—has resulted disastrously in both an economic and a moral sense. It is noteworthy that it is the communistic element in modern life that strikes at the family. This is the reverse of individualism, which on the ground of utilitarianism must seek the good of others in his own good. The greatest happiness in life is only to be found in the family life. Outside of it happiness becomes either too concentrated or too diffused. A communism that breaks up this natural unit of the family simply drives its human unit to a gluttony of sensual satisfaction of his own bodily desires or cuts off the natural use of his powers. It makes him either a sensualist or a slave. There is a deep philosophical truth in the Biblical maxim "the twain shall be one flesh."

The individual no longer relies on himself. He or she relies on becoming part of a clique which will secure to them a larger return for smaller effort. There is just so much truth in the saying that the rich are getting richer and the poor are becoming poorer. Monopoly necessarily must take from somewhere the extra dividend beyond that due to natural competition. These extra funds are to be distributed amid a society that is nourished by the very spirit of monopoly. Every member of it is a communist at heart. They would not think of taking a step by themselves. Everybody in the clique belongs to everybody.

* Principles of Psychology Vol II p. 537 § 493.

else—within the limits of the contract. The only sphere left to the individual in such a society is sensuality; and this is the keynote of modern society. Naturally this affects women also. They govern these little circles in their moments of relaxation. What is the home when others dictate what a man shall do, when and where he shall do it, and sends him off—like a Government—five thousand miles or more on the notice of a letter or a telephone message? Add to the spirit of sensuality—the lust of enjoyment—the disentangling of the interests of women and we have what is seen to-day. Child-bearing is disfiguring and irksome, so it is postponed or avoided altogether in one way or another. As children are the real bond which tie the family together this failure of offspring, this absorption of the woman in a round of social life, simply drives one more nail in the coffin of family life. Even if a woman is a wife she proclaims loudly that she is not a nurse. Women find the direction of social life impossible if they try to carry out their duties as wives and mothers, so they avoid as much as possible these duties and find substitutes if accident imposes motherhood upon them. Nations differ in the progress they have made. The Frenchman leaves his society to the direction of women, trusts to the social code to keep them within the limits in which society has penned them, and demands complete and entire liberty in the field outside of society and to which Phryne alone has entrance. The Englishman walks more on an equality with the woman. His offences outside are not openly condoned by society. This demands of him, as of woman, that they shall not become public scandal, and on that point men are far more loyal to each other than are women, and hence the social check rules the latter in the severest terms. The American not only gives the leadership to women in society, but throws open to them the whole of outside life and the privilege of applying the rules of society to actions in this outside field. This subjection in all social questions is not due to uxoriousness but to public opinion. And this public opinion on the male side as yet regards the woman with the same indulgence as it does children. She has a curiosity and a wish to take this field to herself. Let her do so. The truth is that up to recent times American men were much given to business and but little to self-indulgence. The leisured class to-day is a very small one. A man loses caste by not having anything to do but to pursue sensual pleasure. Such men are likely to trouble themselves very little as to who directs the social formalities provided the business is left in their hands. And this spirit is at the bottom of woman's prominence in American life. After all the actual direction of affairs has to lie in the hands of those that carry them out. Men know this, and it is to be suspected that women know it too for very few American women want to wear the trousers. They are not at all averse to having it known that they have a voice in their own interests, and to assert this in a very unpleasant exaction of an exaggerated deference which shows its very falseness of tone in the exhibition. The writer

was once asked why, instead of saying "my husband," American women so generally used the very cold and impersonal method as when speaking of a stranger. "Mr. X—always does it this way" says a lady, referring to her worse half seated just across the dining table. The question was an apt one for this method of reference is general and not provincial. As nearer to the household American women have a very positive use in public life. The men are so busy that they are apt to forget that they have a police, and are willing to drink glucose and potato spirit, to eat embalmed beef, and to spice their food with condiments made of the harmless bean or fly or both impartially mixed—provided an honest penny is turned. Women look more sharply. They are the "greedy and unprincipled consumers" of household economics.

The American rarely regards the wife as the Frenchman regards her. To the latter she is often not only the nominal but the real manager. He relies altogether on public opinion to save his prestige. The Frenchman can take the place of real subordination and society will "save his face" for him. An American man in such a position loses caste. As long as he can walk and talk he is the real head of his house, for whoever holds the purse strings is the master. Woman's self-assumption in a field in which she displays often a lack of those qualities usually supposed to belong to her sex is not pleasant. She takes advantage of the situation to assert herself everywhere that she can safely do so without interfering with the husband in his task of garnering the dollars. And it is pure self assertion with no object in view except to attract notice to herself as untrammelled. This is often pushed to the point of depreciation of her partner. Sometimes a harmless foible but one so old and in such common practice through the long history of man that one would think that it had been worn out. To depreciate another by no means implies gain to oneself. "Never mind 'pop'" and "the 'old man' needn't know" does not sound well in public, and the writer remembers with pleasure a sound and public rebuke administered to Young America and a somewhat positive wife—the correcting agent being a crabbed, crusty, and indignant old German who had been watching the party for several days, the scene being laid in the garden of one of the hotels of that patriarchal country. These cases of disrespect to the "father" by wife and children are not so uncommon as only to attract attention by their unusualness. This publicity of separateness of interest has given a hardness of character, an advertisement of selfishness, which is not very pleasant to hear commented upon by outsiders. Unfortunately accompanying it is an undoubted over-valuation of self. As a manager—whether of clothing or the house—the American woman perhaps has something to learn from the Frenchwoman. Her capacity as a housekeeper cannot be ranked high; if results are to be judged. American cooking is the worst in the world. The frying pan is a national offence. And nowhere else could such a dish as "hasty pudding" or the

unscientific pie get a footing. Nowhere else have apartment houses with restaurants attached so flourished. Public opinion, however, is hard to change, and the education of which she has a mother's share is in her favour and grants her much and asks little of her. The change in men toward women in America in recent years is therefore the more notable. Women are getting the outer observance granted them in Europe, but they are also getting less and less of real respect. To find this out one must go into those sections of the country—particularly in the South—where women have entered less into public life. Elsewhere their appearance has been met by the demand that they drop all their privileges in the outside fields, and this demand is enforced. Fortunately for woman legally speaking she retains some advantages in less responsibility and in protection of her dower rights. Judging from an expression of opinion from the Bench given some years ago she has still more extensive privileges. A large and robust creature had cited her husband into court on the ground of desertion. The claim was made for alimony. "Large alimony" for the down-trodden female. The appearance of the husband,—a thin, weak, and sickly little man—caused much merriment and a still greater storm of gaiety when he explained that he ran away "because his wife beat him." Whatever were his drawbacks they were evidently not those of physical force; but the Bench rejoiced to know that there was at least one household in which the wife knew how to assert herself. There are undoubted advantages attached to the American woman's position; advantages from a public point of view and not of a character of which instances have just been given. One advantage is her independence of character and position before the public, which leaves her entirely untrammelled and adds much to her mobility and to her ability for self-support. Public opinion has opened the widest field for her—only limiting her to her physical strength. This she has gained at very little cost to herself. She may complain of a lack of the formality and politeness found before she edged her way into the middle of the arena in which a very hard battle is being fought. But men cannot stop to see if the opposite fellow who is aiming a blow at them is or is not a woman. They strike out anyhow. Formality and politeness is a very pleasant thing. It means at bottom very little however, and etiquette is most highly developed among savages.

The supremacy of natural law is shown in the toleration, even the completeness, of the many unions between men and women. This ranges through every type of the higher civilizations like that of the Japanese in which the personal relations throughout the community are regulated by custom down to the minutest detail, or in a civilization like that of America in which the personal relations are submitted only to the lightest restraint of custom and are left to that general ethical standard which the community has set as the minimum for it to countenance in its public law. In the first case there is no range for private action;

and personal relations are very mechanical. In the second case there is a wide range for it and personal idiosyncrasies and humanism has a decided sphere in which to display itself. Both types, Japanese and American, develop fine examples of the mutual concession necessary in the true heart union which is at the base of the family. Among the Japanese there is more certainty as to the outcome as the whole process is more mechanical. On the American side the prize is the more valuable when drawn. The mask of formalism covers all Japanese life even in the inmost circles and must always present a barrier. It is not allowable to throw this off, and the intimate union of two people must always suffer from it. Whether the narrow or the broad system of the family be the best, there is no disposition to dispute in the twentieth century the right of the woman to equality with the man. This makes the broader system the only feasible one. There should be "no taxation without representation"—morally or politically. It is to be confessed that marriage is a lottery with many blanks and few prizes, and in America there is found no exception to this rule, if we are to judge by the popularity of the divorce courts as an indicator of domestic meteorology. To be able to go among a mass of women and blindfolded to pick out one without making any egregious error as to temper is an undoubted advantage—due probably to old *ideas* as to divorce still fully operating under and in spite of Meiji law. But there can be no consultation of personal choice in such a case, and personal peculiarities govern personal relations. There is quite likely not to be compatibility in the case of Japanese matrimony but the range is more limited. Man or woman do not get what they want; but they do not so often get what they do not want. It is a sort of Hobson's choice. Some men would infinitely prefer safety in their matrimonial ventures. Others infinitely prefer a gamble. And no one gambles with the expectation of loss.

With all the much heralded entrance of woman into the field of the world's business, political and otherwise, there has been little fundamental change. Woman has always been a potent factor in the world's affairs. More so in the past than in our commercial age. She has usually been a mischievous factor and perhaps her coming out into the open is for the general good. The actual supremacy of the male remains unshaken, and as long as force rules the world this supremacy will not be touched. The absurdities of our dreamers of peace and disarmament are laid patent every time the newspaper reappears. If men are deprived of weapons they will fight with stocks and stones. Every jarring of interests shows how thin is the veneer of civilization and how it is only maintained by means of the constable. It is the merest axiom to state that a rude capable society will gleefully suppress a refined capable society. It is only as the latter is able to maintain a superiority of armament that it can hold its own. As soon as the barbarians had armed themselves with Roman weapons they tumbled over

the whole unwieldy fabric in spite of its wealth and its resources left in such feeble hands. It is often said that the world is in no danger from its present barbarian peoples. Nor is it now. But if the great hordes of eastern Europe and western Asia again appear on the Atlantic seaboard with all the resources of modern armouries the tale would not be such a new one. There are many grades of civilization, and it is one satisfaction that these barbarian peoples of the plains will have to work pretty far up in the scale before they can make their physical efficiency good. They will be well civilized before their opportunity comes. The first Napoleon stated nothing but a general term for his prophecy. For many ages therefore woman can play nothing but her usual role in government. She is physically and sexually incompetent. She is to-day the merest exotic in political life; to disappear at the first rough contact. When that will come no one knows or wants to anticipate. There are so many legitimate opportunities open to her even in the field of politics that she has no reason to complain if she is practically excluded from those relations likely to end in blows. Her sphere is the home, and things relating to the home engage a whole sphere of internal politics. Questions of reform and of better administration in relation to the daily life in the home all must find their solution in politics, and the voice of one important interest in such questions is all the more welcome as there can be no complaint of a solution in which it has had a hand. No man in his senses is going to choose as Minister of State a man of emotional temperament. As soon as politics spread beyond the immediate interests of the home circle there is needed a breadth of view and a suspension of judgment that woman, either through training or temperament, is rarely willing to exercise. She rather prides herself on her "powers of intuition." These deficiencies of woman make her positively dangerous in the higher circles of politics. For the very safety of the State she must be limited. Her personal influence is dangerous enough. The spirit of compromise is rarely found in her. Once engaged in the battle she suffers with a devotion and an obstinacy that prevents her judging the true condition of affairs. Many a war has been prolonged to absolute ruin through just this influence of women. Moreover, the directive powers in the world are still those of physical force, and real and nominal power soon coalesce. This is one of the reasons for the abnormality of a queen, a condition that is always felt, and which renders necessary the delegation of her powers and the selection of some male to represent her, leaving her but the figurehead. In the world's history where the accession of a woman to power is welcomed or secured it has always been for the ulterior purposes of some powerful clique, or else kingship in such nation has already become a mere formula. Granted a hypothetical superiority in extra-sensitiveness of the nervous system—which, however, seeing the drain on it is not likely—and reducing man in his turn to a husband of Zenobia, the capacity of such a State before

a male-ruled State is extremely doubtful. The higher the intelligence of the fighting material the better the chance, and the woman could only obtain her superior position by the depression of the male to the inferior and less intelligent position. There does not seem to be any difference between the two sexes as far as actual brain power is involved and under the same training. Any existing difference is involved in their widely different functions, for Nature never intended man for the nursery, and in physical structure very plainly devoted woman to that purpose. With equal vitality woman must draw on that vitality to fulfill her natural functions. Education on the same lines is one of the fads, and a doubtful advantage of our modern idea of women. It is good just to the extent that it is necessary to bring the sexes into greater sympathy and makes them on emergency to a degree a substitute for each other. The wide separation in thought and in amusements of olden time was not advantageous. Whether we are to be congratulated on the cause of the change is another matter. It marks the fact that woman's vacation is over, and her entrance on so many fields occupied by men is perhaps occasioned by a necessity created by our modern civilization.

The real situation seems to be this: that the great mass of men and women are attracted to each other, and the aspirations for a separate life are the expression of a theory based on a syllogism which itself has its major premise in the conditional form. If the law of Nature did not sound this call to paternity and maternity there might be something in the idea that men and women can be taken apart from their sex. This of course, is not according to the views of those who wish to find some other source of man's action than the data obtained by him through his senses. The difficulty, however, is that transcendentalism in the first instance has to make its call on the senses. There is no escaping this unpleasant necessity. The transcendentalists usually cut the Gordian knot by the magic term "inspiration," or by the exercise of some metaphysical dialectic which being beyond the acquisition or examination of the unbeliever renders their position impregnable. The first is the method of escape usually preached in the West. The haughty position of the second is usually adopted in the East—whether it be the cramped contemplation of thumbs, navel, and vacuity; or the convolution and involution of a mystic phraseology equally vacuous. Other poor mortals must fall back on common sense and the fact that man is usually to be classed as the *genus homo*. To them it is something to be able to appropriate a whole *genus* to themselves, and not to be classed miscellaneously with the other simians. Nature, therefore, has a great deal to say in man's partnerships; and man has developed that partnership into a union of which the spheres are marked by Nature. Man has further come to the conclusion that the primitive family marked out by Nature is the most efficient form of aggregation for his earthly career. He has tried the

communistic—socialistic system in his sex relations and has found it wanting. So much so that it only exists here and there, a rare type even among savages. Sexual jealousy is too strong to allow its success. But there is more than sex at the base of human union. Satisfaction of desire merely separates. Man feels the need of companionship; a companionship that makes his partner as far as possible his own flesh and blood. It is his effort to escape from that loneliness in which Nature has hedged him. This is little felt by lower man, and just in so far as he is degraded is his relationship with his own sex or the other sex degraded. The unusualness of a woman makes him actually fear her even while he abuses her.* There can be no true companionship among savages, but only an alliance for war and the chase, a life insurance. The degradation of woman was unconsciously and severely felt in the civilized nations of ancient times. It gives us to-day the expression for the effort they made to escape from the isolation that men of keen intellectual temperament were beginning to feel—platonic affection. It is only in our own day and in the teaching of modern psychology that we are beginning to appreciate the impossible barrier cutting us off from the outside world. That we have had to contract metaphysic, issue less inconvertible paper of speculation is no great disadvantage. Men are natural rivals. They can sharpen their wits on each other. Women are not natural rivals. They occupy a field apart; and through the bond of the family the interests of the two sexes can be brought together as never before in the world's history. Man cannot get beyond himself any more than he could previously; he cannot raise himself by his bootstraps. But the intelligent ear into which he pours his burden carries the same interest and is less likely to betray or take advantage of his confidence. The closer therefore the understanding between the two partners to the family union, the greater likelihood there is of united action, the more certainty there is of not only union in person but union in mind.

It makes little difference who is to be the nominal head of the partnership. The strong Will will dominate no matter to which partner it belongs. That the question of sex cannot be eliminated is of equally small importance. At the start there is small idea of offspring except as a natural outcome of marriage. The man looks forward to their support with little pleasure; and the woman with as little pleasure looks forward to the sickness of pregnancy and the pains of childbirth. But it is the children which subsequently unite the parents. The only substitute is one of those rare and strong intellectual sympathies that sometimes spring up between a man and a woman. Such sympathies take time to develop. They are more likely to develop antagonisms if they are made the occasion of marriage. They should develop together, otherwise closer union will soon

* Sexual taboo is thoroughly treated in Mr. Crawley's "Mystic Rose."

disclose differences. Any quality acquired previous to marriage is more a source of jealousy than of affection. The points of difference attract attention sooner than the points of resemblance. As for platonic love between man and woman—there may be such cases. There are many monsters born into the world. Where love as understood between the young and vigorous does not cast its influence it is safe to say that social convention does. A man wants a housekeeper, and a woman wants to be head of a domestic hearth. Agreeable companionship and mutual support in age may dictate many such unions. This, however, is not platonic affection, the marriage of two intelligences. This is possible, but rare, between those of the same sex. Here there is not Nature to be overcome but the rivalries of the world. Sometimes they last. Affection apart from interest can hardly be claimed beyond the period of youth, the only period in which self-interest does not more or less control the actions of men. The *genus homo* is naturally selfish. It is controlled by the law which governs all animal life—self-preservation; and it is gifted besides with more or less prevision. Natural relations and the equality they bring with them are the better. The great mass of men seek sympathy, and sex attraction leads to the earnest expression and satisfaction of that sympathy. People who have seen as little of each other as the average man and woman who enter into the marriage contract can have but little idea as to the mental qualities of each other; qualities so elusive and difficult to determine. Woman's means to attract are her beauty and sympathy. Man's means to attract lie in his power of protection. In both cases Nature—mercifully or unmercifully—operates by miracle and blinds both to reality. Both men and women are supported by centuries of use of these powers, and neither can or will sacrifice them. As soon as a woman has to sacrifice her beauty and her feminine qualities she hesitates. Her ambition is to enter a leisure class in which she has the fullest opportunity to cultivate those charms which are her surest and easiest means of exercising power. No matter how wide her field, the sureness with which work brings wear and ugliness will bring it into disfavour with women. Their ideal is not likely to change. The independence of the American woman will always be kept within bounds by herself. She tries now to direct it into the paths in which it will do her no injury. She will always be feminine.

That the existing Japanese system, with its relegation of one-half the adult community to the tutelage appropriate to the patriarchal stage, is ridiculously antiquated goes without saying. But the effect of its long continuance is to be recognized when bringing it violently and abruptly into contact with advanced civilizations. The Japanese woman has not had the long, gradual, and varied training in public responsibility that the Western woman has had. To remove her bodily from the old sphere of absolute inaction in public life of any kind, without

any balance of conservatism in the new conditions, into a medium hostile to her, would place her very much in the position of those Japanese *samurai*, who, being given a lump sum in commutation of their former pensions, were told to go hence and be seen no more, to make money in competition with men trained to skin something more slippery than eels or *samurai*. In this classic instance the operation did not take long, and in fact was so quickly performed that the victims did not get the benefit even of the experience. To push the Japanese woman into the world of business, not to throw legal protection over her dower and to seriously limit her responsibilities, would lead to much the same result. Perhaps it is true that the position of the Roman woman in Trajan's time, when she was free as air personally and absolutely protected in all her financial affairs, is the ideal for any woman. She had nothing to do with the degradation of politics—and seeing the mass of men politics must deal with these are necessarily degraded—but her limitations were published and known to all, and no one could rob her—not even herself. This is the proper condition for the Japanese woman as at present constituted. Full social freedom and full protection. Having long been kept in a subordinate position her character is marked by a lack of aggressiveness so necessary in the world. Where she is an unexpected figure she is roughly pushed aside. She is not left unnoticed. She is punished as an intruder. This is so much the case that among the lower class of Japanese and in the country it is by no means uncommon for a peasant to roughly handle the women if they do not promptly withdraw to the side of the road. If the Japanese woman ever is given full equality under the law this class of people will need the severest of lessons to enforce it in the commonest affairs of life. They have much to learn. At present custom over-rides law with them even in the meagre advantages gained by women in this Meiji era as compared with the olden time.

The Japanese woman is by no means unprepared to take advantage of any favour shown to her by legislators. As with all the race she turns naturally to organization, and this is skilfully effected through her great knowledge of detail which is part of her life in other fields and gives her great capacity for management. With experience and under proper protection she would gain confidence; and this power of organization—operating through the impersonality of organization to severely punish any who impose on her—would effect a change in public sentiment through fear of consequences if nothing else, the natural feeling gradually replacing what is at first enforced. That this would operate to the benefit of the race goes without saying. No such important element as half the nation can be maintained without loss in a condition below its highest possible efficiency under the conditions. And the benefit to woman of the increased appreciation would quickly be felt in arousing her ambition in new fields and spurring on to greater effort a character already very earnest—perhaps over-earnest.

This would be assisted by the separation of the sexes hitherto so marked a feature of Japanese life. This is not simply the natural separation. It is exactly what is found existing in the customs of barbaric and even savage peoples, and is a distinct remnant of the ancient Japanese system softened and refined by centuries of civilization but thus erratically maintaining the old type. It has had the effect of over-accentuating the femininity of the Japanese woman, a feature which has always attracted the pleased attention of the foreign critic of Japanese manners. The segregation of her sex, thus crystallized into a habit, has worn the deepest of ruts in the mind of the Japanese woman. She has long regarded herself as woman as something apart from the man; hardly, one might say, classing herself in the *genus* as complementary in sex, but rather as a special creation attached thereto but not a part thereof; as only attached to man to continue the species. And so the Japanese woman will long be feminine in this very particular sense; and there would be no harm to her also in the wider independence. Besides—women will always be women.

IX.

NATURE AND MAN.

"Wherever great peoples have passed, they have left sterility in their tracks. This earth, adorned with verdure and with flowers, is a consumptive whose cheeks are red, but whose life is condemned. A time will come when it will be nothing but an inert, dead, icy mass, a great sepulchral stone upon which God will write. 'Here lies the human race.'"

My Uncle Benjamin (Tucker's translation.)

"I am all that hath been, and is, and shall be; and my veil no mortal has hitherto raised."

Inscription-Shrine of Isis at Sais.

An evolution from the past, every people in themselves and in their social life carry with them at least a flavour of that past. There is little reason to believe in a theory of radical deviation that is so usual an explanation of superficial differences. East and West use the same apparatus of thought. There is at times a difference of outward expression not of method. And even this difference of outward expression is only apparent not real. In the West we are told that Eastern people think just the reverse of ourselves, and act just the reverse of ourselves. We push the saw away from the body; the Easterner draws it toward him. Very true; but in both cases the principle in action is the same, the position of the body in both cases is such as to gain the advantage of gravitation. And so in many heralded cases of difference it will be found that there is no difference of principle but that there are two ways of doing the same and often of thinking the same thing. The Japanese, and some other eastern nations, however present peculiar interest inasmuch as they distinctly represent a partial arrested development. Most civilized nations have outgrown all their primitive institutions and have modified therefore their very forms of thought in all branches. The Japanese have not outgrown their primitive condition. And what they have had to suffer, and what disadvantage they have laboured under, is due to this defiance of a law of evolution. One limb cannot be cramped without disturbing the whole circulation. Mankind spend their time in bandaging their members, but no race has so deliberately made a cult of it as the Mongolian. The very basis of Japanese society of to-day is its primitive basis. The priest-king is an institution of the distant past in the history of the Western peoples. It is distinctly a primitive institution and only fit for a primitive people. It lacks possibility of indefinite expansion on account of its under-

lying absolutism. No people who have started on a world career have been able to retain it. Their appearance as a world power has been accompanied by a disappearance of the priestly character of the monarch. In so far as an anachronism is maintained it is a source of weakness. These are days of constitutional monarchs; and needless to say an anachronism in the twentieth century—and one of twenty centuries standing—finds less place in the world than ever. Religion unquestionably has a peculiar function in men's thoughts, but it is very much of a question if a religious anachronism can have any place to-day in the world. All religious thought reaches up to a certain level. Religions have a quality not unlike the tidal action and mobility of the sea. They reach everywhere. They maintain the same level flowing into any place where that level is not reached. They intermingle their ideas as the eastern and western oceans intermingle their waters. This can only be prevented by the most artificial of barriers. Even the sea can be kept out of the Caspian and Gennesereth. It would be better for these bitter waters if it were not. On a primitive people the influence of religion is very great. The first political step of any people is marked by the dominance of priestcraft. The strength of the priesthood waxes and wanes with the nearness or remoteness of the gods. The anthropomorphic God of Roman Catholicism in the Middle Ages was infinitely more terrible than is the ethical abstraction of modern Unitarianism; and the power of the priesthood was correspondingly more terrible. To the Japanese their gods are very near. In their past—as to-day—they are ancestor worshippers. The great gods in heaven were the ancestors of their living monarchs, and take an intensely anthropomorphic tone. Under such circumstances the father is priest, and the king is priest. All this is developed in very primitive form, but it is intensely felt as is all feeling in a primitive race. Into such a society enters Chinese civilization. Kindred in character, changing the basis of nothing, it gave shape to everything by the superiority of its formula. This people could not hope to alter it for the better. They could hope to work up to it; but in so doing tied themselves by it hand and foot. There is nothing elastic in the Chinese system—moral or political. It is a finished product. It can be broken away from, not altered to meet new conditions. Training in such a system discourages all idea of change, and the Japanese were not a people to break away unless someone showed them the way. Its intelligence therefore was blighted or misdirected. All intelligence was devoted to reaching perfection in the model; and the model was wide ranging enough to call for far more than the average intelligence could give it. Devotion to form became the pass-word to all intellectual eminence. Japanese thought—as Chinese before it—passed into the charmed circle of scholasticism.

In the history of Europe there came about a separation of the material and mental interests of society. As the former had the wider range of the two—and a peculiarly wide and efficient

range it was with the cosmopolitanism of Europe to draw on—it was the implement to break down in the end the intellectual and theological scholasticism of the middle Ages. It is the fashion to-day to abuse the mercantile spirit but it is to it that man owes much of his freedom of thought and action. It was the mainspring of all the powerful thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who themselves would have despised the very idea. With some evil it has brought so much good into the world, and we owe it so much, that the last thing we can afford is to throw overboard its spirit and take refuge in reaction toward the old constraint. The old Japanese State presents to us in a microcosm all the evils suffered from in our old world—religious intolerance as soon as religion touched on the practical affairs of life, intellectual intolerance as in the suppression of heterodox schools of Chinese philosophy and for the same political reasons, and commercial intolerance in its non-intercourse policy. The statesman and philosopher Arai Hakuseki is found arguing on the balance of trade, as determined by the quantity of gold and silver which went out of the country through the wicket gate at Deshima, on just the same grounds as the Mercantile Economists so vigorously fought by Adam Smith. The only imports of value from Europe in his opinion were the drugs brought by the Dutchmen. For the rest, the people got along in the old way and these novelties simply tempted them to extravagance, not to work and to develop their own resources for exchange. Arai only saw the gold and silver and copper streaming away to the South. The pall hung far heavier on eastern Asia than it ever did on Europe. The politics and the wars of Europe were international. Its history was a series of alliances—made and broken—against other alliances. The interchange of peoples within the alliances was comparatively active. It was the exclusive policy which reigned in eastern Asia. Politics were purely national. Its wars were attacks or defence by or against the barbarous peoples hovering on the outskirts of the great middle Kingdom. Each country was sufficient unto itself. It was quite possible then to arrest development. The object of every man is a stable condition. Individually this is impossible for man passes rapidly from wish to wish. The accomplishment of one's wish implies the conception of the next. Not so with an abstraction. A form of State can be upheld as an ideal and once attained all effort can be directed to maintaining that ideal. This in itself can theoretically call for just as much reaction as action. An ounce of opposition calls for an ounce of suppression. Men have very little time to turn and see if there is anything but a battle of words over institutions. They only change when these institutions begin to press on themselves. Reformers of necessity must shout very loud. A policy of exclusion therefore always acts in the direction of stagnation or arrested development. The danger of stagnation lies in its turning to active putrefaction and destruction. A political example of such dry rot is seen in the fate of

the Mohammedan Empires. With the most active and energetic peoples in industry and science they went down perforce and by their system before the less trammelled peoples of the West. In China and Japan fortunately we have examples of arrested development. Fortunately, because the world cannot afford to lose any of its virility. A restored circulation can sometimes reanimate the weakened limb—provided it has not withered.

The political effects of the extension of its primitive condition into its advancing life are marked enough in Japanese history. It is seen in full action to-day, for the old theory of the State—based on a worn-out cult of a primitive people—is what underlies the whole body politic. The boundary line for a primitive people naturally does not fit into that of a progressive people. Hence all through Japanese history, since no new principles are introduced into the ground work of the political structure, much energy is given to great elaboration of detail. The whole tendency is to overweight the machine. All the machinery of a great State is devoted to the operation of a very small State, and one without any external policy worthy of mention except as a negation of all such policy. The old Japanese State called for little more than that required for the superintendence of any large landed property belonging to a private gentleman. It had all the paraphernalia of the Roman Empire. This paraphernalia, as far as the outside world is concerned, has become ridiculously antiquated. Most of it was pitched overboard in 1870, but much is very slow in taking a modern and more suitable shape. Its form being settled there was no power of adaptation. And as a matter of fact there was very little necessity for there was practically no change in conditions. The history of Japan therefore is simply a battle for the spoils. Government change is in form, not in substance. There is only a waxing and waning between centralization and feudalism. There is no national policy of expansion. The wars with the *Yemishi* and with Korea gave out by the eighth century, and only the latter can be regarded seriously from a national point of view. There was no growing question between the castes, such as in time would give rise to a People of Japan; as in England it gave rise to the English People. The whole contest—and constant and fierce it was—was a contest of the Ins and the Outs. Nothing from a political point of view can be more deadening. This deadening and materializing of all political life, this narrowing of all its issues, had one very bad influence. It enhanced this crystallization of the past. The very caste in which at that stage of political life could alone be found political energy devoted itself to an apotheosis of that past.

No bricks are to be made without straw and the material effects of this self-arrested development are also plain enough. It has been attempted to show that everything in social life was directed toward this end. Roads, transportation (or lack of it), even the very structure of the houses compelled a uniformity of

life that reached into the most intimate of family relationships. Our socialists have been anticipated not only in their theories but in the working operation of their many schemes. The commonplace is limited and grows tiresome. It drills the mind; but it was a necessity of course to the great majority of the people. Their more active minds naturally turned to what material they had. This was covered with great elaboration of detail. Beyond that it could only develop bizarre combinations and a fondness for the strange. Fortunately in Nature there is an ample fund to draw upon, and this minute study of it by Japanese artists has given us masterpieces of thought and execution as well as grotesques. The great minds of Japanese art—in literary or manual expression—do not dally with the grotesque. The more commonplace having exhausted the immediately visible naturally wander into it. There is an inherent strain of artistic exuberance in the Japanese people. Restraint will force it into *outré* channels. It seems the only way to reconcile the trueness of their taste with this undercurrent of taste for the grotesque. Outside of the established lines the mind had nothing practical to work on. The Japanese have a most prosaic imagination and entirely lack fancy. They simply enlarge or distort fact. They do not rearrange it. Perhaps another reason why we find the grotesque in their art.

Such are the effects of Japanese political and material life, which necessarily stamp themselves on their mentality. For centuries their thoughts have been directed not into certain fields but into certain grooves. Mental action is deeply influenced by such training. It is a training the exact reverse of that which is now advocated. The faculties of thought are now trained at the expense of memory. We try to exercise that power of representation shown to be man's one characteristic distinguishing him from the lower animals. This minute attention to detail can only be exercised at the cost of stunting growth in higher ranges. There is only a sum total of energy, and part of that sum total drawn off into separate channels cannot be made use of elsewhere. And the more deeply grooved the channels of thought become the easier their action and the more readily we turn to them. What old man likes to take up a new line of thought—except for diversion? In art, literature, philosophy, religion, Japanese thought shows the deep grooves in which it has run. Into these grooves it is impossible to run the new thought. It would be to put new wine into old bottles. This it is said, was done shortly after the restoration, and the forcing process instead of the developing process was adopted. Some went crazy from the strain. The old and the new thought are incongruous. New channels of thought are not easily opened. And then this must be a slow process. Meanwhile it is easier to adopt a new method than to change the old into the new. The effort to reconcile the two is a mistake. To try and trace the new to the old simply gives rise to mental confusion. Young brains anyhow are not equal to evolving a new system, and that is really what is called

for by such a process. As to the necessity of the new there can be no question. The world now is seeking for the new; materially and mentally it is what is given full value. This is no rash break with the past; it is no rush for the novel, or depreciation of what we possess of value in the past. But social evolution is now taken for granted as an established fact. Its importance is better understood. Some of the value must necessarily be stripped from the past. A people must take and keep a sharp account of stock and carry no useless lumber as a handicap. The field of a people is in its material and mental and political life. All the rubbish must go overboard. What place has the political life of Old Japan in such a world?

The necessity of action is felt by the pressure on us to-day. The party of reaction is always with us, those who preach the "good old times." Sometimes these times are so "old" that the preachers have to evolve them out of their inner consciousness. Every idea must have a basis of fact or it will not get a hearing. It is only as these schemers get a footing in the present that they can make their way good. The danger is when there is an over balance of theory to the proportion of fact. In such cases reform or even progress is invariably followed by reaction. Accretion must be a slow process or it must fail. The world always gets some good out of these attempts. It pays the bill for its over-education and laughs at its own folly. It is a heartless world in its way. It squeezes the juice out of these reformers and then throws them away. The party of theoretical reaction, long preaching the abuses of our progress, has passed into the practical stage. In so far they are less dangerous to modern civilization than they ever were. Definition implies limits. Society never builds from the ground up. Individuals have tried this and lamentably failed. Paper Constitutions have become a by-word or the worst kind of traps for the unwary. No man, no reform, has a monopoly of political balance. Generally speaking they are decidedly unbalanced in given directions. Society lops off all the dead or exuberant material, calmly appropriates the minute kernel, and throws away the husk—and also the reformer. Our great political innovators have only won their way by the conservative element in their character. Oftener they have followed not led society. The sole requirement of society is efficiency. The very term "society" spells efficiency. It is its cause of being. We would like to think otherwise but every examination forces on us this utilitarian cause of our social life. A Society is vigorous through its efficiency in the mass; and this can only be through its efficiency in the individual. "Mass" is purely an abstract term to represent the "individuals" which go to make up society. A nation must find this force in itself. Borrowing power is limited. It is the power of production that keeps a nation in operation. Man is a machine, part of Nature's machinery, and the law of his operation can be determined with mathematical accuracy. It is the law of supply and demand, so

heartily abused in these days when an unbalanced and unregulated altruism gets such reckless preaching. It is an entirely modern discovery that man shall buy and pay whether or not he wants. Such a system is to say the least wasteful and tyrannous. The English economists were not only in the main right but scientific in their exposition of the law. Adam Smith, and Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill are to-day as heartily abused as the Law of Supply and Demand. Why? Because we are unable to put their system in operation. No one has preached more vigorously against monopoly than Adam Smith; or against the spirit of monopoly found in mercantilism and almost necessary to it. He would open his eyes to-day to find that his system was made a part of mercantilism and a weapon for monopoly. He would probably shrug his shoulders at our helplessness before monopoly. Monopoly in Government, monopoly in the community, monopoly in the individual—he spent many pages in expounding their economic suicide. No one denounced existing inequalities more vigorously than John Stuart Mill, but he denounced them as directed against the individual. The whole spirit of the so-called English School is based on free contract between free men. And a man's freedom lies very much in his own hands. The interests of men must be justly balanced. To prevent the abnormal development of any one element at the cost of the rest is an exercise of police power and is the duty of the State; but it is not the function of the State to assume the position of any one element.

Instead of correcting the ill balance in modern society men are educated to free contract and then limited in their opportunity. One of the great accomplishments of to-day is that men are taught how to think and then are given no way in which to apply their thought. All are teachers. There are no scholars. The result is education and an empty belly. We are waking up to the fact and technical schools are at last beginning to multiply in the land—and to take the truly dignified position that belongs to them. Not without opposition. Organized labour has devoted itself not to efficiency but to mediocrity. It is bound to the old apprentice system and looks at these schools with a sourish eye. It is to be admitted that mediocrity finds it hard to face monopoly and hence it aims at monopoly itself. What is wanted in the State, however, is the highest efficiency. Perhaps the monopoly of both kinds had better go. One can breathe freer under the old standard of Americanism than under these imported products of mercantilism and unionism. One product also mediocrity is unwilling to recognize—the right of birth. Here again we strike against a law of Nature. Carefulness and thrift are not always created in a generation. They are not inherent in the human being still much of a savage just beneath the surface. This is seen in numerous examples of the upstart of our day. Sometimes it is a particularly rank product and lights cigars with twenty dollar bank notes. Sometimes it is seen in the grand piano on the earth floor of a cottage. Sometimes it is

seen in the speculation of the lottery, at times a national vice. Sometimes it displays itself in the careless training of its offspring, and what the first generation has accumulated by the exercise of hand and brain and sacrifice is scattered to the winds by children or grandchildren. There is a high quality in thrift which devotes itself to training its younger generation in thrift. The younger generations are born into a tradition that in itself is a heritage to them. On such depends race progress. Society has profited enormously by that freak of Nature—the genius. It has profited still more by the great mass of intelligent thrift gradually rising and stiffening. It is this intelligence that can understand and profit by the genius. What is needed in the world to-day is fair not fierce competition. Justice exact and even between men, with the freest of contract and the least restraint on honest ability. Unfortunately there does not seem to be enough honesty in man's composition to get along without restraint. For that purpose society makes use of a police, and this police will be found quite sufficient to enforce free and fair contract equally as well as to enforce monopoly.

Evolution calls for the triumph of the individual not for his suppression; which latter is the tendency of the present system and the avowed object of the substitute for it—socialism. The bourgeois suppressed the French Revolution. The taste of liberty, however, was sweet enough to call for reaction. Curiously enough the reaction takes the form itself of a close corporation and further repression. Never has man shown a greater distrust in himself. Never has he avowed more openly the inherent evil of his nature. Never has he so openly confessed, not to his failure but to his inability to be just. We are indeed levelled to the beasts in the gross materialism of latter-day socialism. The raising of the mass, however, cannot even temporarily be safely halted; and the rise of the mass depends on the individual. This is a historical fact. No "society" has progressed. Individuals have progressed, a part of society has progressed. Man is not a mass of dirt or ashes or even protoplasm. He is a complex individual unit, and all his parts are interdependent. With such a machine there can be a levelling down not a levelling up. It is possible to ruin the action of any one of the units, but no benefit thereby accrues to the mass. On the contrary perhaps possible injury. In man's case it could only be injury. There is not only danger but an impossibility in the spirit of reaction. The old can never be restored except as an artificiality. Man is not a mechanical machine but a product of organic evolution. This effort to base the modern Japan on the ideas of Old Japan is a hopeless one. Something has been added to Japanese thought which is out of harmony with the old thought. The sooner this is recognized the better. One recourse is possible to retain the old—force. The reactionaries put this in operation as far as they dare.

§ 2.

The evolution of man and the evolution of the lower animals have taken widely different directions. The latter—where man has not interfered for his own special purposes—has followed in general terms the law of the survival of the fittest in which every little gift of Nature ensuring physical efficiency has ensured supremacy. A little trick—perhaps accident—of Nature has made this superiority of the physical of small moment. Man no longer makes use of his own framework to accomplish his wishes or to defend his person. Artificial weapons have taken the place of natural weapons. Muscular efficiency has been levelled before brain efficiency. Nature having reached a complexity of physical structure elsewhere, beyond which it seems difficult to our limited understandings to conceive of anything but greater size or changing combinations, seems to have turned to the nervous system and started a new line of evolution in that direction. This development of brain and the nervous system in man is a stumbling block in the way of muscular evolution. Man not only preserves his freaks and incapables but melts them again into the common fund of humanity. Perhaps this is Nature's revenge for the defiance of her laws. This Frankenstein of her brain, unmindful that he is not only brain but also flesh, is preparing the way for his own fall. The transfer of man's efficiency to the dead material world has, however, rendered of minor importance the physical changes so important to animals. The dwarf with a modern rifle is more efficient at a hundred yards than a giant. He offers less of a mark.

Moreover this evolution of brain is an accomplished fact. There is an actual deficiency in the undeveloped races. It is not only the actions and expressions of such peoples as the Negro and Negrito races of Central and South Africa, the Australians, and the Indian races of America that teach us this; it is their method of thinking. They are incapable of abstract thinking, or even of concentrated thought, for any length of time. It gives them headache to think. Their ideas are extremely limited and hence the same can be said of their vocabulary. Let us stop for a moment and frankly compare this with our own uneducated classes. Ignorance is everywhere handicapped by this difficulty and pain of thinking. There is more needed than mere brain surface. The operations of daily life are governed by a species of grooving in the brain material. Thought runs in certain lines. The many operations inherited or repeated from earliest childhood are conducted automatically. This is easy thinking. It is an approach to instinct. Fortunately the common affairs of life are either so governed, or in many directions already determined for us by the real thinkers who have saved us the trouble. This is the popular habit of brain action. Our common people, if untrained, are incapable of the higher range of thought. They have no time for it. The ditcher watches the carriage of the railway president roll by,

and mutters a curse because he gets three hundred dollars a year and the other man thirty thousand a year. The president could take the ditcher's place on short apprenticeship, but the exchange could not be made in the other direction except at tremendous cost to society. It is not the actual brain weight that counts. It has been often instanced that an idiot and a Cuvier may have a brain of the same size. Water has weight. It is the government of the intricate complexity of combination represented in re-representation. In this field the common man must take things on trust or miss his way. Not that his field of thought is without value and of the greatest importance. Mr. Spencer has shown very forcibly that the groundwork of our thought lies in sense perception, and this power of re-representativeness is based on it. Accuracy of thinking is more likely to fail than in the lower field. The value of the higher life lies in its wider field through the capacity of re-representation. This is only to be obtained through exercise of brain power. And as it is exercised this mobile field in the cerebrum makes a greater and greater call on the energies at the cost of other nervous centres. There is of course a limit to this call. Fortunately our lives are so governed by functions now become automatic that growth in this higher field does not interfere materially with the grosser functions on which life depends. But the highest thinkers have been by no means the men best fitted for the mechanical details of practical life. The cases in which, however, they have gained such control over the minor centres as to be able to suppress them are rather apocryphal. Diogenes is said to have voluntarily killed himself by ceasing to breathe. Won at great cost the supremacy of brain power is well deserved. Man has nothing to hope in any other field than that of evolution of the brain. It is his highest type, and limited as is the bony box in which this wonderful brain is confined the possible combinations within that space are to all practical purposes unlimited. It combines not only its materials but combines these combinations. It feeds itself and its growth is involved of necessity in its action. As long as it acts it grows.

This is of historical importance. Science and the development of brain are strictly related. Restriction of science—of freedom of research—has affected brain development, and wherever science finds a field there is found the superior development. Hence at the very dawn of history it is among the Egyptians and the Accadian-Sumerian peoples that science is held in high esteem. Their great men are learned men in the science of the day. And such science is true science. Only in such fields do they show their real supremacy. The foolish tales of anthropomorphic divinity are matched by the rudest peoples; but in their knowledge of astronomy and mathematics the ancient civilizations have to learn from us only the details and development. Many of the principles have already been laid down by them. In its connection with science lay the value of the Greek philosophy. This went as far as the

limited field of experimental science would allow. They lacked instruments of precision. But they could determine enough to give them an insight into the truth of what might be beyond. They were on the right track. So much gained they could turn with all the more power to the field that was open to them. Man's conduct could be known and probed to its depths. There is not a book written to-day on ethics or politics that does not quote with respect the works of Plato, of Aristotle, and of the Stoic philosophers. This is test enough of their value. They have stood this test of human thought for centuries. Making man the microcosm they seized the thread which runs through all the universe and on which the whole theory of evolution depends. This makes their idea of the universe as a whole so thoroughly sound for later time. But if the basis of such philosophy was sound its elaboration in detail was necessarily defective. Deduction was supreme. The field of Induction was not only limited but was inexact within these limits. There was no microscope and no means of making exact measurements. And in addition a human factor was placed in the way as a stumbling block. Where there is prepossession there is at once placed a limitation. The blighting influence of ecclesiasticism was thrown over the use of such instruments as they did possess. It was only as they confirmed dogma that they were permitted. The outlet was found by likely and unlikely enough ways. The assumption of temporal power by the the See of Rome aroused the antagonism of the struggling political interests of Europe. There were hostile eyes from every direction watching the growth of political power in the Church. A more unlikely assistance was found in the revival of the Greek philosophy. This found an application to the field of Christian theology. As such it gave only a new extension to the scholasticism of the day; at least until the real Aristotle and Plato were placed in the hands of the men of the West in the fourteenth century. But there was a genuine value in the development of Logic. This was given a supremacy over all other fields of mental exercise. There was the severest examination of premises, middle terms, and conclusions. An ideal was made of exact thinking as to form, and these logical equations paved the way for modern science. This was ushered in by the improvement of the existing instruments of precision and the invention of others. Quantitative science began to replace qualitative science, and induction to take its true place in relation to deduction.

One immediate effect was the immense range taken by thought hitherto confined within the narrow limits of scholasticism. The necessity of formulation quickly arose, the necessity of re-representation, and hence an increasing elasticity of brain. The demands made on the nervous apparatus of man, and hence on his whole physical apparatus, have been steadily increasing. This has given a value to the prime of life heretofore never suspected. The value used to be given to age and experience. Now it is recognized that age is not a matter of years. It is a

matter of experience and vigour. A man may still be young at seventy, and old at twenty. Old age is marked by a disinclination to think, or to think out of the grooves become habitual by years. Hence old age is reminiscent. It is recognized that it is unequal to meet the demand on the nervous and physical strength that the new postulates. And to-day it is asked whether there is not a limit to this demand, even when physically fit to meet it. One thing is better understood, that exertion is not to be pushed to the limit in any one direction. The point can be reached where the physical is starved in order to keep nervous energy keyed up to the highest pitch. Instances are common enough where men are kept alive merely by power of will. As soon as the grosser frame work is called on it collapses. The whole structure is tissue paper, is worm-eaten. What is being learned is that we are not a brain with a subordinate body; but that one nourishes the other, and an equable balance must be kept between the two. Unless this is realized it will be found that the best will break down and the rest will degenerate. There are many kinds of stimulants. They may be found in drugs or in the pressure of modern life. In the effort to keep up these stimulants are sure to find their devotees. Degenerate races take to the grosser excitements of the drugs, and wherever they are brought into contact with the pressure of civilized life and the tingling it arouses in the nerves they are seen melting away from the surface of the earth. It is not simply belly provender that entices the Indian to drink. The black bottle contains a spirit—good or evil—that enables him to rise in the scale of Nature. To him therefore it represents the white man's civilization. There are plenty of the white race who agree with him on that point; but there are others to whom stimulation is only found in the pressure of modern civilization itself. Less and less is given to the body and more to the mind. The telephone passes from office to house. The bank puts on a relay of clerks and maintains a service of twenty four hours. Man only ceases to think when he sleeps, but he also rests his brain by change of the sphere of thought. Advanced civilization seeks perfection by driving thought into one continued tread-mill. A new form of scholasticism springs up. Anything has value in so far as it applies to per cent. Everything is to be turned over and examined—but in this peculiar light. Our business man is becoming a monstrosity. The rest of our civilization is becoming atrophied. We have become one-sided. As if—at his inconceivable best—the chemist could do anything more than imitate Nature in his chemical beefsteak. The very limitations of his brain carry this implication. Nature sits by and watches this self-poisoning in modern races. She is taking her revenge and letting the victims do their own work of destruction.

§ 3.

It is part of man's mental equipment to deal in "futures." Without much reference to his limitations and possibilities in that direction he has invented the great problem of "what is in store for us?" On this point his pride and geology clash terribly. He is perfectly willing to learn the lesson of geologic time in reference to all the rest of creation, and to accept its teaching for the future; but when it comes to applying that teaching to himself he closes the volume. And that teaching is not flattering for it shows the persistence of humble types and the evanescence of higher types. It is part of the nature of any created being to think within the limitations of its own terms. There is an absurd idea in some minds that what animals respect in man is his "different nature." Rather they recognize an animal more cunning and more powerful than themselves, and the whole nature of the animal fear of man is limited to the recognition of this cunning. They fear injury from him more than from other animals. The divinity of a naked man disappears before a hungry tiger. And the tiger does not have to be particularly hungry at that. Doubtless if the *dinosaur* and the *megatherium* could have done any thinking at all they could only have conceived an animal more powerful than themselves. All of man's gods have therefore taken on an anthropomorphic representation; or have simulated some physical phenomenon of nature, flame or gas. We speak familiarly of gas and ether. There is a definite idea of the first for some gases are coloured and can be seen. There is no direct idea whatever of the second, and yet we are forced to discuss its properties in positive terms. The essential element is mystery. To the wandering Bedouin, at sword's point with all mankind and limited to his own little circle, the spirit of the world was found in flame. Man, the too evidently created, only takes on divinity as he becomes merged into that Infinite and hence he is only divine to the little circle which knew him when living. To others he is, if anything, an evil spirit. Gather men into cities; make of them a great people more and more dependent on their leader; and the anthropomorphic element comes more and more to the front. The Elohim disappear with the tents of the Bedouin. The Beni-Israel sojourn in the land of Goshen and pick up the theology of the great nation on the outskirts of which they toil, to reappear in Palestine with Jahweh at their head. It has taken centuries for the world to break away from its old anthropomorphic ideal. And that has only been secured through progressing knowledge of the physical world. "God made man in his own image" writes the Jahwehist. "The Spirit of God was breathed upon the waters" writes the Elohist. A greater knowledge of the universe is displayed in the old Elohist, but both writers are speaking in the limitations of their knowledge; the first had not condensed his Elohim into a world spirit; the second emulating his neighbours, had adopted a national deity. Science cannot

suspend itself in air by grasping its own girdle. We are limited by the flesh in the contact with things external to us. The problem is insoluble in all its terms. The modern idea of God as Force is nothing but a wider generalization. It is still assuming the created as Creator, and is a disguised pantheism.

Within the limits of our knowledge can be read the lessons of the past. And that teaches equally well the lessons of the future; unless the eyes are shut to the facts before them. All through that past is seen the law of evolution resistlessly and remorselessly acting, modifying and eliminating one product after another to substitute other types. We cannot hope to be an exception in the series. The *cohippus* can claim to be a horse in a certain sense. As a record of the past he is to-day a mere museum curiosity. To what comes after man in the distant future man also will be a mere museum curiosity. It is not flattering to think that the man of a hundred thousand years hence will curiously finger our remains as we handle those of a fossil simian. From our own past we can draw no conclusions at all. Man is plainly and palpably a newcomer. There has been little change in the historical period—no reason why there should be. It is not even a point in geologic time. Man's first apprenticeship did not lie in those fields in which we can understand progress. His increased cunning gradually changed physical habits. When he assumed the upright position, learned the fatal effect of stocks and stones and other artificial weapons, he could turn that wonderful brain of his to account. There is, and should be, but little difference between the savage and civilized man. The work of change consisted in this gradual evolution of man from brute to his present special condition. This could only be effected by his developing brain. Once this was accomplished and the necessary elasticity attained, progress in civilization would consist in the use to which it was put, and this might be aided by environment. In this western nations have taken the start and have all the advantage of a practice that gives returns in a geometrical progression. The disadvantage under which the Chinese and kindred nations labour is that they have deliberately directed their practice into certain selected channels and kept it there. The western ideal is free thought, and hence every individual effort reacts on the mass. The eastern ideal has turned itself to form. Any individual effort to escape must necessarily be spasmodic. The form is condemned and rejected without examination of the substance. The mass soon sinks back into those channels which have become second nature to it. The Chinese reached a high stage of thinking before they fastened this chain of scholasticism on themselves. Politics and geography—their isolation—had much to do with it. They had nothing to learn from their neighbours. There was no incentive to internal change which could only be a source of suffering. Mind was driven to exercise itself in a circle. There is little distinction here between the exercise of thought and of instinct. Greek philosophy became scholasticism under the same influence.

In savage races which have no higher thinking their habits do become instincts. The conditions of their life drive all this mental energy into the many petty details necessary to such daily life. The sharpened senses of sight and hearing make constant demand on the attention. In his really idle moments the savage sleeps. He never attains civilization. The Chinese on the contrary arrested the development of a civilization.

This deep grooving of the channels of thought is much the easier process. New thought is hard to master. From this point of view the present stage of Japanese thought is interesting. In the mass of people, subject to the steady influence of their environment, what attracts the attention is the superficiality of the new. The thought of Old Japan ran on definite lines and those lines are not erased. The new thought unconsciously slips into the old rut. There are reasons for this apart from habit. Patriotism and easiness of thinking both operate together. There is therefore also a conscious effort to bring the new into these old channels. The idea is to modify the new practice on the old lines without much thought of their incongruity. Extension is then to be sought on these old lines. There might be some prospect of success if it were not that the gap is too wide to bridge. Europe broke away from its scholasticism, but the gap between modern and scholastic Europe is one of three hundred years. And during this period more has been done than during the whole of the previous historical period. How can the advocates of Old Japan hope to graft modern Europe on to Chinese thought of the twelfth century. To do so is simply to assume that it is material that governs thought and not the reverse. This is the reverse of the world's experience. In so far the principle of the Hegelian philosophy is true, and not its materialistic antithesis. Beyond all this western civilization lies the thought hidden in and operating it. This attempt to graft the old on the new shows simply a substitution of material not a penetration of thought. In the retention of the old structure there is to be a teaching of what to think, instead of how to think. Young Japan is to follow in the "way"; to condense the modern world within the narrow limit of a single and very estimable precept—obedience. This undoubtedly has its very useful field, but its usefulness is limited to that field. There is no inspiration toward originality to be found in it. Eastern and western thought cannot be contrasted without considering the different bases on which they stand. Eastern thought starts out with a proposition directed toward a definite end by definite methods. Western thought has no prepossessions. It marks its direction, gathers all its material by the way, and the classification of that material determines the end reached. The two methods are so radically different that it is necessary to understand the principles in training the mind for their use. Which of the two processes is the more likely to lead to truth there is not any doubt. And the same can be said as to progress.

It may be considered possible to train a people mechanically without giving them any training in the corresponding current of thought. It may be possible that there is no co-ordination between the physical and the psychological. In the application of western practices one thing noted among the Japanese is the lack of training of their people. This has repeatedly attracted attention. Their imitation of western civilization is a poor one. Even material products are inferior. There can be but one explanation of this with a man so acute as the average Japanese and so highly skilled in manipulation. He does not *understand* what he is doing; he is imitating. The sensible conservatism of the peasant is an advantage in a country in which the determination of its food supply should be as far as possible a stable factor. He at least understands the principle on which he works. The difficulty of the situation is that progress is only possible through the individual. This the leaders do not want. Independence of the individual cannot be granted without independence of thought. No one knows where that might lead and hence the importance of teaching what to think. What to think is necessarily a one-sided view. "What" is of small importance in comparison with "how." And so Government takes hold of everything and makes a mess of it as Governments have always done since the beginning of time. As soon as a Government abandons its legitimate business of enforcing "peace on earth, good-will towards men" and takes up the business of trader it shows its own inefficiency and spoils the efforts of everybody else. A new groundwork is perfectly feasible. There is no necessity of slavish imitation of western practice but a thorough understanding of principles is needed. A national development from these principles would be the natural outcome, a development quite sufficient to satisfy the soul of patriotism and perhaps even that of the Japanese Jingo. Japan has deftness and mental training at its command. Why should it attempt to retain the old rubbish? No one in Europe thinks of turning toward scholasticism—except the socialists. National individuality is not sunk in progress along kindred lines. Every race has its bias, which develops a phase peculiar to itself. The French are mathematical; the English are practically philosophical; the Germans are theoretically philosophical, with a tendency to inquisitiveness and detail, which makes "made in Germany" a very uncertain question as to what a thing is really made of so given are they to seeking ingenious substitutions. The Yankee is inventive. All place their individual stamp on the same materials. Why should the Japanese fail to show their special quality? By temperament they are eclectic. They are ingenious and fond of detail. If they have shown but little invention perhaps it is because they have never had the chance in the particular field now opened to them and in which opportunity should in no way be limited. Now that his world is thrown wide open to the Japanese as individual why tie him up again? Why teach him to look to the past? "Granny" government

in the West fears the individual; as if the individual could become so strong as to absorb the modern community—even when under “granny” government. But a despotism is still feared. “Granny” government in the East fears the individual; as if the collection of individuals could become so strong as to upset their despotism, when individualism is equivalent to separation. So both propose to limit his field by undertaking to do badly what can only be done efficiently by the individual. Just in so far as business passes into the hands of that abstraction known as a corporation, in just so far is that business performed extravagantly and inefficiently. The doctrine is as old as Adam Smith, who found many lucid examples of it in his own time; and the present time could add many more, with its over-grown office staff and salaries and watered stock. But for this training of the modern individual what is needed is how to think, and no people need exercise in that practice more than the Japanese. And no people need less of the past: Their past is very close at hand and they have many of the old grooves of thought to eliminate. Modern thinking *must* be done on other lines. Mechanical thinking *must* be reduced to a minimum, and the higher powers—those of combination and re-representation—be given exercise. And just this is the cry to-day of the teachers in the universities and higher schools of Japan. They want their student material handed over to them trained to some power of “how to think.”

§ 4.

Boethius says, “O creatures of the earth, can you not think over whom you are set? If you saw in a community of mice, one mouse asserting his rights and his power over the others, with what mirth you would greet the sight.” It is not simply the mere temporary nature of man’s appearance as a creature of action in the world that has impressed itself on human thought; it is not the relative but the actual insignificance of all human thought and action. This is shown in the short period of the life history of a nation, in the unquestioning confidence they have in its permanency during the flood time of their progress, and their blindness to its decadence, and in the relative unimportance as to whether they disappear from the view of man forever or for ages. The builders of the ruined cities of Arabia and of Central Africa have disappeared without leaving any traceable mark behind them. That their influence has entirely disappeared is unlikely. Some thought, the origin of which to-day has been lost to sight, has perhaps been engrafted by them on the human mind. Sometimes lost peoples are unexpectedly resurrected, and then much is learned of the origin of what has been thought to be original in the later

history of the world. This has been the fate of Assyria and the consequent exposure of the basis of much of Greek thought. And we see what a thrashing over of old straw is continually being repeated. The life history of a nation is simply that of its activity. A stagnation does not live. It is either waiting its call on the world's stage or it may perish of dry rot before that word comes. The active course of a nation's life is comparatively speaking short. There is the period of incubation, the bursting forth into virility, the decay of that virile stage. This has been the history of every active nation. A few thousand years or less marks the span of national life. The highest civilization saps virility. The lamp simply burns out. The national decay may be recognized, even the means to prevent it, but the energy does not exist to put it to use. Pessimism replaces practice in morality. "What's the use?" A world has never been saved by pessimism, no matter how far-sighted it may be. The idea of supposed inferior peoples is all a dream. This was exactly the position taken in the second century of our era by the Roman toward the barbarian world. He never dreamed that the barbarian had greater physical and moral efficiency and could work up to his military efficiency. Then the crash came. This is exactly our view to-day. The hardy races of western Asia and eastern Europe seem so far beneath us as to be no longer dangerous. A worn out civilization can resist but little. Equality of weapons settles the whole affair. The world is turned back temporarily some centuries. But it is not a fresh start that is made. The old civilization is not entirely wiped out. The new starts with much of the old as a basis. Barbarism does not replace civilization. Barbarism, hopeless under its old environment, quickly learns its new lessons and adds its own peculiar genius to the new superstructure. After all the change is not very great within the historical period. We eat no more and we work no less, nor is our work any easier to-day than it was a thousand years ago. There is small difference between resting on a chair and resting on a divan. To the palate of the two men who drink them there is small difference between the wine made of French grapes and the wine made from Assyrian dates. Either would reject the product of the other as not to his taste. It seems very little to say that there have only been added office chairs, plate glass, and electric light to our business fixtures. Men can rush more quickly from one place to another to perform this business in person or by proxy, but they do so because the pressure has increased and they have to do so. Even the physical comforts are exaggerated. Hot water heating of dwellings is lost in the mists of time. The system laid down for the Roman baths and for heating the palace of Diocletian rivals present day systems. One improvement has been made. The increased facilities for transportation have widened man's range, and one district need no longer starve to death when a neighbouring district rejoices in plenty. Even this statement,

however, has its limitations to land transport when it is considered that Italy was fed from the granaries of Egypt and Africa. But on the whole every new discovery brings with it new tastes. What were superfluities become necessities and man's capacity for resistance is just so much diminished, and it is the pressure on a man that counts. If he were not such an anachronism one could almost envy the Turk. But he is not a philosopher; he is a warrior, dreaming of plunder that he cannot hypothecate. His inertia is predatory not philosophical. He knows better than to move a finger. It is only the maintenance of the struggle, this very pressure that grates so upon men, that keeps them up. A period of permanent quiescence is an idle dream. When the natural energies give out a civilization must resort to stimulants. When these fail it collapses. The force acting through the cycle of human civilization is analogous to that acting on a geyser. When the pressure gets too great this boils over, to sink back for a period of uneasy quiescence only to gain force for another collapse.

Nature makes her divisions and on material that is not unlimited. She has to regard that material in drawing on it, and what goes into one thing is withdrawn from another. Forms change according to conditions, and we can thank God that those changes take place according to law and that we do not live in a lawless world. Man, as everything else, is subject to those conditions, and his control over them is—except in his own conceit—very trifling. A slight change in the earth's axis, the necessary astronomical position, and another Ice Age would be—will be—upon us and drive man like any other animal where-soever it will over the surface of the earth. Even before Nature's great convulsions man never loses his grip on his conceit, and after a great earthquake he cackles about it in town meeting and synagogue; as if a landslip was going to listen to the arguments and adjurations of frightened doctors of divinity. Fortunately more practical souls turn to police and the relief of the injured. Nature therefore shows small consideration for the works of man's hands or the work of his brain. Neither are of the smallest concern or influence to any but man himself. The ant or the bee has as much reason to be proud of any structure they raise on the earth's surface. The permanency is about the same whether it be ant or bee or other insect. The insect has somewhat the best of man as far as the length and probable permanency of his earth record is concerned. Eternal time and the universe, in which dead worlds which have gone through their cycle and are waiting to give birth again to organic life are rushing through space, take but little account of such a passing phase as a particular manifestation of matter. Within them is a waxing and waning of forms, with the inevitable result to all at the end.

Man's struggle to exist is therefore strictly one of personal interest and is somewhat ridiculous in the extension he strives to give to it. From his very organic structure his knowledge is

limited within his own organization. He can only know the world through his sense perceptions. Through these he weaves the substance of his world and in so far as they deceive him he weaves a false world. A *strabismus* or the interposition of a reflecting medium can vitiate the judgment of his sight; a fever can so exalt or depress the operation of his senses as to dis-ordinate all his actions in relation to this outside world which he can feel but can never know; a broken or diseased fibre in his brain consigns him to the misery of a mad house, to live in a world which is only different from that of other men in so far as it can be classified by some erratic traits. And as man can conceive of nothing beyond this limited world of his he must find the necessary expression for everything in his own forms. Animals speak—in their way. Man through many grades speaks in his way—does not speak at all beyond the range of animals unless he is taught; and hence he makes his gods speak, so necessary does language seem to him; or did seem to him until the study of the nervous system brought into prominence the possibility of thought through suggestion by muscular action and given the explanation of thought transference in primitive life and languages. Language of some sort is therefore a necessity to him. Could nothing be said as to his limitations! Everything in life must come down to a logomachy as its final and inevitable result. The only rational course therefore is for man to recognize his limitations and to confine himself to those issues so intensely personal to him. The most important is that of “the will to live” as Schopenhauer has phrased it, and the predominance of this interest is shown in the utilitarianism underlying all human action. That this can become so modified as to admit of the development of a genuine morality, as Hartley has shown, has little to do with the actual basis on which all actions rest. There it lies, the core wrapped up in the many layers of our good and evil actions. It is only as the deception of life is learned that we resign ourselves to its extinction. Of such stuff are sacrifices made. Parents sacrifice themselves for their children in the valuation they put on them; life seems little without them; heroes sacrifice themselves for their people in the valuation they place on fame or the disvalue they put on life; with strong men strength generally lies in despising life, and this is so exceptional that it commands the attention of men. They praise it the more that few can attain to this indifference—this annihilation of the will to live.

Man is a predatory animal, and all over the world, handed down from earliest generations, is found the struggle to live this life of tigers. Under such conditions he cannot stand alone and the world struggle has become—to-day as always—a struggle of race. So intense and so important is this struggle to live that it has grooved itself into men's thought. It forms that intense affinity found in soil and language. The mother tongue and the mother land is never forgotten. In a foreign land man turns to this bond of country and language, even though he may never

have seen either of them; but simply because the bond lies in what is naturally taken to be a community of thought. Here is found the only original altruism, necessarily based on this compact between men of the same race for self defence. Modern nations are but little more advanced than the veriest savages, now or in the past; and it is only in the higher circles of these modern nations that there is the slightest hint of a common tie among the *genus* that might govern the relations of the varieties. The present superficiality of this tie is shown in the promptitude with which it breaks down on the slightest strain, and leads men to cut each other's throats legitimately in mass for trifles and for greedy rascalities that in individuals would lead promptly to the gallows, but in nations is salved over in the name of "national interests." "Our country—right or wrong" governs to-day, and governs rightly for the personal and racial struggles are involved in each other. There is but one possible brotherhood of man and race. It is the relationship between the lion and the lamb. While the lion is gorged the lamb is safe, but with the rise of temptation the lamb surely finds his way to that more intimate relation described in the fabulous tale of woe. This is the influence of one civilization on another. It is a struggle for supremacy, or not to be left behind. Absorption is inevitable, although the process may be long delayed. Friction soon shows itself between two civilizations struggling for the supremacy. One must yield. In this struggle but little scruple is shown. Macchiavelism is to-day the keynote of foreign politics no matter how much we may try to disguise it. Public and private morals do not, and cannot, follow the same law. A man acts as part of the community differently from the way he acts as individual. A higher civilization in contact with a lower is therefore damnation to that lower. For its own sake it cannot tolerate the existence of that lower and the absorption of weaker elements. The lower must conform to the higher, and as it is incapable of doing this it of necessity disappears.

There is but one object therefore for man—to work for self and race, the two co-ordinate interests. And this work is not altogether a useless one even from man's sentimental point of view. It must be admitted that nations go through their cycles, and their decay is plain before our eyes within the period of history. But this is not the case with races. A race type is very persistent, and existing races have remained substantially unchanged as long as man has any record of himself. One of these races—the red man or brown man—has fallen behind in the world's progress and is apparently doomed to pay the penalty by his extinction. But the field is still open between the white, the yellow, and the black races. There seems possible no amalgamation between them. Nor is it perhaps desirable. Putting aside the entirely apocryphal statements as to infertility in the half castes, their disappearance can be attributed to their being lost in the ocean of the great community in which they live. They are too few to form a separate community and hence they

are quickly merged in the larger aggregation. A few generations so dilutes the strain of foreign blood that it becomes a negligible factor. Which of the three great types will survive the other two no man has ever been so rash as to prophecy. The weakest of them—the blacks—makes up for intellectual deficiency by a physical stability and fertility under most disadvantageous circumstances that enables him to hold his own. His immunity from certain microbe diseases will for a long time leave him, even in his most degraded condition, in control of a large part of the earth's equatorial belt. The yellow race has shown an economic superiority and a fertility that ensures its position in any coming struggle, but it has paralysed its thought. The white race has obtained, and gives every promise of maintaining, an intellectual superiority that will ensure its position unless it burns itself out. None of the three elements show any sign of weakening in their particular strength. Unless the white race deliberately stunts its progress by holding its intellectual elements in check it can hold its own. Even if the yellow race throws off its shackles it can gain no advantage from its superior economics for these latter are merely a question of pressure on the food supply and hence dependent on the ingenuity to meet that pressure. The task before the Asiatic, to get out of his ruts of mental thinking, is a harder one than that of the European who may simply have to practice more economy in his living and has all the mental versatility to meet the issue in the most effective manner. One thing perhaps can be said—the supremacy of any one of the types means the suppression of the others for they are too incompatible to live together. The Asiatic directs himself naturally to that mechanical type that would be death to the more active European. Supremacy of the Asiatic means supremacy of the mechanical type. The only incentive to-day among the higher thought of Asia to make use of European methods is to maintain their position or assert their supremacy. Such mobility of thought as is found among Western nations is, however, uncongenial to them; furthermore, it is actively displeasing. It is adopted as a necessity and would be as readily abandoned with the removal of that necessity and compelling cause. They would much prefer to find their ideals in following the "way," than the unending and to them unsatisfactory paths of western science.

What is "the riddle of the universe" is far beyond man's ken. One thing we know—that at the close of great periods there has been a marked change in what has followed on, and there is no reason to believe that this will not repeat itself. Man is very unwilling to believe himself related to the apes although the physical structure shows that he is made in their image. That he will have a successor is as certain as that the sun rises, but what will be its form is not determinable. For the very good reason that he can only determine what he knows, and can only speculate on the possible forms from the data which Nature has given him in experience. Here steps in the limitation of human powers, which makes guesses as to the future as much

a matter of good or ill digestion as anything else. Even nightmare, creature of the brain, depends on the stomach.

§ 5.

Nature does not deal on a small scale. As individuals, with our thought concentrated on ourselves, we lose sight of this large field and accuse Nature of wasteful methods. We even point to our own economy and speak of the lavishness of Nature. Nothing could be more presumptuous and inexact. Nature cares nothing for a given individual. She only cares for the type. All material is hers. The individual is conditioned by the environment. If Nature in preserving the type is lavish in the surplus of seed scattered without prospect of fruition, in the end nothing is lost. The preservation of the type in its greatest perfection is effected. For the rest there is a conversion to other forms equally useful for her purposes. Working on this wholesale scale she scatters her seed far and wide, sure that some of it will fall on fertile and favourable ground and accomplish its mission. If the rest were lost her method would be wasteful, but this is impossible. It again takes its place in a closed system from which nothing is lost. The very limitation of the material world proves to us the necessity of the process. Nothing can be made from nothing. Growth implies a transfer not a creation. The use of the chemist's balance has exploded the old creation theory and has traced these mysterious growths to the surrounding medium. A thing can only grow at the expense of something pre-existing. But this very lavishness of Nature ensures the fitness of the receptacle for whatever is to be placed in it. It finds its expression in the formula—the survival of the fittest. Only that can exist which has fulfilled the requirements of its environment. If it does not, something will fill its place better. Pain therefore is merely an adjustment to environment or the correction of a mistake. This is what Mr. Spencer tells us when he says that pleasure is beneficial and pain is injurious, that pleasure can become pain, but pain cannot become pleasure. The extraordinary nervous development makes this of more importance to man than any other living creature. He is peculiarly individualistic and hence the greatest sufferer. In his efforts to escape he does the impossible in trying to impress this individuality on Nature. He cannot realize that he is only entered on Nature's books as *genus homo*. Nature is utterly indifferent to him as individual. She attacks him through the physical outside world. She attacks him through his own physical frame; and she attacks him through human competition. As with every other animal he can only meet these attacks by fulfilling this law of the survival of the fittest. If he fails to do this he works his own destruction. To delicate refinement is *not*

given the things of this earth ; but to the strongest, the ablest, and often to the least scrupulous. This occurs naturally, as is found in the desire of the will to live ; and it is found intelligently, in the effort to strengthen and preserve the efficiency of the race. It is due to an understanding that Nature's economy must be met and its conditions fulfilled. Every effort is made in the intelligent world to palliate suffering, but wisely the world of men have heretofore made no effort to perpetuate incompetency. In men and in nations the natural law quickly makes itself felt. Most of the trouble in this world people make for themselves. Nature does not go out of her way to attack man. She takes as much care of him as of any other animal, and what care she can take is beautifully illustrated in those insects which go through metamorphic changes with long periods of unconsciousness. As far as the type is concerned Nature is a tender mother. But there is no necessity of her attacking man. She simply has to let him alone and let him make his own mistakes. His ultra-development induces him to believe in the world of his own brain, and it is only as he is brought back to the world of reality by experience that he avoids disaster. Many a heavy penalty has he paid for his deviations into this ideal world in which he is king. The worst of it is that the race suffers as well as the individual. All the blood and pain lavishly drawn on by religious and political persecution, all the wars between peoples, all the oppression exercised by man on man are directly traceable to the attempt to evade Nature's law of the survival of the fittest. One nation wishes to live at the cost of another. Whether it be the oppression of a weak nation by a strong nation ; or the oppression of man by a capitalist society or by a socialist society ; the object is to deprive the individual man of the fruits of his labour and the exercise of his powers according to natural law. In both cases brute force is exercised openly or speciously.

What progress man has made has been in compliance with Nature's law when he has found out and developed her resources. For this purpose he gave up hunting and grew wheat—when he was compelled to it. And owing to the same compulsion he probably had previously given up living in trees and had come to the ground. The progress has not been so very great as to brag too much. Man in the world is still mainly uncivilized. Eliminate a very small controlling factor—as sometimes happens in the most refined of our societies—and the underlying brutality of the mass appears at once. The prestige given to the term "gentleman" is no idle one. It is not necessarily arrayed in fine linen nor does it fare sumptuously every day. There are plenty of "pigs in clover." The "gentleman" stands a better chance with his three generations or more of training—some of the human hogs could not be groomed during a millenium—but there are plenty of "gentlemen" who use phonetic spelling without any official reason except that they know no better. Among some Euhemerists it is the fashion to find in the legend

of Polyphemus a reference to that rudimentary eye—the pineal gland. It is possible perhaps to justify the thought that man gave up its use too quickly; for both externally and internally it would be of profit. The natural field is strictly limited and in that field the chief prey of man—to-day as always—is human prey. At times he finds this condition an exhaustive one. There are periods of weariness and of common-sense, and in them much is heard of peace congresses and kindred organizations for the amelioration of man's lot. It is a question whether these organizations have not their limitations. Their field can be misdirected inasmuch as horror is an antidote. Their effort is to soften the unutterable miseries of war, those frightful and brutal struggles between races. Such softening has exactly the reverse of the desired effect in so far as it disguises the horror. To eliminate war it would be more effective to make it ultra-horrible. Every effort should be made to protect the peaceable and the weak, to throw care and protection around those tilling the soil and attending to the duties of ordinary life. But the contending hosts are objects of horror and there is some object to arouse this feeling. The Australian paints himself to create horror and appeals to the eye. The European pats a twelve inch shell, standing some three feet high, and speculates on the amount of devastation its explosion will cause among a mass of human tissue represented by a group of men. He appeals to the intellectual. Men would stop to think if instead of three thousand dead and forty thousand wounded there were forty three thousand dead men left on the field of battle. If every legitimate device and what is to-day regarded as illegitimate were put to use; if every bullet meant certain death instead of a few weeks in the hospital and a possible pension; men would not march so gaily to war and there would be a more earnest movement to secure settlement of disputes leading to war. Some outlet would be found to prevent such certain sacrifice. Let the chemists loose with their bombs of ill smelling and deadly compounds; give the smallest as well as the largest nation a free hand in this work of destruction, and war would become impossible. There is one saving grace in human nature—such drastic methods are impossible to us through that very nature. Our present position seems not unlike that of the bloody Aztec confederation. Earnestly they longed for the coming of the Fair God—Quetzacoatl who was to drive from the altars those powers of darkness Tezcatlipoca and Huitzilopochtli, and for human victims substitute the sacrifice of flowers.

Nature's field is the universe and her law is the conservation of energy. In that field there are new stars and old stars, and the spectroscope shows that the constitution of these great suns is the same as that of our tiny Earth. Some of these suns are either dying or withdrawing from our sight into still more distant depths of space. The presence of such vast systems, themselves the merest points in universal space, is hint enough to this merest item on a tiny planet to understand his limitations better and to confine his speculations within

the limits of those powers granted to him. From Professor Baldwin's development theory of evolution it can be shown that there is not only a social heritage of man but also a social heritage of nations. Much of this social heritage is preserved in all the cataclysms through which human society passes. As the material remains practically the same from one age to another the value of such social heritage lies in thought. The only limitation here is the human brain, and the possibilities of its combinations and recombinations and re-recombinations are enormous. Theoretically only does there seem to be a limit. But the substructure is limited and can never be left out of account. It is quite a favourite trick of advanced civilizations to forget this and to try and build their mental life on the airy fabric which often is only a combination of letters and words and has nothing to do with facts. When the brains of a civilization are devoted to such practices they fail it altogether when the real test comes calling for knowledge of reality. They have been trying to lift themselves by their bootstraps. However in such practices there is progress. There has been improvement thereby both mental and moral. The valuation of the different elements making up man's life differs but little from generation to generation. The same material goes from one related form to another. When the chemist has succeeded in generating life the problem will not have changed one iota. Nature's laboratory must always be infinitely more efficient. Man only copies her processes. No new forms are possible. The element must try to think in terms of the material processes and can only approximate to her perfection. The limitation of his thought makes it impossible for him to improve on it. And man's moral position is unlikely to change. His physical limitations mark him in the future what he is now—a digestive tube, an animated gut; and to the very large majority of men applies, in theory anyhow, the epitaph that Herr Teufelsdröckh wrote on Count Zahndarm. There was never anything more false than the snuffling assertion so often made—that the Earth is made for man, and all the fruits thereof. The small fish is the natural prey of the large fish—if the latter can catch him; and both are the natural prey of man—if man can catch them. And man is the natural prey of any large and fierce animal that can catch him at a disadvantage and is sufficiently hungry. They are *not* made for each other or for man, or man for them. The fish that lies cooked on the breakfast table had as much right to its life as we have. If we had gone fishing and been drowned, bottle and all, we would equally deserve to be the breakfast of the fish. It is the animal nature of both that makes us mutual prey under the proper conditions. Man has proved more cunning, equally hungry, and lazier than the fish. The fish must live by his hunting. The whole animal kingdom is a train of sequences; sometimes broken, as Charles Dudley Warner puts it in reference to his cat-Calvin: "The worms eat a noxious something in the ground. The birds eat

"the worms. Calvin eats the birds. We eat—no, we do not eat Calvin. There the chain stops. When you ascend the scale of being, and come to an animal that is, like ourselves, inedible, you have arrived at a result where you can rest. Let us respect the cat. He completes an edible chain;" according to circumstances, as likewise with man; standards differ, or differed, in New York and Fiji.* Man by tilling the ground can live without taking life. Instead he exercises his craft as animal, and then exercises his hypocrisy in praising the Master of Life of both for sacrificing the one to the other. Grace before meat is the acme of egotism. Substitute the term "animal" and you have the prayer of the Pharisee.

Bede makes one of the thanes say to King Edwin—: "The present life of man, O King, seems to me, in comparison of that time which is unknown to us, like to the swift flight of a sparrow through the room wherein you sit at supper in winter, with your commanders and ministers, and a good fire in the midst, whilst the storms of rain and snow prevail abroad; the sparrow, I say, flying in at one door, and immediately out at another, whilst he is within, is safe from the wintry storm; but after a short space of fair weather, he immediately vanishes out of your sight, into the dark winter from which he had emerged. So this life of man appears for a short space, but of what went before, or what is to follow, we are utterly ignorant." Man under the weight of the universe rebels against the idea involved in geologic time. It accents his insignificance and shows his limitation too clearly. This is one cause of his religious obstinacy. It seems better to him to reason in a circle than to advance. All human knowledge subject to proof shows the prevalence of error. How much better to establish a theory beyond proof and sacred from examination, and then to circle around the ideal so erected. Mental evolution, however, is forced by Nature. Every new combination calls for some subtle mental change. It involves a new light, and the incompatibility of the new knowledge with the old thought makes man wriggle most uncomfortably. And so we drift away from the old thought until it becomes difficult to understand the point of view of men of ancient times. There are changes in thought, in language, and in knowledge. Ancient and modern philosophy differ in their metaphysics. The latter is based on the new experimental science. The former is essentially a mental science and its only field could be man himself. Wonderful is it that in their study of the microcosm the ancients should obtain the insight that they did into the macrocosm. But there is one base on which man has always stood to-day as in the past—on pride. The unchangingness of Egypt was an inheritance of pride. The most energetic

* An equally effective sequence (with the same limitation, or nearly so, as to edibility) is furnished by the Formal Logic—: "Being, Substance, Matter, Organized Matter," "Animal, Vertebrata, Mammal, Carnivora, Dog, Terrier, 'Snap.'" Cf. McCosh's Logic p. 27.

of the Semitic peoples were known by this quality, and the "pride of the Assyrian" became a proverb among the peoples. It rules every one of the units of our modern civilization. And when a voice is raised against it, it is called the voice of a recluse and of a dreamer. The world's struggle has been always the same. It is the old struggle between Judea and Assyria, between Ormuzd and Ahriman, the struggle of idealism against sensualism. Idealism is never entirely crushed out. It can always find its preachers. The majority of men, however, like ease, both physical and mental. The monastic spirit—using the term in its rarest and best sense—is given but to few. Hence the value of symbols. To the yokel the sound of the bell at evening in the hands of the housewife calls up nothing but the approaching satisfaction of his bodily cravings. But there is a far higher meaning to better equipped minds to be extracted from the piece of metal. There is an ethical value attached to it and an influence thrown out from it as it swings to and fro in the church tower that is absolutely removed from all material connection and reaches far down the avenue of thought and into our past, stirring up depths and reminiscences of the existence of which we were unconscious.

Man has no interest in the final problem. His limitations point out for him his sphere of action and indicate therein his usefulness. And in this sphere what is accentuated is the importance of himself. The interest of humanity dominates over all. Man cannot help feeling the overwhelming power of Nature as expressed in her grander works. Sometimes it frightens him, oftener it wearies him. To him scenery with a touch of man is the best. Every landscape is distinctly attached to human interest. It is attached to personal interest, for the early impression stamped on the mind during the plasticity of youth make a standard to which everything in later life is referred. As then earlier scenes drift away from the actual reality of our present struggle we forget the struggle of these former days and idealize them. Hence the charm of reminiscence and the desire to see the haunts of our youth with the eyes of age when there is no longer the obligation to learn the lessons of life. This supremacy of self-interest in man gives him an excessive importance in his own eyes. The most cunning, and hence the strongest, of animals he regards the rest of the animal creation from the standpoint of a superior being. His superior organization, moreover, not only gives him this position but leads him to understand his own subjection before the world forces. Animals have no sense of worship and they have very little sense of death. With them it seems only to be the natural feeling of self-preservation. They fear injury and they fear death, and it is a question whether the two are not very much the same in their minds. In the feral state animals deliberately run the risk of death to satisfy a minor craving, which if they had any understanding of death as cessation and more than atrocious or exaggerated pain they would not

do. Rut or hunger leads them to take deliberate chances of injury which any creature of higher reasoning power would associate with the possibility of the greater evil and hence would avoid. Man has a very keen sense of death, the limitation it places on him. He foresees. Hence worship, for his spirit of inquiry seeks a cause, and this he weaves out of himself and in the only terms he can understand—in his own image. Death is therefore more to him than any other object. It is constantly before his eyes in those falling around him, and in the feeling for self-preservation planted within him. He remembers, and plans, and schemes to palliate the one thing that no ingenuity can avoid. Natural objects are nothing to man. They are so slowly forced on his attention by his growth that their presence is perfectly natural. The sun is nothing to the savage as an object of worship; any more than it is to a dog or a new-born infant or a half grown boy. Later in his social life the savage associates the grander phenomena with the feelings of subjection aroused in him; as does the infant and to a much greater extent the boy absorb the influence of the progress in worship already made by those around. But first the savage applies these feelings of subjection to himself. Ghost worship is a very crude product; Nature worship a very elaborate product. And with by far the large majority of men it is not a question whether a thing is true but how does it affect this religion that they have elaborated. Old beliefs are only questioned with difficulty even by those of the race the most advanced of their time. The old stories and legends long pass as good currency. We can find an illustration of this in the worthy Ammianus Marcellinus. This soldier and knight, an educated gentleman of his time, did not of course believe that the solid earth and mountains could spontaneously open and shut like a spring door; but what they did not do in his day he saw no reason to believe could not be done in previous ages. It was the ship of the Argonauts that first escaped the clasp of the Symplegades in the Bosphorus, fatal to every ship and sailor that tried to pass between them into the mysterious sea beyond. "These rocks, when the Argo, the first of all ships hastening to Colchis to carry off the golden fleece, had passed unhurt by them, stood immovable for the future, the power of the whirlwind which used to agitate them being broken; and are now so firmly united that no one who saw them now would believe that they had ever been separated; if all the poems of the ancients did not agree on the point." Many a man of average education to-day, in reference to many an old tradition current among ourselves, would hesitate to put the saving clause "if" in connection with those traditions. We cannot jeer at the simple trustfulness of the Roman knight in Hesiod and Homer.

As man asserts his superiority over animals, so he asserts it over his fellowman. This is the case whether he acts as individual or as a nation. Hence the value of earnestness which can seize a school of philosophy or take possession of a whole

people. And the outcome differs. Moses and Mohammed were philosophers with more luck than Plato. Meanwhile man's world goes through many phases; materialism, idealism, pessimism; the grossness of indulgence, fever, depression all play their part. In such a world of action neurotics do not guide the future. Extravagant idealism or pessimism is the precursor of the grossness of materialism. Both stages are marked by seriousness, and we can ask whether the world will ever be light-hearted again, for the present age is much given to seriousness and to idealism and to pessimism. Perhaps this is a sign of misgiving for the future and not of disheartenment. "Oh! for a lodge in some vast wilderness" sang Cowper, and the cry can be repeated, for one thing at least is well marked out—namely, the grossness of the coming struggle in which the lowest and most material interests are to be the controlling factors. This perhaps accounts for the revival in this twentieth century of what is very akin to the ancient stoicism as the only creed of real value during the coming strife. The only man of worth is the man of action. Neither superstition nor resignation is to be of any real value in the coming phase. Only that creed which drives to action as a part of the world force, and to a contempt for its more immediate manifestations, can be of value to stronger minds in this battle of material interests. It is a contest of this world, and a man cannot shirk it by centring himself on the affairs of another world and leaving the real struggle to the most unworthy to settle as they please by right of the numerically strong.

And there is the relation of the world problem to science. Experimental science has replaced the old metaphysic simply because of its reliability. The unknowable reality appears to us in subject and object as mind and matter. The unknowable *ego* appears to us in the individual in the same relation. Science has taught us to understand the necessity of this limitation, and hence our trust to-day is greater in that unknowable inasmuch as we can understand that it only manifests itself to us under forms which can be brought within our comprehension. Now we treat a mystery as a thing not yet understood but understandable on wider knowledge or examination. The *deus ex machina* has fortunately disappeared from the field of science to go on its lumber pile. The bargain of Doctor Faustus is no longer a possible one; just as perhaps some day the foolish bogies with which children are frightened will go on the lumber pile of the nursery as a dangerous toy. All experiences and experiments have some real object behind them. Nobody has shown better than Bishop Berkeley that the real object can never be known. The agnostic position of idealism is impregnable on this point; but it does not necessitate the rejection of a real object behind the phenomenon. In fact it necessitates it, as Mr. Spencer in his criticism of the Berkeleyan philosophy has shown—for the reassurance of all interested in real knowledge. That the universe is without a cause is unthinkable. Once created or

existing, and however created or existing, the universe is self-acting, otherwise God would be reduced to the position of a mere mechanic. It is this mechanical idea of the Creator in modern western religions that falls so far short of what science has shown to exist as fact. They are lamentably insufficient to the field opened by the telescope in the depths of space and by the microscope in the matter of which the universe consists. But entirely apart from this grosser and more mechanical field which has absorbed the energies for the propaganda of the faith there has always existed both in ancient Jahweism and in modern Jehovahism an esoteric circle; and in this circle the mechanical interpretation, whether celebrated with the fire and flame of sacrifice and by gorgeously clad priests in the Temple at Jerusalem, or by their later successors in the temples of great western cities and in honour of a sacrificed divinity, has found but little favour. Divinity himself drove those priests out of his Temple and rebuked their materialism. Much there is of value in antiquity, and the ethical value of the old Hebrew books can hardly be over-rated. For centuries they were the rallying point of those who found the real religion—esoteric religion—in the prophets and not in the books compiled by the hierarchy; of those who could hear the real voice in the Divinity who said

“I have desired mercy, and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings.”

And in curious ways antiquity does thus come forward to teach its lessons. Sargon the Old little suspected that more than three thousand years later, in 600 B.C., another monarch would unearth the cylinder he had placed in the foundation stone of the great temple at Erech. And Nabonidus as little suspected that his record of having done so should at an almost equal distance of time find its way to the curious gaze of a people on the borders of a western sea, the existence of which was to him the merest name.

If there is a limitation to the problem open to man's powers, there is granted to him an advantage in the concentration of those powers on what is within that narrow range. Here is to be found the final reward of the man of science. To him indeed “the Word is God,” and written in letters of flame on the book that Nature holds up to him. There is no disadvantage in knowledge; no disadvantage in the dissection of Nature's masterpieces; for the more this is done the more wonderful they appear. On the contrary, knowledge is necessary to understand what a marvellous thing is the simplest speck of protoplasm, and how much more marvellous are those groupings which go to make up the countless shapes of the material world, organic and inorganic. Unless they are understood the attention quickly flags. There is as wide a gap between the trained scientist and the yokel before the wonderful painting on a flower and laid on by the hand of Nature, as there is between the trained artist and